Migrations, Mobility and Globalization

Proceedings of the Postgraduate Papers
Presented at

Consortium for Asian and African Studies (CAAS)
2nd International Conference
INALCO, 25-26 November 2010

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PREFACE

This proceedings volume contains the papers presented by thirteen young researchers, all of whom are postgraduate students of six higher educational institutions, and one of the two keynote speeches delivered in the second international symposium of the Consortium for Asian and African Studies. This conference, entitled "Migrations, Mobility and Globalization," was held on 25th and 26th of November, 2010, at INALCO, Paris, France.

The Consortium for Asian and African Studies (CAAS) was initiated in March 2007 by five higher educational institutions worldwide that lead Asian and African studies, in order to strengthen collaboration in research and education activities.

The original member institutions are Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO, France), Leiden University (the Netherlands), Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of National University of Singapore (FASS-NUS, Singapore), School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (SOAS, UK), and Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS, Japan). In 2010 Columbia University (USA) joined the CAAS, thus making this symposium the first occasion for the six institutions to participate in the CAAS activities.

One of the major objectives of the CAAS is to train researchers of the younger generation in the framework of international collaboration. To facilitate this objective, in conjunction with an annual symposium, a workshop for young researcher has been planned to give an opportunity to demonstrate their research activities, to enhance their academic skills, and to develop a fresh network of international researchers.

In the first CAAS conference held in Leiden University in 2009, the workshop for young researchers was organized separately from the symposium itself. However, in the second CAAS conference at INALCO, presentations by young researchers were mixed with those by senior researchers, providing a stimulating environment for the young researchers.

As an introduction to the theme of the symposium "Migrations, Mobility and Globalization," there were the two keynote speeches, both of which brilliantly illustrate major issues involved in the theme, followed by the thirteen papers by young researchers presented in five sessions (no papers presented by PhD students in Sessions Two and Five). As a record of the complete list of presentations, the program of the symposium is attached at the end of the volume.

The two keynote speeches were delivered in the first session, chaired by Jacques LEGRAND, President, INALCO: 1) Human globalization: migration and mobility, by Catherine WIHTOL de WENDEN, Senior Research Fellow, CNRS, CERI-Sciences Po, and 2) The ageing of populations and international migration: some remarks, by François

HERAN, Director, INED, Paris, President, European Association for Population Studies, La Haye. This proceedings volume contains the French version of the first speech.

Both Session Three "High-Skilled Migrations, Migrations and Development," chaired by Anne de TINGUY, Professor, INALCO, and Session Four "Integration, Identity and Citizenship," chaired by Shirlena HUANG, Associate Professor, NUS, included one paper presented by a PhD student. These papers are respectively: The significance of remittances from the West for a Liberian refugee population and the local host community in Bududuram village, Ghana, by Naohiko OMATA, SOAS, and Gendered naturalization: a path to integration for marriage immigrant women in Taiwan, by Isabelle NIAN-TZU CHENG, SOAS.

In Session Six "Migration Dynamics in Asia," chaired by Nayan CHANDA, Director of Publications and the Editor of Yale Global Online Magazine, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, four papers were presented by PhD students: The emergence of a transnational market between North-East China and Russian Far-East as a consequence of Chinese migration to Russia, Eugene ZAGREBNOV, INALCO; Why having 'underclass' when you can have 'class'? Why kin, and not citizenship, is key to understand inequality in post-Mao China, Roberta ZAVORETTI, SOAS; Formation of a multiethnic society and religious emigration in South Vietnam, Hironori TANAKA, TUFS; and Solving Japan's 'population problem': reexamining pre-World War II Japanese migration to Brazil, Andre Kobayashi DECKROW, Columbia University.

Three papers are presented by PhD students in Session Seven "Diasporas, Transnational Migrations and Networks," chaired by Manuelle FRANCK, Professor, INALCO. These are: Russian associative field in Paris and London, by Olga BRONNIKOVA, INALCO; 'Migration' and exophonic writing in dramas translated by Tsuga Teisho, by Akane OIKAWA, TUFS; and Diaspora linkages and networked narratives: a comparative analysis of media and information technology, Priya KUMAR, SOAS.

Finally, four PhD students presented their papers in Session Eight "Labour Migration and Migration Policies," chaired by Serge WEBER, Associate Professor, Université Paris Est, Marne la Vallée. These papers are: Theorizing the labour-exporting state: a view from political economy, by Liberty L. CHEE, NUS; Nomades, Navétanes, and Citoyens: towards an integrated history of the Futa Jallon Fulbe diaspora, by John F. STRAUSSBERGER, Columbia University; Delicate engagements: civil society in Senegal and the 'development-alisation' of European migration control, by Anne-Line RODRIGUEZ, SOAS; and Dismantling borders?' East African Common Market and the changing migration ethos, by Sabastiano RWENGABO, NUS.

The names of the affiliations of the researchers were correct at the time of the planning. Some of the titles were changed before included in this volume for the sake of improvement.

Unfortunately circumstances prevented from one keynote speech and five papers from being included in this proceedings. Nevertheless, hopefully this volume serves as a record of the fascinating exchange of minds.

I would like to thank all those who have made this symposium happen. I am particularly grateful to Jacques LEGRAND, President of INALCO, Anne de TINGUY, Professor of INALCO, and the members of the Scientific Committee of the symposium, who made preparations for the symposium with utmost devotion. I also would like to congratulate all the young researchers who contributed to this symposium with the fruits of their diligent research activities.

Finally acknowledgement must be made for the sponsorship of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). The organization of the symposium and the publication of the proceedings would be impossible without the JSPS's financial assistance under the scheme of the International Training Program-Asia Africa (ITP-AA).

Toru AOYAMA

Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo
ITP-AA chair person, OFIAS
16 February January 2011

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La Circulation des Personnes Dans Un Monde Global, Un Enjeu Mondial Pour Le XXIème Siècle

Catherine WIHTOL de WENDEN
CNRS (CERI)

Le rapport du PNUD (Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement) 2009 rappelle que la mobilité est un facteur essentiel du développement humain. Dans le même temps, les migrations se sont accélérées au cours des trois dernières décennies, atteignant 214 millions de migrants internationaux (soit 3% seulement de la population mondiale) et 740 millions de migrants internes. Pourtant, la plupart des pays occidentaux, tout en valorisant la mobilité comme symbole de la modernité, tendent à fermer leurs frontières, à dissuader et à réprimer l'immigration irrégulière et à n'attirer que parcimonieusement l'immigration légale sous la pression de l'opinion publique qui vit cette nouvelle donne comme une invasion, voire une conquête et tarde à prendre en compte la banalisation des phénomènes migratoires, les pénuries de main d'œuvre, les déséquilibres démographiques et l'interdépendance du monde dont les migrations sont le reflet. La migrations sont l'un des exemples les plus criants des globalisations contradictoires qui traversent les enjeux mondiaux.

Mondialisation des migrations et droit à la mobilité

Presque toutes les régions du monde sont aujourd'hui concernées par les migrations internationales, soit par le départ, soit par l'accueil, soit par le transit. Les catégories de migrants deviennent de plus en plus floues, entre migrants volontaires et migrations forcées. De nouvelles catégories se profilent, comme les déplacés environnemantaux, les touristes qui prolongent leur séjour en s'installant à la retraite plus au sud, les diasporas de la connaissance et la même personne peut, au cours de son existence emprunter plusieurs statuts, du sans papier à l'élite qualifiée au séjour de longue durée, une situation impensable il y a trente ans quand l'OS se différenciait sociologiquement fortement du réfugié politique issu des dictatures de tous ordres. Tout en se mondialisant et en se globalisant (c'est-à-dire issues des mêmes causes et prenant les mêmes formes), les migrations se sont régionalisées en « systèmes migratoires complexes » autour de pôles géographiques oú l'offre rencontre la demande de mobilité et de migration: le continent américain compte ainsi de plus en plus de migrants qui viennent du monde américain par rapport à d'autres régions du monde,

comme hier l'Europe: Mexicains et autres latinos forment la moitié des résidents nés à l'étranger aux Etats-Unis et en Argentine, au Brésil, au Chili et au Venezuela, l'essentiel des migrations vient des pays andins; l'Europe fonctionne dans un face à face migratoire avec la rive sud de la méditerranée et l'Afrique sub-saharienne, qui elle-même tend à migrer au Maghreb face à la difficulté de franchir la méditerranée; au sud de l'équateur, c'est l'Afrique du sud qui est le principal pôle d'attraction; les pays du Golfe ont attiré une main d'œuvre de la rive sud de la méditerranée, de la corne de l'Afrique, du Pakistan et des Philippines; le monde russe fonctionne entre le centre et la périphérie de l'ancien espace soviétique qui tient lieu de lien linguistique et culturel pour les républiques musulmanes; l'Asie du sud-est oppose deux géants démographiques, l'Inde et la Chine et quelques autres sources de migrations régionales comme l'Indonésie, les Philippines, aux pays riches et demandeurs de main d'œuvre comme le Japon, la Corée du sud, l'Australie, Singapour, Taï Wan. Des pays comme la Turquie, le Maroc, le Mexique sont devenus à la fois pays d'émigration, d'immigration et de transit.

Si les relations internationales ont provoqué bien des mouvements de population dans le passé, les transformations apportées aujourd'hui par ces migrants et réfugiés sur la scène internationale sont nombreuses. C'est ce second questionnement qui, renversant les interrogations habituelles voyant le migrant comme le résultat du désordre international, a servi de fil conducteur à l'ouvrage *La question migratoire au XXIème siècle. Migrants, réfugiés et relations internationales* (Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, 2010). Ces transformations sont de trois ordres: l'Etat se trouve bousculé par les migrations car elles transgressent ses frontières, introduisent des acteurs et mouvements transnationaux qui les traversent; la citoyenneté est modifiée dans sa définition, son contenu et sa pratique; enfin une diplomatie des relations internationales se profile par migrants interposés, soit que les diasporas pèsent comme acteurs non étatiques, soit que les Etats d'origine cherchent à mener une influence sur les Etats d'accueil, soit que les migrants eux-mêmes deviennent les acreurs d'enjeux eux-mêmes internationaux, soit enfin que les organisations internationales et les ONG cherchent à mieux gérer les migrations et à définir les contours d'une gouvernance globale de celles-ci.

La souveraineté est remise en question. Avec les migrations, l'Etat nation perd les attributs classiques de sa souveraineté car il ne contrôle plus totalement la population qui réside sur son territoire tout en proclamant le plus souvent son adhésion à l'économie de marché: l'Etat et le marché se trouvent alors en conflit. Ses frontières sont transgressées par des flux illégaux qui défient sa capacité à les maîtriser et mettent en échec ce symbole de la souveraineté. De nouveaux acteurs comme les réseaux transnationaux économiques, politiques, religieux et culturels, les diasporas transnationales et les individus devenus acteurs à part entière sur la scène internationale, font figure de concurrents dans leur capacité à construire des logiques migratoires qui finissent parfois par s'imposer aux Etats

par la force des liens qu'ils construisent par delà les frontières. Enfin, l'émergence d'un droit de migrer comme droit de l'homme au XXIème siècle se profile, faisant de la mobilité un bien public mondial à défendre par delà les logiques étatiques de sécurité intérieure et extérieure, par ailleurs mêlées avec les migrations.

La citoyenneté est revisitée: des formes de citoyenneté plurielle se multiplient par delà l'ordre étatique qui n'a plus le monopole des allégeances exclusives des citoyens. Les cas de double nationaux se répandent, de nombreux étrangers sont aussi citoyens locaux du pays d'accueil quand ils bénéficient du droit de vote et de l'éligibilité locale: citoyenneté et nationalité peuvent ainsi être dissociées. Le contenu de la citoyenneté se modifie, car des formes diverses de cosmopolitisme font aujurd'hui partie de celle-ci, depuis la reconnaissance de la diversité comme valeur citoyenne jusqu'à la définition du multiculturalisme comme valeur de la démocratie. Les migrants, les réfugiés et les apatrides sont-ils alors une anomalie de l'ordre étatique, des intrus ou une confirmation de celui-ci par le régime particulier qui leur est attribué dans un monde oú les deux tiers de la population de la planète ne peuvent pas circuler librement?

Une diplomatie des migrations se fait jour, à l'initiative des pays de départ qui ont compris que leur population était devenue une ressource quand elle avait migré à l'étranger du fait des transferts de fonds et des liens transnationaux construits avec les régions de départ, qu'elle pouvait devenir un instrument d'influence dans les pays d'accueil surtout quand elle en a acquis la nationalité et qu'une politique d'attention à l'égard de leurs nationaux pouvait à la fois leur permettre d'acquérir plus de place sur la scène internationale tout en menant des visées nationalistes à l'égard d'une diaspora paradoxalement transnationalisée. Du côté des pays d'accueil, d'autres diplomaties des migrations se profilent, à travers les accords bilatéraux conclus avec les pays d'origine oú l'aide au développement se négocie en échange des procédures de réadmission des sans papiers dans les pays de départ ou de transit. Dans les régions d'intense circulation migratoire, des accords de coopération prévoient parfois des espaces de libre circulation, mais peu d'entre eux, à l'exception de l'Europe pour les Européens de l'Union ou du marché nordique du travail fonctionnent réellement. Enfin, la gouvernance mondiale des migrations fait maintenant partie de l'agenda international: le multilératéralisme a été introduit depuis 2004 par le Global Migration Group, créé à Genève, comme processus de négociation entre acteurs aux intérêts parfois contradictoires comme les pays de départ et d'accueil, les employeurs et les syndicats, les associations de défense des droits, les OIG et les ONG. Les Nations Unies encouragent cette initiative depuis 2006 et sont à l'origine de Forums mondiaux réunissant 150 partenaires. Après Bruxelles (2007), Manille (2008), Athènes (2009), Puerto Vallarta, au Mexique (2010), et Genève (2011) un bilan sera tiré en 2013 de cette sorte de « Bretton Woods des migrations » qui peine cependant à s'imposer face aux

puissants Etats d'immigration. L'initiative s'appuie pourtant sur un texte de référence, la Convention de 1990 des Nations Unies sur les droits de tous les migrants et leurs familles, qui reconnaît aussi des droits aux sans papiers, signée à ce jour par 44 Etats. L'avenir du Forum est encore incertain, même s'il promeut la moblité comme bien public mondial. Avec le droit à la mobilité comme droit de l'homme pour le XXIème siècle, la reconnaissance de flux migratoires légaux dans un monde plus fluide s'y profile, ainsi qu'une citoyenneté évolutive oú les migrants deviennent acteurs d'une société internationale en reconstruction oú les Etats ne sont plus les seuls protagonistes.

De nouvelles configurations migratoires

De nouvelles configurations migratoires amènent à élargir la réflexion sur le droit à la mobilité. Ces migrations se répartissent en migrations sud-nord, les plus connues, 62 millions, les migrations sud-sud, plus récentes, 61 millions, les migrations nord-nord, 50 millions, les migrations nord-sud, 14 millions, le reste étant constitué par des migrations est-ouest et, plus rarement, ouest-est. On a coutume de dresser des typologies des flux migratoires selon leurs buts, distinguant entre les migrations de travail, les migrations familiales, les migrations d'études et les mouvements de réfugiés, selon leur caractère volontaire ou forcé (migrations de travailleurs ou de réfugiés, politiques et environnmentaux). La durée des migrations constitue un autre paramètre de classification, entre les migrations d'installation et les migrations de travailleurs hôtes (« gastarbeiter »). La qualification, entre migrants très qualifiés, qualifiés et simple main d'œuvre est aussi une autre catégorisation. Académiques ou administratives, ces typologies ont souvent une incidence sur les titres de séjour, notamment pour les travailleurs les plus qualifiés, les réfugiés, les membres de familles. D'autres enfin, notamment à des fins statistiques, différencient les migrations régulières et irrégulières, moins faciles à compter.

On observe de nouvelles migrations transversales intercontinentales. Les plus récentes sont les migrations chinoises en Afrique: le Maghreb, l'Afrique sub-saharienne, riches en matières premières (pétrole, minéraux, pêche, bois) et demandeurs d'infrastructures (téléphone, internet, bâtiment et travaux publics) reçoivent une migration chinoise d'affaires et de main d'œuvre temporaire qui se fournit en ressources de la mer et du sous-sol. Les migrations nord-sud forment de leur côté de nouvelles situations migratoires: le « Britishland » en France en est un exemple, avec les Britanniques venus s'installer dans sa partie ouest (Normandie, Bretagne, Aquitaine). Ces migrations de retraités plus ou moins aisés sont aussi présentes en Espagne (Allemands, Anglais), au sud du Portugal (Anglais), en Grèce, au Maroc, en Tunisie et au Sénégal (Français). On trouve le même phénomène aux Caraïbes pour les Américains et les Canadiens. La Bulgarie, depuis son entrée dans l'Union européenne en 2004, cherche aussi à jouer cette carte. Ces migrations sont le prolongement

du tourisme international, oú les avantages comparatifs du coût de la vie, de la qualité des services et du climat plaident en faveur des pays ensoleillés. D'autres migrations intercontinentales, de mineurs non accompagnés ou de jeunes à la recherche d'emploi ou d'asile viennent compléter ce paysage de plus en plus fragmenté: Afghans désireux de passer en Angleterre, prostituées d'Europe de l'est et des Balkans, avec une importante prise de risques.

Les déplacés environnementaux peuvent-il être considérés comme des réfugiés puisque ce sont aussi des migrations forcées? Le phénomène, quoiqu'ancien, n'a commencé que récemment à devenir une question politique liée au réchauffement climatique et sa prise en compte par le droit d'asile est pour l'instant quasi inexistante. Les causes des déplacés environnementaux sont multiples: outre la désertification liée au climat, les catastrophes naturelles (cyclones, tornades, tremblements de terre, éruptions volcaniques), la déforestation, la fonte des glaciers, l'immersion de zones inondables (îles Tuvalu et Maldives, îles Helligen en Allemagne, Bangla Desh), les invasions d'insectes, les coulées de boue peuvent provoquer des mouvements de population. La plupart des foyers de crises environnementales se trouvent au sud, dans les pays pauvres oú les Etats sont rarement en mesure d'y faire face. Les experts du climat (le GIEC, groupe d'information et d'étude du climat) prévoient qu'à l'horizon 2050, ils pourraient atteindre entre 50 et 150 millions de déplacés, voire 200 millions à la fin du vingt et unième siècle.

La migration d'élites a suscité depuis le début du vingt et unième siècle une attention particulière de la part des Etats d'accueil et des Etats d'origine. Les pays d'accueil, conscients des risques de concurrence pour le recrutement des élites du monde entier dans les secteurs de pointe, ouvrent leurs frontières à ces migrations de haut niveau: permis à points au Canada, en Australie, en Allemagne depuis 2005, en France avec l'immigraton « choisie » depuis 2006, au Royaume Uni puis en Autriche depuis 2010, accords bilatéraux avec les pays voisins ou du sud. Les pays qui attirent le plus les élites et les étudiants sont les Etats-Unis, le Canada, l'Europe de l'Ouest. Ceux qui voient partir leurs cerveaux sont l'Europe de l'est et la Russie au lendemain de la chute du communisme en 1991 mais surtout les pays du sud (Afrique sub-saharienne, Maghreb, Proche et Moyen Orient, Inde et Chine). S'agit-il d'un brain drain, d'un exode des cerveaux ou d'un brain gain, d'une diaspora des connaissances bénéfique au développement par l'exil? Tout dépend des situations: le départ d'un Indien ou d'un Chinois de haut niveau de pays milliardaires en population n'a pas les mêmes incidences que celle d'un médecin du Malawi. Les analyses montrent qu'aujourd'hui, contrairement à une idée longtemps répandue selon laquelle les migrations étaient une perte pour le pays d'origine, les migrations sont bénéfiques pour le développement, tant par les transferts que par les retombées potentielles sur le marché du travail dans certains pays (informaticiens indiens donneurs d'ouvrage en Inde,

investissements chinois en Chine, par exemple): plus il y a de migrations, plus il y a de développement. A l'inverse, le développement induit souvent les migrations, un phénomène que l'on peut observer aujourd'hui dans nombre de pays du sud, notamment en Afrique passant en un siècle de 70% de ruraux à 70% d'urbains à la fin du vingt et unième siècle. La monétarisation de l'économie, les progrès de l'information et de la scolarisation, l'abandon du fatalisme, l'espoir de réaliser son projet de vie, l'individualisation des parcours migratoires conduisent de la migration interne à la migration internationale. Un écart se creuse ainsi parfois entre les populations pour lesquelles la migration est une source de mieux être et certains pays qui n'offrent aucune issue à court terme. La restauration de la confiance entre les migrants et les pays du sud apparaît alors comme une condition nécessaire au retour et aux investissements productifs dépassant le cadre familial.

Enfin, les transmigrants achèvent ce panorama des nouvelles situations migratoires. Apparus au cours des années 1990-2000 lors de la chute du mur de Berlin, ils ont formé l'essentiel des migrations est-ouest en Europe. Anticipant leur entrée dans l'Unon européenne, ils ont commencé à effectuer diverses formes de circulations migratoires: une installaton dans la mobilité comme mode de vie. Colporteurs « à la valise » d'est en ouest d'abord, travailleurs saisonniers ou domestiques comme dans l'Europe de l'est vers l'Europe du sud sud ensuite, faux touristes à la recherche de travail, commerçants occasionnels sur les marchés, ils ont commencé à constituer une catégorie nouvelle au tournant du siècle avant que leur accès progressif au marché légal du travail européen les rende moins visibles. Leur vie s'effectue « ici » et « là-bas », dans un entre deux alimenté par la force des liens migratoires transnationaux. Ces migrations de circulation existent aussi dans d'autres régions à proximité d'autres lignes de fracture du monde, mais les conditions juridiques sont moins favorables car les migrants sont soumis à des visas. Ceux qui ont un statut privilégié (double nationalité, visas à entrées multiples, commerçants et hommes d'affaires, intellectuels) constituent des réseaux migratoires d'allers et retours entre les deux rives de la méditerranée, riche d'activités entrepreneuriales et commerçantes. Plus les frontières sont ouvertes, plus les migrants circulent et moins ils s'installent définitivement car leur espace de vie s'élargit. A l'inverse, plus les frontières sont fermées, plus les sans papiers tendent à se sédentariser, faute de pouvoir repartir chez eux et de ne plus pouvoir revenir. La circulation migratoire est l'une des tendances de fond des nouvelles mobilités d'aujourd'hui.

The Significance and Limitations of Remittances from the West for a Liberian Refugee Population and the Local Host Community in Buduburam Village, Ghana

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1. Introduction: Research Theme, Background and Data

With major advancement in transportation systems and communication technology, trans-national interconnections have been reinforced in contemporary migration. As a concrete, material manifestation of trans-nationalism (Guarnizo 2003: 666), overseas pecuniary remittances have emerged as an important external financial flow into developing countries in recent years. Given this trend, there has been growing interest in the roles of overseas financial remittances in refugee studies. Drawing from my recent one-year fieldwork in Ghana and Liberia, this paper focuses on impacts as well as limitations of overseas financial remittances on economic subsistence of the Liberian refugee community and of the Ghanaian host population in Buduburam village in Ghana.

With dwindling assistance from the international donor community, pecuniary remittances from the Liberian diaspora in western countries had been the most significant resource for the economic livelihoods of Liberian refugees in the Buduburam refugee camp. These remittances were mostly sent by resettled Liberians in industrialised countries, mainly the United States.[1] In addition to assisting the subsistence of this protracted refugee community, external pecuniary assistances had largely contributed to boosting the Ghanaian host economy owing to the spending of received money by Liberians in neighbouring local markets.

The remittance-based life style in Buduburam, nevertheless, had been destabilised by the deployment of a tighter refugee policy in Ghana. In 2008, the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Ghanaian government started promoting the repatriation of refugees to Liberia, which led to the mass departure of Liberian remittance recipients from Ghana and consequently slimmed down the influx of remittances into this area. The sharp reduction in remittances undermined not only the economic life of Liberian refugees but also the subsistence of local Ghanaians. Whilst remittances have certainly been an important livelihood resource for Liberian refugees and the host population, this paper argues some vulnerability in the remittance-reliant economy.

The paper is based on my doctoral fieldwork between August 2008 and July 2009. During my one-year field research, I conducted about 300 interviews with Liberian refugees and local people residing in Bududuram village in Ghana. Whereas my research methods were mainly qualitative, such as one-to-one interviews and focus group discussions, I also assembled quantitative data such as the amount of remittances flowing into this village.

2. General Features of Liberian Refugees in the Bududuram Refugee Camp

Established in 1990, Bududuram refugee camp lay in a semi-urban area roughly 35 kilometres west of Accra, approximately a one-hour drive from the capital. The area of the camp was approximately 140 acres, although the boundary of the camp was never defined clearly. The majority of refugees in this camp were Liberians. Most of them had fled from the Liberian civil war that was launched in 1989. According to the most recent UNHCR Statistical Yearbook (UNHCR 2010), at the end of 2008 there were about 16,000 Liberian refugees in Ghana, and most of them were residing in the Bududuram refugee camp. Due to the latest repatriation programme between April 2008 and March 2009, as of March 2009, the residual number of Liberian refugees in Ghana was reduced to about 13,000. This refugee population had been well known for their adamant refusal to repatriate to Liberia. Many of them dreamed of resettlement in a third country.

A diversity of economic activities was carried out by refugees inside and around the camp. As mentioned above, however, overseas remittances from western countries were the most important source of their economic subsistence. The camp was founded two decades ago and counted as one of thirty-eight protracted refugee situations by UNHCR (UNHCR 2004). As commonly observed worldwide, as the refugees' exile became more prolonged, the international donor society lost interest in assisting this Liberian refugee community. In the face of dwindling help from the refugee-assisting regime, remittances played a particularly important role for the subsistence of Liberian refugees.

The Gomoa district in which the Bududuram camp was located had been known as one of the poorest districts in Ghana (Porter *et al*. 2008: 235). My interviews with the local host community reconfirmed that the area used to be a tiny village in virtually bush country with very little economic activity beyond small-scale subsistence farming. Despite the development induced by the influxes of the Liberian refugee population, the economic standards of the local inhabitants remained quite weak. Without any significant local industries, most locals were petty traders. According to my interviews with about ten Ghanaian retailers living around the camp area, their daily sales were between 2–15 GHC (1–12 USD) with the most frequent response of 4–5 GHC (3–4 USD). A Ghanaian bishop who had been living in the area since 1993 told me: "only a handful [of local] people can spend more than 1 USD per day [on food]. I think the majority eat only once a day". When I asked twenty locals

"who is better off, Ghanaians or Liberian refugees?", all except one answered that Liberians were better off because they had access to remittances while very few locals had any relatives abroad to help them.

3. Impacts of Remittances on Buduburam Livelihoods

In front of the Buduburam refugee camp, there were two Western Union branch offices. According to camp residents, the majority of remittance beneficiaries received their overseas financial assistance through one of these branches.

If a refugee household was privileged to have access to a consistent and reliable flow of remittances over a long period of time, it could entirely depend on the financial assistance without being involved in other livelihoods. A male refugee in his 60 s had been in Ghana since 1990. His main source of income was financial remittances from his wife and children who had moved to western countries.

> "I receive financial assistance from my family members abroad. My wife (59 years old), my daughter (40), my son (38) are living in the US, North Carolina. My youngest son (36) is in Canada. They assist me.
> My youngest son used to be in Buduburam. He fortunately got scholarship and went to Canada in 1999. Now he is working in Canada. He has his wife and son living in the camp. He sends money to me sometimes. He also remits to his wife regularly and she cooks for me every day … Thank God, [because of the assistance] I don't have many problems here. Whatever I receive from my family, I can spend all for myself. My life is OK."

Though he never revealed the amount of the remittances to me, with these multiple remitters in the US and Canada, evidently, he did not have any major welfare challenges.

Some refugee recipients in the Buduburam camp capitalised on remittances to invest in independent livelihoods by establishing their own enterprises. John, the refugee owner of a successful internet café, mobilised USD 2,500 to purchase thirteen personal computers and install other necessary internet infrastructures to launch this business. Alice, who was engaged in the cell-phone trade between Ghana and Nigeria, embarked on this trans-border initiative in 2006 with the support of USD 500 from her relatives resettled in western countries. In these cases, remittances certainly gave recipients "a greater level of power and choice" (Horst 2006: 7).

Not all refugees in the camp had access to overseas remittances, but there was an internal redistribution of remittances in this refugee community. Refugees in the camp formed an umbrella over a person who was getting overseas financial support, and this association had

become an important coping means for individuals and households without remittance access. Households with constant remittance access almost always supported some non-recipient households. According to a female refugee in the camp who was financially assisted by her husband in the US, "I provide assistance for my three or four friends and prepare big meals for nine or ten people on every Sunday. These people often come to me for help when necessary".

In addition to assisting refugee livelihoods, remittances contributed considerably to boosting the Ghanaian host economy. As I described above, in the Bududuram camp area, it was difficult to draw a clear boundary between 'locals' and 'refugees'. Some shops inside the camp were owned by Ghanaians who hired Liberian refugees as their shop keepers. The predominant economic means of locals in the Bududuram village was the small-scale trading of groceries and other daily necessities. Right next to the camp entrance, there was a Ghanaian market where many Liberians would purchase their daily food and other necessities from Ghanaian traders. According to local merchants, the most important customers for Ghanaian retail sellers in the area were undoubtedly Liberian refugees residing in the camp. A Ghanaian drugstore owner in a village adjacent to the camp said to me:

> "Normally, I receive twenty customers per day. Ten out of the twenty are Liberians. A Liberian normally spends more money than a Ghanaian customer … Before [repatriation started], I received many more Liberian customers. At its peak, I received almost fifty [Liberian customers] in one day … In this area, all Ghanaian shop-owners are benefiting from Liberians' money."

Testimonies such as this highlighted the large dependence of both this refugee population and the local host community on financial assistance to Liberian remittance recipients. As some refugees and Ghanaians portrayed, indeed, overseas financial remittances were a 'lifeline' for this refugee community left in a poor village without any leading industries.

4. Refugee Policy Change in Ghana: Refugee Repatriation Promotion

In early 2008, however, the situation regarding refugees and hosting communities in Bududuram village changed drastically. As I explained above, the host government and UNHCR started a large-scale repatriation programme for remaining Liberians in April 2008. This drastic situation change was triggered by the refugees' demonstrations against UNHCR between February and April 2008. According to various different sources, some one hundred Liberian women refugees started protesting against UNHCR in February 2008 in the football ground which was located immediately next to the camp entrance. The main

messages of the demonstrations were the rejection of the local integration plan for residual Liberians in Ghana and the demand for either third-country resettlement or repatriation to Liberia with USD 1,000 for each individual. Despite some dialogues between UNHCR and the demonstration leaders, the protests continued. The series of demonstrations provoked the Ghanaian government into describing the demonstration as "a threat to the security of the state" (Government of Ghana 2008) and resulted in around 630 arrests and sixteen cases of deportation to Liberia.

The consequences of these protests did not end with arrests and deportations but led the host government to employ a more stringent policy towards the Liberian refugees in the country. The furious Minister of the Interior, Kwamena Bartels, made an official statement on 1 April 2008 that all Liberian refugees should go back to Liberia as the internal war there was over and peace was already restored in Liberia. The Ghanaian administration subsequently expressed its intention to reduce the residual number of Liberians in the country as well as to break up the inhabitants of the Buduburam camp into manageable smaller groups and to disperse them to other parts of Ghana.

In response to the protests, a tripartite committee comprising the Ghanaian government, the Liberian government and UNHCR was formed in April 2008. In agreement with the committee members, UNHCR then launched a voluntary repatriation programme of Liberian refugees to Liberia in the same month. UNHCR's thrust for 'voluntary' return continued beyond the original deadline of repatriation in August 2008. At one point, it turned out to be rather an 'assisted' return and it became almost threatening to residual Liberians in the camp to accept the repatriation option. In November 2008, UNHCR placed an official notice in the camp announcing: 1) that organized voluntary repatriation would continue until 31 March 2009; 2) that those who opted to remain in Ghana would be dispersed to other parts of Ghana after 31 March; and 3) that a verification exercise would be carried out in early 2009.

As I explained above, Liberian refugees in Ghana had been unwilling to repatriate to Liberia despite UNHCR's previous efforts at promoting repatriation programmes. This time, however, the reaction of the Liberian exiles was different under this strong repatriation pressure. According to UNHCR statistics, more than 10,000 Liberians returned to Liberia between April 2008 and March 2009 under this UNHCR 'voluntary' repatriation package (UNHCR 2009).

5. Consequences of Refugee Repatriation: Reduction in Remittances and Collapsing Buduburam Economy

This drastic refugee policy change eroded the financial lifeline of refugees and locals in Buduburam village areas. In refugee studies, it is often said that those who are wealthier or

more resourceful tend to repatriate or leave earlier from a camp, especially in the face of any insecurity or trouble. Crisp wrote (2003: 8) that "the strongest members of a refugee population are usually the first to repatriate, leaving the weaker members behind". Presumably, under the strong repatriation pressure from the host government and the UN Refugee Agency, many of the well-to-do refugees, namely recipients of constant remittances, departed from Ghana. As a consequence, this considerably slimmed down the influx of overseas remittances into this area.

I negotiated with the managers of the two Western Union branches in front of the Bududuram camp and succeeded in obtaining remittance data from them. The graph below illustrates a sharp drop in the monthly average value of remittances that were received in these two branches. Between 2006 and 2008, approximately 800,000 USD on average per month was flowing into the camp area but in 2009 the average amount decreased to about 400,000 USD, almost half of the previous three-year average.[2] Also, to make the matter worse, due to the global financial crisis in 2008, some refugees lost remittances because their remitters in western countries became unemployed.



Given its heavy reliance on financial assistance from outside, the sharp reduction in remittances largely undermined the economic life of Bududuram village. First, almost all of the camp businesses run by refugees faced a significant decline in their sales as they lost their most crucial customers. In the camp, those with remittances had been spending money

received from abroad and many enterprises were almost solely reliant on their purchasing power. As a result of sales decline due to the mass departure of remittance recipients, many refugee businesses shut down. Second, as I mentioned above, these remittances were shared with non-remittance recipients in the camp. Thus, the repatriation of direct remittance recipients from the camp also meant the loss of important internal sponsors for many refugees without remittance access. In fact, this sharing culture of remittances was a crucial safety net for poor refugees in the camp but this mutual assistance network was completely destroyed.

In addition, the reduction in remittances damaged the subsistence of local Ghanaian business people. As Phillip noted (2003: 14), in the case of entrenched refugee settlements, departure of refugees often generates a downturn in the local host economy. I interviewed about thirty Ghanaians in this camp area and, similar to refugee business people, almost all of them lamented a sharp decline in their sales due to the loss of their refugee customers. Because Bududuram village was located in a very poor district, local Ghanaians did not have the same purchasing power as Liberian remittance recipients. These local people were really furious about and extremely frustrated with the government's refugee-policy change. Nevertheless, neither the host government nor UNHCR was aware of these negative impacts generated by their drastic refugee policy shift on the local host economy.

6. Thoughts and Lessons from this Case Study

Overseas remittances attract immense attention from international donor communities. According to the *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008* published by the World Bank (2008: 16), migrant remittances continued ballooning in size to an estimated total USD 318 billion worldwide in 2007, more than tripling from USD 102 billion in 1995. Arguably, the surge in remittances has given rise to 'a kind of euphoria', with the financial assistance from migrants being proclaimed as the newest "development mantra" (Kapur 2004) amongst the World Bank, donor governments and western development NGOs. In refugee studies, there is also a flourishing number of studies on overseas monetary remittances.

Whilst remittances had certainly been an important livelihood resource for Liberian refugees and the host population in this Bududuram village, I also have to point to some vulnerabilities of the remittance-reliant economy.

(1) Instability and volatility due to external environment

As this case study shows, remittance-based livelihoods, especially in refugee contexts, are very unstable and vulnerable to changes in external environments: for instance, 1) the refugee policy change by the host government and UNHCR and 2) economic climates.

The remittance-reliant economy in Bududuram was crippled in less than one year by the

mass departure of remittance recipients due to the repatriation promotion by the Ghanaian government and UNHCR. As my case study highlights, refugees' sojourn is highly dependent on the host government refugee policy. Even after decades of exile in a country of asylum, in many prolonged refugee situations, refugees have not been granted permanent residential status or citizenship. As Liberian refugees discovered, a host government policy shift can suddenly put their exile into an unstable state and can even pressurise them to leave the country. Since remittances are attached to a specific recipient, not a location, once a recipient leaves the place, remittances will be lost accordingly.

Moreover, the influx of remittances can be capricious due to the economic climate. Diaz-Briquets and Perez-Lopez (1997: 414–5) stated that a recession in a migrant receiving country can result in a sudden and significant decline in the volume of remittances. As I briefly mentioned, in 2008, some regular remittance recipients in the Buduburam camp had lost their financial support from abroad since their remitters became jobless under the global financial crisis.

(2) 'Remittances = development': is this a linear equation?

Overseas remittances are often described as a tool for 'development' although this is a point of contention in the academic arena.[3] Extant research underlines that remittances can strengthen the economic capabilities of recipient households by being directly invested into small-scale businesses and other income-generating activities of households (Durand *et al*. 1996; Orozco 2003). Given my findings, however, in the Buduburam refugee camp, the financial resources from abroad were predominantly used to meet daily expenses of households such as food, clothing and health care rather than investment for development. According to one of the refugee community leaders, "Ghana is a 'transit point' for most of Liberians. This is not a place where we invest … Remittances are more or less for upkeep of recipients".

Notwithstanding their decades of sojourn, the legal status of Liberian refugees in Ghana remained ambiguous; none of the refugees were granted permanent residence in the country. Furthermore, Liberian refugees were almost entirely excluded from formal employment opportunities and were not allowed to purchase land. Because of these impediments, refugees therefore perceived Ghana as a 'transit point' (not a place to stay for good) and did not make any significant investment in this area. Many refugees agreed that remittances to the Buduburam camp were mainly 'money for food'. This implies, particularly in refugee contexts, that there is need for collective, coordinated efforts by the host government and UNHCR to capitalise on these remittances for more proactive use of development.

(3) Inauspicious future for remittances

The Bududuram refugee camp lost many remittance recipients because of the large-scale repatriation promotion. Nevertheless, if this refugee community could create new remittance recipients by resettling others in western countries, they may be able to create new remittance pipelines and revive the village economy in the future. But this optimistic scenario seems unlikely to occur in the current situation surrounding Liberian refugees.

In the first place, UNHCR in Ghana asserted that there was only a very slim chance of resettlement for residual Liberians. Additionally, it seems unpromising that new resettlement doors for Liberians would open in the near future. Resettling refugees has been perceived as an unwanted burden on the welfare states of traditional UNHCR resettlement countries (Hyndman 2007: 251). Given these trends, as Koser noted (2007: 251), in general, resettlement quotas for refugees in industrialised countries would remain very limited or would further decrease, especially for prolonged refugees.

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In the current development arena, overseas financial remittances are often portrayed as a lifeline for the poor. I fully admit the importance of remittances for the subsistence of recipients as well as of secondary beneficiaries. Nevertheless, at the same time, I also have to point to some weaknesses inherent in these financial support mechanisms. Given the presented case study, we need to be cautious not to over-highlight remittances as if they are cure-all medicine.

Endnote

1 As a means of refugee protection, the UNHCR and some donor countries transfer certain groups of refugees who are unable to return to their country of origin to a third country such as the US, Canada, Australia. These resettled Liberians in the west were remitting to their relatives and friends in the Bududuram refugee camp.

2 I completed my fieldwork in July 2009 so May 2009 was the latest data available at that point.

3 There are arguments about what are considered to be 'productive' investments. Orozco (2006: 28) said that spending on health, education and housing puts recipients in better life conditions and consequently promotes them to pursue opportunities for advancement. Stalker (2000: 81) wrote that many forms of consumption such as food, education, and health care are in a sense a good form of investment that will lead to higher productivity.

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Gendered Naturalisation: A Path to Integration for Marriage Immigrant Women in Taiwan

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1. Introduction

The relationship between the state and naturalised citizens is analogised as marriage, family and club membership. The marriage metaphor implies mutual commitment, family metaphor stresses primordial ties, and club membership is underlined by the mutual consent based on reciprocal gains (Schuck 1998: 217). What if a naturalised citizen is an immigrant whose citizenship is based on marriage with and/or parenthood of local citizens?

This is the unique situation marriage immigrant women find themselves in. Together with South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore, Taiwan has become a major destination for female marriage migration in East Asia (Belanger, 2010; Jones and Shen, 2008). From 1987 to 2009, a total number of 289, 281 women were granted residency in Taiwan because of their marriage with local citizens. Half of them have become citizens (NIA 2010, see Table 1).

In Taiwan it is taken for granted that citizenship is desired by marriage immigrant

Table 1 Numbers of Naturalised Marriage Immigrant Women in Taiwan: 1987–2009 (unit: person)

Country of Origin	No. (a)	Naturalisation (b)	% (a/b)
Southeast Asia			
Vietnam	82,158	52,758	64
Indonesia	26,082	20,741	80
The Philippines	6,278	3,269	52
Thailand	5,705	1,065	19
Cambodia	4,345	3,887	89
Subtotal	124,568	80,656	65
Mainland China	164,713	67,595	41
Total	289,281	148,251	51

Source: Department of Household Registration, 2010.

women. This is based on a presumption that they attempt to take advantage of social benefit and employment rendered by citizenship. Another presumption is that poverty and the determination of betterment makes the changing of *nationality* a straightforward decision. Moreover, advocacy groups argue that substantive citizenship is critical to their survival whereas formal citizenship is secondary to their concern. This unintentionally strengthens the perception that immigrant women are keen to reap practical gains, but care less about the formal citizenship.

2. Research Questions and Method

In spite of superficial perceptions, it remains unexplored how marriage immigrant women understand their citizenship. Established literature tends to pathologise them (Wang and Belanger 2008: 102–103) and associate them with mail-order brides (Piper and Roces 2003: 2), transnational prostitutes (Ruenkaew 2002; Lisborg 2002; Mix and Piper 2003; Mix 2002) and victims of human trafficking (Wang and Chang 2002: 110; cf. Nakamatsu 2009: 191). Ito argues that this creates a 'compelling framing effect' and makes it 'seemingly impossible to conceive of migrant women's status and activities in terms of citizenship' (Ito 2005: 52).

This paper tries to unpack these presumptions by exploring the lived experiences of immigrant women. What kind of legislation is in place for the residing state to integrate them? How do they understand their relationship to the natal country as well as the residing country? How is this perception affected by the change of their legal status and life course? These are fundamental issues but exoticness and sensation of marriage migration preclude a serious investigation.

To explore their lived experiences, an appropriate definition is required. By '*marriage immigrant women*', I refer to *women who migrate from their natal country to the country of their husbands' residence in order to live a family life as a married couple with their husband*. This definition allows the inclusion of women whose marriage is formed through different channels (professional brokering, social matchmaking and mutual affection) and avoids invoking stigmatisation. It stresses the movement across the border of a state, therefore underlines the impact of national legislation. This enables a processional perspective to examine how the immigration legislation affects the well-being of immigrants.

Piper points out migrant women have multiple roles, including worker, wife, mother and citizen (Piper and Roces 2003: 15–17). Some studies have explored the relationship between *motherhood* and citizenship. For example, Winarnita argues that motherhood is the driving force for Indonesian women who marry Australian men to campaign for the reform of Indonesian legislation to ensure their children are entitled to Indonesian nationality (Winarnita 2008). Jones-Carrea shows Latino women are more likely to be involved in

community-building efforts and work as intermediaries between the immigrant community and the surrounding society (Jones-Correa 1998). Both underline that *motherhood* is a key to understanding how immigrant women exercise citizenship.

Following these findings and informed by interviews, this paper sees the migration of immigrant women as *a rite of passage* from an outsider to a citizen, and from a married daughter to a wife and mother. The two transitions take place side by side and interact with each other. This paper aims to investigate how this *rite of passage* is utilised by the legislation and how motherhood affects their decision regarding their application for citizenship.

To achieve this, I conducted fieldwork in Taiwan in 2009 and 2010. Taking a '*way, way down-below*' perspective (Yuh 2002: 7), I interviewed twenty-six Vietnamese and thirteen Filipino women and observed twenty sessions of evening Mandarin classes which some of the interviewees regularly attended. Interviews with Vietnamese immigrants were conducted in Mandarin, and English was used with Filipino interviewees as the latter requested. All interviewees are disguised with pseudonyms. Inspired by the *groupness* approach Brubaker and Cooper suggest observing *what people do with ethnicity* (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), this paper is set to find out how immigrant women respond and interpret citizenship in their daily life.

3. Motivation: Marriage and Migration

On the whole, Filipino interviewees married at older ages (28.7 years old) and nearly seventy percent of them received a college or university education. They were more engaged with waged employment and experienced domestic migration. By contrast, the Vietnamese interviewees married at younger ages (22.3 years old) and sixty-one percent of them received secondary education. They were more engaged with home-based livelihood and had less moving experiences. While the Filipino interviewees relied on English for communication but picked up sufficient words in local languages, the Vietnamese interviewees were left with no option but to speak Mandarin. In spite of these differences, the majority of both groups married through arrangement (brokering as well as social matchmaking), and betterment was the main driving force behind their decision to participate in marriage migration.

There was a strong element of pragmatism in the Filipino interviewee's decision to marry abroad. It was to pursue a *better* life for themselves and often also for their parents, siblings and in some cases children of previous marriages. Although they took into account the well-being of others, they were not 'forced' to adopt this strategy. For Daisy and Jennifer, the decision of marrying a Taiwanese man was entirely theirs. The *collective* consideration and individual willingness was blended into an *ambition* to go abroad, a determination to defeat (relative) poverty, a flight from a broken relationship, a rational move after

calculating risk and cost, and a preparedness to compromise when marriage did not live up to expectations.

Before large numbers of Vietnamese women married to Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore men,[1] there had already been a stream of marriages to overseas Vietnamese men (male *Viet Kieu*) in the US. Such a marriage is imagined as a channel for personal and familial upward social mobility (Thai 2005; Thai 2008). A survey shows that helping the family, having a better life and pleasing parents are the driving forces for pursuing this option (Hugo and Nguyen, 2007: 379). This is indeed found in my interviews that marriage migration was seen as a solution to the perennial issue of poverty or the sudden collapse of a family-run business. Compared with Filipino interviewees, the role played by Vietnamese parents in the decision-making was more significant. On the other hand, there were also adventurous daughters who took the future into their own hands and were willing to take a risk.

The filipino and the Vietnamese interviewees had specific expectations about marriage immigration. Whether they were able to realise these expectations was largely subject to the legislation and the socio-economic environment in Taiwan. Becoming a mother was the critical turning point of the trajectory of their migration plan.

4. Gendered Naturalisation

Universally there are four principles to draw the boundary between citizens and non-citizens. They are birthplace (*jus soils*), bloodline (*jus sanguine*), marital status and residency (Weil 2001: 17). Abrams points out, as far as a foreign spouse is concerned, the immigration law of the US is a *family* law (Abrams 2007: 1629). Ito also finds 'family' is constitutive of Japan's 'citizenship regime' (Ito 2005). The legislation of Taiwan is not exceptional. The package of immigration legislation has been amended to keep abreast with the growing number of marriage immigrant women residing in the country. The intervention of state in marriage is translated into regulations concerning entry, residency, employment, naturalisation, and citizenship.

For an immigrant, becoming a citizen is to be accepted by the state as a member of the polity. In the terminology of Tomas Hammar, becoming a citizen is depicted as crossing gates guarded by relevant legislation (1990: 21). In the case of Taiwan, the legislation is a package of *the Nationality Act, the Immigration Act*, and *the Household Registration Law*. In concept, the first gate is *the Immigration Act* safeguarding entry and residency. (Their employment is regulated by *the Employment Services Act*.) The second gate is *the Nationality Act* controlling the awarding of nationality. The third gate is *the Household Registration Law* granting citizenship and issuing the National Identification Card (ID Card).

In theory nationality may be conflated with citizenship. However, there is less conflation

in the legislation of Taiwan. Nationality is a formal status to designate one's belonging to the national community. Nationality alone does not grant a member with political, economic and social rights. These rights are withheld until a *national* receives *prior permission* to be formally included in a *household* and this inclusion has been registered with the government. Only until afterwards a national becomes a *citizen* endowed with substantive rights.

By law it takes no less than four years for an immigrant to be granted citizenship. In my research, it takes an average of 8.6 and 7 years respectively for Filipino and Vietnamese interviewees to acquire citizenship. By that time, they had already become mothers, acquired proficiency in local languages, taken up employment, and visited their natal countries with their husband and children. That is, the change of legal status took place side by side the change of their life course. This change of life course, specifically becoming a mother, defines the immigration legislation.

In the following text I will analyse how gender is interweaved into the immigration legislation in the aspects of residency, employment, naturalisation and citizenship. This is later contrasted by the interviews to illuminate immigrant women's interpretation and reaction to the legislation in their daily life.

Residency

The Immigration Act permits a foreign *spouse* to reside in Taiwan because the state cannot deprive its citizens of marital companionship. The gender character of the legislation is not revealed until when the marriage is deemed fraudulent or breaks down. Article 24 stipulates that in such occasions the residence permit shall be withdrawn and an immigrant woman faces expulsion. However, Article 31 provides exceptions for repatriation: a foreign wife is allowed to stay if a) she suffers physical or mental abuse from her husband and has been issued with a court protection order: b) she wins the custody of her children; c) her divorce is the result of domestic abuse and she has juvenile children in Taiwan; d) her departure poses 'grave and irreversible' damage to her children. These exceptions are clearly grounded on her integrity as a wife and her function as a mother.

Employment

Most interviewees actively sought *waged* employment outside of the home to ensure the survival of the family, afford the needs and wants of self and children, and support the natal family — if there is a surplus. An earned wage holds the key to realising their migration goal because it is more likely to be under their personal discretion. Although employment is desired, its acquirement is not easy. In addition to deskilling, there is a fundamental issue of legality.

The Employment Services Act originally restricted the employment of immigrant women. The restriction was removed in 2003 (EY 1999b, LY 2002) because the government was brought to recognise, by the intensive social campaign, the contribution of their employment to their families. It was also a response to the findings of a nation-wide consensus which revealed that the right to work was their primary concern (MoI 2004; 2009).

Naturalisation

Evoking naturalisation is to be examined by the state for the qualification of candidates. Roger Smith notes that immigration policies in western Europe and the USA show favouritism for immigrants who claim kinship with local citizens without making efforts to prove they have more 'civic' credentials to be awarded with citizenship than those without any kinship links (Smith 2002: 110). Marriage is one occasion where favouritism is offered. In the past, a woman automatically acquired her foreign husband's nationality but this has been repealed in most European countries since WWII in line with gender equality and concerns about fraudulent marriages[2] (Weil 2001: 28).

Taiwan followed suit and in 2000 amended *the Nationality Act of 1929*. Marriage is now regarded as a channel whereby foreign nationals — men and women — can acquire nationality *through naturalisation*. However, the originally administrative requirement of renouncing a previous nationality is being elevated as a legal requirement. The government clearly stated that it was to prevent dual nationality (EY 1999a). The other active requirements are financial adequacy and acculturation. To eliminate the financial burden on the state, in 2004 the law doubled the official minimum wage as the threshold for evidencing financial adequacy. This was strongly criticised for setting a *price* on citizenship. In 2008 the government backed down and replaced it with a requirement to produce a variety of documents of financial status, including those of husband and parents-in-law.

As for acculturation, the state levies immigrant women with duties associated with their role as mothers. In 2005 Chinese language proficiency and basic knowledge of the local way of life was made a prerequisite for naturalisation eligibility[3]. The government clearly stated that enhancing an immigrant mother's ability of caring and educating for children was behind this introduction (EY, 2005). Yuval-Davis and Anthias point out women are incorporated into the nation-building project as biological reproducers, national boundary markers, and cultural transmitters (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989: 7). This elucidates why the legislation demands the acculturation of immigrant women. The requirement also mirrors a *belief* that their motherhood ought to be improved *for the sake of the nation* otherwise their lower education and weaker language facility will allegedly deteriorate the quality of the population, weaken the international competitiveness and pose a *national security* threat (NSC 2006: 61).

Citizenship

Household registration is the watershed distinguishing a citizen from a national (Shelly 2002). Under *the Immigration Act*, visitation and residency of *a national without registered household*[4] are still term-defined, sponsored by their spouses and require prior permission. If their marriage ceases to exist, the government still has the power to cancel the permit. Thus being a *national* does not render further security and stability. The key to defeat conditionality is to apply for citizenship and be issued with the National Identification Card (ID Card).

Household registration can be applied for after residing as a national in Taiwan for a period of time. This in effect commences a *probationary* period. That is, in case the marriage ceases to exist because of divorce or death of her husband, a woman may apply if she has juvenile children and is capable of exercising guardianship. On the other hand, if her marriage is proven to be fraudulent, her application will be denied. Thus gender is the guard throughout the legal process to assess whether marriage immigrant women can finally be accepted by the nation-state.

5. Responding to the Gendered Legislation: Crossing Gates as a *Rite of Passage*

Residency

The *conditioned* residency has a substantial impact on the life of immigrant women. It means insecurity and instability. On the other hand, it ties the interests of immigrant women with that of their children. When the immigrant women arrived, they were hoping to achieve *a better life for self and parents*. After living in Taiwan as a mother, this was modified to pursue *a stable and secure life for self and children*. As Daisy said, '*I wanted to apply for citizenship only for security, because I have children*. When you have quarrels, they [husband and in-laws] will say, 'Go back to the Philippines!' *You're not secure if you don't have an ID [Card]*. It doesn't matter to give up my Philippine nationality because *they [husband and children] are my own family, they need me here*.'

The sense of conceiving the interest of children as one's own interest is encapsulated in Jennifer's elaboration. To care for her children, Jennifer saw the state of Taiwan as a generous philanthropist who makes a contribution to her motherly duty: 'I want to have an ID Card because I have three sons. In Taiwan, as long as children are interested in study, they have *many privileges*. The government is eager to help smart children in poor families. *I'm practical*; I don't want to go back as long as my children are fine [here in Taiwan].' Interpreting the value of citizenship from the perspective of motherhood and the interest of children is also common amongst Vietnamese interviewees. Hoang Minh Suong is exemplary: 'In the beginning I wanted to go back [to Vietnam] but then I saw my children gradually growing up. Then you'd stop thinking about going back. *My home is where my*

children are.'

Employment

Annabelle pointed out 'we came from a poor country and need a *stable* life'. The life would not be stable unless it was supported by a reliable income, particularly if husbands were not regular wage earners. However, the liberalisation of working rights is not well known in the society. Often both employers and immigrants are convinced that without an ID Card the latter are not allowed to work. Thus employers are either reluctant to hire, or use the lack of an ID Card as an excuse to impose unfavourable conditions. For those who did get jobs, however, employment brought up the critical issue of discriminative conditions. This is well captured by Jo's aspiration: '*I wanted to get a pension, covered by health insurance and other benefits. I wanted to get equal pay and get what a citizen would be entitled to*.' Hence citizenship is understood not only as the assurance for legal employment but also a desire for equal employment conditions.

Naturalisation

The precondition of financial adequacy links citizenship cognitively with financial capacity. This is what Ellie, who had a poorly-paid job at a piggery, understood: 'If you want to have an ID, *you must earn money*.' Citizenship thus becomes an *earned* status. On the other hand, accepting the property of husband and parents-in-law as evidence for financial adequacy makes their cooperation indispensable for the application. Hence some interviewees thought they could not apply on their own behalf 'unless their husbands *endorsed* their application'.

The acculturation requirement makes it necessary for immigrant women to enrol on language or orientation courses. Linguistic attainment was a critical contribution to increasing the confidence in childrearing, widening job opportunities, improving labour conditions, and adaptation to the local way of life. On the whole Chinese language proficiency is a potential source of empowerment. On the other hand, they also experienced frustration under the governmental, social and familiar pressure of speaking only Chinese language and transmitting only the local culture to their children. This was well conveyed by Pham Thi Phuong and Annabelle. When asked whether she saw her child as Taiwanese or mixed, Phuong replied: 'I don't think my boy is mixed. *Some people don't like us to teach children Vietnamese*. When my baby was crying, I lifted him up from the cot and rocked him in my arms back and forth. *But I can't sing any of the local nursery rhymes. I didn't sing Vietnamese nursery rhymes. I speak only Mandarin to him*.' When asked what she would do if her daughter was given an assignment to introduce her Filipino culture, Annabelle answered, 'I tried to explain things to her before, but I couldn't speak Mandarin or

Taiwanese dialect fluently to explain, so she wouldn't listen.' The intimacy of speaking *mother tongue* and passing mother's cultural inheritance was thus squeezed if not totally deprived.

Reaching the decision of renunciation is a complex of considerations. It is experienced as *a married daughter* moving to live with her husband, loosening ties with parents and committing herself to the well-being of husband and children. It is because both Filipino and Vietnamese interviewees identified with and abided by the *norm* that women live with their husbands after marriage, and children's well-being is the first priority. The family-characterised conceptualisation of *nationality* is encapsulated by Pham Thi Phuong's reply to the question of how she felt about relinquishing nationality: 'My family *over there* won't be with me forever. *I belong to here since I marry to here*. Vietnam is where my mum and dad live. *I'll live here forever after having a child*. Had I not had a child, it might not be the case.' In Phuong's conception nationality has been '*privatised*' within the family domain. Its renunciation is experienced as shifting her caring responsibility and committing herself to the role as a wife and mother as the cultural norm anticipates.

Citizenship

Lacking citizenship symbolised by the ID Card proves a recurrent hindrance for carrying out normal life in Taiwan. The ID Card is required as the proof of identity by the public and private sectors[5]. It takes much persuasion to convince the general public that an *Alien Residence Certificate* (ARC) and foreign passport are of equivalent authority. Because of its authoritativeness, any solicitation of one's ID number is guarded with suspicion. Even as a wife who had lived together with her husband for seven years, Melissa found it difficult to get her husband's ID Number. This convinced her of the necessity of obtaining an ID Number to 'make her life easier'.

The lack of an ID Card also effectively separates citizens from foreign residents. Deriving from this is the perception and experience that foreign residents receive differentiated and secondary treatment by social and institutional actors. Lacking an ID Card thus deepens the sense of being under suspicion, dependence, incompleteness, incompetence, or even inability. This deep sense of *secondary* status is behind the casual comment that 'having an ID Card makes everything convenient'.

6. Conclusion

Set out to answer straight-forward but fundamental questions, this paper identifies contextual meanings of citizenship embedded in the everyday life experiences of marriage immigrant women. The findings reveal that the gendered legislation paves a path for immigrant women to become part of the host society as a mother and wife. While crossing

the gates, immigrant women also experience a change of life course. This process is an intertwined *rite of passage* from an immigrant to a citizen and from a daughter to a wife and mother. Anticipating the change of life course from wife to mother, the legislation carries out a gender agenda and legitimises rights and entitlements of immigrant women by their functions as marital companion, parental guardian, biological reproducer and cultural transmitter.

As motherhood is given more weight by the twin criteria to grant citizenship, their self-interest is blended with the one of their children. In the process leading up to citizenship, immigrant women gradually claim Taiwan as their *home where they belong as a wife and mother*. As Winarnita (2008) and Lister (2002: 197) point out, this is a motherhood-orientated and duty-based conceptualisation of citizenship. However, this transition is *liminal* (Turner 1967) in contrast to the *lineal* transformation of the legal status. The gendered legislation itself is a conglomeration of the role of wife-mother, yet relinquishing the previous nationality does not wipe off a sense of belonging that originates from bloodline. The liminality of a woman's *rite of passage* is thus characterised by the fact that she continues to play multiple roles and views both the Philippines/Vietnam and Taiwan as home.

Endnote

1 It is estimated that the numbers to South Korea and Singapore have reached respectively 6,000 and 3,000 (Dang 2006; cited by Hugo & Nguyen 2007: 371).

2 This was the case in Sweden in 1950, Denmark in 1951, Portugal in 1959, Italy in 1983, Belgium in 1984, Greece in 1984, and Israel in 1996 (Weil 2001: 28).

3 Proof can be obtained in two ways. One is to attend publicly-funded language or orientation courses, or enrol at any formal education institution. The other way is to pass the test of *Standards for Identification of Basic Language Abilities and Common Sense of National Rights and Duties of Naturalised Citizens*.

4 The official English translation is '*National without Registered Permanent Residence*'. As Permanent Residency is an alternative option to citizenship in the legislation of Taiwan and countries around the world, the former translation might cause confusion. To avoid confusion and maintain clarity, this paper uses the term '*national without registered household*'. The provisions are in Chapter 3 of *the Immigration Act*.

5 The occasions requiring the presentation of ID Cards range from joining a Karaoke singing contest, signing up to a mobile phone service contract, booking train tickets online, collecting registered mail at the post office, children filling in forms containing parents' information, to claiming lottery prize money, hiring a car, lodging at a hotel, signing a lease, opening a bank account, applying for a credit card, investing in the stock market, buying property and casting a vote.

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Only a Matter of Citizenship?
Understanding Inequality in Post-Mao Urban China

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The theme of internal, rural to urban migration in China has been largely researched by sociologists, economists and anthropologists for the past 15 years.

Lately, and in particular after the seminal work of Dorothy Solinger (1999), there has been a lot of talk on citizenship in China. Prominent works (Fong and Murphy, 2006, Kipnis, 2008) suggest that citizenship might represent in itself a privileged framework of analysis for rural to urban migration in China.

For example, Kipnis advocates a perspective that should provide 'a much broader window for theorizing the *independent and central place* of citizenship laws in global inequality today'[1] (2008: 195) and suggests that the 'blame for the exploitation which illegal immigrants suffer cannot be laid solely at the feet of the "capitalist classes"' (2008: 195).

Through this approach social anthropologists of China may suggest that rural to urban migration within China might somehow be comparable to 'transnational' migration, thus finding their way into the larger academic debate on migration. However, although I certainly appreciate and even endorse some of the concerns and intentions of these scholars, I believe that taking any analytical variable as uniquely relevant, independently from its context, may be inherently problematic in the field of social anthropology.

Firstly, these works, in general lines, associate the idea of 'full citizenship' with the status of 'urban resident'. Rural migrants, it follows, fail to hold full citizenship and for this reason they are excluded, marginal, unequal subjects *par excellence*.

In these works, however, citizenship is often treated as a conceptual black box, an under-theorised variable, whose meaning remains unclear. 'Citizenship' ends up meaning everything and anything, from the right to vote to a complex array of social rights. We then have the multiplying of 'citizenships' (legal citizenship, consumer citizenship, biological citizenship and so on…) that more often than not ends up giving a fragmented, limited and static vision of inequality in societies that are, on the contrary, complex, dynamic and in continuous change.

In addition, and more specifically with regard to the case of China, the equation between 'urban residence status' and 'full citizenship' (whatever this latter term might mean) is in

itself simplistic for many reasons. Among those, I will here mention only the most macroscopic ones: the important changes in residence status administration that have taken place in the last 15 years, which have been widely documented; the relentless economic and social transformations faced by Chinese people across the country; and the continuous making and re-making of China's urban and rural spaces, which prompt the anthropologist to question the meaning of categories like 'rural' and 'urban'.

During my doctoral fieldwork in Nanjing between 2007 and 2008, I worked with migrants who had settled in Nanjing some 12 years before. Their situation in terms of social and labour rights was incredibly diverse, despite the fact that they held the same residence status. Consistently, informants had diverse perceptions of their life in the city and of their own relations to their village of origin.

This was despite the fact that I chose an informant group that was largely homogeneous in terms of educational background and economic condition. Had I chosen migrants with more diverse educational levels, the differences would have been more striking.

Some informants were working together or in close contact with Nanjing residents, members of the so called 'dispossessed working classes'. Following the gradual falling apart of the 'work unit' employment system, that offered a solid package of social security services, and the subsequent liberalisation of services and of labour markets, urban citizens with less cultural, social and symbolic capital did not always manage to get secure jobs and ended up loosing out in terms of access to basic services.

Most 'migrant' informants wished to buy a flat in order to earn an urban residence. This wish brought them once again together with other informants with urban residence status, since all my informants, independently from their residence status, were working hard and saving up to buy a house and send their children to university. For the non residents, however, the idea of earning an urban residence permit evoked the possibility of acquiring the status of the 'Maoist worker': able to have a secure post, with the promise of a pension, full medical cover and free education for her children.

Needless to say, this status was by now a mirage for many urban residents, even those with rather 'good' jobs. For those without residence in town, the hard earned urban residence might have emerged to be very soon empty of much of its previous value: an urban residence today, in fact, would not necessarily lead to all the privileges that an urban residence might have entailed during Maoist times.

This once again highlights that in post Mao China, where labour, services and even residence status are largely commodified, inequality largely depends on different forms of capital: social (guanxi), cultural, economic, symbolic, which are all exchangeable and mutually interdependent. For different reasons, all informants-resident or not-were fighting to earn what were largely considered to be obvious markers of *class*: home ownership and

higher education for their children.

Family and kin strategies, including division of labour, marriage, living arrangements and so on were key to this pursue. For this reason, in the context of urban China the study of kin support, including marriage arrangements and the cultivation of long term friendships, may be fundamental to understand the emerging and consolidating dimension of class.

In this context, then, it may not be helpful to speak about 'migrants' as a homogeneous category of 'non citizens', which may sound like a 'global underclass' whose only common feature would be that of being too unprivileged to be deconstructed. It may be more helpful to look at the ongoing reconfiguration of a society in terms of class and status.

The wish to produce a 'transnational migration agenda' and to insert China-based migration into it may end up suggesting that migration may entail more or less the same experience all over the world and for everyone, as far as they do not retain citizenship in their place of destination.

If the category of 'citizenship' has to hold meaning, instead, it needs to be defined according to specific time and place conditions, and to be conceptualised as intertwined with, among others, class, ethnicity, gender and so on.

Endnote

1 Emphasis mine.

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The Formation of a Multi-ethnic Society and Religious Emigration in South Vietnam

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1. Introduction

In 1944, a new form Buddhism, Khất sĩ, was founded in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam. This new Vietnamese Buddhism has unique characteristics beside traditional Mahayana and Theravada doctrines. Yet up to now, few observers have studied them in detail. Some of the observers, who recognized the existence of Khất sĩ, only briefly described them. Althouh many observers assume that Khất sĩ is a new Buddhism, which has "fused" the two traditional doctrines, few studies examine the meaning of "fusion" itself and why the founder of Khất sĩ should and could establish a new Buddhism (Tanaka 2011).

Thich Hanh Thanh (2007) described Khất sĩ systematically, by summarizing the history, the feature and the sect. Han On (2001) gave in particular the founder's biography. However, anyone didn't think about the social background and the social movement at the time when Khất sĩ came into being.

This paper will attempt to deal with one question. That is the question why Khất sĩ was formed in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam. In order to clarify this simple but difficult question, I will focus on the multi-ethnicity and the mobility of the society in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam under French colonial policy. Especially, in the section dealing with the mobility in Mekong Delta, I will discuss the founder as a "religious emigrant" and the process of forming a new religion that adapted itself to the social condition. In other words, it may safely be said that the regional unification is one of the main factors which enabled the formation of a new religion in South Vietnam. On the other hand, I am not concerned with the questions of the economic changes of the society and the intention of French colonial policy, even though they are important.

2. Vietnamese Mendicant Buddhism Khất sĩ

The founding patriarch of the Khất sĩ tradition was Minh Dăng Quang. He founded the tradition in 1944 with the vow "Nối truyền Thích Ca chánh pháp" (Transmitting the correct Dharma of Sakyamuni), which became the motto of the Khất sĩ tradition. The new tradition is regarded as the Buddhism sect which "fuse" both the Mahayana and Theravada

doctrines. The total number of Khất sĩ 's pagoda is 361, and the total number of monks, excluding those who are studying to become monks (sa-di), is 2,359 (Social Republic of Vietnam Government Committee for Religious Affairs 2006). To be a full-fledged monk or nun, a men (*tỳ-kheo*)must observe 250 precepts, while a woman (*tỳ-kheo ni*) 348 precepts. Many monks study abroad in Myanmar, Cambodia, India, China, and U. S. A.

Khất sĩ followers believe in only Sakyamuni and recite sutras in Vietnamese. They observe a vegetarian diet, shave their head, wear a certain type and color of robe.[1] But unlike Mahayana sects, they seek alms and advocate living a lifestyle that is closer to the historical Buddha, in the fashion of Theravada Buddhism. Since Zen meditation and mendicancy are regarded as important practices for them, they practice mendicancy in the eraly morning and Zen meditation three times a day (each time lasts about one hour). However, in recent years, in Hochiminh City, as false monks wearing monk's cloth appeared and asked for alms, Khất sĩ and Theravada sects were prohibited from seeking alms. In an urban area, pagodas depend on money, food, medicine, and cloths from donation made by the laity.

We can see Khất sĩ pagodas in the midland of the south Vietnam, but not in the north Vietnam. This is probably because in the north Vietnam Mahayana Buddhism has become more popular. Generally a pagoda in Vietnam is called "Chùa" but Khất sĩ pagoda is called "Ṭinh xá," which means an abbey. The Khất sĩ tradition is recognized as one of the official Buddhist sects, and is a member of the Vietnamese Buddhist Sangha (Giáo hội Khất sĩ Việt Nam), established in 1981.

3. Multi-ethnic society in Mekong Delta

Prior to becoming a French colony, the Mekong Delta was home to indigenous Khmer people. They had been living in the Mekong Delta long before they constructed Angkor Wat. However, they were gradually driven out by an influx of Chinese and Kinh (Vietnamese) people because this area represented a true frontier to the Chinese and Kinh. At the end of the 17th century, the Kinh took control of Prey Nokor,[2] which was located in the territory of the Khmer, as a base for the Kinh expansion into southern areas. Following this, the pioneering days of the Kinh continued unfettered for around a century. Furthermore, among these pioneers, there were surviving retainers of the Ming Dynasty, who had traveled from China. In this way, the Kinh developed the Mekong Delta and led lives mainly revolving around agriculture. In the new frontier of the Mekong Delta, a small population and a surplus of space increased the mobility of inhabitants; in southern villages, these different groups of people often lived alongside each other. However, their villages had yet to take on a clear form and were not integrated on an administrative level. Thus, we can infer that the society in this region already had a basis to form a multi-ethnic society

through influxes of different ethnic groups. It was under the French rule that this multi-ethnicity was consolidated and further expanded.

Development of the Mekong Delta began in earnest under the French colonial rule. Originally, this region—in particular, the western morasses—was not particularly suitable for human habitation, let alone rice cultivation. However, development at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century resulted in the production of commodities aimed for export. From the end of the 19th century, the colonial policies of French Indochina were aimed at integrating Indochina into its own economy and Indochina also came to play a part in securing and expanding the market for French products.

By the time colonization was complete, France had further expanded the boundary of Indochina to include surrounding countries. It had changed the socioeconomic systems by force and had conspired to introduce the colonial culture in these countries. As a result, these countries were subsumed into a single nation, and a society which was different from the past was formed as if the countries had become a single colony. This compelled the people living in this colony to accept major changes. One of these changes was the emergence of a multi-ethnic society.

Many development activities in a wide range of fields were achieved by implementing the French colonial policies, including the transformation of land systems, the upgradation of infrastructure, and the improvement of education and sanitation. Although the land reform hit the poor, local residents hard, the residents benefited greatly from the reforms such as the upgradation of infrastructure and the improvement of education and sanitation. Among these, it was in particular the French infrastructure policies that consolidated the mobility and multi-ethnicity of these regional ethnic groups (Hammer 1966: 63–71).

(1) Land Transport (Taiheiyou Kyokai 1940: 280–304)

During the French rule, the Mekong Delta, which until then was undeveloped, gained priority for development; thus, railroads, roads, and waterways were put in place, creating a region in which people moved around actively and the exchange of goods was facilitated.

・Railroads

Railroads in Indochina spanned a total distance of 3,370 km, comprising the northern, southern, Cambodian, and Yunnan railroads. The railroads were mainly used for inter-country transportation. More roads and waterways than railroads were developed in the Mekong Delta.

・Roads

By 1939, the total length of the national and regional roads developed in the region was 35,890 km. Route 1, also called route mandarine, was the most important national road. This was a wide motorable road extending 26,000 km in length, and it connected the four

major cities of Hanoi, Hue, Saigon, and Phnom Penh. With this road as the main artery, intersecting roads stretching nationwide were put in place, similar to veins stretching from the artery.

With the development of these roads, there was a marked increase in automobile traffic and activities such as the construction of bridges. While railroads were limited to main cities and towns, automobiles were used as the main mode of transport to access remote areas. Local residents generally used bus, which aided people's transportation.

(2) Water Transport (Taiheiyou Kyokai 1940: 305–319)

・Maritime Transport

A large proportion of cities on the 2,500-km-long Indochina coastline face the China Sea. However, although the coast is flat, there are sheer cliffs all the way along, and only the delta regions are relatively extensive. Hence, good ports were not present in abundance in French Indochina, with only Hai-Phong and Saigon fulfilling the role of important sea routes. However, with the development of maritime transportation, there was an increase in the number of people moving from China to Indochina and it is possible that most of the Chinese people who came to this region used maritime transportation.

・Domestic Water Transport

Two rivers were developed for transportation in French Indochina: the Red River in the north and the downstream of the Mekong River in the south. The Mekong River is the only waterway in French Indochina connecting Cambodia and Thailand. In Cambodia, as Lake Tonle Sap regulates the volume of this river, one can sail upstream to the inland capital city of Phnom Penh. Furthermore, in Cochin China it diverges into a number of tributaries, forming a giant delta with the Đồng Nai River and the Saigon River. This area plays a vital role in river transportation in Cochin China and Cambodia. The port of Saigon developed in this delta area played a central role by linking the respective regions. It formed the center of government, industry, and commerce, and was an important port for land and maritime transportation in the southern part of French Indochina. People in the Mekong Delta region used the canals and waterways constructed by the French and traveled between different areas of the delta and Cochin China.

In this way, by having improved access to transportation, the movement of people within the territory became easier; furthermore, the population (by birth and immigration/migration) increased due to the development of the region and the building of plantations. Thus, the population became concentrated in coastal cities on the Mekong River and the density of various ethnic groups living alongside each another increased. Thus, there were thriving exchanges and interactions among people in Cochin China and the region entered a period of high-mobility.

In such social situation, Khất sĩ was formed and accepted, but it is important to explain the background and the movement of the founder Minh Dăng Quang.

4. Religious emigrant, Minh Dăng Quang

Minh Dăng Quang, the founding patriarch of Khất sĩ, was born Nguyễn Thành Đạt in 1923 to a peasant family (the youngest of a family of five) from the village of Phú Hậu, Bình Phú prefecture, Tam Bình district in Vĩnh Long Province in the Mekong delta; today, ấp 6, xã Hậu Lộc, huyện Tam Bình, tỉnh Vĩnh Long (6th village of Hậu Lộc, Tam Bình district in Vĩnh Long Province). He founded the tradition at the age of 23 and passed away at 32 (1954). It was said that he disappeared suddenly and was never been heard of since, but it was rumored that he was assasinated by agents of a rival Buddhist sect who saw his growing movement as a threat to their own power base in the Mekong Delta.

Because his mother, *Phạm thị Nhàn*, died of disease after his birth, he was raised by the stepmother, *Hà thị Song*. He was interested in Buddhism and had an intention to become a monk since early childhood. At first his parents were opposed to him but he became a monk in spite of opposition at last. In 1938, he migrated to Cambodia, and was taught Buddhism by a master who was half Viet[3] and half Khmer. By way of parenthesis, there were rumors that Minh Dăng Quang was a half Viet and half Khmer too.[4]

While his stay in Cambodia for about 4 years, he was engaged in the disciple's life and studied the sutra of Theravada Buddhism. Then he decided to pass on his experience to Vietnam, and returned with master's permission. However, on his return, he was married through his parents' arrangement to Kim Huê, who originated from Sai Gon.[5] Then after his wife's death, he became a monk at LINH BỬU pagoda in My Tho in 1944. After that, he named himself Minh Dăng Quang as monk's name and established Khất sĩ. He formed the systematic foundation and preached his thought to people in the south until 1954.

The above is an outline of Minh Dăng Quang's history and the formation of Khất sĩ. As the next topic, we should note that he grew up in a multi-ethnic society and studied Cambodian Buddhism in French Indo-china (Cochin-china). These two points are concerned with the formation of Khất sĩ. Now, it is necessary to see why and how he traveled to Cambodia.

Vietnamese general education in Indo-china was modernized by French colonial policy and was established in the early 20th century, following the French model. At the primary education level, pupils were required to study French and the native language. Education for monks in Vietnam was not systematical one; in each temple the master taught the sutra and precepts to the disciples by word of mouth and had them gain experiences through practice. Each Buddhist sect had its way of mission, so the relationships between them were not so close. For common pepole, however, the temple was the religious place, and at the

same time was the place where children were able to study characters and people were able to cultivate mutural friendship. On the other hand, in Cambodia in the end of 19th century, France dispersed French language to make their colonial rule penetrate the society effectively. It was popular in Cambodia to learn the mother tongue, easy arithmetic and literature from wise monks in a temple. This educational institution, attached to most Cambodian temples, was a kind of Buddhist school similar to the private elementary school of the Edo period in Japan. Monks taught admonition and morals with the Buddhist stories besides the liberal studies in the school. There were more than 2,000 village schools in Cambodia (Bell 1942: 26–29). In the 20th century, these small schools were authorized as the elementary course by the ordinance of Governor. The ordinance stipulated for the reformation of the schools and also the construction of teachers schools for monks in 1908. After that, this educational policy was applied in the whole country, and 3,000 temple schools were opened by 1911 (Sasagawa 2006: 113–114).

France established the royal library (1923) and the Buddhist institute (1930) in Phnom Penh. The French planned to separate the rerationship between Cambodian Buddhism and Thai Buddhism in the way of making Cambodia the central point of Indo-china (Edwards 1999: 311–313). Then monks and students, who intended to study Buddhism, gathered in Phnom Penh from all over Indochina. Minh Dăng Quang was one of the students who studied Theravada Buddhism in Cambodia as well as HỘ TÔNG.[6] Although no document existed that recorded in detail how Minh Dăng Quang traveled to Cambodia and where he studied, we can suppose that it was not so hard to travel from Vĩnh Long to Cambodia because of the developing condition of transport in Indochina, as mentioned above. Furthermore, under the French colonial policy, people were permitted to travel in the country to some extent. That is to say, Buddhist cultural exchange between Vietnam and Cambodia was in full flood too.

On the other hand, at that time people's livings were not easy at all, especially for people who lived in a farming village. Under the land policy of the French government, the burden on the poor farmer increased day by day; in other words, it was the age when the rich grew richer and the poor grew poorer. Then the poor was forced into a tight condition, and came to seek a cult religion. Indeed, during this period a lot of cults appeared in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam and gathered followers (Nguyen Hong Duong 2004: 336–337). Some of them would be powerful in the future like Caodaism and HoaHao.

Under the circumstances, Minh Dăng Quang established Khất sĩ, intending to spread Cambodian Buddhism (Theravada) with the addition of some elements of Mahayana. For the founder, Khất sĩ was a variety of Buddhism based on Theravada Buddhism. After all, the social background and the founder's own background affected the birth of Khất sĩ. Thus, the regional integration as Indo-china (Cochin-china) caused high-level mobility as

well as a new form of religion.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we investigated the formation of a multi-ethnic society in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam, and the impact of religious emigration under the French colonial policy, Indo-china. As a result, a new form of Buddhism, Khất sĩ, appered and developed in the society.

These facts suggest several important observations concerning the social relationships of colonization and religion. First, the colonization, by combining various regions into an integral borderless region, and thus reconstructing the nation as a capitalistic area, changed the life-style and the social connection in the area. Second, in the religious circles, the ideological exchange formulated new religions with the regional characteristics; for example, Caodaism, Hoa Hao Buddhism and Khất sĩ.

In the case of Khất sĩ, the founder based his thought on the experiences of emigration and established a religious community in the multi-ethnic society, where three types of Buddhism[7] were practiced. He was able to grasp his times and the general context, because his doctrine was acceptable to Vietnamese. In other words, the times and the general context gave him an opportunity for self-actualization.

The present study is intended to be exploratory with limited data of one of Vietnamese monks who went to Cambodia at that time. We can expect the existence of such monks, but can not obtain the concrete number of such monks yet. However, it is important to note that my objective is to examine the background in which Khất sĩ was established in the Mekong Delta. Some cases of the interchange of monks between Vietnam and Cambodia, therefore, were instrumental in achieving this objective. This kind of information may be far more significant for understanding Khất sĩ Buddhism, which "fused" Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism, than the statistical number of monks.

Future studies can explore some of the issues identified in this study using particular data on both migration in general and migration in Cambodia in particular.

Acknowledgement

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Endnote

1 Ordinarily, monks put on the yellow surplice. Many of them put on the brownish one when they go out and go to school.
2 Hochiminh City is located where Prey Nokor was situated.
3 Means Vietnamese (Kinh).

4 The truth is not confirmed yet.

5 At the time, he was not a full-fledged monk yet.

6 "In the 1920s and 1930s, there were a number of movements in Vietnam for the revival and modernization of Buddhist activities. Together with the re-organization of Mahayana establishments, these were then available in French. Among the pioneers who brought Theravada Buddhism to the ethnic Kinh in 1939 was a young veterinary doctor named Le Van Giang. He was born in the South, received higher education in Hanoi, and after graduation, was sent to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to work for the French government." (Binh Anson 1999)

7 The Buddhism for Vietnamese (Kinh), for Khmer, and for Chinese (Hoa). Ultimately, his doctrine is Buddhism having two elements, which are for monks and for lay believers.

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Russian-speaking Associative Field in Paris and London

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The aim of this paper is to highlight some empirical incomes relevant to the study of contemporary West-bound migration from Russia. The CAAS symposium is particularly well-suited to a cross-disciplinary dialogue of different fieldwork methodologies and approaches to migration. What I shall present in this paper are only a few preliminary ideas resulting from ongoing fieldwork, which I started in 2007.

My research looks at contemporary Russian communities in London and Paris and focuses specifically on the growth of new forms of community activity in the context of Russian-speaking migration more generally (which is usually discussed in broad ethno-national terms).

What I am especially interested in is the process of Russian migrants' mobilisation into particular social networks as a means through which they seek to achieve very specific aims. The formation of social networks is vital to Russian migrants in both Paris and London.

In terms of the practicalities of fieldwork, the social milieu of the migrants in question is arguably the closest to that of the researcher, enabling relatively easier access (not least through the researcher's own social networks and through the mobilisation of her own contacts to serve as 'intermediaries' and 'guarantors'); this has also enabled relatively smoother communication both in general fieldwork interaction and in the more formal semi-structured interviews with individuals who represent key nodes in the networks in question (i. e. individuals involved in the processing and transmission of relevant information or action in the network).

The key aim of my research project is to use the network approach to the study of contemporary Russian-speaking migration to the West. I use social network theory as part of a broader theory of human social relations. I see its virtues lying especially in its flexibility and its ability to account for change—something often ignored by the structural functionalists. (This seems especially important in the study of migration from Russia, which has experienced tremendous changes over the twentieth century, with very little connecting, for instance 'white' aristocratic emigration after 1917 and contemporary post-Soviet economic migration; changes that are due to systemic social, cultural, political and economic shifts over a relatively short period of time in both Russia itself and in the

world at large.)

I also believe that network theory can provide a better understanding of personal motivations for migration and the process through which migrants seek to realise their aims and ambitions, yet without bracketing off either the broader or the narrower socio-economic context which influences these individual aspirations.

As one might expect, in both London and Paris, much information about possible opportunities in host society circulates 'by word of mouth'. Significantly, this kind of information circulates loosely and randomly through communication networks that form around a whole host of ethno-cultural migrant associations—associations, the aim of which is to bring together individuals with similar ethno-cultural and linguistic background in a more general way and for a variety of purposes. One example of such an association would be the Russian church, which many of my interviewees encouraged me to visit as an example of a place where Russians gather, even though they themselves might not attend it regularly or even at all, apart from on big holidays, and even though religion did not seem to play a great role in their lives.

Most of my interviewees stressed the significance of the Russian language as something that unified persons from the entire post-Soviet space. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that key Russian migrant community networks in London, for example, revolve around Russian language schools for the children of migrants.

These schools and the individuals involved in running them become central nodes in networks of wider migrant social, cultural, economic and even political activity within the Russian community in London (including, in some cases, acting as a base for the cultural-political involvement of the Russian government). At the same time these schools also involve specific professional networks, especially those of teachers of Russian language and culture in the Diaspora. Furthermore, several schools can also often form a wider network, which sometimes reaches beyond national borders. For example the head of the London Russian School positions herself as one of the key nodes in the Russian community in London more widely, by also assuming a lead role in the association of Russian schools in Europe (with links formed especially with a school in Paris), and in the Russian government-supported network of Diaspora organisations.

In my own fieldwork I am also interested in those communication networks that form around particular professional associations and which tend to be restricted to forming links specifically between Russian professionals (whether in London or Paris). These associations frequently require more formal membership in order for information to be shared within the network. Having said that, while being restrictive in terms of membership, these associations are not entirely closed and exclusive. For example, the association of Russian jurists in Paris organises regular conferences open to a wider public (mostly a public of

Russian speakers), the purpose of which is to attract future members as well as establish contacts with other Russian associations. In Britain, an example of such a network would be the association of Russian bankers and lawyers working in the City of London.

Interestingly, on the individual level, very different patterns of both personal and professional networking emerge—patterns that cannot be fully grasped if one focuses only on networks based around associations, (whether professional, cultural or other). At this individual level there is far greater diversity of networking patterns. While there are some individuals whose personal networks are composed strictly of 'compatriots', there are others who systematically avoid all interactions with other Russians. Similarly, there are those who seek primarily to develop business and professional relations with French or British partners and thrive in Franco-Russian or Russo-British associations, while there are others who work for Russian enterprises and agencies in London or Paris, and who are often in contact only with Russian colleagues (in the host country or indeed in Russia itself). These diverse networking patterns provide clues to the multiplicity and diversity of identities of these new Russian migrants and they can help explain many of the ambiguities one encounters in these individuals' choices of whom they seek to be linked with and why.

History of Migration

At the beginning of the XXth century Russian speakers « diaspora » comprised 30 million people. Of those 20 million people were living in so called "near abroad", and 10 millions in the rest of the world or "far abroad". I am presenting here the statistics provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia which in my view are exaggerated. The confusion of statistics arises from the difficulty of defining Russian speakers as an imaginary community of people of common language, cultural and historical background.

The Russian speaking communities in France and Great Britain are negligibly small when compared to those of the US or Israel. In France presence of Russian speaking community is mentioned for the first time in XVIII century, and today's we are witnessing a significant influx of the immigrants coming from post-soviet space. Great Britain is not an exception as well and it has become a host country for numerous Russians speakers after the collapse of Soviet Union. The official statistics mentions 300 000[1] of Russian speakers in Great Britain and informal surveys give the figure of about 600 000 of Russian speaking people residing in Great Britain.

The main point I would like to make is not about the importance of quantitative data on Russian speaking immigrants in the world but about the development of the intra and extra community links between the Russian speaking associations in Great Britain and France on one side, and the Russian government on the other side.

The comparison of the Russian speaking immigration in France and Britain is interesting

not only due to the differences in migrant's history in these two countries but also because of the different system of the hosting the immigrants in these countries.

The migration of the Russians speakers begins in the XVIII century but develops throughout the XX century. Between 1917 and the collapse of the Soviet Union Russian immigration in France is characterized by political aims. Nowadays the migrant's flows and migration context is being diversified what helps to create the large interpersonal space of the migrants from different waves of migration.

The migration of Russian speakers to Great Britain is a relatively recent phenomenon. The community in this country is not yet established. This community is homogeneous in terms of the common past shared by each member of this community. But the variety of the socio-professional groups of migrants makes the Russian speaking community extremely diverse.

The aim of my paper is to provide new insight into the identification process of the Russian speakers immigrants. In order to do this I analysed two lexical fields. Those are widely used by community and by Russian politicians dealing with Russian compatriots abroad.

The first is the intercommunity lexical field which is characterized by the self identity. Many different definitions are employed by Russian speaking associations: « Russian », « soviet », « post-soviet », or « Russian speaker », to name but a few. This variety of « ethnic » or « cultural » definition can be attributed to the different periods of emigration from the country of origin. But this explication is not exhaustive. The construction of the « national idea » in Russia requires more precise analysis.

As reported by M. Mendras « Russia has constructed in empire and not in Nation-State » and « Russia and empire, Russia and URSS are synonymous ». The notion of « russian » or « russianass » has more of a cultural dimension than of ethnic one in that sense in the context of migration the new significances emerge. Migrants easily employ the term « post-soviet » than « Russian » or « soviet ». It means that the dimension of the common pass is more important here. Nevertheless, the 'sovietism' independently of its positive or negative sense has an important symbolic dimension. In other words this cultural system is based on the common historical and symbolical background which individuals share between them.

I tried to explain how self identification process functions inside the community field. Now I will try to show how this process is utilised in political aims.

The new Russian government also investigates the self identity field. The statistics of public opinion shows that the victory of USSR in the Second World War has become a significant symbol in Russian history. The discursive analysis of politician shows the importance of this fact in the construction of the national ideology. The second important

element of this ideology is relevant to the collapse of USSR which is named by V.Putin as the most important geopolitical catastrophe of the XX century when millions of Russian compatriots find themselves outside of the border of former Russia. According to the ex-president of Russia V. Putin Russia has to take their responsibilities for the compatriots of the "far" and "near" abroad, because they are the part of the "Russian world". In other words, the debates on the "national idea" in Russia take into consideration the Second World War as its the most important symbol and the consolidation of the "Russian World" including the population of Russia and all its compatriots abroad.

The term "compatriot" is defined by the federal law of 1999 and modified many times later on (the last modification was in 2010). This law states that compatriot is "any citizen of Russian Federation living abroad; person and their descendants living abroad and those who historically forms the part of population living in Russia and who made their free choice to be related to Russia spiritually, culturally or juridically; person whose direct ancestors were living previously in Russia, including soviet citizens and also soviet citizens who became "non-citizens". The work of the consolidation of "Russian World" or "Russian diaspora" is based on the transmission of national ideology of Russian State to communities of compatriots via the representative of compatriots in the host country. In other words, the idea of the consolidation of the "Russian World" is founded on the joining of the Russian compatriots with the Russian Federation, successor of the Russian Empire and later of the USSR by using symbols of the role of Russia in the Second World War. In a sense, national ideology of Russian State and of its compatriots is determined by common historical facts.

Many associations in Great Britain and in France utilise the term "Russian speaking" instead of "post-soviet" or "soviet" which is perceived as very connotative. The associations in Great Britain include members from all the post-soviet space with wider range of contrasted histories of migration than those in France. The term "Russian-speaking" was introduced in order to overcome the divergence on the grounds of religion and ethnicity, thus simplifying the interactions between the members of the associations.

The sense of belonging and the notion of the "distance" are the key-words of the reflexions on the organisation and the transnational activities of the Russian descendants network in Great Britain and in France. This reflexion can be completed by the reflexions on the ideological transnationalism of State of origins which practices regarding its compatriots the policy of the consolidation of the dispersed and less connected communities. One of the aims of my study is to underline the multiplicity of ideological, political, cultural and economical interactions existing between these associations and the State of Russia.

Which are the strategies of distinction used by these associations in Great Britain and in France? How does the Russian State influence these representations? These are closely related questions which I would like to address in my study. According to my definition the

migrant association is the association created in the host country consisting of the people born abroad but living in the host country for more than 3 month or of the people whose parents were born abroad, and the activity of this association is oriented on the host country and on the country of origin. In other words, these associations of Russians born in USSR, Russia or in other former Soviet Republics and Russians whose parents immigrated to Great Britain or France, but were born in USSR, Russia or in other former Soviet Republics independent of their nationality.

The first criteria reflects the mix definition of the foreign person by INSEE and of the compatriot. The second criteria formulate the aim of my study—the interactions between the associations of Russian speaking people and the Russian State.

In this sense, the associations of Russian speaking people is considered to be the way of joining together two territories, host country and country of origin. These associations allow to reduce the distance by their transnational activities. My question is whether these interactions form the autonomous socio-spatial formation called transnational space of migrants or they just serve the aim of political consolidation of the "Russian World"?

Endnote

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"Migration" and Exophonic Writing in Dramas Translated by Tsuga Teishō

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1. Introduction

In these several decades, non-native authors of Japanese language have produced a prodigious amount of quality work in Japanese literature. Aside from the ethnic Korean and Chinese postcolonial authors, the authors from other parts of the world, such as Ian Hideo Levy, David Zoppetti, Arthur Binard, have started to get their works published in Japan energetically since the beginning of the 1990s. What is common among these authors is that, they did not have Japanese-speaking background, and they got acquainted with Japanese language through learning after they had reached adulthood. Now, in the 21st century, the focus of attention is particularly on these authors whose mother tongue is not Japanese. For example, the Akutagawa 芥川 prize, the literature prize for promising new writers of serious literature, was awarded to a Chinese national Yang Yi 楊逸 in 2008, and an Iranian Shirin Nezammafi was nominated for the same prize in 2009 and 2010.

Meanwhile, more and more Japanese-native authors have started to produce their works in two languages. The most outstanding of these attempts is *An I Novel from Left to Right* by Mizumura Minae 水村美苗, printed horizontally in Japanese and English bilingual text. And also there are authors who write in two languages, both native and non-native, such as Tawada Yoko 多和田葉子. She describes her attempts as "Exophony" in her outstanding work, *Ekusophonii: bogo no soto e deru tabi* エクソフォニー 母語の外に出る旅. She defines exophonic literature as "the challenging idea that comes from the intriguing creative question "How to step out of the surrounding native language world? And then what would be the consequences.", and says "Even though the author who can use only one language, if s/he does not 'choose' the language in some way, his/her works cannot be called literature. Exophonic phenomenon asks a critical question that has never been asked before of 'ordinary' literature, which does not go out of mother tongue world; why do you choose this language?"[1]

But actually, contemporary authors are not only ones to be tested by this question. In the history of Japanese literature, *wabun* 和文, Japanese indigenous language, and *kanbun* 漢文, Chinese language had coexisted until Meiji period. It does not only mean Japanese literature

had two different writing styles, but it also shows a kind of multilinguality in written language. However, it is not necessarily the case that Japanese people always considered *kanbun* as a foreign language, because both Japanese and Chinese languages use the kanji characters. In the sense, Japanese authors had used Chinese language to produce their works, and developed Japanized style of Chinese writing which is named *kanbun*. What brought to this peculiar situation was that; Chinese language had become established only as a written language but was not to be used in everyday conversation in Japan.

Chinese language could be divided into vernacular Chinese and literary Chinese. They could not always be clearly split, though their usage depended on the circumstances; the authoritative books of Confucianism and history books were written in literary Chinese, whereas vernacular Chinese was only used in novels, stories and dramas, which are subordinated with ancient traditional values. In Japan, people spoke Japanese language in everyday conversation, whereas literary Chinese was adopted as literary language. It was an essential education for Japanese literati to write and read literary Chinese, albeit vernacular Chinese had been brought to Japan as well.

In this research, I will focus on the translated work named *Shimeizen* 四鳴蝉 (*The Cicada That Calls Four Times*, 1771) written by Japanese author Tsuga Teishō 都賀庭鐘 (1718–ca. 1794) in Edo period. It is noteworthy that; it was translated from his native language, Japanese into a mix style of classical and vernacular form of Chinese, a language non native to him; and was translated into Chinese in the form of Chinese drama. What did Teishō seek by this attempt? I will discuss his work focusing on "exophony", an aim to put his attempt as not a one-way reception but a dialogue with the outer world in Japanese literary history. Specifically, I will discuss two points; how he achieved his "migration" in his translation on his language and form, and how his contemporaries saw their non-native language, Chinese.

2. Tsuga Teishō's Attempt in *Shimeizen*

Roberta Montemorra Marvin summarizes the scholarship about opera as, "[works which] have been transformed or translated in some way, migrating from one medium to another, one era to another, one culture to another, one genre to another."[2] We can see "migration" in *Shimezen*, in terms of both language and genre. The translation of dramas established in the Japanese language, into Chinese shows trans-language "migration". Whereas, the transformation of Japanese dramas into Chinese Ming and Qing *zaju* 雜劇 forms, and the translation of the lyrics modeled on the Southern Chinese style Operas show trans-genre "migration".

Before discussing *Shimeizen*, I will briefly explain the outline of the translation of Chinese dramas in Japan.

The oldest record of the Chinese drama texts imported from China goes back to Keichō period (1596–1615). We can find the title of *Yuan Zhen Xixiang Huizhen ji* 元稹西廂會真記 and Xixiang ji 西廂記 (*Romance of the Western Chamber*) each in Japanese thinker Hayashi Razan (1583–1657)'s diary of his reading records. *Go-bunko mokuroku* 御文庫目録, the archive of shogunate library, also gives the title of *Qin-xin ji* 琴心記 (–1638), *Hong li ji* 紅梨記 (1639), *Mudan ting ji* 牡丹亭記 (*The Peony Pavilion*) (1646), *Yuan ren zaju bai zhong* 元人雜劇百種 (*Anthology of one hundred pieces of Yuan zaju*) (1646), and *Hong fo ji* 紅佛記 (*Red Duster*) (1654) and so on. According to other records, *Xixiang ji* and a drama anthology *Zhuibaiqiu* 綴白裘 (*A Cloak of Patchworked White Fur*) were brought to Japan in 1726, *Li-weng chuanqi shi zhong* 笠翁傳奇十種, *Xueyuntang pidian yanzi jian ji* 雪韻堂批點燕子箋記 and *Yili-an xinbian Renshouguan chuanqi* 一笠庵新編人獸關傳奇 in 1728, and *Pipa ji* 琵琶記 (*The story of Lute*), *Huan hun ji* 還魂記 (*The Return of the Soul*, a. k. a. *The Peony Pavilion*) in 1735.

Thus, a few literati had started to enjoy Chinese dramas in Japan, then translated and adapted these works to make them get a large readership. The oldest example of translation in existence is the work included in *Shinkoku yakusha kōmoku* 新刻役者綱目, translated by Hachimonji-ya Jishō 八文字屋自笑, which was published the same year as *Shimeizen*, 1771. Jishō picked up two chapters named *Jie shen* 結蜃 and *Shuang ding* 雙訂 from *Shen zhong lou* 蜃中樓 (*The Illusory Tower*) by Li Yu 李漁, to translate it in the form of Japanese *kabuki* while retaining the original role-types of Chinese drama, such as *sheng* 生 (the young male lead) and *dan* 旦 (female lead). Chinese theater is a form of musical theater, and the arias which consist dramas are written to *qupai* 曲牌, or pre-existing tunes. In the translation of *Shinkoku yakusha kōmoku*, Jishō rendered all of the tunes to "*jiuta kyoku*" 地唱曲, and indicated no names of each of the tunes in original text, thus we cannot tell how he understood the music of Chinese dramas. In 1774, Jishō published *Yakusha Zensho* 役者全書 and expounded the role-types, format and technical terms in Chinese theater according to the article "*Danqiu Xiansheng Lun Qu*" 丹丘先生論曲, a supplement in *Yuan-qu xuan* 元曲選 (Anthology of Yuan Plays). That is to say, for the readers in those days, the interesting point of Chinese drama was not only the plot and character, but also how Chinese actors performed them in real theater. And how the specialized terms used in Japanese *kabuki* 歌舞伎 or *joruri* 浄瑠璃, corresponded directly to the terms used in Chinese drama texts was also a matter of great interest.

The introduction of Chinese drama to Japan was not in the form of real performance but mainly in the form of literary text. One of the few occasions to access the real performances was to see those at *Tōjin Yashiki* 唐人屋敷 (Chinese residences in Nagasaki), whereas almost only *Nagasaki bugyō* 長崎奉行 (officials of the Tokugawa shogunate in Nagasaki) and their retainers could have had chances to see them. It can be easily imagined that the literati in neither Edo nor Osaka had occasions to see real performances.

In these circumstances, Teishō translated Japanese plays such as *nō, kabuki* and *jōruri* into Chinese using the form of Chinese drama in *Shimeizen*. This is the first "migration"; the migration of the form. As a matter of form, *Shimeizen* basically transformed into Chinese *zaju* forms of Ming and Qing Dynasty, meanwhile, act 1 Hana wo Oshimu no Ki 惜花記 did not use northern tunes used in *zaju* 雑劇 but used southern tunes used in *chuanqi* 伝奇. It can be implied that Teishō mimicked the form of Ming *zaju* especially "*Si sheng yuan*" 四声猿 (*Four Shrieks of Gibbon*)[3], though he used *chuanqi* especially "*Yu zan ji*" 玉簪記 (*The Jade Hairpin*) as its model for lyrics. It should be noted that he translated not only *nō* and *kabuki* but also *jōruri* in the form of Chinese drama. As is the case with above-mentioned translation by Hachimonji-ya Jishō, Chinese dramas were translated ordinarily in the form of *kabuki* in those days. The second "migration" is of the language, which migrated from Japanese to Chinese. Teishō translated the Japanese plays where each of them had its own linguistic characteristics, similar to the style of Chinese drama, whereby, he added some literary vocabularies which would not be used conventionally in Chinese dramas. Therefore, the language of *Shimeizen* had more literary characteristics.

In terms of these two "migration", I will illustrate Teishō's attempt in *Shimeizen*. In his short article *Tenshi no yin* 填詞引 in *Shimeizen*, Teishō made an attempt to clearly distinguish between the elegant *nō* 能 and vulgar Chinese drama, *kabuki* and *jōruri*, though he considered Chinese *zaju*[4] as the origin of *nō*. That is to say, through the "migration" of the form, that is to translate the elegant *nō* in the form of vulgar Chinese drama, Teishō attempted to give *nō* back to its roots, i.e. Chinese drama. Chinese drama, Japanese *nō*, kabuki and *jōruri*, were originated from the same roots, though having already been divided into elegant and vulgar by the time Teisho was alive. So he translated *nō*, kabuki and *jōruri*, into Chinese using the form of Chinese drama, as an attempt to explain both of them on the same dimension. Then, the new dimension he had explored was the elegant or the vulgar? It must be the elegant, since the elegant always is placed above the vulgar in his concept of literature. However, Chinese drama was regarded as vulgar in those days. Thus, Teishō handled this matter tactfully by changing the writing style slightly. This is the very point of his "migration" of language. He used the mixed style of vernacular and literary Chinese, the same used for Chinese drama, but at the same time put literary vocabularies which would not be conventionally used in Chinese dramas.. This resulted in the whole work of *Shimeizen* to have a more literary tone than ordinary Chinese drama. We can form a hypothesis from above; what he intended in *Shimeizen* was the attempt acceptance of the vulgar by linking up the vulgar to the elegant through the "migration" of both form and language. As for the writing style, vernacular language was not accepted on its merits but had to be linked up with literary language so that it could be the window to the ancient elegant world.

3. Chinese as A Non-Native Language

The largest number of Han-Chinese works written by Japanese authors was in the genre of poetry and prose. There are only a few works of novels and stories, particularly in vernacular Chinese. As for the dramas, there are some pieces of translation of *jōruri* into vernacular Chinese, though the oldest existing work is *Shimeizen*. Both *Shimeizen* and Hachimonji-ya Jishō's translation of the work of Li Yu were published in 1771. This shows the comparatively early reception of Chinese drama in Japan.

Behind the interest in Chinese vernacular literature was the rise of interest in Chinese language itself. Although Japanese literati could read and write in Chinese, they only had the discipline of literary Chinese, and most of them remained ignorant of vernacular Chinese. As for the literati of that time, Chinese was the language to learn through writings, and was hardly used in everyday conversation. Hence, the literati attached importance to the study of coveted Chinese classics, and placed more emphasis on the literacy and less on conversational skill. Inevitably the main object of their learning was not vernacular Chinese but literary Chinese. But later, they had started to read the texts written in vernacular Chinese since that was needed for studying the Ming criminal code and Zhu Xi 朱熹 Confucianism during the Edo period. The Confucian scholars needed to read them as well.

The central roles of *Tōwa* 唐話 study, which means the study of vernacular Chinese language, were mainly taken by the Zen monks, some local governments, and *Tō tsūji* 唐通事. The Zen monks had got acquainted with colloquial Chinese through the collections of Zen Buddist *kōans* 公案 since Muromachi period. Likewise, the local governments also took the key role, for example Mito domain took on Zhu Shunshui, the surviving retainer of Ming dynasty, to impart practical knowledge and theories of Chinese studies. At the same time, *Tō tsūji*, the translators of Chinese in Nagasaki, which was the contact point for international trading, also promoted the diffusion of knowledge of vernacular Chinese. *Tōwa* studies later got penetrated in the central part of Japan. Especially Shogun Tokugawa Tsunayoshi 徳川綱吉, known for his passion for study, was also aggressive about studying vernacular Chinese. One of his followers Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu 柳沢吉保, taught himself some vernacular Chinese at first, later enlisted the services of Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666–1728) because of Sorai's unique scholarly talent. I will illuminate the contribution of Ogyū Sorai, who was one of the important scholars who had played a big role to the development of *Tōwa* study, from the perspective of the concerns of the literati.

Ogyū Sorai established the *kobunji* 古文辞, or the study of ancient language preserved in the Five Classics which represents the path followed by earlier kings. His concept of language is represented in the dictionaries named *Yakubun Sentei* 訳文筌蹄 (1714–15) and *Kunyaku Shimō* 訓訳示蒙 (1735, a posthumous publication), which explicates Kanji characters that are homophones in Japanese.

In those days, most Japanese people studied Chinese through a particular reading method called *kundoku* 訓読, which allowed Japanese to read Chinese texts by rearranging the character order so that it matched Japanese grammar. However, Sorai pointed out the problems inherent to the *kundoku* method. His point of view was that the readers should not mindlessly follow their forerunners in reading the text but translate it, taking into consideration the differences between Japanese and Chinese, modern language and the archaic words. On the basis of his thought, there is the recognition of the otherness of Chinese. He indicated the difference between Japanese and Chinese repeatedly in *Yakubun Sentei*. It seems that this difference was very obvious, though we can see that the readers in those days would never have been critical to *kundoku* and would not have thought of the original meaning in the Chinese contexts.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that he compiled these manuals not only to enable one to read but also to write like native-Chinese. Sorai considered that it is essential for people who want to be in touch with the thought of ancient people to strive for mastery of writing poem and prose in Chinese.[5]

Tsuga Teishō did not have a chance to learn from Sorai, and what company he kept is still unclear, but we can postulate that Teishō was greatly influenced by Sorai because Teishō wrote a preface to Ogyū Sorai's book *Narubeshi* 徂徠先生可成談 in his earlier days. Although allegedly Teishō made his collection of poems titled *Taikō Gyoshō* 大江漁唱, it cannot be traced now, and we cannot see how he reflected Sorai's thought of literature in his Chinese written poems. Nevertheless, we can see from his novels that the concept of translation Sorai emphasized is also the core concept in Teishō's literature. Especially in his early work, *Kokon Kidan Hanabusa zōshi* 古今奇談英草紙, a collection of short Yomihon 読本 stories including the adaptations from Chinese fictions including vernacular stories and plays, he followed some original sentences faithfully almost to be regarded as translations. It's notable that he recreated the variety of writing style of the original text through using both indigenous Japanese and *kundoku* style. In his short article "*Tenshi no yin*" in *Shimeizen*, he writes "Why could he be called good author if he could not express what he wanted to say in another language." He attempted to bridge the gap between Japanese and Chinese, between modern language and the archaic words in *Shimeizen*. The translation does not mean to replace one word with another automatically, but to make a concept in one language world exposed to another world. Some concepts are brought to another language world for what it was, and others are modified as a result. It might be said that what Teishō tried through writing *Shimeizen* was not the way he brought the usage of Chinese vocabulary into Japanese context, like he had used in his novels, but to bring Japanese language out of Japanese context and to make it exposed to Chinese. We can see this kind of attempt in his narrative as well.

4. Tsuga Teishō's Journey to Another World

One of Teishō's favorite motifs is that of the central characters leaving their society, or they leaving for supernatural worlds (such as hell). Although these works include the adaptation of Chinese vernacular stories, only Feng Menglong's two collections of short vernacular stories, *Yu shi ming yan* 喩世明言 (*Clear Words to Instruct the World*) and *Jing shi tong yan* 警世通言 (*Common Words to Warn the World*), which were mainly adapted by Teishō, contain 80 stories on various themes. The fact that he selected stories with the aforementioned theme suggests that he was most oriented toward that theme.

In these series of stories, the most noteworthy work is the sixth story of the collection of short stories *Shige shige ya wa* 繁野話, *Sokei kanjin nishi wo morokoshi ni tazusaeru koto* 素卿官人二子を唐土に携る話. This is the work of imagination based on a real character So Sokei (Song Suqing) and his trouble in Ningbo, China and the Yokyoku 謡曲 *Tōsen* 唐船.

A Chinese man named Sokei 素卿 got on the wrong side of his relatives and abandoned his wife and two kids to leave for Japan. After his arrival, he took to learning and made a fortune; later, he was appointed to go to China as an emissary. His two Japanese-born children begged him to take them with him, and he consented. In his hometown in China, he found his once abandoned children were suffering from extreme poverty after they lost all their relatives. He decided to settle in China, and made all his four children settle in Ningbo, and departed for Japan, promising that he would return soon. However, when he next returned to China, the Japanese accompanying him got into serious trouble, resulting in his execution. In this story, Teishō made Sokei pour out his heart to the dilemma he faced. Sokei commented, "It's all because I lived in two countries; now I really don't know what my destiny will be tomorrow." He once became free from his home country; after coming to Japan, he served at Muromachi Palace and rose to a position of wealth and honor. However, he became involved in Japanese customs, and was still required to leave his children in Japan as hostages when he got appointed to go to China. Moreover, the two Japanese who committed a heinous crime were not subjected to punishment because they were foreign emissaries in China, yet Sokei was executed according to the laws of the Ming dynasty.

In this story, Teishō depicts the tragedy brought by a situation in which a man departed from the world to which he originally belonged to in order to obtain temporary freedom, became bound to his new world, and even his original world could not set him free. This tragedy gently hints at his awareness of his style of writing.

5. Conclusion

On the basis of above discussion, I will illustrate what Teishō aimed by writing *Shimeizen.*

Firstly, I depicted the character of his translation by forming a contrast to the works of his

contemporary, Hachimonji-ya Jishō. The translated works of Jishō adapted the form of *kabuki* and have presented the dialog through the words used in *kabuki* as well. On the contrast, Teishō translated not only vulgar *kabuki* and *jōruri* but also elegant *nō* into Chinese using the form of Chinese drama in *Shimeizen*. It shows his attempt of acceptance of the vulgar by linking up to the elegant through both "migration" of form and language. As for the writing style, he added some literary vocabularies which would not be conventionally used in Chinese dramas, therefore, the language of *Shimeizen* has more literary characteristics.

Secondly, I focused on the discourse of Ogyū Sorai, and illuminated the background of *Shimeizen*, especially how the literati had become motivated to write Chinese poems and prose and placed it as their goal. At the same time, I discussed how the essential difference between Japanese and Chinese language was highlighted in author's mind not only through the reading of the Chinese text but also through the highly practical act of writing Chinese works.

In the third part of this article, I placed *Shimeizen* as the application of migration of language in Teishō's literature world. The cross- border motif which is used repeatedly in his works simultaneously means his "migration" in his selection of language and writing style. In his works, most of his protagonists try to "migrate" to another world, and decide to go back to their original world finally. It might hold true with author's choice of writing style.

Now consider Teishō's attempt from the perspective of "exophony" again. Exophony is the question that "How to step out of the surrounding native language world? And then what would be the consequences?" as mentioned at the beginning. Teishō started his literary life from the adaptation of Chinese vernacular stories in trying to re-create the colorfulness of the writing style in original text. These attempts in the collection of short stories like *Kokon Kidan Hanabusa zōshi* and *Shigeshige ya wa*, finally evolved into his monumental work, *Shimeizen*, as a wild attempt to take Japanese language out to the field of Chinese language. Teishō stepped out of his native language world not through creating his own work but by translation. However, he could not reach the point to handle Chinese as his own literary language. What is important is that he wrote in the language he could not speak. Then did his attempt of producing the works in his non native language, vernacular Chinese, end in failure in the sense of stepping out from the world of his mother tongue?

Shimeizen was published in Japan and was only accepted in Japanese territory, and had a very small and limited circulation. In contrast to his intention to step out of his native language, the main readers were people who lived in Japanese environment and had some knowledge about vernacular Chinese from printed books. A Sharebon 洒落本 work named

Hō Ton Chin Kei 和唐珍解 (1785) by Tōrai Sanna 唐来参和 cited the lines from *Shimeizen* with some syllabic characters which indicate the pronunciation. It shows that there even was an author who wanted to use a few vernacular Chinese lines to display a high-class taste in his own works. That is to say, Teishō's attempt was imperfect in terms of language skills and the work itself was accepted only in the territory of Japanese language.

Thereby, nowadays when it comes to talking about stepping out from one's mother tongue, Japanese Han-Chinese literature is already being forgotten. However, the attempt of travelling outward from Japanese language had existed even in the era when the geographical migration was not easy like today.

When we consider the influence of Chinese literature, not only the one-sided acceptance of Chinese literature but the depth of Japanese literature which was brought by the attempt of being exposed to Chinese might have to be evaluated as well.

Endnote

1 Tawada Yoko, *Ekusophonii: bogo no soto e deru tabi* エクソフォニー 母語の外に出る旅. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2003. 6–7.

2 Marvin, Roberta Montemorra. "Migration and transformations" In *Operatic migrations: transforming works and crossing boundaries*, ed. by Roberta Montemorra Marvin and Downing A. Thomas. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2006. 1–6.

3 Teishō also adapted the first play of the "Sisheng yuan" into his story "Yoshino shōjō ningen ni asobite kabu wo tsutauru koto" 吉野猩々 人間に遊て歌舞を伝る話 in 1783.

4 This theory has already been rejected. For details to Wang, Dong-lan 王冬蘭. "*Nō* ni okeru genkyoku eikyō setsu—sono keii to haikei 能における元曲影響説－その経緯と背景." In *Nō ni okeru Chūgoku* 能における中国, Tokyo: Tōhō shoten, 2005.

5 Hino, Tatsuo. 日野龍夫 "Bungaku shi jō no Sorai gaku・han Sorai gaku" 文学史上の徂徠学・反徂徠学 In *Nihon shisō taikei 37 Sorai gaku ha*, 日本思想大系 37 徂徠学派 ed. by Rai, Tsutomu. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1972.

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Transnational Diaspora Linkages: A Comparative Analysis of Tamil and Sikh Networks

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1. Introduction

Information communication technology (ICTs) outlets such as the Internet have become a main vehicle through which many diasporas maintain linkages with their country of origin. Such avenues have come to serve as a platform to discuss ideas and objectives surrounding community grievances. Diasporas increasingly have the capacity to foster violent and sophisticated networks of resistance. This paper is concerned with transnational relations in the framework of diaspora linkages.

Group narratives can be 'marketed' in a multitude of ways (human rights appeals versus religiosity for example). This paper looks to compare the impact of such framing. Emphasis is placed on uncovering how ICTs foster conceptions of group identity. These narratives can come to resonate with community grievances. The Internet in particular has created a 'wireless platform' for many diaspora populations, rebel organizations and transnational activists respectively. Much impetus is placed on uncovering the origins of framing narratives in relation to exploitive media campaigns and 'borderless grievance'.

The paper undertakes an exploratory comparative analysis of Sikh and Tamil diaspora groups respectively. Both groups demonstrate notable transnational linkages between various immigration hubs and differ significantly in their abilities to mobilize. Emphasis will be placed on analyzing the frames surrounding the willingness and receptiveness of community members to engage in such narratives.

2. Networked ICTs

Information communication technologies (ICTs), have amplified the ability of diaspora members to establish and maintain host-homeland links. Diasporas have moved beyond the passive role, especially when considering the influence email, message board/chat rooms, and independent websites have had in facilitating narratives and raising community consciousness. "Internet technology facilitates issue framing".[1] Such narrative framing has become the basis for the establishment of cyber grass root organizations within diaspora communities. These transnational virtual communities allow for the discussion of cultural

norms, and values. With limited hierarchy, wireless platforms are open to those who wish to engage.

3. Case Studies

Tamil Grievances

Decades of mass riots and rebellion have rooted the identity of many Sri Lankan Tamils in the 'struggle for independence' and political validation. This is particularly evident in the level of activism within respective diaspora populations. With the Sinhalese accounting for roughly 74% of the country's population many Tamils feel there to be a clear ethnic separation between relative 'legitimate' power and social platform access.[2]

As the ethnic majority, the Sinhalese gained relative power over the country during the period of decolonisation. This was due to the fact that much of the nationalist movement's call for independence was largely spearheaded by the Sinhalese. Tamil narratives read decolonisation as the basis of divisive injustice that would come to frame group grievances for decades to come. Such sentiments fuelled the establishment of a Tamil national press in the 1930s; which after 1948 became a major platform for calls for independence.[3] During the 1950s, perceived injustices were further exacerbated by multiple policies which marginalized the Tamil minority. Most notable was the 'Sinhala Only' policy of 1956, in which Sinhalese was made the country's only official language.[4]

It was only after the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that Tamils established a more unified, victim based group narrative. Militant in nature, the LTTE was formed by the Tamils Student' Union in the mid 1970s as an aggressive revamp of the Tamil New Tigers.[5] Grievances revolved around human rights violations against innocent Tamil civilians and the corrupt activities of the Sri Lankan army.[6] This has spearheaded narratives of 'victimhood' and a desire for an independent state 'Tamil Eeelam' in north east Sri Lanka. Ethnic tensions reached all time high in 1983 when the LTTE killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers —which after a series of riots, exploded into a full on civil war.[7]

Until a temporary ceasefire in February of 2002, the civil war spanned some 18 years— leaving hundreds of thousands dead.[8] It was only in 2009, with the death of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran that the rebel organization laid down their arms. However, with years of on going conflict, 2009 was hardly a 'victory' for governing officials. Decades of ethnic rioting and ultimately civil war have fuelled a backlash within respective diaspora populations. Although the LTTE may be (or *have* been) at the root of respective group narratives—it is now the case that the diaspora maintains the ever-evolving 'borderless grievances' of Tamil Eelam.

Tamil identity is rooted in ethno-nationalist calls for independence, stemming from both the LTTE and diaspora networks.[9] When considering the migration patterns of respective

members, the Tamil diaspora largely carries a conflict based identity. Although many Tamils emigrated in the early years of independence, a mass exodus occurred in reaction to the outbreak of the 1983 civil war.[10] Between 1983 and 1998, 450,000 plus Sri Lankan Tamils were noted to be seeking asylum in Western Europe and North America.[11] Networks have since grown larger, going from under 2,000 (in 1983) in Canada for example to some 110–200,000 (90% residing in Toronto).[12]

Sikh Grievances

India's independence and partition marks a period in which Sikh grievances were officially formalized into a quest for political representation vis-à-vis the establishment of Khalistan (land of the pure). Partition marks an extremely tense period in South Asian history. Managing Hindu, Muslim and Sikh populations (amongst others) proved difficult for Indian governing authorities and British colonials. With the maps of Punjab redrawn some three times between 1930 and 1940, Sikh demands for independence had been brewing for sometime.[13] Some 200,000 were killed during this process of partition.[14] Political chaos surrounding partition further fuelled the narrative that emancipation from 'Hindu India' would be the only solution for the Sikh *panth* (community).

Conceptions of Khalistan have been framed around religion, communalism, and the greater diaspora.[15] Religion remains the basis of inclusion and exclusion for the Sikh diaspora. Narratives often site the creation of the Muslim state Pakistan as justification for Khalistan. Communal links tie farming and Punjabi folklore as clear cultural distinctions of Sikh 'ethnicity'. Many Sikh men migrated to the United Kingdom from the 1860s to 1940s as military and police recruits. Hence, narratives appealing for statehood are not new—rather reactions have changed. This was most notable in the 1970s, when Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan bought out a page in the New York Times (12 October 1971) appealing for a Sikh state.[16]

Without major cause for eruption and mobilization, acts similar to those of Dr. Chauhan were largely nixed by host and homeland populations. With a lack of tangible grievances, group narratives were not mobilized until the catastrophic Operation Blue Star—the "slur on the nation's dignity".[17] June 6 1984 marks the day on which, in response to increased Sikh protests and militancy, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered armed forces to swarm the Golden Temple on the commemoration of Guru Arjan Dev's visit to Amritsar.[18] The symbolic authority that Sikhs give the Golden Temple cannot be undermined. An attack on the Golden Temple was perceived to be an attack on every single Sikh.

The Sikh diaspora's ability to influence group grievances and the subsequent nationalist movement post 1984 has been largely due to the sheer size of the population. The majority of immigration flows occurred in the 1960s. As of 2005, some 336,179 Sikhs reside in the UK,

278,415 in Canada and 250,000 in the US.[19] On 10 June 1984, in response to Operation Blue Star, some 25,000 Sikhs in London, England engaged in protests chanting "*Kalistan Zindabad!*" (long live the Sikh state).[20] This coincided with other mass protests in Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Toronto, New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles.[21] Such transnational linkages have placed much validity in previously shunned protest behaviour. This includes the champagne celebrations in Birmingham, England in November of 1984, following Prime Minister Gandhi's assassination at the hands of her two Sikh bodyguards.[22]

A distinction must be made however between those who support their *panth* and those who wish to establish an independent nation of Khalistan. Sikh extremists support the latter, and this has created much friction between orthodox Sikhs and the greater Punjabi diaspora.[23] Only a small number of fundamentalists within the diaspora rally, lobby and entice the population to support their Khalistani *panth*. In fact, opinions on Sikh independence and Khalistani statehood depend on the context of how the conflict is framed.

4. Grievances, Narratives and Transnational Linkages

The above case studies highlight key trends and inherent qualities of host-homeland ICT relations. The maintenance of transnational linkages remains at the discretion of group members. Borderless grievances in practical terms can be manifested in a multitude of ways. The following analysis focuses on the shifting tactics employed highlighting the practical results of online engagement in propelling group grievance.

5. Framed Memory and Unified Narratives

Conflict based diaspora's are more likely to create unified grievances. Origins of migration are less likely disputed resulting in far more manageable narratives. This has been the case for respective Tamil narratives. Even prior to the 1983 civil war, multiple networks and platforms voicing Tamil grievances had been established. From the 1940s onward Tamil newspapers echoed internal sentiments of inferiority and marginalization.[24] The LTTE continued to promote this quest for independence after the 1970s. With such a large network and limited competition, the LTTE has single-handedly controlled the Tamil narrative since its inception. With monopolistic power, the organization was able to use grievances associated with the civil war to its benefit. The Tamil diaspora has been receptive to such narratives. A large number of the diaspora contextualize themselves in terms of the war, and surrounding ideas of strain and displacement.[25] For Tamil migrants it has also established an identity of guilt.[26] The LTTE strategically use this guilt to obtain funds (80% of the LTTE's income comes from the diaspora) through umbrella organizations such as the United Tamil Organization, World Tamil Movement, and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization.[27]

This commonality of history has served as a unifier for host and homeland populations. The same cannot be said however, for economic based diasporas such as the Sikhs. Identity for the Sikhs has been consistently linked to religion, which for some diaspora members has been rather off putting. Where as Tamil struggles have their origins in the years before the civil war, the impetus for Sikh independence largely comes as a reaction to 1984. A lack of monopolistic control over respective group narratives has meant that members have created their own interpretations of the events. This is not to say that a slew of organizations gained notary after 1984 (namely the World Sikh Organization, International Sikh Youth Federation, Babbar Khalsa International, and Dal Khalsa).[28] Rather, relations with the centre (Punjab) are "holistic" —Sikh identity does not follow one narrative and producers of identity competitively vie for legitimacy and authenticity.[29]

Khalistani calls for statehood have consistently attempted to establish concrete networked transnational linkages. Sikh narratives are often promoted through graphic images of martyrs and temples. Described as the "diasporic sublime", the idea of imagination has for years run ramped online.[30] Images counter inexperience, so that even if one did not experience Operation Blue Star, through graphic images and worship of martyrs, one may be more receptive to Sikh claims for Khalistan.[31]

The events of 1984 represent a period of rediscovery of homeland origins. This has produced a relative "struggle over memory", where pockets of the community choose to "remember" group grievances at their discretion.[32] The lack of unity between respective populations characteristically divides nationalists fixated on a Khalistani 'homeland' from diasporic based interest of 'recognition'.[33] As a reactionary group, respective members appear to engage in community activities when necessary. One such instance was in the months following Operation Blue Star where the Council of Khalistan in Southall, London raised some 100,000 pounds sterling for Sikhs in Punjab.[34]

Such a lack of unity has also raised ethical questions in terms of commemoration practices. This was most notable in June of 2001, when a worldwide coalition of Sikh organizations looked to establish a virtual transnational campaign to commemorate the death of martyr Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.[35] The commemoration was reluctantly sponsored by the Akal Takhat, Damdami Taksal and the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC).[36] However, all of these orthodox organizations publicly condemned the commemoration, commenting that a symbolic funeral would admit Bhindranwale's death, which they fundamentally refused to accept.[37] Such ethical debates highlight the tension between regulatory and normative debates within networks. Even the term 'Sikh' and what it is meant to encompass has divided respective group members.[38]

6. Religion and Concentrated Networks

For the Sikh's regulatory practices of normative religiosity have placed hurdles in the way of transnational networks. Linkages rooted in religious unity are not attractive for the majority of 'part-timers' (members who pick and choose when to engage in community affairs). Reactionary in nature such moderates, are more drawn to community based social activities. By the early 1990s, the majority of Sikhs in Punjab had abandoned extremist/ orthodox Khalistani perspectives. Today, the majority calls for Khalistan stem from host country diaspora members, whom often travel internationally and maintain hidden networked linkages. Religion has acted as a divisive unit—separating orthodox Khalistan from the greater Sikh narrative. The Gurdwara (Sikh Temple) remains a key institution for populations; often invoking sentiments of both community consciousness and long-distance nationalism. However, in modern times, ICTs have come to remove information hierarchies so that beyond institutions, narratives have become network based.[39]

In 2000 there were an estimated 12 daily newspapers and 13 periodicals available internationally to the Sikh diaspora.[40] This is also the case online, where among others, the Khalistan Council in the UK, World Sikh Organization, Babbar Khalsa, Dal Khalsa, and the Sikh Youth Federation act as major information hubs.[41] As of 2006, some 1,800 websites and 200 chat rooms focused on Sikh affairs including the debate of Khalistan, culture and the role of the diaspora.[42] Online networks have de-territorialized claims for statehood. Unlike the Khalistani discourses, diaspora discourses do not place territorial limits on the sovereignty of the so called 'Khalsa *panth*'.[43] For the majority of host and homeland populations, online activity goes beyond religious based conceptions of statehood—favouring debates rooted in common transnational struggles. To the dismay of fundamentalists, questions surrounding statehood are no longer inherently tied to Khalistan.

Orthodox grievances are relatively concentrated and maintain hidden wireless links. Communities formed through social networking platforms become virtual 'ghettos' for Sikh extremists. There exists a multitude of private Khalistani e-groups which maintain networks similar to that of physical communities.[44] Such supporters often prefer to interact privately. A clear divide based on religious commitment does indeed limit unity between respective populations. However, Khalistani groups often look to weave themselves within the greater Sikh population. This is noted in the various YouTube and message board links available on Khalistani websites. In an attempt to subside the religious roots, multiple organizations have made attempts to explain grievances through a human rights platform.

Websites such as Khalistan@yahoo.net (now Khalistan.net) often showcase heroic martyrs such as Bhindranwale to invoke emotions of pride in visitors.[45] The website header reads, "A new global reality", pointing to the immediacy of support needed.[46] The website combines religious aspects of Sikh identity with socio-cultural issues and local news,

connecting the diaspora with the struggle for statehood. Most interesting, is the weaving in of Operation Blue Star, as a 'genocide' that stands to occur again if Sikhs do not unite. Through side by side images, the Sikh Holocaust (Operation Blue Star) is compared with the Jewish Holocaust.[47] Tactical memory and images are used to sweep away religious rhetoric. This is visible on the Council of Khalistan's website which maintains an image of the Golden Temple on the top of its homepage.[48] Organizations also look to promote a more unified group consciousness based on criticism of Indian authorities. Examples include criticism over the Indian government's decision to revoke visas of "Christians" (as labelled by the Council of Khalistan).[49] The attempt here is to establish a unity based on difference, a common 'enemy': the Indian government. Sikhism remains the unifying cornerstone for host and homeland populations. However, how religion is interpreted and catered to by members often differs.

7. Tackling the Hurdles of Static Transnationalism

The above indicates that while internal community networks may be strong, for the Sikhs (Khalistani's more specifically), transnational linkages remain fairly weak. The diaspora has not embraced statehood as a necessary solution to grievances. Conversely, undertones of victimhood remain implicit within respective host and homeland Tamil narratives. Decades of censorship within Sri Lanka have forced rebel organizations to constantly look to improve networking techniques. Supporters of Tamil Eelam remain interested in weaving grievances into community dialogue. The aim of such press media is to attract sympathizing populations within host countries, effectively removing the linearity of narratives. With some 10 weekly newspapers (5 of which are free), and 4 radio stations (with weekly call in shows) Toronto for example has become a central community hub.[50] Most diaspora press caters to subtle propaganda for the LTTE by criticizing Sri Lankan governing authorities.[51]

The LTTE however, has hampered the legitimacy of greater Tamil Eelam supporters. Highlighting the level of sophistication, one of the very first cyber attacks to ever occur was undertaken by the specialized Black Tigers in August of 1998. Sri Lankan embassies around world were bombarded, receiving up to 800 emails a day with the message "we are the Internet Black Tigers and we're doing this to disrupt your communications".[52] The LTTE was even noted to have posted Canadian and US passport's online for what can assumed to be for fake identity production.[53] Post 9/11 however, for tactical reasons the LTTE removed this along with the majority of their images of martyrs.[54] Umbrella organizations and actors have also come under fire regarding their connections to the LTTE. The Tamil Eelam Society provides social services to Tamils in Ontario, Canada and has been criticized for its close connection to the World Tamil Movement an alleged front organization for the LTTE.[55]

Transnational linkages stand to be threatened by association with such rebel

organizations. Tactically, the LTTE remains a silent leader in grievance campaigns. With interests in self-preservation, the organization looks to strategically establish multiple transnational links and networks. The aim has been to create a structure of borderless grievance with the ultimate goal of statehood in mind. When the LTTE were demilitarized in north east Sri Lanka in May 2009, surviving leaders made this clear by stating that the Tamil state would now need to be pursued abroad (distributed by audio email file).[56]

The Tamil diaspora has not shied away from this responsibility. Schemes rooted in militancy have taken a backseat to debates surrounding human rights. Diasporas have embraced ICTs and are a key source to transnational community consciousness. Considering that only 30% of homes in Sri Lanka have access to the Internet, majority of online traffic is coming from individuals in host countries.[57] Efforts have subsequently been made to network beyond the Tamil population, and discuss issues beyond statehood. This is facilitated by engaging a wider group of people, so that eventually, narratives may largely give up "opaque expatriate" frames for that of "objective neutrality".[58] This is visible in the number of chat rooms/message boards available (Tamil Circle, Sri Lanka Tamil Interest Digest, and TamilCanadian.com).[59] These open forums promote discussion and transnational community narratives. TamilCanadian.com has been known to hold what is called 'talking points', where expatriates discuss issues pertaining to Sri Lankan issues, including struggles associated with the civil war.[60]

Open discussion based networks have proved most useful for Tamil legitimacy. One of the most notable examples has been the transformation of Tamilnet.com which was first established in 1995.[61] Tamilnet.com remains a pivotal example of how transnational networks can produce legitimate links for otherwise 'rebel' causes. The website was reformatted in 1996 by noted Tamil columnist Dharmeratnam Sivaram.[62] Sivaram had two main goals, to improve the longevity (avoid censorship) and legitimacy of the website. To avoid domestic censorship, webmasters resided in the diaspora.[63] To counter criticism from the Sri Lankan government and to separate themselves from LTTE, news was supported by western outlets (BBC, Reuters, and the Associated Press).[64] Both patriotic poems and martyr imagery were reduced. Information, while similar in nature, was stripped down to 'just the facts' with titles reading, "Seven killed in Vanni clashes", and "Another journalist arrested".[65] Through this 'just the facts' reformation, Tamilnet. com gained a considerably larger following as a legitimate news provider. Within a year of its rebirth, Tamilnet. com was noted to have received some 3 million hits per month.[66]

Although, online news infrastructure is often based outside of Sri Lanka, consistent efforts are made to not forget ground realities. In response to such fears, Tamilnet.com has established a program called "wire service" for aspiring journalists within the country.[67] So that while webmasters are located outside the country access to primary information is not

compromised.[68] Transnational networked structures have made the website very difficult to shut down.

Such transnational networks place the Tamil diasporas at the for-front of group grievance. Inherent in all networked websites is the promotion of independence with much onus placed on the diaspora. Common "about us" sections of websites disclaim links to the LTTE —such groups are an "organization of expatriate Tamils to promote the right to self-determination of the Tamil nation".[69]

Borderless grievance and wireless platforms may come to alter strategic understandings of statehood and the greater Tamil Eelam. Much of the onus has been placed on the diaspora to limit the "hijacking of the cause".[70] A decrease in hierarchical monopoly over narratives may in future be the source of divide between respective populations. Multiple discussions for example have occurred on Tamilnet.com regarding ideas surrounding the diaspora in relation to a transnational government of Eelam Tamils.[71] This differs considerably from previous understandings of independence and statehood. Overall, united narratives and censorship have propelled wireless platforms as main ways in which host and homeland Tamils can discuss their grievances.

8. Conclusion

Diasporas increasingly have the capabilities to become key actors in homeland grievances. Narratives are not static, and grievances are ever-evolving; a reality which may stand to help *or* hinder group struggles. Unified narratives are far easier to manage by host and homeland members. There is likely to be a more unified narrative if grievances are framed by one actor (as in the case of the LTTE). Secondly, human rights based claims tend to engage a wider scope of individuals. This includes both part-timers and individuals outside of the diaspora. Group identities surrounding ethical questions of human rights tend to be less contentious than religion, which often carry black and white divisions. This has been the case for many Sikhs within both host and the homeland communities.

The majority of Sikhs do in fact support the development of a robust transnational community. However, this does not necessarily weave itself into ideals of statehood and more importantly Khalistan. Even with sophisticated networks Tamils still lack an official state. As a result, questions remain as to whether or not transnational communities have in real terms benefited the Tamil cause. What can be said is that respective communities have embraced transnational linkages as a way to not only gain support but also to move beyond the questionable reputation of the LTTE.

Indeed, wireless platforms do not always establish and maintain transnational community structures. Rebel groups tactically use ICTs to increase levels of 'receptivity' within both the homeland and the diaspora. However, each grievance carries with it a different starting

point. Leaders may embrace media technology at their discretion. Censorship (as in the case of the LTTE and the greater Tamil diaspora), provoked innovative techniques and public relations tactics. Ultimately, rebel organizations are interested in increasing their number of 'followers'. What such following (in the realm of 'support') entails can vary. The real affects of such transnationalism are yet to be seen. Regardless, ICTs and media stand to remove relative hierarchies and linear forms of networking which previously set real limits on diverse community dialogue.

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Theorising the Labour-exporting State: A View from Political Economy

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1. Introduction

International migration has been explored from various lenses in the social sciences. It is seen as a sociological, geographic, demographic and economic process. As a political phenomenon, the scholarship has focused on security and the valorisation of 'sovereignty'. The preoccupation with the policing of national borders has 'securitised' migration (Graham and Poku 2000, Guild and Van Selm 2005). A non-security approach tackles issues of citizenship and identity (Yeoh & Willis 2004, Iredale, Hawksley & Castles 2003). The role of the state, seen through this schema, then becomes that of an apparatus safeguarding the 'i nside' from the 'outside.' This corresponds with the traditional conception of the state in international relations. In this vein of scholarship, the state is a unitary actor in pursuit of rational objectives and goals to preserve 'national interest' in an inter-state system usually depicted as 'anarchic', i.e. having no central governing body.

Through this traditional perspective, labour-receiving states may well be seen as a protector of borders and sovereignty. After all, it guarantees not only the physical cordoning-off of the inside from the encroachment of unwanted 'outsiders', but also employs techniques of control such as visas and passports. Here, the state prescribes domestic policy to identify 'desirable' aliens who are permitted to enter the sovereign territory.

Applied to labour-sending countries, however, the same logic of the state as a rational actor in pursuit of national interests becomes problematic. 'National interest' here needs to be further disaggregated in ways that point away from the safeguarding of sovereignty or consolidation of domestic power vis-à-vis the anarchic international system. When a state exports its workforce, how does this accrue sovereignty or power? When a state, in its activities related to labour export, relies on actors and processes operating in sub-national, supra-national and transnational levels, what becomes of state autonomy?

This paper is primarily aimed at situating the state within the discourse of international migration. Scholarship on state theory typically put forward a qualitative change in the form and function of the nation-state in the last half century. The 'Keynesian welfare

state' in Europe, and its Asian equivalent—the 'developmental state' has given way to new forms—the 'competition state' or the 'regulatory state'. These state forms are embedded in a global economy that has also restructured and reconfigured from 'Fordist' to 'post-Fordist' or 'flexible' regimes of accumulation.

The paper argues that the current regime of accumulation rearticulates the 'State', relocating its functions within and without the domestic frontier. This rearticulation is manifest in the state's multilevel networks and relations with sub-national and supra-national actors and processes.

Drawing from political economy helps unpack the 'sending state' in the literature on international migration. It is not merely a rational actor using labour export as a means to achieve national goals (Acacio 2008, Ruiz 2007). New scholarship on the state as 'labour b roker' (Magalit-Rodriguez 2010, Guevarra 2009) extends beyond this assumption of state rationality. This new conception hints at labour brokering as the state's response to 'neoliberal' globalisation. It focuses on *how* the state rearticulates and relocates authority and power over migrants through a study of institutions, state mechanisms, private actors (recruitment agencies) and 'discursive practices' or 'cultural logics'.

While it is clear *how* the state brokers labour, it is not entirely clear *why* it does so and *why* it engages sub-national and supra-national actors and processes. Some of the reasons offered have been the need to generate foreign exchange, neo-colonial ties and the demands of the new international division of labour (Sassen 1998). The first reason still implies rationality, giving primacy to state agency. The other two give primacy to historical and structural factors and the state is reduced to reacting to these processes.

This paper argues that the labour-exporting state is not a mere rational actor pursuing goals through policy and state directives. Neither is it merely reacting to the perils and opportunities offered by the globalising economy. Rather, it is a product of the current regime of accumulation, constituted and constitutive of this process. 'Neoliberalism' as a project which emerged out of the crisis of the Fordist regime in the 1970s is characterized less by liberalised and deregulated markets but by the regulation of these markets by various nodes of authority. 'Free markets' are underpinned and policed by layers of governing mechanisms which cut across borders and spaces. States play an important role in this schema. It is not 'withering away'. Nor is it unchanged. The 'labour-exporting state' is an important regulator of migrant worker flows in today's globalising labour markets.

2. Theory: Rearticulating the State

To locate the 'state' in 'international migration', both concepts need to be re-framed using methodologies from political economy. Scholars who have drawn from the theoretical tools of the Regulation Approach (RA) see the state as a contingent institution which 'regulates'

the contradictions generated by capitalist development. While drawing from Marxist economics, RA scholars do not see a pre-determined end to this economic system:

> …Capitalism is neither automatically stabilised nor will it inevitably break down. Instead it develops through a series of ruptures in the continuous reproduction of social relations. Crises are resolved through an irreversible transformation, which allows the fundamental or 'determined structure' of capitalist society to continue. A regime of accumulation with characteristic labour and competitive processes arises and develops. This regime comes to be regulated through certain socio-political institutions. Eventually the regime's internal contradictions mean it can no longer be reproduced/ regulated in the old way. It gives way to a new regime with its own characteristic mode of regulation; if Capitalism is to survive. (Friedman 2000: 61)

The 'regime of accumulation' is a period of stability and growth in capital accumulation. A mode of regulation on the other hand, is a "set of mediations which ensure that the distortions created by the accumulation of capital are kept within limits which are compatible with social cohesion within each nation" (Aglietta 1998: 44). This set of mediations can be economic or 'extra-economic' (Jessop 1997: 29).

Modes of regulation could take ideational forms or concrete institutional ones. Ideational modes of regulation might include laws, norms and ideologies. Institutional ones would include organisational and state forms. Bob Jessop identifies five dimensions; the wage relation, the enterprise form, the nature of money, the state and international regimes which link the domestic and the external (1997: 291). This paper specifically interrogates the fourth dimension—the state.

Alain Lipietz sees the state as the "institutional form which condenses the compromises which prevent the different groups making up the national (or at least territorial) community from destroying one another in an endless struggle" (1987: 19). It is seen as the "concentration of social relations" where social compromises are made and stabilised (Hirsch 2000: 104). Viewed this way, the state cannot be seen as a rational, unitary or autonomous actor but instead a product of contingent social relations which change over time.

The Keynesian welfare state (KWS) in Europe and the developmental state (DS) in Asia are products of the Fordist regime of accumulation (Jayasuriya 2000: 315). The stability of Fordism rested on mass production and mass consumption. Continued growth of either realm of economic activity, in turn, relied on increased wages and worker welfare.

In Europe, the KWS was underpinned by the state's mediating role between capital and labour. This capital-labour compromise saw policy preferences for full employment,

adequate social protection and rising wages to complement mass production (Lash & Urry 1987, Lipietz 1987). In Asia, the DS does not play the mediator role but is instead the driver of entrepreneurial activity. It is dependent on a 'rational', technocratic machine relatively insulated from 'society' (Low 2004).

The cycle of increasing wages to guarantee consuming power relative to increasing mass production ceased being profitable by the mid-70s (Lipietz 1995, Dunford 1990). To realise continued growth, firms internationalised production to cut costs and also expanded markets overseas. Internationalisation meant the fraying of the national capital-labour compromise brokered by the state. The post-war state form was able to shield 'society' from market forces, allowing only certain sectors of the economy to be fully accessible to marketisation. This meant key social services and utilities being publicly-owned and the support and protection for 'national champions' or key industries. These social protections have been eroded by the globalisation of production and consumption and the liberalisation of financial flows.

> The internationalization of production accelerated, the export sector overtook the consumer goods sector as the main creator of jobs, and import penetration increased, especially in capital goods sectors. To the export sector, what mattered was the world market and not the national market, and market growth did not seem to depend on the growth of domestic wages. Wages were simply a cost. (Dunford, 1990: 317)

What has emerged from the transition into the new regime of accumulation is what scholars call the 'competition' or 'regulatory' state. Philip Cerny describes the competition state as one that has essentially given way to the penetration of market forces in previously protected aspects of social life "in order to make economic activities located within the national territory, or which otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international and transnational terms" (1997: 259). This increasing 'marketisation' is manifested in what has been called 'neoliberal restructuring', i.e. liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation. However, far from the state 'withering away' to give complete reign of free-market forces, new forms of regulation are put in place. Here the state no longer plays the mediator of labour and capital, and has re-calibrated its intervention in the economy in order to cope with structural changes brought on by globalisation.

Jessop characterises state transformation in three processes—denationalisation, destatisation and internationalisation (2000). Denationalisation, or the 'hollowing out' of the state is described as the devolution of state powers to the supranational and sub-national levels. Destatisation is the decentralisation of policy-making inputs away from the state. Internationalisation reflects the blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign

policy and the expansion of the terrain in which the state must make decisions.

Kanishka Jayasuriya essentially sees the regulatory state enmeshed in a kind of governance which has moved away from the politics of social bargaining and aggregation of domestic interests (2005: 95). There is increasing separation of policy-making from implementation, usually evident in contracting services out to the private sector. Regulatory institutions are created which enjoy relative autonomy from 'politics.' Central banks are archetypal of these kinds of institutions or agencies. Lastly, the state is seen to shift away from direct intervention (government) to facilitating intervention (governance) in social and economic policy areas. Because of the need to respond to globalising market forces, the regulatory state is also embedded in governance above and below the 'national' level (2004).

The combined processes mentioned above have resulted in an increasing depoliticisation of the state, especially in the realms of social life most linked to global markets. Governance mechanisms, practices and actors which cut across borders are now evident in many issue areas. The global trade and finance regime are perhaps one of the most expansive and institutionalised areas governed by not only formal bodies (i. e. the World Trade Organisation and international financial institutions), but also rules and common norms with which various actors apart from states must negotiate. In these issue areas 'national interests' are not readily identifiable. National governments have had to devolve authority and decision-making powers to actors above and below the state-level to compete successfully in attracting capital investments and carving out new markets for goods.

International migration can be reconceptualised to move away from discourses on sovereignty and the identity politics of citizenship and political belonging. With an increasing penetration of market forces in the current Post-Fordist regime of accumulation, international migration can be reframed as the globalisation of labour markets.

3. Globalising Labour Markets

The so-called 'new international division of labour' is itself a product of the internationalisation of production and consumption. The drivers of this process were initially multinational corporations. In their search for new manufacturing sites and overseas markets, they integrated pools of new labour into the global circuit of production along with their own management personnel.

> The emergence of these global production structures have been everywhere accompanied by greater movements or transfers of technical and managerial personnel. Another important development has been the growth of informal as well as flexible forms of employment, opening markets for foreign workers willing to enter occupations or

> sectors abandoned by natives. Still another factor is the rapid expansion of the knowledge economy and the demand it has created for a ready supply of young IT professionals. At the same time greater and greater numbers are seeking further education in other countries, many eventually not returning home and becoming migrants. (Abella 2006: 11)

International migration can then be seen as a component of the liberalisation of factors of production. Just as there are liberalised markets in capital, and to a much lesser degree even land (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009), labour may be seeing a similar trend. One could argue that labour mobility is not necessarily a novel phenomenon, as hundreds of thousands also 'crossed borders' at the height of the slave trade (Postma 2003). What are new are the post-World War II state system and the codification of human rights which are now part of global norms actors are expected to observe.

There is, as yet, no international regime governing cross-border flows of workers. Compared to other factors of production, labour's specificities make it more problematic than the trade of capital, the sale/lease of land or exchange in commodities. Labour is, after all, reflexive (Fine 1998: 254). For other 'commodities', what matters is who buys and who sells. But workers are conscious of selling their services and are able to compare salaries with other workers in similar jobs. Further, a crate of Irish potatoes being sold in Ugandan markets would not cause demographic imbalances and would not demand for an equal right to be treated as crates of German or Polish potatoes.

4. The Labour-exporting State in International Migration

A re-tooling of the 'state' and 'international migration' would open up new avenues for research and new ways of articulating either concept in relation to one another. The regulatory state is embedded in the increasing globalisation of labour markets, both constituted by and constitutive of domestic social compromises vis-à-vis external actors and processes.

In the current regime of accumulation, labour import and export are means of regulating labour flows across borders in ways that are qualitatively different from the Fordist regime given the changes in the global economic system, the new 'rules' players must abide by and forms and functions of the state.

If international migration (i. e. globalising labour markets) is an aspect of the Post-Fordism, then the labour-exporting state takes on the complexion of the competition/regulatory state. It is denationalised, destatisised and internationalised. Different from its role of allocator of public goods in pursuit of public interest, the state 'off-shores' traditional functions to other spheres of authority.

To respond swiftly to the demands of labour markets overseas, the state apparatus, acting as a facilitator of the labour export as an economic activity, devolves authority to different actors with the expertise to train, recruit, process and deploy workers. With competition in mind, the state might also engage in identifying existing or potential markets overseas. The labour-exporting state has also had to delegate social policy to agents below and above the state-level. This allows the state to nominally 'extend' the coverage of policy beyond territorial boundaries, especially when formulation and implementation are taken up by international organisations (IOs) or civil society organisations (CSOs) working trans-nationally. At the inter-governmental level, the labour-exporting state might cooperate with other states, either labour-receiving or sending, to jointly manage labour mobility.

As a mode of regulation, the state is also the site of social reproduction and social cohesion. This is why the state cannot fully 'marketise' or turn over to the private sector the entire labour-export process. It must play a dual role of producing political subjects, bounded by the ideology of nationality - which guarantees not only the social reproduction of remitting migrants but also labour power with a political identity separate from that of the receiving society.

The Philippines may be the 'archetypal' labour-exporting state today, recognised to be a 'model' of its kind. The labour-export bureaucracy has evolved throughout the decades to incorporate private sector participation either through direct policy intervention or through opportunities offered by the marketisation of training and education. At the core of the labour-export process are seven agencies, all under the auspices of the executive department. The centre-piece agency is the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) whose main functions are to limit entry of actors in the worker-deployment process, set rules and regulations and ensure their compliance through monitoring (Orbeta et. al. 2009).

The labour-export bureaucracy is one designed to 'encounter' all actors in the labour-export process and to set standards—from workers and recruiters to potential employers overseas and receiving-country government agencies. The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) is tasked with the provision of welfare services while the relatively new National Reintegration for Overseas Filipinos (NRCO) is meant to facilitate returned migrants' re-entry back to Philippines society.

While there is a national policy detailing the form and function of the labour export process (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act or Republic Act (RA) 8042), there is no acknowledged 'labour-export policy.' In fact RA 8042 specifically states that "…the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and achieve national development (Section 2(c))." Official government rhetoric has switched from that of actively exporting labour surplus to that of enabling potential migrants' 'personal choices'.



Adopted from: Ruiz, N. G., "Managing Migration: Lessons from the Philippines", Migration and Development Brief 6 (Migration and Remittances Team - Development Prospects Group, The World Bank, August 2008). www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances.

The labour bureaucracy also engages counterparts overseas in what has been termed 'bi lateral labour agreements (BLAs).' It has over a dozen of these agreements with countries on every continent in past decade alone. These range from recruitment to joint training and manpower development. Recently the Philippines has also inked agreements with other labour-exporting countries such as Indonesia and Laos to pool resources for technical cooperation.

While the labour bureaucracy is most effective in recruitment and deployment, its capacity to assure worker protection and welfare is severely limited by its incapacity to project influence over its subjects once they enter other sovereign territories. Here the state off-shores social policies to other actors—intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), IOs and CSOs. The Philippines has a number of projects with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to regulate migrant flows, protect vulnerable populations and improve border security management. The state has also supported initiatives by the United Nations (UN) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The more important labour standard-setting measures would be the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families and, more recently, the ILO's Convention on Domestic Work.

RA 8042 also specifically identifies non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as 'partners' in the promotion of migrant welfare and protection. Perhaps because CSOs in the Philippines enjoy a more open political space compared to its neighbours, NGOs geared towards migrant issues are not only active domestically but also create partnerships overseas. Perhaps the most visible would be the region-wide network of Migrant Forum in Asia which is headquartered in Manila.

The off-shoring of nodes of governance to different actors and spaces achieves two goals

—it extends the state's reach to other sovereign spaces and at the same time facilitates the regulatory state's autonomy. The labour export process, and the state's role in it, is one that is essentially 'hidden' from domestic politics. In the case of the Philippines, the precariousness of this autonomy is made visible each time the local media highlights the plight of migrant workers who meet a tragic end. Two accounts are notable, not only in the intensity of national public discourse but also the consequences of the "push-back" of society. The death of domestic helper Flor Contemplacion precipitated the legislation of the Migrant Workers Act in 1995. The capture of bus driver Angelo de la Cruz in Iraq during the war of 2003 saw the pull-out of Philippine military forces from the US-led coalition.

For the labour-exporting state to continue supplying global markets in a relatively stable manner, its activities must be depoliticised—perceived as matter-of-fact if not 'natural.' Here the regulatory state's function as a site of social cohesion is crucial. It must produce and reproduce workers for export, creating not only the institutional setting to facilitate international migration but also an ideational one. For the latter, the notion of 'migrant citizenship' serves as a cultural glue assuring not only the emotional allegiance of the migrant to her home country but that this also bears fruit in terms of remittances (Rodriguez 2010).

But are these 'fixes' necessarily rational ones? That is, designed and implemented with specific policy goals in mind? Not necessarily. If the regulatory state is the product of primarily domestic social relations, then it is where tensions between contradictory tendencies and social forces are resolved. For example, the inability of the domestic economy to create employment, which creates a considerable push factor for migration, rests on a problematic transition to capitalist development. Labour export is usually perceived as a temporary fix to a complex of societal tensions which are beyond the scope of this paper to tackle.

5. Conclusion

A different set of analytical tools has permitted a re-articulation of the 'state' vis-à-vis international migration and to unpack the black box and see its movable parts. The empirical example has largely been the Philippines. It would be of interest to see whether the archetype depicted here 'travels' to other labour-exporting countries. The model of the regulatory state in its facilitation of global labour mobility, might also apply to labour-*receiving* countries.

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

CONSORTIUM FOR ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES (CAAS)

2nd Symposium

INALCO, Paris

November 25th-26th, 2010

MIGRATIONS, MOBILITY AND GLOBALIZATION

Opening of the Symposium at 9.a.m., November 25th :
Jacques LEGRAND, President of INALCO, and
Koji MIYAZAKI, Executive Director of TUFS, CAAS Executive Coordinator

Scientific Coordinator : Anne de TINGUY, Professor, INALCO

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CONSORTIUM FOR ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES (CAAS) 2nd Symposium
INALCO, Paris - November 25th-26th, 2010

Thursday, November 25th
Salon d'honneur

9. a.m.-9.30 a.m.
Welcoming speech: Jacques LEGRAND, President of INALCO, Paris
Introductory remarks: Koji MIYAZAKI, Executive Director of TUFS, CAAS Executive Coordinator, Tokyo

9.30-10.45 a.m.
Session One – KEYNOTE SPEECHES
Chair: Jacques LEGRAND, INALCO

Human globalization: migration and mobility
Catherine WIHTOL de WENDEN, CNRS, CERI-Sciences Po

The ageing of populations and international migration: some remarks
François HERAN, INED, Paris, European Association for Population Studies, La Haye

(Coffee break)

11.00-12.45 a.m.
Session Two - WHAT IS THE MEANING OF MOBILITY TODAY ?
Chair: Carol GLUCK, Columbia University

Pastoral nomadism or migration? The case of Mongolia
Jacques LEGRAND, INALCO

Transnational Mobilities and Urban Spatialities: notes from the Asia-Pacific
Francis Leo COLLINS, National University of Singapore

Viewing Globalization from the 'Jungle': the contradictions of mobility in a globalized world
Polly PALLISTER-WILKINS, SOAS

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2.15 p.m. – 4.15 p.m.
Session three - HIGH-SKILLED MIGRATIONS, MIGRATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
Chair: Anne de TINGUY, INALCO

Highly skilled mobility and diasporic dynamics for development
Jean Baptiste MEYER, IRD

Diaspora and Growth without Development in the Philippines
David CAMROUX, CERI-Sciences Po

The significance of remittances from the West for a Liberian refugee population and the local host community in Bududuram village, Ghana
Naohiko OMATA, SOAS, PhD student

International Student Mobilities in Japan and Singapore
Teofilo C. DAQUILA, National University of Singapore

(Coffee break)

4.30 p.m. - 7.00 p.m.
Session Four - INTEGRATION, IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP
Chair: Shirlena HUANG, National University of Singapore

Integration: how immigrants become part of society?
Christophe BERTOSSI, IFRI

Pashtun migration and identity
Mariam ABOU ZAHAB, INALCO

Gendered naturalization - A path to integration for marriage immigrant women in Taiwan
Isabelle NIAN-TZU CHENG, SOAS, PhD student

Diasporic forms of citizenship in the UK : Lebanese women in London speak out. A gender analysis of belonging and participation
Maria Carmen CARUSO, SOAS

Mobility and Marginality. Contemporary Caribbean and East-European Migrant Narratives: an (Un)likely Kinship ?
Robert RAKOCEVIC, INALCO

Friday, November 26th
Salon d'honneur / Room 221, 2nd Floor / Room 124, 1st Floor

9.30 a.m. – 12.30 a.m.
Salon d'honneur
Session Five – MIGRATION DYNAMICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Chair: Nobuaki KONDO, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

A quest for the origin of high mobility and networking ability of Lebanese and Syrian migrants: Historical background and contemporary dynamics
Hidemitsu KUROKI, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Egyptians over-Nile: fragments of a nation in exile
Delphine PAGES-El KAROUI, INALCO/Migrinter

Aharon Appelfeld: an immigrant at home
Masha ITZHAKI, INALCO

Aliya, migration, diaspora -The interaction between these three concepts in Israel
Rina COHEN MULLER, INALCO

Experiencing the globalization in the City: facts, methods and feedback from Tel Aviv
William BERTHOMIERE, Migrinter, Poitiers

2.00 p.m. – 6.00 p.m.
Salon d'honneur
Session Six - MIGRATION DYNAMICS IN ASIA
Chair: Nayan CHANDA, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

International migrants in contemporary China
Frank PIEKE, University of Leiden

Struggling around 'dagong' : dialectics of contention and accommodation
Eric FLORENCE, University of Liège, College of Europe (Bruges)

The emergence of a transnational market between North-East China and Russian Far-East as a consequence of Chinese migration to Russia
Eugene ZAGREBNOV, INALCO, PhD student

Why having 'underclass' when you can have 'class'? Why kin, and not citizenship, is key to understand inequality in post-Mao China
Roberta ZAVORETTI, SOAS, PhD student

(Coffee break)
Formation of a multiethnic society and religious emigration in South Vietnam
Hironori TANAKA, TUFS, PhD student

Solving Japan's 'Population Problem': reexamining Pre-World War II Japanese Migration to Brazil
Andre Kobayashi DECKROW, Columbia University, PhD student

CONSORTIUM FOR ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES (CAAS) 2nd Symposium
INALCO, Paris - November 25th-26th, 2010

9.30 a.m. – 12.30 a.m.
Room 221, 2nd Floor
Session Seven – DIASPORAS, TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATIONS AND NETWORKS
Chair: Manuelle FRANCK, INALCO

'Return' to the 'Homeland' – Diaspora Sojourners in Armenia
Sossie KASBARIAN, SOAS

Russian associative field in Paris and London
Olga BRONNIKOVA, INALCO PhD student

'Migration' and exophonic writing in dramas translated by Tsuga Teisho
Akane OIKAWA, TUFS, PhD student

Diaspora linkages and networked narratives – A comparative analysis of media and information technology
Priya KUMAR, SOAS, PhD student

2.00 p.m. – 6.00 p.m.
Room 124, 1st Floor
Session Eight - LABOUR MIGRATION AND MIGRATION POLICIES
Chair: Serge WEBER, Université Paris Est, Marne la Vallée

Labour migration: a new cement of the Postsoviet space?
Anne de TINGUY, INALCO

Transnational labour migration and politics of care in the Southeast Asian family
Lan Anh HOANG and Brenda SA YEOH, National University of Singapore

Theorizing the labour-exporting state: a view from political economy
Liberty L. CHEE, National University of Singapour, PhD student

Nomades, Navétanes, and Citoyens : towards an integrated history of the Futa Jallon Fulbe diaspora
John F. STRAUSSBERGER, Columbia University, PhD student

(Coffee break)

Delicate engagements: civil society in Senegal and the 'developmentalisation' of European migration control
Anne-Line RODRIGUEZ, SOAS, PhD student

'Dismantling borders?' East African Common Market and the changing migration ethos
Sabastiano RWENGABO, National University of Singapore, PhD student

African and Asian female domestic migrants in Lebanon
Fida BIZRI, INALCO

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