CULTURAL EXPRESSION AT THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

Tenth Annual Symposium of
the Consortium for Asian
and African Studies (CAAS)

全球化时代的文化表述

第十届"亚非研究"国际联盟学术年会论文集

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CONTENTS

Poetic Devices in Somali Cultural Expression: Reading Somali Women's Poetry through the Lens of Lyric Theory

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The Somali language is spoken in the eastern part of the Horn of Africa and in the displaced communities outside the Horn. For as long as we know, a great part of Somali cultural expression consists of oral poetry. Somali poetry used to be a men's domain, however, nowadays a growing number of passionate Somali women are making themselves heard through poetic art. The focus of this paper is their poetry and how they express, what they express.

In the era of globalization, how do we approach literature from culture as foreign as of Somalia, in order to achieve cultural exchange and the development of human civilization? Through which tools and methods should we engage with indigenous poetics so that a reader who is not familiar with the language or the culture can appreciate the aesthetics in Somali oral poems? While the literary theories in general currency have been formulated with a view to European literary histories, how can we negotiate the complex dialectic of understanding what is inherent in Somali poetry while making the most of tools available to us? Failing to engage with this dialectic mires us in Eurocentrism.

My initial approach is to look at Somali poetry from a lyric perspective. I suggest that a theory of the lyric should not be limited to the European languages and cultures, and that an attempt to tease out the central features of the Somali poems which reflect the possibilities that underlie the lyric tradition is crucial for the appreciation of Somali poems. In this paper, I intend to make a close reading of

some of the Somali poems by women and look for the major devices that are evident in the poems. In using terms such as voice, address, rhythm, etc. in English, I shall consider the possibilities inherent in the Somali poems that allow us to speak of these Somali poems as lyric poems in the sense given by western lyric theorists. I shall also take the Somali terminologies and present how the Somalis conceptualize their poetry in a manner that can be compared with how Western theorists conceptualize poetry in European languages.

Lyric poetry has a long history in the West. Although there has never been a definitive answer to the question "what is lyric", the notion of lyric as a genre, embodies the need for a common ground that is narrower than poetry as a whole (which includes long narrative poems of various sorts), but broad enough for comparison and discussion of some salient features that have shown in different poems. In Blasing's Lyric Poetry, she wrote "The lyric is a universal genre and it is the foundational genre in diverse languages. She also quoted Earl Miner, specialist in Japanese poetry, saying in all other world literature, the lyric, which, operating under an expressive-affective rather than mimetic conception of language, is the 'foundational genre' (Miner 1990, p.82; 85 in Blasing 2007, p.28)." For Susanne Langer, lyric is defined as "the literary form that depends most directly on pure verbal resources-the sound and evocative power of words, metre, alliteration, rhyme, and other rhythmic devices, associated images, repetitions, archaisms, and grammatical twists. It is the most obviously linguistic creation, and therefore the readiest instance of poesis" (1953, p.159).

A theory of the lyric is not limited to the European languages and cultures. As Jonathan Culler says, "there are, of course, very rich lyric traditions in other cultures, which I am not competent to address" (2015, p.355). A broad conception of lyric is helpful for thinking about Somali poems in that, first, all of the poems that I am looking at are short and non-narrative. Second, the theory of the lyric that Culler suggests "makes salient the discursive strategies and possibilities in a range of periods and languages" (Ibid, p.90), hence makes it possible for poems made by Somali women poets in different times and in different language to be discussed together.

In this paper, I'd like to take *Dookh* by Caasha Luul Maxamed Yuusuf as the first case study. *Dookh* is a *gabay* poem, which is the most prominent genre of Somali poetry that used to be composed by male adults. The poem consists of 8 line groups, starting with an *arar*, which can be translated as "introduction." From the second to the seventh group, the lines of each grouping start with a "*hadda-*if," and end with a repeated line. *Oo aanu dookhaaga noqon, waa dariiq xidhane*. Together they form the middle section of the poem which in Somali is *dhexdhexaad*. And the last ending section, the *gebaggebo*, sums up the whole poem. As Orwin (2003) suggests, the expectation of the *arar*,

dhexdhexaad and *gebaggebo* in a *gabay* poem implies the notion of "totality or coherence", which is a convention that Culler recognised in Western European lyric poetry.

Dookh

Haddaanad gabayga deelqaafka iyo, dari ka saaraynnin
Dalabtiyo haddaan laga midh tirin, diniqa aan muuqan
Meeshii dahsoonayd haddaan, lagu daqiiqeeynnin
Doogtiyo haddaan lagu lafgurin, dakharradii raagay
Darar lagama maaloo tixuu, dufan ma yeeshaane,
Aan dareersho caawoo kalaan, daribta saafaaye.

Inkastuu darmaan quruxsan iyo, daaddax ugu yeedho
Ama uu ammaan deexdo oo, 'dawlo!' ku yidhaahdo
Hadal dhegaha deeqaaya oo, dabacsan oo fiican
Dun xariir ah iyo shaal hadduu, dahab ku saarsaaro
Daraandaryo araggaaga hooy, damacu waa yaabe,
Oo aanu dookhaaga noqon, waa dariiq xidhane.

Hadduu daaro waaweyn dhisoo, dabaqyo kuu jeexo
Dal dhan oo muraayad ah dhammaan, adiga kuu deyro
Sancadaw dambeeysiyo hadduu, dalabka kuu keeno
Naftu waxay yara doonayso uu, deregga soo saaro,
Oo aanu dookhaaga noqon, waa dariiq xidhane.

Inkastoo adduun door ah iyo, duunyo lagu sheego
Inkastuu dulqaad badan yahoo, deeqsi lagu sheego
Duub iyo malaaq uu yahoo, dooje lagu sheego
Digriiga iyo maastariga iyo, derejo weyn haysto
Digrigiyo Quraankiyo hadduu, diinta yahay xaafid,
Oo aanu dookhaaga noqon, waa dariiq xidhane.

Inkastuu dillaacshoo qalbiga, daabac ku xardhaayo

Xididdada dil-dilayee wadnuhu, dirayo dhiiggooda

Dahriga iyo laabtaba ku dhigo, Deeqa magacaaga

Diiwaankii Cilmoo kale galoo, deli ka laallaado

Suugaanta duugga ah murtida, damashi kuu qaado

Daaweeynta heesaha intaa, daram garaacayo,

Oo aanu dookhaaga noqon, waa dariiq xidhane.

Haddii uu dalxiis kuugu diro, dunida guudkeeda

Diyaarado hawada sarena aad, kula damaanshaaddo

Durdur iyo hadduu kugu dul furo, ilo dareeraaya

Deeradiyo cawshiyo ugaadh, quruxda daa'uuska

Doog iyo cagaar soo ifbaxay, darinta kuu daadsho

Ama Daallo oo roobku heley, Dalawa kuu maalo

Oo doobi kuu buuxiyoo, kuna daryeelaayo

Dayrtiyo Gugaba kuu da'oo, adiga kuu deexdo

Daruur hoortay uu kuu noqdiyo, malabka doocaanka,

Oo aanu dookhaaga noqon, waa dariiq xidhane.

Inkastuu darwiish adag yahiyo, geesi diriraayo

Dirica iyo wiil hoog yahoo, degello naafeeyo

Dumukha iyo qorigaba ridoo, diiradda u saaro

Halka lagu dagaalamo hadduu, doorar ka ciyaaro

Ama u daqiiqaaya oo uu, duubiyada gooyo,

Oo aanu dookhaaga noqon, waa dariiq xidhane.

Xeedhyo duuban oo duqus leh oo, geedo lagu daadshay

Hilbo duban kuwii diirranaa, qaar dux lagu shiilay

Daboolkiyo lingaxa lagu xidhood, uumi lagu daaro

Ubbadii dahaadhnayd haddii, diiqo lagu siiyo

Haddaan milix yar lagu daadinayn, kaama daadego'e,

Dookhana sidaasoo kalaan, loo dirqiyahayne

Damiirkaagu meeshaanu rabin, dooni kari maysid.

Taste

If this poem isn't free of flaws or clunkiness,

if it contains disharmony or defects,

if it doesn't illuminate what's hidden

and isn't used to staunch old injuries,

its verses won't nourish, are a withered breast.

Let me recite this with spirit. It's night; it's time.

Though he may call you fair names, a 'lovely mare',

and praise you up onto a pedestal, all-powerful,

and slip soothing words in your ear, sweet to hear,

dazzle your eyes and make desire rear up,

if he's not to your taste, he's just a blocked path.

Though he may place you in a skyscraper

and fill your world with glass

or fashion, or your demands,

arriving at your door with every whim,

if he's not to your taste, he's just a blocked path.

Though he's said to be wealthy, with a portfolio of property,

and is known for his patience and generosity

and like a tribal chief, is spoken of with honour,

and has his Master's degree and letters after his name,

if he's not to your taste, he's just a blocked path.

No matter that he wears his heart on his chest

and shows you the blood's beat in his veins

and prints your name on his skin

and writes love poems like Cilmi, from the edge,

and sings enchanted ancient lyrics full of wisdom,

if he's not to your taste, he's just a blocked path.

Though he takes you on a tour around the world

and wants you by him on the plane,

and shows you fountains and pulsing streams

in places teeming with deer, antelope, peacock,

and lays carpets for you on lush low grass

and takes you to stunning Daallo just after rain

and gives you bowls of camel-milk, wanting your comfort,

wanting to look after you through spring and autumn,

conjuring rainclouds and Yemeni honey,

if he's not to your taste, he's just a blocked path.

Though he might be a holy Dervish, a fighter for God,

a fearless young man who can destroy dark forces,

skilful with guns, never missing his target,

commended for bravery in battle,

who crushes his enemies and tears up their bodies,

if he's not to your taste, he's just a blocked path.

You might be treated to a bowl of spiced food,

barbecued meats and meats cooked with fat

steamed to perfection underneath a tight lid,

or a ghee pot with its beautifully crafted case,

but if there's no salt to season, you won't eat with relish.

Taste cannot be won by compulsion.

You cannot go against your own heart.

(Translated by Clare Pollard)

The *arar* serves as an opening section that warms up the audience. The first word "*haddaanad*"

is made up of three parts, "*haddii*" (if), "*aan*" (not), and "*aad*" (you), with the second person pronoun making it clear that the voice of the poem is addressing a *you*. Then, the second word "*gabayga*" reveals that the voice is making a point on the *gabay* poetry to the *you*. The next word "*deelqaafka*" means bad alliteration in Somali poetry. In the second half-line, the alliterative word "*dari*", which literally means a defect in a spine, here figuratively implies flaws in a poem. And the last two words "*ka saaraynnin*" is the negative form of the verb "to remove" in the past tense. Thus, in the first line of this poem, the voice of the poem says, "if you did not remove the bad alliteration and defects from the *gabay*," then something would happen. In the following three lines, the word *haddaan* is repeated. The alliterative words in each half-line, "*dalabta*" (disharmony), "*diniqa*" (wound), "*meeshii dahsoonayd*"(the hidden place), "*doog*" (pain from an old wound), and "*dakharradii*" (the wounds), all symbolise flaws in a poem. Instead of the second person pronoun, in these three lines, the impersonal pronoun '*la*' (which is equivalent to "one" in English) is used. If one didn't get rid of the disharmony and the invisible wound, if one didn't shed light on the hidden place, if one didn't have a surgery on the pain from an old wound, if the wounds delayed. The poet guides her audience to imagine the pain from an old wound, the darkness of a hidden place, and all the other images which metaphorically give a vivid description of the frustrations that an imperfect poem may cause. Then in the penultimate line she used two metaphors that are deeply rooted in the nomadic Somali culture and said: precious milk-production and grease can't be made from the lines.

Somali poetry exists to be presented to real audiences that it hopes to resonate with. A Somali poet persuades a listener of her position through the reasoning as well as the virtuosity of the technical brilliance in her poems. In this *arar*, the use of four negative conditional clauses, with plenty of images, serves to achieve a persuasive or impressive effect. On the one hand, it affirms one single argument, which is "a poem should be good"; on the other it proves to the audiences the poet's competence in making a good poem as she makes different words with similar metaphorical meanings alliterate in lines that perfectly fit in the metrical pattern. Hence, the effects of the compositional techniques make the poetic language become rhetorical.

In this rhetorical act, the poet persuades her listeners by offering discourse in which a voice addresses a "you". There isn't clear evidence in this *arar* pointing to any specific poet who made poems with terrible alliteration. Whereas the impersonal pronoun "*la*" confirms that the "*aad*" (**you**) is a "blurred" "*la*" (**one**). The deixis gestures towards the real listeners, but doesn't apply to a specific person or group. The speaker here, is addressing an imagined someone, a pure place holder, with the

pronouns "*aad*" and "*la*", in order to deliver a message to the real audiences. The voice, therefore, is speaking indirectly to the audience.

In Culler's study of the lyric theory, he stresses the structure of indirection resulted from what he calls "triangulated address", where a poet addresses an audience "through the act of address (implicit or explicit) to an imagined addressee". He suggested that "there is always an indirect 'you' in the lyric, as lyrics strive to be an event in the special temporality of the lyric present." The shift from "*aad*" to "*la*" in this *arar*, coincides with the indeterminate potential of the lyric *you* that Culler conceptualizes. While the poet reads the *arar* to her audiences, making her arguments on defective poems through the act of address to an imagined *one*, listeners are free to feel addressed and make observations on this poem without being directly preached to.

In the following *dhexdhexaad* section, a third person pronoun '*uu*' appears and the imagined addressee changed to a woman. In each stanza, conjunction words 'inkasta' (although) and hadda (if) are used to introduce a series of concessive or conditional clauses, describing how a "*uu*" (he) might impress a "*ku*" (you). Starting from material wealth, moving to his virtues, educational background, religiosity, and the more specific things "he" does for "you", the lines brim with pleasant images that a woman may be expected to find appealing. However, just as a favourable impression of this "he" grows in a listener's mind, at the end of each stanza, a repeated line "*Oo aanu dook haaga noqon, waa dariiq xidhane*" dampens the enthusiasm. With the title word "*dookh*" joining the second person possessive suffix "*kaaga*", the refrain points out the thrust of this poem. Despite the desirable characters and the pleasing acts of the man, it is not those things that the poem is about.

Although the majority part of this poem is filled with "he" and "you", I suggest that neither this imagined man nor this imagined woman that the voice is addressing is at the centre of this poem. The vivid description of the man's acts may lead a listener to expect what comes next between the man and the woman, however, the poem is far from a fictional representation between this man and any woman. Instead of creating a "she" persona, the poet creates a voice who seems to be a sophisticated woman, and addresses a "you" throughout the lines. At the end of each stanza, the refrain disrupts the seemingly 'plot' and brings it back to a present of discourse. In a poetry reading event, the audiences naturally recite the repeated line together with Caasha Luul "*Oo aanu dookhaaga noqon, waa dariiq xidhane*".

In this poem, the voice can be but doesn't have to be the poet herself. Whoever reads the lines can take the position. The "he" is less an actual person or a fictional persona than a poetic device that serves to the purpose of addressing a "you", which Johnson (1982, p.4) suggested being a "metaphor"

for the audience, a "symbolic mediator", and a "conductor" between the poet and each of the readers and listeners.

Hearing the performance of a voice addressing a lyric you, the audience has considerable scope in choosing whether to treat the discourse as the thought of the poet or as general wisdom that he or she can make observation on. They are also free to feel addressed by taking the position as the "you" in the poem, or stay as an observer of the performance. To a woman who may have met such a "he" before, she can become a close friend of the poet and resonate with her insights. To a girl who has not yet realised the taste of love, it can be an advice from an anonymous experienced woman: one cannot go through a blocked path.

Dookh is composed in a very classical fashion, using a proper *arar* which is reminiscent of great *gabays* of the past, and imageries and metaphors that are deeply rooted in the nomadic society. It is also composed in a contemporary manner, having words such as "aeroplane" and "master degree" in its lines. What's more, it engages with the poet's identity as a contemporary woman and urges her fellow women to listen to their own feelings and find the right man who is to their taste.

Having looked at the case, I hope to have shown some possibilities of relating Somali poetry to lyric poetry and lyric theories. To tease out the central features of the Somali poems which reflect these possibilities from close reading, also points to my research question: how the poets express what they want to express. Other topics such as political issues, the sea-migration, and the notion of home are also concerned by the Somali poets. Other poetic techniques such as alliteration, apostrophe, repetition etc. are also key features that are worth to be explored.

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Representations of China in Contemporary Kenyan Narrative: Goods, Markets and Friends

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In 2000, one year before China joined the World Trade Organization, the first ministerial conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held in Beijing. Since then, the interactions between China and Africa both in politics and economics have been increasing in volume and intensity at all levels. In 2018, "China has been Kenya's largest trading partner, investor and contractor" for three consecutive years[1] and it has witnessed the opening launch of the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) in 2017 and the test run of the Nairobi-Naivasha SGR in September 2019. The "Belt and Road Initiative" proposed by Xi Jinping in 2013 has also featured Kenya as the gateway to Africa.

This fast development and drastically growing intimacy between China and Kenya have attracted scholars from all disciplines and have contributed to the emergence of China-Africa research field, but these studies mostly focus on macro-level interactions and are from the discipline of economics, politics, international relations and infrastructure. Literature and art, both as a reflection and representation of reality and medium of intervening reality, providing a unique perspective into this complexity, ambiguity and interconnectivity of China-Kenya encountering.

"Selling World Power" is a short story by Billy Kahora published in 2007 in Kwani series and is republished under the name "World Pawa" in the collection of Billy Kahora's short stories *The*

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1 Tang Ying. "China, Kenya successfully follow up on 2015 FOCAC". chinadaily.com.cn | Updated: 2018−08−26. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/26/WS5b824e20a310add14f387cbc.html accessed on 30.09.2019.

Cape Cod and Bicycle and Other Stories in 2019. The Kenyan literary magazine Kwani, which was launched in 2003 in Nairobi online by Kwani Trust, has been the platform for contemporary Kenyan writers to narrate their political, social and cultural concerns in a creative way that might not be considered as literature in the classic definition (Ligala 47). Kwani Trust was funded by the Ford Foundation for printing hard copies and was intended to bring "the things that are untidy and alive, that are present in society, into the book" (Haines, Interview with Kahora, 12.08.2015; Wallis 40). The series were mainly edited by Binyavanga Wainaina and Billy Kahora and the name Kwani means "so what" in Sheng, an urban language mixing Swahili, English and local ethnic languages. The journal gets popular and famous for its inclusion of popular forms as well as its artistic intervention and engagement with the 2007–2008 Kenyan post-election violence. "Selling World Power" published in *Kwani? 04*, which tells the story of a Kenyan lady's journey of "becoming Chinese" (Kahora 351) through her participation at a Chinese multilevel marketing company in Nairobi and through her help of selling made-in-China fake products. In the foreword of *Kwani? 04*, Kahora writes that "we recognize that in these stories we share a common identity and, perhaps more importantly, tell others about who we are" (Kahora iii). The author tries to review and analyze representations of China in Kahora's "Selling World Power" to explore how gender, class and race are entangled with discourses surrounding China and Kenya encounters in everyday life, and how identification and agency of local actors are effected during the process.

Selling (next) World Power

As the title of the short story indicates, a process of selling and buying is taking place, but it is not clear who is doing the "selling", what the "world power" is, and who is buying it, only till the first sentence states that "Jemima Kariuki is becoming Chinese" (351). Jemima is a young worker at "Domestic Revenue, ExtelComms Inspectorate, Nairobi Lower Hill" (352) with parents in Karatina, an extra-marital son Kim at boarding school and a "useless" lover Miano. Just as her colleagues doing small business outside the job, Jemima works "part-time" for Kianshi, a multi-level marketing company, in which one gains 10% of the "membership" fee 500 ksh by introducing another into the network. In a sense, "selling world power" is Jemima's selling of "membership" of Kianshi to mama Jacinta of the chapati stands, to all the staff at Mlima House including askaris, which shows the social and economic class of Jemima as well as her strong motivation for changes. Even though she is aware that products from Kianshi are fake, she still tries to persuade others by stating that "Not America, Chaina is the next world powa—everyone knows. You need to buy new Made in China" (352). It

showed a desire for modernity, for development and life improvement, a desire to stay with the global trend for a better future, and a desire not to be left behind in the fast-changing era.

Meanwhile, Jemima sells Chinese company Kianshi under the label world power, while at the meantime she is also the buyer of China as the "next world powa". What seems paradoxical here is that Kianshi has arrived in Kenya while China is still and perhaps the NEXT world power. Even though China is narrated in the present tense, it is actually still yet to come, implying a potential and possibility out of many futures and also the need for efforts to make it happen next. A future of China as the next world power is conceived and has revealed part of its plan in the present but has not been fully realized, since it still depends on the choice and workings of people, on Kenyan's decision whether to get involved with China or not in the present. To some extent, what Jemima is selling is a future prospect and uncertain certainty of China-Kenya encounters, though the selling is under the pretense of all for the other's benefits actually only out of the prospect of economic gain for oneself.

Jemima's involvement and highly motivated selling of China exhibits a strong local agency in the Chinese engagements with local markets, even though in informal economy and even illegal business. The benefits that she got also made her to retort her colleague Bessie, who had a rich Nigerian boyfriend, that "Do not compare China to Nigeria.［ ... ］How can you compare a world power with a *foo foo* drug culture" (362). This assertion reiterates an exceptionality of China not only in economy but also in culture as the representation of modernity in opposition to "foo foo drug culture" and of recognized world influence in the eyes of Jemima. However, ironically in the end, Jemima's Chinese boss Han So disappears due to the fake product scandal report from the news agency and Jemima has to flee, which parallels with what happens to Bessie and her Nigerian boyfriend Obi who "was thrown out of the country" two years ago (352). The products' fakeness seems to suggest the faking of "world power". Meanwhile, the arrival of Han So following the disappearing of Bessie's Nigerian boyfriend reflects changes of tides in global economy, the fall and retreating of Nigeria and the arrival of China in Kenyan market, the globality of Kenya and Jemima and Bessie's enthusiasm to participate in those informal business reveal urban working women's desire of upward mobility through connections with foreign forces.

The desire for change is also reflected in Jemima's dressings. The whole story is narrated from Jemima's view, a limited third person point of view. In the middle of the plot, she recalled how she changes from "the chiffon dresses with erratic hemlines and balloon shoulders" when she first moved to Nairobi to "softer skirts with shorter hemlines and white blouses" and then to "the new red suit with padded shoulders［ ... ］after joining Kianshi" (355). Jemima's dressings and clothes actually change

with the development of her career. Clothes, as the meeting and interacting point between body and the world, is not only functional but also as a cultural and social signifier of one's identification. Jemima's chiffon dress and balloon shoulders corresponds with her being young, romantic and unsophisticated freshly out of Maseno university. Then the short and soft dress is the time of her being the mistress of her boss PK Maina, trying to use sexual attraction for benefits. The red suit shows a confident professional Jemima empowered and capacitated through her involvement with Kianshi and her identification with China as in the color of the suit. Not only does Kianshi change Jemima's clothing, Jemima is also bestowed with the task of "dressing a Chinese company in Kenyan clothing" (Thornber 711), giving Kianshi a Kenyan name. The names Jemima comes up with are "Chenya, Kinya" (354), which suggests a highly entangled China-Kenya relations with China entering Kenya or China internalized by Kenya, which echo with the photographs at the beginning of the story with Mao Tse Tung on a 1000 Kenyan shilling note and Jomo Kenyatta on a 100 RMB note.

"Power over a man"

In addition to the world power that Kianshi means for Jemima, it also symbolizes another possible way of life. In the time of difficulties or being surrounded by "things she is trying to get out of life" (354), she often "visualise" herself as "a non-working and free woman" driving "towards leafy Nairobi suburbs", the middle class and high-end areas of Nairobi as the Kianshi video says. This reveals the attractiveness of Kianshi for Jemima by depicting an alternative future, a class upward mobility and an independent and free female image for a lower-class working woman like Jemima. This earns the cooperation of Jemima on selling fake products and indeed has "empowered her". Jemima has been called as Beijing by her male colleagues since she started working for Kianshi and she was picked up by her boss PK Maina when she wore Qipao dress in the office. He asked her to only wear it at home and derided it as "mambo ya wanawake" (women's thing) when Jemima dared to speak up for herself. However, PK Maina went to Jemima after Han So's visit in his office for deals about phones and computers with bribery and confessed to her that he liked Jemima's "kajamaa", relative. What Kianshi won for Jemima is not only economic gains, but also a change in the attitudes of her male boss and male colleagues towards her. Her rising earnings and financial independence impact on her personal life. She makes her husband "sleep on the floor after he came back after three days, drunk, meek and dishevelled" while one night before he almost beats her during their television fight (356). With money and her ability and rise in Kianshi, she found her husband "useless now that she has more money but likes the new sense of power over a man" (357). This new sense of power

comes from her selling of "world power". At the moment when Miano and Jemima have to flee, Jemima is already imagining her own shop in Karatina, which "she will call it 'World Power'" (364), even though those goods are left over from Han So's storage of fake products.

"Jackie Chan" and "Leettle Monkeys"

The whole story is divided into seven parts and it begins with Jemima's attempt of convincing the owner of chapati stand to join Kianshi during a lunchtime on Friday. Then the story moves to three weeks after she joins Kianshi when Han So visits her boss JK Maina as a retrospect as well as Han So's visit of Jemima's neighborhood. These two parts are where Han So directly speaks and acts. Before and later he is always indirectly mentioned or remembered by Jemima. These episodes are soon followed by the visit of guys from State Research Bureau at Jemima's office after she joined Kianshi for a year and the visit of the mini-market owner, to whom she has sold those fake products and who comes to complain his recent imprisonment and his shop close-down. Only till the second last part has the story reveal how Jemima gets to know and be involved with Kianshi. In a sense, the fakeness of the products is only revealed near the end of the story. This organization not only emphasizes the agency, acts and motivation of Jemima but also engages readers with the process of faking and "pretending" not knowing the "truth" as Jemima, even though it has been stated that these goods are sold at a very low price and has been alluded that it is impossible for them to be authentic. Similar with Han So, even though he is not present, not in Jemima's workplace, not in the questioning of inspectors, Han So is always the center of the topic or the cause of the turn of the plot. In this sense, Han So symbolizes the world power that is ubiquitous and influential in all aspects of Jemima's life, the elements of "China" in Kenyan life from food to dress, from thinking patterns to company, from government corruption to multilevel marketing. Even in the last part, Jemima was visualizing her own shop in Karatina on her flee in a matatu with fake products in her luggage. China is indeed in the Kenyan's future.

Moreover, Jemima's relation with Han So is also very ambiguous. Han So is often referred as the sponsor, boss, boyfriend, or even kajamaa of Jemima by different people. In Jemima's eyes, he is short, with small eyes, and for a long time "she has never contemplated physical contact with him. […] she wonders what their children would be like. Pink to medium brown depending on the time of day, she decides" (358). The lack of sexual appeal of Asian guys seem to echo with the racial and gendered stereotypes surrounding Asian male, who are represented either as evil as Fu Manchu or in a castrated femalized image with no sexual appeal. Jemima's musings on the color of their kid reveals not only unfamiliarity of mixed marriage between Chinese and Kenyan but also a casual racism on the

ground. This is also reflected in Han So's visit of Jemima's neighborhood. "Kids have gathered around Han So, 'Jackie Chan, Jackie Chan.' Chopping their hands and kicking in the air." (360). Han So is stereotyped into Kungfu movie and the sensation he causes among the kids shows the singularity of Chinese visits in Nairobi lower class residence.

These stereotypes do not only come from the Kenyan side. When kids surround Han So, "'Like leettle monkeys,' Han So smiles, looking at the crowd of kids gathered around when⌈Jemima⌋finally appears" (ibid). All these interactions show the cultural ignorance among China and Kenya and (casual) racism showed in the process illustrate a "gaze", racial discourse copied from the west, from the "imperial eye" (Pratt 4) instead of a "mutual gaze" (Cheng 94) directly between the two intersected with social, cultural and class differences. The Euro-centric cultural productions and knowledge system is repeated here, reproducing and reproduced through the emotional structure in quotidian life and everyday interactions.

Royco/Loyco: Chinese goods

Han So's accent is prominent in his characterization. He always speaks with an accent, mixing l and r, e and i, with broken grammar. When he went to Jemima to hand over the fake goods, he said "for you. Good friend of Han So. Loyco." (360), whose real name is Royco. Han So's pronunciation of Royco as Loyco, on one hand, shows the similarity and fakeness of his products from the real one, on the other hand, it may be attributed to accent, which reveal the ambiguity of these products' authenticity. In the news report, the article is titled "FAKE OR REAL: THE CHOICE IS YOURS" (368), which echoes with Han So's ambiguous naming of the products. Whether "Loyco" is fake or not, whether customers should buy it or not (since it is cheaper than real products) is a choice, not a fact. As many studies of economics and anthropology show, there exists "a continent-wide discourse of the African encounter with China that criticizes Chinese manufactured goods as cheap knockoffs of European, Japanese, and American goods" (Siu & McGovern 345), which enhances "the perception that Africa is a dumping ground for goods of inferior quality remains a point of contention, even for those who might not be able to afford better-quality goods" (ibid). However, what shows in this short story is as Sylvanus notices, "the distinctions between authentic and fake that define proprietary goods in Togo are much more fluid and part of a changing field in which the construction of what counts for authentic and fake are socially defined and always contested" (241). The linguistic inflection in Han So's pronunciation of the products (the name on the package is still Royco) is not only a repetition of Chinese stereotypes, broken English with accent, but also a veil over fakeness, an honest revelation/

confession of deception, and the grey and blurry area between fake and real.

The story of Lin Tse Xu

Near the end of the story, the first meeting between Jemima and Han So is narrated. Han So tells the story of Lin Tse Xu. Lin is taken as a hero who "refuses British product" in opposition of "greedy" government official. In Han So's narration, he is different from the British and what he does in Kenya is different from what the British did in China, even though both sell "world power". British sells opium to China under the excuse of making China strong, while he "want to make China strong and Kenya strong. Bring products that make Kenya and China strong. Bring Kianshi. Bring World Power" (364). A very interesting complexity is unfolded here. On one hand, it is the anti-colonial discourse that China and Kenya have been colonized by the British, which revokes a historical imagination and constructs an anti-colonial solidarity between China and Kenya that was also wide spread in the 1960's. Like when Jemima is asked what the differences between Kianshi and other multi-marketing companies, Jemima answers that "Kianshi is special. All members are a FAMILY. China is the next World Powa" (364). A solidarity, as family, with shared history of being colonized, is recounted as the official narrative on both governments. On the other side, the parallel of selling products and "world power" between the Britain and China in different times and space insinuates a comparison between the two, questioning the claims of Han So whether Chinese is really different from the British. To some extent, Han So and Kianshi do bring benefits to Jemima and have made her "stronger" and they get "stronger" through Jemima's help and support, but the claim that Kenya is made strong by bringing world power of China, or in this case fake products made in China, is scrutinized under question through the comparison.

Conclusion

All these show that despite the morality or legal issues surrounding the sale of Chinese fake cheap products, its marginal profits, the cooperation between Chinese and Kenyan in everyday life at the low-end globalization (Mathews & Yang 97) does in a complicated way help to improve class mobility and gender equality by empowering and enriching lower-class urban female workers. Though it might not be structural changes. The availability of the fake "made-in-China" products in Kenyan markets does harm the local markets and production, which brings in the perspective and criticism of China as the neo-colonial world power, but it, on one hand, helps the democratization of the market, making the market more accessible at a smaller cost, lower starting capital, and it, on the other hand,

is a result from a complex and contested "joint" efforts within China-Africa encounters, which confirms the agency of African actors who "have negotiated and even shaped Chinese engagements in important ways" (Mohan & Lambert 93), even though Mohan and Lambert's studies focused more on political and business elites. Billy Kahora's story showed the alliance established on lower social strata united by economic gains and how class, gender, race play during the process together with colonial/ postcolonial discourse.

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Transplantation and Dual Legal Framework during British Empire and Post Empire Era: A Nigerian Example through the Novel *Children of the Eagle(2005)*

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Abstract:

In 2005, Nigerian writer Akachi published *Children of the Eagle*, the last of the Umuga trilogy. This novel examines how Biafra War has impacted Nigerian lives, esp. those of women's. Different narrative modes intertwine to relate Biafra War to the post-Biafra era. By focusing on the individual life and struggles of Eaglewoman and her five daughters, Akachi gives a panoramic view to Nigeria. The symbiosis of law transplanted from British legal system during British Empire and traditional Nigerian social norms form a dual legal framework which adds both complexities and leverage to women's lives. It is deciphered that the degree of defying gender-based customary norms and the degree of being victimized are in opposition, rather than in conformity. In illustrating the divergent strategies that women adopt to cope with gender-based traditional norms, Akachi is decoding the operational mechanism of cultural institutions across spatial and temporal boundaries.

Keywords: transplantation; dual legal framework; indirect rule; Children of the Eagle

Colonial Governance and The Biafra War

In 1914, the United Kingdom amalgamated the occupied western African land, carving an area

out of West Africa containing hundreds of different ethnic groups and unifying it, calling it Nigeria (Ojeleye 30). The three predominant ethnic groups were the Igbo, which formed between 60%–70% of the population in the southeast; the Hausa-Fulani, which formed about 65% of the population in the northern part of the territory; and the Yoruba, which formed about 75% of the population in the southwestern part. The coincidental putting together of populations with largely varied ethnicity, religion, and languages foreshadowed future disastrous conflicts. Henceforth, a unified legal system was established within Nigeria.(Nwankwo 26)

The British Empire's indirect rule reinforced rather than alleviated regional and tribal differences and antagonism. Frederick Lugard, the High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria from 1899 to 1906, instituted a system whereby external, military, and tax control was operated by the British, while most every other aspect of life was left to local pre-British aristocracies who may have sided with the British during or after their conquest. Lugard explained the system in the influential work, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*.This system, in which the structure of authority focused on the emir to whom obedience was a mark of religious devotion, did not welcome change. As the emirs settled more and more into their role as reliable agents of indirect rule, colonial authorities were content to maintain the status quo.

The tensions among ethnic groups and regions took shape at the birth of Nigeria, got solidified under the indirect rule during colonial era and escalated in post-colonial era. Ethnic groups and their respective religious beliefs further grudges against each other. Northern Nigeria was predominantly Muslim and Southern Nigeria Christian and Animist. The Southerners including Igbos and Yorubas who value individual responsibility and individual accomplishments, deem Northerners mostly Hausas as lazy parasites. Due to the obvious economic and educational advantages of the South over the North, Northern Hausas deem southerners, especially the Igbos as a threat against them.

The discovery of oil in the Eastern Igbo area since 1956 and its ensued commercial exploitation furthered above negative perceptions towards each other. Half of the oil revenue stayed within Eastern area, while the other half went to the Federal Government. The Eastern Igbo area therefore hoped to secede so as to keep the entire oil revenue, while the other areas especially the Northern area would try to keep the Eastern area in Nigeria to have stable oil revenue to support developments. The situation led Olukunle Ojeleye to opine that "if oil were not present in commercial quantities in the Eastern Region, the East might not have opted for secession. It may also have meant the Gowon-led federal government would have allowed the Eastern Region to go its own way and become the Republic of Biafra"(39).

In 1967, the tensions erupted into the Biafran War, also known as the Nigerian Civil War (6 July 1967–15 January 1970), resulting in massacres killing an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Igbo, half of them children, and fleeing of more than a million to two million to the Eastern Region. After the Federal Military Government (FMG) occupied the port city, Port Harcourt, it made the blockade against Biafra total and scarcity of food became FMG's weapon of war to compel Biafra into submission. (Moses & Heerten 333) The result was massive civilian deaths. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported estimated 3,000 famine deaths daily by the middle of 1968 summer, and by the end of the year the number rose to 8,000–12,000 deaths daily. The total starvation casualties was estimated to be over one million.

The Akachi's 2005 novel *Children of the Eagle* combines third person narrator and multiple first person narrators in its narration of the Biafra War era, and is a precious perspective to how the Biafran War devastated the people's especially women's lives during and after the war. The use of food scarcity as war weapon and unselective attacks on civilian areas convinced the Biafrans, especially the Igbo people, of FMG's intention of genocide against them which only strengthened Biafra's determination to hold on. "The birth of Biafra signaled the birth of a terrible beauty. The beauty that aroused the desire to sacrifice one's self to ensure Biafra's survival." (298) Ogonna, the eldest child of Eaglewoman in the novel was one of those who during the Civil War served in the army and "stared death in the face"(287). Oganna fell in love with the Squadron Leader Harry Ozoemena who was "fighting the war with absolute dedication" and "would perish in the war" (298). Harry's death shattered her. After the War, she married only to please her parents. The marriage without love was miserable. What Ogonna could resort to was imagination: "When I lie on my bed and close my eyes, recalling a time I was extremely happy and secure-like during the war when Harry and I were together—I experience great happiness and pleasure, which stay with me for a week or more." (312)

During and shortly after the war at Biafra, out of the desire for survival from famine, some women entered into relationship with Federal solders or officers in exchange for food and other scarce items. Eaglewoman's third daughter Obioma unluckily became one of them. Immediately after the War, the Federal Government urged students to return to school. Obioma returned to high school, only to find she had to skip to a higher grade and had to sleep in dormitory rooms without bed or cushions. The family was totally impoverished and the situation got even worse for Obioma when her father's purse was stolen on the way to her school to send her money for food. Before her father could rummage through all relatives for a little money to bring to Obioma, she was in entire starvation while having to attend classes and handling difficult schoolwork. After three days without any food, she was

seduced by her schoolmate Florence to go to a place where her starvation could be ended. It turned out to be the Federal soldiers' barracks. When Obioma arrived at the barracks, she couldn't change her mind and had to start a relation with Captain Lanre Roberts. The relationship sustained for two weeks before Obioma's father came with money when she immediately severed links with Lanre. But she soon found herself pregnant. Abortion is illegal and doctors are liable for imprisonment if found procuring abortion, unless the operation is done to save the woman's life. (Okagbue 197; Adeniran et. 18). Florence led her to a private clinic to have abortion, where when she was all bound up on the bed for surgery, the doctor requested sexual intercourse before the abortion procedure could move on. The doctor raped her on the surgery bed and then agreed to conduct the abortion. Impulsively Obioma decided to cancel the abortion and lied to Florence about it. Obioma confided the truth to her family. Her mother Eaglewoman came up with the solution of Eaglewoman faked pregnancy and would become mother to Obioma's baby-Nkemdirim. Nkemdirim's real identity as Obioma's son has henceforth become the family's secret. The experience defines Obioma. The feelings of guilt and remorse are always ready to "pierce Obioma like a spear"(275), even after she has become a pastor at church.

The Biafra War cast shadows on both Oganna and Obioma, under which they are still struggling and may never walk out of during their lives.

Customary Law and Gender-based Traditional Norms

In *Children of the Eagle*, some traditional norms are largely influencing people's lives. One such rule is that women can't inherit land. Eaglewoman is strong-willed, determined and industrious. Although her husband is an civil official, Eaglwoman never allowed her to entirely rely on him financially. Her husband relocated several times because of his job, but Eaglewoman managed to restart her business each time and make it prosper until after the burst of the Biafra War. With the wealth she accumulated from her business, the family could purchase plots of land and houses. She gave birth to five smart daughters. However, wealth and kids couldn't save her from misery. The family "suffered the psychological trauma that only a household without a male child could be exposed to"(274). Relatives from the husband's side sending signals that the lands would belong to their male heirs, while making different attempts to occupy the properties. The situation didn't change until Eaglewoman "gave birth to" a male child Nkemdirim, who "would silence the rumbles of the extended family's discordant voices and opinions"(272–273). When Nkemdirim was badly hurt in an accident and wasn't sure to survive, the family's friend Pa Joel suggested "Amara (the youngest

daughter who is getting married in three days) should remain at home to perpetuate her father's name by producing a son or sons to inherit his vast property and wealth in Umuga and other places." (437) Pa Joel was not being irrational with such suggestion. Another Ogunano Ezeala representative to help erect concrete boundary markers on the disputed land supports Pa Joel's logic. On insisting the only male heir's presence on the scene to represent his family, the representative argues, "Your brother may be a child but he is a male. The land in question belongs to him: it is his inheritance. Whoever hears that land issues are settled in the presence of women in Umuga?" (354)

Another tradition is the prejudice and malice towards widows. "His death exposed me to the sharp tooth of Umuga's unkind customs directed against widows. I tasted the poison of malice brewed by his envious and greedy relatives." (50) The first horrible custom for a widow is a three-day lament after the burial. Eaglewoman was "humiliated, browbeaten and pressured" (164) to perform the ritual from the cockcrow; furthermore, for entire three days, all the daughters of the lineage, came to eat and drank in the house, remained extremely picky about food and kept threatening to desert the rites and rituals, which would cause a scandal for Eaglewoman to suffer. The second custom is a one-year mourning period for the widow to stay confined indoors. The third malice towards a widow is the attitude of contempt from around. "I am a widow, so people can talk to me as they like, treat me as they like. People who would never have blinked their eyes at me when Osai was alive now confront me and show me their backsides. I am a prey to every roaming hyena because I do not have a husband any more."(40) That is why when asked what was most painful experience in her life, Eaglewoman picked the experience of becoming a widow.

The traditional attitude towards marriage and divorce has been changing, but not fast enough. In African traditional belief, getting married is the mode of life. As philosopher John Mbiti expressed it,

> *Marriage is a drama in which everyone becomes an actor or actress and not just a spectator. Therefore, marriage is a duty, a requirement from the corporate society, and a rhythm of life in which everyone must participate. Otherwise, he who does not participate in it is a curse to the community, he is a rebel and a law-breaker, he is not only abnormal but 'under-human'. Failure to get married under normal circumstances means that the person concerned has rejected society and society rejects him in return. (Elechi 2006, 150)*

Life out of marriage, especially for women, is therefore deemed abnormal. Mbiti's above statement has an echo in *Children of the Eagle*. The eldest daughter is suffering a bad marriage, but she declines to divorce and uttered,

> *I dread the stigma of divorce. The embarrassing sniggers of people: the finger-pointing. How can I face life as a woman alone, a single woman on the threshold of middle age, after being married for so many years? Do you know what a woman faces in our culture, as a divorcee? You are pitied. You are scorned. (122)*

Eaglewoman's fourth daughter Chiaku was divorced and she has no plan of coming back from London to Nigeria except as a short time traveller, because she wants to avoid the "scorpion sting of divorce" (127). The reluctance for women to end a failed marriage is in large due to the impact of divorce on kids. "Most of the men raised in our culture are reluctant to marry girls from divorced or broken marriage. They say such girls cannot make happy homes." (123) Remarriage isn't usually a new hope as many women in second marriage end up becoming baby-minder for the children from the previous marriage, a housekeeper and a cook. A relief for women with education and a means to earn their own living is they don't have to "grovel in the mud when a marriage collapses" (127). Many women, like Oganna, choose to stay in a collapsed marriage, without suffering too much as Oganna's aunt Rachel did, who "was like a boat cut adrift from its mooring, moving from one place to another, from one relation's home to another"(126).

Another restriction that women may still be subjugated to is lower expectation for their accomplishments, and more hindrances exist for them to move higher on the ladder of accomplishments. The second daughter Nnenne has been struggling from childhood to "be accepted as person with a right to be clever, and be respected for having certain abilities". (372) Her excellence at school work and spelling competition won her ridicules from around, such as "Where will your cleverness take you except a man's kitchen?" Her first year after graduation was spent at a technical college teaching English under the abusive manipulation of Mr. Edet. "Displeased with my self-confidence and self-assurance, "he arranged Nnenne (pregnant at the moment) to live in a rat-swathed storeroom when there were vacant rooms. Her promotion at the current university has been delayed for years. In the "male-dominated" academia, women is outnumbered, and encountered with more obstacles. Nnenne's best friend Adanna had to resign because the head of the department "could forgive her for spurning his amorous advances" and took steps to frustrate her at every

opportunity"(220). Adanna together with other two activists later formed an NGO called Gender Equality Watch to work for change for women in the country and in Africa.

Dual Legal Framework and Customary Law Reinforcement

Colonial ruling strategy in Nigeria created a dual law systems: Common law and Customary law. Frederick Lugard, the High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria from 1899 to 1906, advocated indirect rule in Nigeria. Under indirect rule, external, military, and tax control was operated by the British, while most every other aspect of life was left to local pro-British aristocracies. Indirect rule recognized native law and customs of the different ethnic groups in Nigeria and allowed the continued operation of traditional dispute resolution under the supervision by British officials, or new native courts established by the colonial administration. In matters involving natives and land matters, the courts ascertained and applied native law and custom. (Ilumoka, 425–426)

At the dawn of Nigeria's independence, to sustain British benefits at Nigeria, British and colonial officials made strenuous efforts to keep the impact of Britain by supporting Nigeria to model at British political and legal systems. "From 1946, when the first constitutional reforms were enacted, until the 1960, the colonial government collaborated with moderate Western-educated elite nationalists to develop a system of gradual self-government." (Toyin 148). The Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 established Nigeria as a federation of three regions, Northern, Western and Eastern and henceforth the founding of the Federal House of Representatives. Pro-Britain aristocrats and politicians were helped to enter the Parliament. British government assisted Nigeria in training lawyers and legal staffs. "Precedence is an integral part of colonial court systems; as such, previous decisions of the courts influenced subsequent cases."(Armstrong et al 1993). British publishers compiled and published cases for Nigeria for the feasibility and convenience to enforce the rule of precedent under common law. Western-educated elites came to "dominate the political scene" (Toyin 155), and were willing to adopt British mode for independent Nigeria.

The common law v. customary law dual legal framework established under the indirect rule mode of governance and continued in post-colony era has been reserving a protected zone for traditional norms in the name of customary law. Some gender-biased traditional norms are terminated even prohibited by ordinances, but still recognized as legal by customary law. The outcome of the dual legal framework is that traditional norms, including a number of outdated gender-biased norms have been cloaked as customary law and hence have been largely kept intact, losing the chance of getting terminated.

One customary law rule is permitting polygamy. Marriages may be contracted through Customary law, or Ordinance law (also known as the Marriage Act), or instituted through the Church. Marriages undertaken under any of the systems are duly recognized as valid in Nigeria. (Elechi 149) Polygamy is recognized by customary law but prohibited by the Marriage Act, with violations resulting in five years' imprisonment.

Colonial indirect rule and post-colonial Western-educated elites' influences made it possible for the dual law legal framework to continue in post-colonial Nigeria. Rule of precedents has been adopted and "precedent cases were uncritically cited as evidence of the applicable custom in subsequent cases" (Elechi 51).Under the dual legal framework, some legal practices are able to sustain through the Colonial era till modern Nigeria, such as the law about land property.

A land dispute and its resolution in the novel demonstrate how modern Nigerians are making choices within the dual framework of Nigerian legal system. A man named Umeaku borrowed money from Eaglewoman and her husband Osai, and later sold a piece of land to them to pay back the debt. After Umeaku died, his sons started to question the settlement. After Osai died, Umeaku's sons got bolder and even destroyed boundary markers and robbed harvests from Eaglewoman's land. A land dispute of this nature could go to a local court to be solved. However the first choice that Eaglewoman's well-educated daughters made was to approach the highest decision-making body in their village Ogunano Ezeala. "If we are not satisfied with their judgement, we will take the matter to the larger body in charge of settling cases in the whole town." (64) Only after they would exhaust all available local dispute resolution means, were they going to approach courts. A key issue is the local decision-making bodies are highly gender-biased: Ogunano Ezeala is formed by selected men, in consideration of their courage, sense of justice and the ability to make peace as well as equal representation of different families and clans; women are not permitted to approach it. To obey the Ogunano Ezeala's rule of not allowing women to approach it, Eaglewoman's daughters decided to write a letter and then asked their good neighbor and family friend Pa Joel to bring the letter to Ogunano Ezeala. After Ogunano Ezeala ruled favorably for Eaglewoman, the body's representative demanded the presence of a male from the family when they were erecting concrete markers at the disputed land. "Your brother may be a child but he is a male. The land in question belongs to him: it is his inheritance. Whoever hears that land issues are settled in the presence of women in Umuga?" (354)

The sequence that Eaglewoman's daughters adopt among the available land dispute resolutions illustrates how women in Nigeria struggle to maneuver through gender-biased institutions under the dual legal framework. Between gender-biased local dispute resolution bodies and more gender-neutral

courts, Eaglewoman's daughters choose the former in the belief that if they could word the message well enough, the Ogunano Ezeala council could be made "to act without delay". High efficiency has a great advantage over courts. However, Ogunano Ezeala's exclusion of women members and rejection of direct contact with women put Eaglewoman and her daughters at a disadvantageous situation. With Pa Joel's help, contact with the Council can be achieved. To sway the Council to their side, Eaglewoman's daughters employ several tactics in the letter:

Josiah Obidiegwu

Okwara's compound

Ezeala Village

Umuga

Deccember 16, 1990

Ggunano Ezeala

Ezeala Village

Umuga.

Dear brothers,

Land Dispute

We-Ogonna Okwara-Nduka and Nnenne Okwara-Okoli-the two eldest daughters of late Josiah Obidiegwu Kwara, arrived home yesterday. We were informed and we also saw and confirmed that the agbudu -boundary markers -used for the demarcation of the disputed land between Josiah Obidiegwu Kwara and the family of William Umeaku were cut down and removed by Umeaku's sons.

We are particularly concerned about this latest development because it is not the first time this has happened.A year ago the same thing had happened. We feel it is time to erect a permanent boundary on this piece of land to avoid repeated provocations and bloodshed.

We have, therefore, made arrangements for concrete pillars to be erected as a permanent prevention of any such occurrence. We have provided cement, sand and gravel, and have paid a workman to do the job. We are appealing that as soon as the pillars are ready, you will be kind enough to come and supervise their erection on the correct spots.

Dear brothers, we are grateful for all you have done in the past to resolve this issue and we urge, we appeal to you to do all in your power to ensure that this matter is resolved once and for all in the

name of peace. We know what to do to protect our proprietary rights, but we wish to accord you the respect and trust due to you as primary arbiters in settling cases in our beloved village of Ezeala.

We sincerely hope that you will not fail in meeting the challenge posed by this case.

Thank you very much.

Your sisters,

Mrs. Ogonna Okwara-Nduka   *Dr(Mrs) Nnenne*

Okwara-Okoli

The first is highlighting family tradition, connection with and deep roots at the area. Eaglewoman's husband Josiah Obidiegwu Okawara died several years ago, but he had been working strenuously for the good of the people as a diligent, devoted and respectable civil official. Josiah's grandparents were heroic figures when there were alive and would be honored post humorously several days later by the town. Therefore the family had an honorable tradition and sound reputation. Putting the father's name at the most noticeable space in the letter is a way to draw Ggunano Ezeala's attention to the family' blood lineage and tradition, and therefore the Council's favorable evaluation on their stance. The letter addresses Ggunano Ezeala members as "brothers", and is signed by "sisters", instead of more official titles to claim their identity as a member of the community and sense of belonging.

The second is simplifying the case. The letter leaves out the unhappy entanglements in the long past and omits detailed descriptions of the offenses. Rather than gives the Council the freedom to decide who is at fault and what measures to take, the letter gives a brief introduction to the dispute and then quickly a well-considered and easy-to-enforce suggested solution: "you will be kind enough to come and supervise their erection on the correct spots".

The third is combing sincerity with threat. The letter accords the Ggunano Ezeala members due respect, deeming them as "arbiters", appealing to their help and gratifying them for their help. Meanwhile, the letter makes it clear that the writers of the letter are well-educated and are equipped with consciousness of rights and knowledge of protecting rights. Legal expressions such as "We were informed and we also saw and confirmed", "a permanent prevention of any such occurrence", "supervise", "ensure", "proprietary rights", "primary arbiters" are warnings that if the Council "fail(s) in meeting the challenge posed by this case", the Okwara girls will for sure appeal to higher arbiters, which actually was their plan before the letter was drafted. When the family had been discussing how

to solve the dispute, Nnenne advised, "we'll write a letter to them. This means we'll communicate with them directly as well as have a record of our petition and our demand for Justice in case we need to go beyond the council to seek justice at a date" (65).

Compared with local dispute resolution bodies, the English common law legal system, particularly the official judiciary has prolonged delay in adjudication of disputes and high cost of litigation. (Nwocha 431).The reason for Eaglewoman's daughters to resort to local dispute resolution body rather than courts is not only out of the consideration of efficiency or cost. The dual legal framework and judicial structures add complexities and render the results uncertain. Under *The Nigerian Land Use Act,* occupancy of land is divided into two types: customary right of occupancy and statutory right of occupancy. In the regard of land properties inheritance, customary law is applied to the the case of customary right of occupancy and statutory law is applied to the case of statutory right of occupancy. While for interregional land property, the land owner has the right to choose which law to apply to the case. It is thus possible for land owners to disinherit wives and/or daughters by choosing to apply customary law, though such operations may encounter constitutional checks. The Nigeria Supreme Court since 1963 haven't been consistent in its decisions in this regard. Judged Cases demonstrate the resilience of customary law in its interaction with English Common law, especially in the area of land law. The well-educated daughters of Eaglewoman had a reason to shun the courts, because they were not as confident as they sounded in the letter about what would come out of the judicial procedures and process. That can explain why "customary law is the law that governs and regulates almost all informal transactions in Nigeria such as marriage and inheritance issues as well as land tenure in rural societies"(Nwocha 440).

Women's Strategies towards Customary Law and Traditional Norms

The Children of the Eagle, through voices of the mother and five daughters, lists the possible strategies that Nigerian women can take towards gender-biased customary law and traditional norm.

Non-confrontational Strategy

Eaglewoman, more than her daughters, suffers from customary law and traditions: the extended family's provocations and hostilities, obsessions with male heir (s), contempt towards and rituals for widows. However, she more often that the other female characters in the novel compromises with customary law and traditions. When questioned why she ever drilled all five daughters in cooking skills, but not Nkemdirim, Eaglewoman franks that the reason is gender: Nkemdirim is male. "if

you are not happy with the situation, you can go and sprout a penis!"(55) She believes that "a womb is meant to bear fruit, but when it is not s used,it is in trouble."(32)Therefore she deems her fourth daughter Chiaku, about to get thirty yet "without a child to call her mom", a real loser, although Chiaku is a certified medical doctor at London. Eaglewoman concludes that Chiaku was irrational to have "blocked her womb with artificial devices to prevent a child from taking on life inside her" before Chiaku's husband later on proved to be a crook, and divorced her. When the fifth daughter Amara reveals that she doesn't want a child in her life, Eaglewoman is ferocious like "a maddened bee" (35), scolding her ruthless statement. Eaglewoman instructs her daughters to adopt an "amicable" or "non-confrontational" way of living in a social environment that is harsh towards women. "You have to know how to deal with these people if you want to get on with your life. A woman is like a snail that must crawl over thorns and rocks with as smooth and lubricated tongue. This is the only way the snail can survive, or its tongue will be torn to shreds as it journeys on rough terrain. But, being like that does not mean women are fools"(357).

Eaglewoman's eldest daughter is another woman who feels the pain and burden of traditions and customary law, while after contemplating on the costs of revolting against traditional norms, chooses to follow. After losing her love in the Biafra War, Ogonna wasn't willing to enter marriage. "Perhaps I shouldn't have married at all after losing Harry," but, "it wasn't quite easy for a woman to operate or survive in our society outside marriage."(308) In the marriage she entered for fear of the difficulties that a woman without marriage could encounter, Ogonna is finding no possibility and no motivation to repair the broken relationship with her husband Uzoma. She doesn't plan ending the marriage which is only a formality now. Contempt towards divorcees and biases against female kids from broken marriage are all considerations that hinder her from divorce.

The reason for women like Eaglewoman and Ogonna to choose submission to tradition over violation of them, is not that they agree that those traditional rules are rational; on the contrary, they perceive injustice and evilness and hate to find the existence of such rules. Their choices of submission are more a result of the function of deterrence of customary laws. The social and psychological costs from violating traditional rules are high enough to deter them from attempting to defy. Their compromise is also a result of losing confidence in reforming and eradicating biased traditional rules. Ogonna opposes Nnenne's positive belief in the changes of people's attitudesby a series of questions: "how do you uproot ingrained attitudes and opinions?...Has femalegenital mutilation ceased in spite of the negative publicity it has received, in spite of the campaign mounted against it? Has this country done away with the sin of corruption and the demon of ethnicity even though everyone is aware of

the havoc these evils wreak on our corporate existence as a people?(124)" Eaglewoman's "tactics of compliance" is also a "temporary" compromise: "women must find a benign way to survive until salvation comes" (358). For Eaglewoman, it is not easy, if not possible, for such a battle for salvation to win. She clarifies,

> *The truth is that it will take not a few people them. One wonders but the whole community to fight these unwholesome customs and uproot them completely. This is the time everyone will rise up and say, "No, we do not want this and this, that and that to exist in our midst any longer." I think this is the only way out. It is not a battle one man or one woman can fight and win. This is what I keep saying to those like you, my children and Adanna, Joel's daughter who are engaged in this battle. You must mobilize everybody-women and men and even children-in this war.(358)*

Confrontation-to-evasion Strategy

Chiaku and Amara adopt a confrontational approach to traditions, divergent from that compromising strategy of their mother's and Ogonna's. Chiaku settles in London and declares the intention of living a life, free from the shackles of tradition, "my life is my own and I will live it as I wish"(191). The fifth daughter Amara is explosive at any hint of gender-inequality. She stares at a man who remarked discriminatory words, "impaling him with her eyes that are as lethal as an eagle's talon"(354). As a journalist who has been exposed to various corruptions and social injustices, she gets increasingly critical and direct. Both Chiaku and Amara find their confrontational strategy hard to work in a society where the number of conservative minds exceeds their expectations. Therefore, they choose to evade the culture entirely by emigrating to a different country-the U.K. "I am bound for a safer zone.... I am sick of things around here. I want to escape before it is too late."(209–210)

Spiritual Salvation Strategy

The third daughter Obioma, after being traumatized in the Biafra War, switched to religious belief and services. She is now working as a pastor in a church. She finds tranquil mind and peaceful heart in her faith. She puts the hope of women's salvation in God. In her preaching, she favors topics about women in which she exemplifies women's unique role as one standing beside men, not in front of, nor behind. She defies the traditional viewing of women's bodies as unclean: "her body is the source of life and its sustenance. Her womb moulds and cocoons life; her breast milk is a source of nourishment. Her monthly flow is a means of regeneration and purification: it is wrong to see it as a sign of uncleanness,

as some people do."(206) Obioma finds the spiritual nourishment from the religion is able to uplift individuals, man and women, from their troubled minds and life.

Renovational Strategy

The second daughter Nnenne has been inquisitive and smart from childhood. Though also cruised by gender-biased traditional norms and hostilities in different phases of life, she has been able to face life complexities with a confident and courageous spirit. Instead of being dispirited by realities like her mother Eaglewoman and eldest sister Ogonna do, or retreating into foreign soil like Chiaku or Amara do, Nnenne is optimistic that changes are taking place and she, along with her friend Adanna, are active in making changes occur from where it seems trivial. She encourages women in Umuga to nurture their bodies, to cultivate positive feelings and to dare to ask for the chance of being pleasant in intimate relationship.She keeps smooth communication with her husband, requires and tactically gains respect and equality in marriage. She rallies resources and utilizes opportunities to bring a difference to women around her. Furthermore, she has the habit of contemplation: keep reflecting on the past events for the real reasons or values.

"Why do we do this? Why do we gather these women every year to teach them how to prepare certain recipes, which most of them may never try out at home after we have shown them the way to prepare the food?...the ritual is necessary to forge family cohesion, ensure continuity through the spiritual and physical linking of different generations." (99)

Extraterritorial Impacts and Operational Mechanism of Cultural Institutions

In *Children of the Eagle*, Akachi isn't satisfied with relegating Chiaku and Amara's emigration and life in the U.K. as a background for the novel. Instead, Akachi furthers her inquiry into the extraterritorial impacts and working mechanism of cultural institutions.

One of the features that characterizes the operation of cultural institution is **resilience through resistance**: when confronted with robust resistance, cultural institutions may recede from invisibility into less visible sphere, even into subconsciousness; when the resistance is less strong and the repression is gone, cultural institutions will be emerge to visibility. Chiaku gained her medical doctor degree at the U.K. At London, she fell in love with Mossey Kwesi and married him soon after they started dating. Three years marriage ended abruptly with the husband's disappearing with the excuse of business trip. Chiaku was shocked to see, in one of the wardrobe drawers, photographs for Mossey's

previous four marriages with different young pretty women. Chiaku turned out to be the fifth victim to a man who hunted for women to marry and to abandon several years later. The man targeted black women who were reluctant to expose him to the police in fear of revealing their own humiliation and identities of coming from a foreign country. The husband Mossey Kwesi, the son of a Ghanaian father and a Togolese mother, has been keeping a virtually polygamous lifestyle. Outstanding education in a British college, good job as a medical doctor and the truth of being in a different culture all fail to unbind her entirely from her traditional norms. When her younger sister Amara accused her of lesbian inclination, Chiaku out of fury, impulsively uttered,

> *"A case of the pot calling the ettle black,eh?What about your white boyfriend who you told me you are going to marry? Wouldn't our ancestors, especially Obiatu and Ejimnaka, turn a hundred times in their graves to hear that their preious offspring is consorting with and plans to marry a descendant of the people who caused their ultimate death, destroyed their culture and took away the wealth of their land?"(193)*

When the flame of anger quenched, Chiaku apologized for what she said, but the above unchecked outflow is a proof of repressed existence of traditional values in the deep unconsciousness. The traditional attitudes towards divorce is clear and fresh in Chiaku's memory, and she therefore makes plan to settle in England and avoids the painful contempt that a divorcee suffers at Nigeria. However, the stored-away and well-hid traditional values can get activated instantly. When Chiaku, after five years, finally made the trip back to Umuga, she was not sleeping late in bedroom in early morning, but getting up early to visit relatives. "If she fails to do any of the social rounds, those she doesn't visit will nurse resentment against her. Her negligence of this social obligation will be interested as a slight on the people concerned or as a lack of affection for them. Some of them will say she is proud and irresponsible."(418) So Chiaku has to make the best use of her short stay visiting relatives so as to "insulate herself from the sting of people's scorpion tongues. The traditional norms deep in her unconsciousness automatically starts working once the circumstance appropriate arises. Cultural institutions are able to exert extraterritorial impacts rather than evaporate into the air of an alien culture.

Another feature of the operation of cultural institutions is **disobedience via submission**: when a cultural institution commands submission, submission may be achieved in formality, which is in the core disobedience. Before Eaglewoman "gave birth to" the male heir Nkemdirim, the extended

family had been assuming the properties of Osai and Eaglewoman would finally be theirs, though the bulk of the properties had been purchased with money earned from Eaglewoman's businesses. When the extended family conspired first step of taking their land-sending husband Osai's sister Rachel to live in the front of the compound, Eaglewoman was dishearted by their decision and her husband Osai's ageement to do it. Yet she found herself was in no position to show disobedience. Eaglewoman, therefore, unfolded the news to her five daughters who immediate hinted message: there are things that wife can't do but daughters can. So the five daughters blocked the gate and managed to drive the bad-intentioned extended family members away. Eaglewoman's "woman-snail analogy"- a snail has to "crawl over thorns and rocks with a smooth and lubricated tongue" (357) is able decipher her "submission-and-disobedience-in-one" living philosophy. Ogonna's insistence of keeping a marriage facade is a similar "submission-and-disobedience-in-one" approach.

A dual legal framework makes it possible for cultural institutions, in the form of customary law and official common law to counterbalance each other. The resolution process of the above mentioned land dispute demonstrates feasibility and modes for official common law to be used as a deterrence for a customary dispute resolution body to restrain gender discrimination. Customary law and local resolution arbiters are a check on the corruptions and high costs of litigation existing in the official common law judiciaries, as how cases are ruled in two different legal systems are visible to public who can compare judgments and make comments.

Akachi innovatively employs the alternations among third-person and multiple-first-person narrators to establish plural perspectives to one same event(s). The coexistence of such perspectives renders it possible for readers to discern how differently a cultural institution is operating in the public sphere and in the individual sphere, how it is evaluated and received/rejected, how it is impacting the recipient socially and psychologically, and how political, historical and legal structures can become hindrance or assistance to those who are maneuvering through them. Through the deciphering the struggles and the divergent strategies that women adopt to cope with gender-based traditional norms, Akachi is able to decode the operational mechanism of cultural institutions across spatial and temporal boundaries.

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East Asia and East Africa—Japanese Scholarly Research on Ethiopia

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1. Introduction

It may be surprising that Japan had "significant contacts with Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular" and played "an important and too-forgotten role in Ethiopia's struggle against colonialism" (Clarke III 2011, xii). Partially due to the long history of communication, Ethiopian studies in Japan stand out in the academia worldwide[3] and have perhaps been the most advanced among all countries in Asia. This paper aims at investigating the Japanese scholarly research on Ethiopia. It is of the authors' belief that the fruitful experiences of the Japanese scholars can serve as a model for the currently developing African studies in China.

2. Background

2.1 Japan-Ethiopia relationship

Lying at either ends of the Maritime Silk Road, diplomatic relations between Japan and Ethiopia began in 1923 in the League of Nations. Even before the treaty signed in 1930 (Clarke III 2013, 236), Japan was exporting to Ethiopia indirectly "not only 80% of cotton articles but also silks, cotton

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3 "The study of Ethiopian languages has been of interest primarily to Westerners, mainly Americans and West Europeans. One of the features of the 1990s, however, is the involvement of Japanese scholars in Ethiopian linguistics, Osam Hieda, Motomichi Wakasa, and Yoichi Tsuge are example in the field," c.f. Abebe G/Tsadik and Haileyesus Engdashet (2001, 99).

thread, sugar, chinaware, and pottery for the general public" (Faërber-Ishihara 2007).

Japan had an extraordinary influence on the political history of Ethiopia. Emperor Menilek II drew comparisons between Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 with Ethiopia's victory over Italy at Adwa in 1896 (Clarke III 2013, 232). Taken as a model for modernization of Ethiopia, Emperor Ḫaylä Śəllase tried to follow the Meiji model and promulgated the 1931 constitution which had similarities with the 1889 Meiji constitution (Faërber-Ishihara 2007, 268). The 1931 delegation to Japan led by the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ḫəruy Wäldä Śəllase, as well as his report[1] resulted in the political movement of the "Japanizers" in quest for the development of the nation (Clarke III 2004). On the other side, in Japan, philo-Ethiopian groups like "Roundtable for Ethiopian Issues" (エチオピア問題懇談会), with influential members having personal experiences in Ethiopia, produced numerous writings and lectures introducing Ethiopia and even interfering Japan's diplomatic policy (Clarke III 2013, 234). Behind the scene was pan-Asiatic pursuit to replace Western imperialism in Asia with Japanese domination (Clarke III 2007, 269).

Perhaps due to the political intentions, complications of Japanese-Italian relationship the late 1930s and early 1940s negatively affected Japanese-Ethiopian relationship until the diplomatic relations between two countries were reestablished in 1955. Mängəśtu's regime saw yet another downfall of the relations till its reestablishment in 1991 (Faërber-Ishihara 2007, 269).

2.2   Prince Takahito Mikasa (三笠宮崇仁亲王)

The late Prince Takahito Mikasa (1915–2016) was the youngest brother of the late Emperor Hirohito and uncle of Emperor Akihito. It was said that his interest in history went back to his pupil days and with his awareness of the importance of historical studies, he was ordered to study war history as a member of the Research Department of the Military Staff College upon graduation. Having been posted to China during WWII, Prince Mikasa was impressed by the zeal of the Christian missionaries and the rigorous discipline of the Communist army. Such behavior became his research interest since he became a research student at the University of Tokyo in 1947. Therefore, starting from Church history, he moved on to study Biblical Hebrew and the Old Testament and then he judged that the ancient history and civilizations of the Middle East are of crucial importance for the understanding of the Old Testament.

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1   Published in 1931/1932, it is entitled *Place of Light, the Country of Japan* (ibid.).

In 1954, Prince Mikasa established the Society for Near Eastern Studies and served as its chair and donated his own royalties, making it possible to award annual prizes to young scholars. He also initiated the project to establish the Middle Eastern Culture Center (中近東文化センター) in 1975 for housing collections of research materials, and later it conducted remarkable archeological excavations in Northeast Africa and in Anatolia. The Prince also played an important role to raise the public awareness of Near Eastern civilizations in the media[1] and facilitated cultural exchanges between Middle Eastern countries and Japan. His research and teaching activities at several universities, as well as the research institutions he established, fostered in the Japanese academia the research interests in the Near East, and naturally paved way for Ethiopian studies, which is one of the integral parts of the studies on Near Eastern history, archeology and religion.

2.3 Active scholars

Apart from Yoichi Tsuge (柘植洋一) detailed in 3.1, Motomichi Wakasa (若狭基道) is another renown scholar working on Ethiopian studies.

Other notable scholars include: Hideyuki Inui (乾秀行), Mitsuo Kowaki (小胁光男), Yona Takahashi (高桥洋成), and Hiroshi Yoshino (吉野宏志) etc.

3. Academic achievements

3.1 Language and linguistics

In December 1997, jointly hosted by the Japan Association of Nilo-Ethiopian Studies and the Japan Association for African Studies, the 13th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (ICES) was held in Kyoto, Japan. ICES is an interdisciplinary international conference initiated in 1959 in Italy held with intervals of 2–3 years and it has been a tradition for every third conference to go back to Ethiopia. Including the latest ICES20 in Mekelle (Ethiopia), to date, Kyoto was the only[2] Asian

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1 With Japan Broadcasting System Corporation (), he broadcasted on the radio for 3 months in 1995 in a serial program entitled "The light of Ancient Culture" (); in 1957, he participated in a three-month TV series by NTV called "The Journey to the Ancient Orient" (); in 1987, he participated in the NHK serial program "Gods of Ancient Egypt" (), c.f. Mori (1991).

2 ICES1 (1959) in Rome, Italy (Accademia dei Lincei); ICES2 (1963) at Manchester, UK (Manchester University); ICES3 (1966) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Haile Sellasie I University); ICES4 (1972) in Rome, Italy (Accademia dei Lincei); ICES5A (1977) in Nice, France (Association française pour la recherche scientifique en Afrique de l'Est / ARESAE); ICES5B (1978) in Chicago, USA (University of Chicago, Northwestern University and the University of Illinois); ICES6 (1980) in Tel Aviv, Israel (Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities); ICES7 (1982) in Lund, Sweden (Lund University and the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries); ICES8 (1984) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University); ICES9 (1986) in Moscow, USSR (Asia and Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences); ICES10 (1988) in Paris, France (Société française pour les études éthiopiennes); ICES11 (1991) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University); ICES12 (1994) in East Lansing, Michigan, USA

host of ICES. Among Japanese participants of various disciplines, Yoichi Tsuge (柘植洋一) presented his studies on personal pronoun systems in Omotic, the most understudied branch of the Afroasiatic language family spoken in Ethiopia.

Tsuge can be considered representative of the second generation of Japanese scholars working on Ethiopian languages if we start counting from Akio Nakano (中野暁雄) and Yukio Isigaki (石垣幸雄) who pioneered several studies on languages of Ethiopia. Before getting enrolled in the graduate program at Tokyo University, he started studying modern Hebrew with Nakano, at the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (アジア・アフリカ言語文化研究所) at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, c.f. 3.3. Later Tsuge also worked with Nakano on the latter's field notes and broadened his knowledge of Semitic languages. By participating in the Amharic intensive seminar offered by Isigaki, Tsuge acquired the basic grammar of Amharic and went on his field trip to Ethiopia in 1980. His field trip combined several missions, collecting lexical and grammatical materials of not only Amharic but also Oromo and Tigrinya (Tsuge 2016, 8).

Thus, Ethiopian Semitic and Cushitic languages got published in 1970s: Isigaki (1971, 1972, 1973, 1978), Nakano (1976), Tsuge (1976, 1983, 1988). Much more research articles appeared around the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century: Nakano (1995, 2006), Tsuge (1993, 1995, 2008, 2009), Wakasa (2005, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2014a, 2014b, 2018). Studies by Japanese scholars on Ethiopian languages in the 1990s managed to caught worldwide attention (Abebe G/Tsadik and Haileyesus Engdashet 2001, 99).

It is also worthy of noting that remarkable courses of Ethiopian languages have been offered in institutions, even open to the public. Firstly, we found the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies offering such intensive courses as part of its training program of Asian and African languages, c.f. 3.3.

3.2   Other fields

In addition, Japanese scholars have been actively participating in a wide range of fields, including not only social but also natural sciences.

（接上页）(Michigan State University); ICES13 (1997) in Kyoto, Japan (Kyoto University); ICES14 (2000) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University); ICES15 (2003) in Hamburg, Germany (Asia-Africa-Institute, Hamburg University); ICES16 (2007) in Trondheim, Norway (Trondheim University); ICES17 (2009) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University); ICES18 (2012) in Dirre Dawa, Ethiopia (French Centre of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa & Institute of Ethiopian Studies, in cooperation with Dirre Dawa University); ICES19 (2015) in Warsaw, Poland (Department of African Languages and Cultures, Warsaw University); ICES20 (2018) in Mekelle, Ethiopia (Mekelle University). C.f. the official website for ICES20 (http://ices20-mu.org/material.html).

The first quasi-academic comprehensive field report can be attributed to the diplomat Yutaka Tsuchida (土田丰). On order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tsuchida visited Ethiopia in an attempt to obtain first-hand information about the country due to the increasing attention to it in Japan. His publication (Tsuchida 1935) in two parts included general topics in the first: geography, population, climate, ethnics, society, food, education, etc., as well as the political influences of European countries and historical events in reigns of key emperors and empresses; the second part focuses on modern history, diplomatic relationships, and trade and national characteristics.

From the 1970s, several studies involving Africa and/or specifically on Ethiopia added several notable publications in various fields: Yamaguchi's (1971) work on African myths was based on his three field trips to Africa, one of which was conducted in Southwestern Ethiopia. Nomachi's (1988) work on Ethiopia described the religious life throughout the country. A comprehensive history of Ethiopia was published in 1999 by Takashi Okakura (冈仓登志) (Okakura, 1999). Publications after the turn of the century include ecology (Fukui 2005), ethnography (Miyawaki, 2006; Yoshida, 2014), anthropology and sociology (Takachio 2006; Matsumura 2008; Nishi 2009), as well as religion (Ishihara 2014).

Perhaps especially worthy of mentioning in the realm of paleo-biological research in Ethiopia, is the international joint project *The Middle Awash Project*[1], which is a joint scientific expedition to the Afar Rift of Ethiopia for the quest of determining the origin of mankind. At the turn of the century, we find Japanese institutions supporting scholarly endeavors to participate in the project and joint publications with several Japanese scholars involved. In the *Nature* articles providing evidence for Homo sapiens coming from Middle Awash (Clark, Yonas Beyene, Giday WoldeGabriel, Hart, Renne, Gilbert, Defleur, Suwa, Katoh, Ludwig, Boisserie, Berhane Asfawkk and White, 2003; White, Berhane Asfaw, DeGusta, Gilbert, Richards, Suwa, and Howell, 2003) and the project publications on Pleistocene evidence for *Homo erectus* (Gilbert and Berhane Asfaw eds, 2008) as well as Late Miocene evidence for *Ardipithecus kadabba* (Yohannes Haile-Selassie and Giday WoldeGabriel eds, 2009), we found several Japanese scholars in the joint contributions, Gen Suwa (诹访元) of the University Museum at the University of Tokyo is most notable. Suwa's archeological fieldwork since 1990 and subsequent paleo-biological research yielded many contributions to the discovery of *Ardipithecus ramidus*, a homonid species more

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1 Website at: https://middleawash.berkeley.edu/middle_awash.php.

than a million years older than Lucy (*Australopithecus*). Suwa and his team are still contributing to the understanding of the homonid species and early history of mankind (Yohannes Haile-Selassie, Suwa and White, 2004; Suwa, Kono, Katoh, Berhane Asfaw and Yonas Beyene, 2007; Katoh, Yonas Beyene, Itaya, Hyodo, Hyodo, Yagi, Gouzu, Giday WoldeGabriel, Hart, Ambrose, Nakaya, Bernor, Boisserie, Faysal Bibi, Saegusa, Sasaki, Sano, Berhane Asfaw and Suwa, 2016).

3.3   Dedicated associations and publications

There are also several specialized associations and institutions holding regular academic events. Since 1967, Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA) at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies has been offering intensive training courses in various Asian and African languages almost every year. In 1970, Amharic was offered by Isigaki, and Tsuge who was enrolled that year offered Amharic again in 1995. In 2011, Amharic was offered for the third time by Wakasa. Founded in 1992, the Japan Association for Nilo-Ethiopian Studies[1] (JANES) aims at contributing to the development of the region from Northeast Africa to the East African coast and surrounding areas through more extensive research. JANES has regular academic conferences, with the latest (28th meeting) held at Kyoto University. Another host for Ethiopian studies is the Japan Association for African Studies (JAAS), which has annual conferences with the latest (55th) held at Hokkaido University.

There are also dedicated academic journals on Ethiopia receiving submissions from Japan and abroad. Issued by The Japan Association for Ethiopian Linguistics since 2004, in accordance with the government[2] funded joint project with Addis Ababa University, the annual journal Cushitic-Omotic Studies was initiated as a dedicated platform for studies on Ethiopian languages. In 2012, the journal was renamed *Studies in Ethiopian Languages* and it has been receiving more and more international submissions. JANES has several newsletters publishing short articles and essays not only restricted to language and linguistics but also incorporates a larger geographical area in accordance with the association. In addition, Journal of African Studies by JAAS is certainly another platform for various research articles on Ethiopia.

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1 https://www.janestudies.org.

2 The project was funded by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (文部科学省) in 2001, c.f. http://ds22n.cc.yamaguchi-u.ac.jp/~abesha/SEL/index.html.

4. Analysis and outlook

4.1 Multidisciplinary studies

In general, we could see a multidisciplinary trend with topics on Ethiopia and the surrounding African regions. Language and linguistics studies are closely combined with studies of folklore and society, as well as anthropology. Recently more studies cover the domains of environment, development, and many more.

4.2 Fieldwork

The majority of (if not all) scholars have first-hand field experiences; their research works involve fieldworks of various scales. As noted in 3.2, the very first extensive publication on Ethiopia essentially grew out of the field experience of Tsuchida. Later pioneers of Ethiopian languages like Isigaki and Nakano all conducted fieldworks in Ethiopian and surrounding regions from broader linguistic perspectives. The next generation of language specialists, such as Tsuge and Wakasa, who started from Ethiopian Semitic (Amharic) and devoted their efforts to studies on lesser studied sister languages in the Afroasiatic family, including Cushitic and Omotic, all based their research on first-hand field experiences.

5. Conclusions

In European academia, Ethiopian studies arose with a close connection to the European colonial activities in Ethiopia. Several important early Ethiopianists either had personal connections with or actually served in the colonial government: Ignazio Guidi (1844–1935) and Carlo Conti Rossini (1872–1949) for example, both worked as colonial officials. To some extent, records and studies of non-Semitic languages of Ethiopia appeared hand in hand with the colonial expansion to the south of the region. Such a colonial background was hardly if not never the case for Japanese academia and would never the case for Asian academia in general. Admittedly, there may have been political intentions involved as mentioned in 2.1, but in general, later Japanese academic endeavors flourished on the basis of mutual communication and cultural exchange, to which economic factors can be added as we entered the age of globalization.

The thriving Japanese scholarly research on Ethiopia proved Asian academic potentials in African studies. The fruitful experiences obtained by Japanese scholars could serve as a model for Chinese

and other Asian scholars embarking on academic endeavors on the Horn of Africa. As proven by the Japanese scholars as well as others, e.g. the pioneering African anthropological studies initiated at Sun-Yatsen University, fieldwork is of crucial importance to basic communication and in-depth investigation. Furthermore, for the purpose of conducting effective fieldwork, it is essential to foster the studies and researches on languages of the Horn of Africa, an area which is still in its infancy in China.

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Who is Representing Whom to Whom and Why? The Cinematic Representation of Japanese Culture through Globalization and De-globalization (1896–1945)

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The question of when globalization 'truly' began is a contested one, but it is remarkable that the boom of globalization in the nineteenth century (O'Rourke & Williamson, 1999) coincided with the development and subsequent availability of the new technology of cinema. Due to early cinema seemingly overcoming the curse of Babel by its absence of language, it appeared to be the first truly global medium (Williams 2002). Early films predominantly relied on visual clues, and in the case of export to different language markets, new inter- or subtitles in the target language could be added, and later on so-called multi-language versions were produced to try and circumvent the problem arising with the coming of sound. This potential for transcultural communication was further underscored by film's ability to cross national borders and reach a mass audience at a time when few people could afford to go and see the world by themselves.

Only a few months after Paris audiences saw the Lumiere brothers' Cinematograph for the very first time (28 December 1895), cameras and films arrived in Japan. Apart from unspoken economic incentives, the importer and rights holder Inabata Katsutarō placed the notion of cultural expression and exchange at the centre of his endeavor: "... I believed that this would be the most appropriate device for introducing contemporary Western culture to our country ..." (Inabata, cited in Toki & Mizoguchi 1996). The representation and interpretation of Western culture through imported films continued to play a prominent role in the discourse on national culture in the age of globalization, but soon, films were also made in the country by Japanese nationals that unavoidably reflected aspects of

the nation's physical, institutional, and behavioral culture. At the same time, non-nationals made films about Japan that represented cultural facets to audiences abroad. The on-screen expression of Japan and its culture within an international framework, unsurprisingly, soon came to the fore in national discourse, with an increasing focus on the correction of perceived international misconceptions and the representation of the "true image" of Japan. My talk traces the intertwined issues of international communication and self-representation in Japanese film from the "globalization boom" of the early twentieth century to the period of "de-globalization" ending with Japan's surrender in 1945. At the same time, a struggle emerged around the very notion that a "national culture" is difficult to define, inherently heterogeneous, and can mean different things to different people living within the same construct labeled the nation state.

When Japan emerged into the international arena after the forced "opening" of the country in the mid- 19th century and the internally as contested as pushed modernization efforts hinging on the Meiji Restoration of 1868, it was with the literal "bang". In tandem with the rapid adoption of foreign structures and infrastructures that were deemed beneficial, such as the military, the education system, or a political system based on constitutional law, economic growth went hand in hand with military expansionism to counter the threat of Western colonialization and to be recognized as "equal" among the major world powers. In this sense, despite Japan never having been as "closed" as popular discourse and popular culture likes to suggest, Bayly's definition of "modern globalization" starting with the collapse of previous, eighteenth-century regimes and being characterized by imperialism and colonialism as well as the concept of free trade appears pertinent to the Japanese case (Bayly 2002). Western gunboat diplomacy accelerated economic and social changes as well as engendering colonialism, starting with the assumption of control over the Ryūkyū islands and government-planned migration to Hokkaido (film), the establishment of Korea as a "protected state" in 1876 leading into a fully-fledged colonial relationship from 1910.

At the same time, Japan appeared with a vengeance in the Western public imagination, due to the sheer increased accessibility of goods and information. "Japonisme" transformed artistic sensibilities, but also more gaudy objects intentionally produced in Japan for Western consumption enjoyed great popularity. "*Yokohama shashin*" (Yokohama photographs, an allusion to "*Yokohama mono*", objects mainly made in Yokohama that were out of line with Japanese tastes but bought by Westerners) for instance, were initially taken and sold by Western photographers. Yet, soon Japanese colleagues turned towards the genre that limited to image of rapidly modernizing Japan to a more exotically attractive narrative, seemingly "untainted by civilization" (Satow 2006): "We might say that by internalizing the

gaze of the guest in early *Yokohama shashin*, 'Japaneseness' was constructed and so was tradition" (ibid.: 51). From photography, it was but a small step to the moving pictures that had started to take the entertainment districts by storm; in the West as well as in Japan.

The "geisha dance" in photographer Tamamura Kōzaburo's 1910 English-language book *Japanese Views and Characters*, came alive on German screens, for instance, in various productions. The common theme in those early cinematic representations of Japan is Orientalist: honour, geisha, samurai, hara-kiri, etc. In other words, the Other is constructed as a premodern, exotic, erotic, violent, but nevertheless attractive entity. Fritz Lang's aptly named *Harakiri* (1919) is a case in point. Based on Puccini's Madame Butterfly, it transports the same received image of subservient femininity and violent masculinity, all set in an exotic landscape – in this case shot in the famous German zoo Hagenbeck. Across the Atlantic, Cecil DeMille's *The Cheat* enraged Japanese spectators with star of the silent Hollywood screen Sessue Hayakawa's impersonation of a Japanese ivory merchant with a premodern violent character, who brands the white female lead character on her shoulder to mark her as his. Unsurprisingly, Japanese filmmakers, producers, and intellectuals strove to both "rectify" the image. But at the same time, as with *Yokohama shashin*, capitalize on the cultural trend. "What anguish to think that, had we been exporting Japanese films all this time, ⌈ foreign filmmakers ⌉ would not have been able to make pictures like this, full of misunderstandings and insults to our national pride", pondered screenwriter, film critic and producer Mori Iwao in 1919. Yet, while Japanese audiences enjoyed foreign and Japanese films alike, Western spectators showed little interest in Japanese productions that were brought to the West through individual filmmakers or businesspeople. The idea of the motion picture as a means to bring the people of the world to a better understanding by mobilizing empathy, did not necessarily work in both directions: "Film relieves man from his isolation and makes the whole world his own. It makes people familiar with one another and transcends dividing frontiers. The foreign becomes palpable ... Human fate is the same everywhere ... The cinematograph is international in the deep sense of being universally human" (Moreck 1929: 41). Moreover, the end of the Taishō Period in the late 1920s increasingly worked counter the ideal of globalization as theorized for instance by Bhagwati as constituting the "integration of National economies into the International economy through trade, direct foreign investment (by corporations and multinationals), short-term capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology" (Bhagwati 2006:3). The economic and cultural protectionism accompanying the era of "de-globalization" slowly emerging in the interwar period saw the influx of foreign films either completely halted completely or regulated through a strict quota system. In particular, the

forceful acquisition of foreign territories, such as Manchukuo in Northern China brought with it an even increased the desire to "correct" foreign misconception about Japan and its policies, as well as to distribute audio-visual ideals of the correct version of "Japaneseness" both at home (naichi) as well as in the colonies and occupied territories (gaichi). As Carol Gluck stated, a "[c]ollective national history tends to produce a canonical past that excludes variant voices" (Gluck 1993:88). And indeed, films produced for Western export, such as *Gendai Nippon* (Contemporary Japan, 1937, Fujita and Shigeyoshi), initiated by the International Film Association of Japan (*Kokusai Eiga Kyōkai*) under the Foreign Ministry, almost intuitively drew back on traditional imagery and topics. While they were criticized in Japan itself for presenting a distorted image of industrialized (and militarized) Japan, films directed at Japanese audience in fact increasingly utilized a similar strategy. Films set in contemporary Japan extolled "traditional" Japanese virtues, such as frugality, diligence, and selflessness. Films set in the past presented a "canonical past" (see Davis 2015 on the 'monumental style' employed in such productions) that silenced other views and versions of history.

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Chinese Language as Representation and Consciousness of "National Language" in Early Modern Japan

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This paper aims to analyze the discourse of consciousness of "National Language" in early modern Japan mainly through the analysis of *Kanji San On Ko* (《汉字三音考》[*Study on Three Speech Sounds of Chinese Characters*]) written by Motoori Norinaga, one of the founders of Kokugaku (国学[National Learning]) in 18th century in Japan. The project of establishing the system of Japanese language (especially classic language) reflects on consciousness about another language, that is, Chinese, which was a dominant language and which expressed the dominant culture in early modern Japan. Kokugaku scholars tried to find "harmonious" and "simple" order in Japanese language and prove the superiority of Japanese language in order to reverse the hierarchy between Chinese and Japanese.

Examining more deliberately, however, we notice that Kokugaku scholars "invented" or "constructed" their ideal language as "superior Japanese" after they had identified Chinese with an alien language, that is, with a foreign language. This is because the writers in early modern Japan depended mainly on Chinese syntax and vocabulary when they used the written language. To begin with, it is not axiomatic that a language as an integrated system exists. According to Sakai Naoki (1997:59), "the figure of one's own language as a systematic unity is a correlate in this schema of configuration to its twin partners, the figure of a foreign language." What means by the quote is that the notion of"Japanese" as a unity postulates the corresponding language, that is, Chinese. Therefore,the discourse of "Japanese" invented by Kokugaku scholars is nothing else but a cultural

expression in relation to Chinese language and culture.

Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) is one of the founders of National learning (generally speaking, there are four founders of Japanese national learning in Edo period: Keichu Kamo no Mabuchi, Motoori Norinaga and Hirata Atsutane). Japanese national learning mainly tried to find "pure" Japanese national culture and thought because they thought that Japanese spirits were contaminated by foreign cultures, mainly by China, at that time.

They adopted the philological method in order to evaluate the Japanese Classical texts. Before them, the readers of classical texts had depended mainly on the doctrine of their schools or their masters, which interpreted the texts as the lessons of the thought of Confucianism or Buddhism. National learning tried to read the Japanese classical texts by the way that they fixed the meaning of the texts by referring other classical texts at the same time with the target texts rather than by forcing them on Confucianism or Buddhism context.

Motoori was the very person who adopted the philological method most consciously. Heeven admonished his pupils not to adhere to his doctrine but to criticize it in his essay,Tamakatsuma. It suggested that he was very proud of his method and doctrine. He studied Japanese classical language and interpreted the classical texts by his method. His products were left as the annotated editions of *Kokinwakashū* (Kokinshū Tōkagami《古今集遠鏡》), *the Tales of Genji* (Genji Monogatari Tama no Ogushi《源氏物語玉の小櫛》), *Shinkokinwakashū* (Shinkokinshū Mino no Iezuto《新古今集美濃の家づと》) and *Kojiki* (Kojikiden《古事記伝》). Among them, *Kojikiden* is the most important work of Motoori. He succeeded the spirit of his mentor, Kamo no Mabuchu, who left the commentary on Manyōshū, and accomplished the commentary of all part of *Kojiki*, which was regarded as the oldest book representing the ancient Japanese language, thing and heart.

Kojiki is written by Man'yōgana, which is the early Japanese writing system. It utilizes Chinese character mainly to express the Japanese syllables phonetically. It is difficult to determine one of the Chinese characters as the corresponding Japanese syllable because one Japanese syllable can be written by many kinds of Chinese characters. Or rather, the examination of the usage of Chinese Character to the corresponding Japanese syllable enables to discover the ancient Japanese phonetic system. In the time of Motoori, the texts of Kojiki could not be read very accurately because Man'yōgana had not been decoded yet (Even nowadays, there are disputes about Man'yōgana's decoding). Motoori tried to decode the text of Kojiki written by Man'yōgana through the examination of phonetics of Chinese characters. Its product is *Kanji San On Ko.*

The three speech sounds shown by *Kanji San On Ko* indicate Wu Reading (吳音), Han Reading

(汉音) and Tang Reading (唐音). Motoori could not directly understand Chinese phonetics, so he utilized Mako Yinkyo (《磨光韵镜》) edited by Mon'o (文雄1700–1763), which is the commentary of Yunjing (《韵镜》), one of the oldest Chinese rhyme tables.

In the above context, the reason why this paper focuses on Motooti Norinaga's *Kanji San On Ko* is that the book describes the relationships between "Japanese" speech sounds and "Chinese" speech sounds, and he claimed that Japanese phonetic system is superior to Chinese one because it has the simpler system than that of Chinese. Although there is no need to discuss the evaluation itself now, we have to analyze how Motoori tried to consider "superior Japanese" in relation to Chinese, which he represents as complicated and therefore inferior language, and how the argument leads to his exclusive thought as nationalism in early modern Japan. Therefore, the problem necessarily leads to Derrida's phonocentrism and logocentrism.

Until now, the book has been dealt with mainly in the field of linguistics because its main topic is phonetics. This paper will attempt to analyze the discourse as a cultural expression from the viewpoint of intellectual history.

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The Language of the Nation: Multilingualism in the Age of Imperialism and Liberation

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Abstract:

"The Egyptians are a 'nation' comprising Arabs, Turks, Circassians, Albanians, Copts, the Sudanese, and Israelis, from among Muslims, Christians and Jews, brought together by a blessed, perfumed territory where they have lived together for a long time. They live in close proximity, united by their love for each other, their intercourse and interaction unaffected by religious, racial or linguistic difference." thus wrote ʿAbdallāh al-Nadīm (1843–1896) in the weekly newspapers he founded, *al-Tankīt wa l-Tabkīt*, in 1981, and *al-Ustādh*, in 1892. Al-Nadīm, an Egyptian nationalist famous for his advocacy of the Egyptian colloquial in his modernist writings, seems to have internalized the idea of the nation as territorial and sovereign that has rooted in the immemorial past. His 'imagined community', however, is multi-racial, -confessional and -cultural. This visionary diversity of al-Nadīm's modern nation, I argue, is informed by a form of multilingualism that is at the heart of cosmopolitanism and attendant modernist thought at the turn of the twentieth century. Multilingualism is not limited to diglossia(classical and colloquial)familiar in discussions of the Arabic language but extends to embracea cosmopolitan heteroglossia visible in the language of the new culturalinstitutions, such as the newspaper, which encompasses simultaneously the multilingualism of the local and the global. It manifests in discussions of material conditions of living,which in turn reveals new structures of thinking. More importantly, it is because the laboratory of experiments that led to cultural and literary creativity.

Postcolonial and Nationalist Readings of 19th Century Arabic Print Culture

Yaʿqūb Ṣannūʿ (1839 Cairo – 1912 Paris), also known as James Sanua, was an Egyptian Jew who made his mark as an architect of Egyptian "nationalism" and "cultural and literary modernization", before the current racialized, sectarianized and nationalized discourses would begin to downplay and dismiss his achievements and contributions. Seen in histories of the 19th centuryArab *Nahdah*, a word usually translated into English as "renaissance" or "awakening", this "polyglot, writing in Arabic, English, French, Hebrew, Italian, Persian and Turkish", was pioneered as "journalist","national activist", and 'playwright'. In fact, many would consider him the 'father' of Egyptian theatre. Elaine Ursula Ettmüller, who located, collected, digitized and made available most of the issues of the journal(s) Ṣannūʿ published in Cairo and Paris between 1878 and 1910, which is now housed in the University of Heidelberg, said this about Ṣannūʿ:

⌈ he ⌉ was a pioneer in theater, satirical journalism and caricature. With the aim to foster nationalism in Egypt in the last third of the 19th century, he experimented with various literary genres. Deprived by Khedive Ismāʿīl (1835–1895) of his career asa playwright, he started a satirical newspaper called *Abū Naẓẓāra Zarqā* (the man with the blue glasses) in 1878 which was forbidden after its 15th issue and its editor was forced intoexile. Based in Paris, Sanua continued to publish his magazine which was—according to hispersonal accounts—smuggled massively under adventurous circumstances into his home country where on 9th September 1881, Aḥmad ʿUrābī andhis fellow offices ʿAbdal-ʿĀl Ḥilmī and ʿAlīFahmī made their march of protest tothe ʿAbdīn palace. This popularly supported revolt was later recognized as the starting point of the first Egyptiannationalist revolution.

In her book, *The Construct of Egypt's National-Self in James Sanua's Satire and Caricature* (2012), Ettmüller understandably focuses on Ṣannūʿ's contribution to Egyptian nationalism and the role of his journalism in fashioning Egyptian selfhood in the era of European imperialism and colonialism of Egypt (Egypt was at the time under the British rule). Her work is also part of reassessment of the "Arab Renaissance" in the 19th century, which broadens from the immediate Egyptian context, and this context is drawn on the territory by the nation-state and has a clear definition in the 20th century. Geographical shape, as well as the Arab and Arabic cultural and literary sphere or the fields of production and consumption, as defined ethically and linguistically, are very unhelpful. It highlights the role of an Egyptian Jew in Egyptian nationalism, and here seeing nationalism as part of the projectof Arab modernization, and echoes other works on "Jewish"(Haskala), "Ottoman"(Tanzimat) and "Persian" modernization projects that follow similar

and even overlappingagendas and trajectories.

Like most works that focuses on and informed by the works of a single author, this research on Ṣannūʿʿ is pioneering in many ways. It focuses on the emergence of national consciousness and the heterogeneity of Ṣannūʿʿ. Also composed of "classical" Fuṣḥā Arabic, colloquial Egyptian and French, and caricatures are regarded as a sign of the increasing nationalization of Egyptian subjects. Journals (both newspapers and magazines), caricatures, and theatrical plays are all deployed to express and propagate this new Egyptianness, and above all to call for revolution. A firm supporter of the ʿUrābī Revolution, Sannūʿ wrote down the ills of the British mandate of Egypt and called forEgyptian independence. They are simultaneously the site on and sphere in which modern literary sensibilities, aesthetics and even genres were born, nurtured and brought into maturity. The transformation of Arabic literature from classical to modern took place in the 19th century Arabic print culture.

The same is said that ʿAbdallāhal-Nadīm (1842–1896), a fellow countryman of Sannū',who edited two periodicals, *al-Tankīt wa l-Tabkīt* (1881) and *al-Ustādh* (1892), and like Sannū', partook in the project of modernizing Egypt on the pages of the two journals he wrote and edited. Even though he came from a non-cosmopolitanbackground, he aligned himself with the kind of nationalist ideology propagated by Sannu', supported the ʿUrābīRevolution, called for Egyptian independence, and produced a nationalist discourse that grounded itself in a sense of authenticity concomitantly structured around the cosmopolitan Arabic *Fuṣḥā* language and the local Egyptian colloquial. In fact, the oddcouple, the cosmopolitan Sannūʿ and the "peasant" al-Nadīm, colluded in their construction of the literary symbol of the "authentic" Egyptian in the form of the Egyptian peasant, *fallāḥ*, who hailed from the "popular" performance traditions of the Middle East, particularly the shadow plays(*khaāl al-zill*) and puppet theatre (Qarāqūzor Arāgūz), and spoke the Egyptian ʿĀmiyya colloquial. This *fallāḥ* is now a stock motifin modern Egyptian literature that pervades the rural imaginary of Egyptian nationalist discourses (Selim 2004).

This is only a very small part of the story. The exuberant 19th century Arabic print culture can tell us about the emergence and maturation of modern Arab world, and the cultural rejuvenation that serves as its historical, political and social context. In fact, it is rather reductive, for it extracts from the messy 19th century Arabic print culture, and from its context of the multilateral culture encounters between Europe and the Arabworld, and between the past and the present, a neatly constructed nationalist discoursethat is seen to have fashioned a homogenous national consciousness starting from Egypt and proliferating out into the entire Arab world. This nationalist discourse, as I have already hinted above, is informed by two major conceptual categories, nation and language, which are imagined not

only as authentic but also bordered and sovereign. The nation, in an ideal situation, must be ethnically (as well as linguisticallyand culturally) authenticand territorially autonomous. More importantly, the language through which the nation expresses itself must be linguistically "pure". These two conceptual categories, monolingual nation andlanguage, have informed the post colonial reading, understanding and theorizing of cultural and literary expression and production. More importantly, they have determined how the 20th century took stock of cultural encounters between Europe and the Arab world that occurred in the 19th century.

The decolonizing impulse of nationalist discourses has understandably, as Edward explained observantly and painstakingly in his discussions of the relationship between power and culture, mobilized the symbolic capital at their disposal in order to generate a revolutionary ethos that would affect liberation for the colonized subjects and nations. The 20th century postcolonial readings of the 19th century have beendistortive in many ways. Taken to extremity, the monologized nation overlapped with his monolingualized language which has encouraged, but tressed and legitimated ethnic cleansing on the basis of all kinds of imagined purity and authenticity. The two architects of Arab modernization centred in Egypt, Yaʿqūb Sannūʿ and ʿAbdallāhal-Nadīm, are today seen in certain fanatical quarters as two diametrically opposed figures: the former 'othered' as the Europeanized Jew whose contributions to Egyptian culture, and particularly theatre,are dismissed as unsubstantiated claims, and the latter owned as the 'authentic' representation of the Egyptian 'self' and celebrated as a father of Arab nationalism. The contemporary—21st century—radicalization of an earlier moment of nationalization and modernization—the19th century—is arguably a "logical" development of the 19th century nationalist discourses, though necessarily informed by the current material conditions of living. In this case, what may be described as "theera of globalization"? Does globalization necessitate radicalization?

This paper argues that radicalization is an effect of a particular type of "monological" thinking—and "mono" is key here—inherent in the imaginings of the nation premised on "monolingualism". This type of thinking has thus far underpinned the various articulations of the messy processes of cultural encounters in the age of European empires. It is paradoxically the product of European imperialism. It gave shape to a colonial form of globalization and determined to a large extent the responses to this very colonial globalization from different parts of the colony. It more particularly informed the reception of these responses. The postcolonial binarization of European empires and postcolonial nations, and by extension "self" and "other", are the products of European imperialism and colonialism and their attendant power structures and strategies of control. It pushed nationalist discourses in the direction of collective and individual liberation that necessarily "othered" colonial globalization and

swept under the carpet other, morevaried, nuanced and even colourful responses to globalization. As the world moves into a new era of globalization, which has elicited even more narrowly conceived "nationalisms", it is perhaps time to recover those other responses to globalization in the past—and there have been many eras of globalization in human history—so as to enable and foster multiplicity of positions and responses. I return to the key nationalist moment in the 19th century Arabic print culture and re-read the nationalist discourse through a multilingual lens. I focus on ʿAbdallāh al-Nadīm and his discourses on nation-building in *al-Tankītwal-Tabkīt* and *al-Ustādh*, and more particularly, on the multilingual and multicultural fabric of his language.

Egypt is Multilingual and Multicultural

As the titles indicate, the two "newspapers" are dedicated to the education of the nation under the British rule. Whereas *al-Tankīt wa l-Tabkīt* does so through satire and "name-and-shame", *al-Ustādh* adopts a straightforward didactic tone. The pages are filled with discussions of the Arabic language as a means of education, of both men and women, in politics and ethics, and of nation-building, in which modern knowledge, including science and technology, play a key part. These discourses on language as the site of education and nation-building, or of the transformation of Egypt into a "modern" nation through reforms of language, education and culture, would be "neatly" extracted from the complex fabric of al-Nadīm's writing and consolidated into a nationalist definition of Egypt. Egypt, seen from the perspective of his discourses, would be identified as an Arab nation with "grammatical" Arabic language, or *Fusha*, serving as the national language, which is in turn undergirded by the "civilization", or "cultural heritage", communicated and passed down from one generation to another through this language.What is often obfuscated is how much "foreignness" is absorbed through "grammaticalization", a process in which the Arabic language is and continues to be modernized and brought into the present (Versteegh 1997〔2001〕). In fact, the monolingual veneer cannot hide al-Nadīm's multilingual Arabic or hismulticultural Egyptian nation.

The first issue of *al-Tankīt wa l-Tabkīt* (6 June 1881) includes a satirical sketch of an Arab who became French (ʿ*arabī tafarnaja*). Zʿit is a peasant boy who grew up in the country shepherding buffalos and eating meat cooked with onion. One day, as he sat with his father watching over the buffalo, a man of the merchant class from city passed by and urged his father, Mʿit, to send him to school so he would become a human being (*insān*). Mʿit indeed sent Zʿit to the government school. The government then sends him to Europe for further studies. Four years later, Zʿit returned to Egypt. His father, Mʿit, went to the harbor excitedly to meet his son. When he saw his son, he rushed to him,wanting to embrace him and kiss

him. Zʿit pushed his father away, denouncing the custom of hugging among the Muslims. "But how would we greet each other?" his father protested indignantly. "Say 'Bon arrive!' and shake my hand once. That should do it," the son retorted. When they arrived home and the boy's mother, Mʿikah, serves him a dish of meat cooked with onion. Zʿit complained, "You put too much of what is it ..." "What, Zʿit?", "That thing, what's its name?..." "What its name, son, pepper?" "Non, non, that thing, the thing that is planted ...", "You mean wheat?" "Non, non, the thing that only its head stays under the earth," "But there is not a trace of garlic in the dish," "The thing that makes your eye stear, we call it 'onion'", "Son, there is no 'onion' in the dish, this is meat with *basal* onion," "Si, si, *basal* onion," "Zʿit, my son, you have forgotten *basal* when you ate nothing but *basal*?" Mʿit finally complained about his son to someone he looked up to, a *nabīh*. This is what the *nabīh* said:

This is because you did not educate your son when he was still at a young age. He did not learn about his responsibilities towards his homeland (*watanihi*) or his language (*la ʿarafa ḥaqq lughatihi*). Nor did he appreciate the honour of his community (*ummah*), or the fruit of preserving the customs of his fellow countrymen, or the value of patriotism (*wataniyyah*). He may have learned (European) sciences, but these in the end would not benefit his homeland one bit, for he has no love for his brethren (i.e., fellow countrymen), but those who know their language will be able to love them. Rather, he has become like a partridge that wants to imitate the walk of a crow but fails and at the same time cannot go back to his original walk. He now hops around, having forgotten the nature of his species (*kharaja ʿan al-jinsiyya wa tibāʿ al-nawʿiyya*—noting that *jinsiyya* of species is synonymous with citizenship). Only an ignorant, mean man would do what your son did. How many a young man went to Europe but returned with their belief, customs, and language intact. And they would put the science they learned in Europe in the service of the progress of their country and their sons. The epitaph of "an Arab who became French" does not apply to them at all (*al-Tankīt* 7–8).

ʿAbdallāh al-Nadīm does not condemn multilingualism let alone reject it. Rather, he rejects monolingualism, especially the type that calls for replacing one language with another. Throughout *al-Tankīt wa l-Tabkīt* (June-October 1881) and later *al-Ustādh* (August 1892-June 1893) he insisted on the multilingual and multicultural fabric of the Egyptian nation: "The Egyptians are a 'nation' comprising Arabs, Turks, Circassians, Albanians, Copts, the Sudanese, and Israelis, from among Muslims, Christians and Jews, brought together by a blessed, perfumed territory where they have lived together for a long time. They live in close proximity, united by their love for each other, their intercourse and interaction unaffected by religious, racial or linguistic difference" (*al-Tankīt wa l-Tabkīt* and *al-Ustādh*). Like the Nahdawi intellectuals in the second half of the 19th century

and the first half of the 20th century, when the Arabic print culture flourished, al-Nadīm called for political and economic independence and advocated cultural reform and modernization through active engagement with life not isolated. The European presence in Egypt, in addition to the new arrival of the French and British as a part of the most recent imperial ambitions in the Middle East, has been a fact of life around the Mediterranean since time immemorial. There was no doubt that the most recent cultural encounter between Egypt and Europe, and in this case of an unprecedented scale, was welcome food for thought.

The Nahdawi intellectuals, including ʿAbdallāh al-Nadīm, took advantage of the freedom of expression affording them at the time to put forward their views for debate in the "public sphere" created and shaped by the modern Arab printing culture. Due to the proliferation of printing technology throughout the world, it was very prosperous. The rise of a new class of intellectuals who received education in new schools or contacted the reform culture through the Internet or print culture, availability of funds raised from the new capitalism generated by the silk farming and trade in Syria and Lebanon, and the cotton farming and trade in Egypt, and the lacunae of control left unchecked temporarilyin the interstices of overlapping empires. They wrote freely, daringly and spectacularly about topics that concerned them most at the time. They examined the Europe, directly orvicariously, and thrived on comparative analysis of European civilization (*madaniyya* or *tamaddun*) and its Egyptian counterpart (ʿ*imrān*) and proposed agendas, projects and steps that would bring Egypt up to par with Europe. Even for someone like ʿAbdallāhal-Nadīm, who came from a peasant background and did nottravel around Europe likeYaʿqūb Sannūʿ, Europe and her modernity were easily accessible. He even shared the prevalent views of that time and saw the necessity of reform not only of culture but also of the human being. Liberation must be accompanied by education that would enable Egyptian men and women to become capable of responsibly handle freedom, including freedom of speech. They would learn from Europe but not give up Egypt. Rather, modernity would emerge from the ferments produced in the cultural encounter between Europe and Egypt. Al-Nadīm insists on keeping to cultural roots but not on returning to the past. Modernity is rather a creative reckoning between East and West, past and present, made possible, in fact, given urgency and impetus, by the cultural encounter.

Creativity in Cultural Encounter and Political Activism

The language of the modern Egyptian nation, to give one example, is a modern language to be fashioned creatively from its roots found in the "classics" as well as the present needs to communicate

the new, be it derived from the local conditions of living or imported from European way of life. What Fusha al-Nadīm advocates, like the Nakhdavi intellectuals, does not preclude European languages or Egyptian colloquial, and from al-Nadīm's own practice, it does not revive the pre-modern ornate literary style. It is classically grammatical. However, its grammaticality is precisely its strategy for modernization. Through grammaticality it absorbs "foreign" ideas, ideologies and worldviews into the fabric of the Arabic language, making "conceptual blending" seamless and natural. For example, al-Nadīm replaces ʿimrān, a term used by Ibn Khaldūn to mean "civilization", with either *madaniyya* or *tamaddun*, words derived from a classical Arabic word, *madīna*, which means city, slipping the sign and its attendant signifying process from, let us say, Ibn Khaldūn and the 13th century, to Europe and the 19th century but without giving up the pre-modern Arabic roots or traditions of thought.

The languageal-Nadīm invented in mimicry of the ignoramus Egyptian peasant similarly relies on linguistic blending that opens language up to conceptual blending. The multilingual fabric of the sketch cited above, combining Arabic, Egyptian colloquial and French, interlaces with another combination, that of French theatre with shadow play and puppet theatre familiar in the Middle East and Mediterranean during Ottoman times. More significantly, it transforms the "carnivalesque" politics of pre-modern "grotesque" performativity into a theatre of national education. The early modern Muslim intellectuals in the 18th and 19th centuries, from as early as Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān al-Miknāsī (d. 1799) and Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Tahtāwī (1801–1873), had been fascinated by European performance traditions, including Italian opera and French theatre, and particularly by what they saw as its educational potential. It was not until the second half of the 19th century that experiments with Mediterranean performance traditions, including Middle Eastern music and song as well as European opera and theatre, came to fruition and led to initially the emergence of Arab theatre and eventually Arabic drama. The Arabic print culture, particularly al-Nadīm's *al-Tankīt wa al-Tabkīt* and *al-Ustādh* and Yaʿqūb Sannūʿ's *Abū Nazzāra*, served as the laboratory for Arabic theatre and drama. The dramatic sketches these two Egyptian pioneers of theatre and drama wrote may read like naïve and even uncouth attempts today, but they were revolutionary in their time: revolutionary not only in their political participation—exposing the ugly "faces" of colonialism and shaping the Egyptian national subjectivity—but also in cultural and literary terms—creating new cultural expressions through blending the old with the new, the local with the foreign.

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Hope under Harsh Conditions:
New Symbols in Palestinian Cinema in the Post-Second Intifada Period

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Since the Second Intifada (2000–2005), Israel has enforced siege on the entire Palestinian society. Palestinians' freedom of movement is severely curtailed. In the name of Israeli security, long curfews are often imposed to prohibit Palestinians from staying outside; access to Palestinian cities and villages is cut off by concrete blocks, piles of dirt, deep trenches or checkpoints; and the Israeli West Bank barrier began to be constructed in June 2002. Restrictions that limit supply of water and electricity, access to educational and economic opportunities and medical care are imposed. What's more, Palestinian homes and other property are at risk of being demolished and people suffer from arbitrary detention. As a result, half of the Palestinian population is impoverished, and the other half has seen a decline in living standards since the onset of the second intifada (Miskal, 2004). As James Miskal (2004) stated, since the beginning of the Second intifada, if anything, economic and personal security conditions for Palestinians have only worsened.

Apart from the deteriorative economic and personal security conditions, the Second Intifada did not bring about a Palestinian statehood or lead to a settlement of refugee claims. The Palestinian principle nonviolent tactics—"nonviolent demonstrations, school closure, labor strikes, boycotts of Israeli merchants and the occasional stone throwing by Palestinian youths at Israeli soldiers"—of the First Intifada had once generated wide criticisms of the heavy-handed Israeli response to these protests. These tactics had an effect on building diplomatic and political pressures on Israel, driving the defenders of status quo,mainly from the United States and Israel, to recognize the legitimacy

of calls for change. This step was crucial, according to Miskal (2004), as "In this era of ubiquitous and continuous media coverage, recognition of a protest movement's legitimacy inevitablyleads to a reappraisal of the propriety and proportionality of the actions that are being taken to defend the status quo." However, the growing support for change accomplished inthe First Intifada was hijacked by the violence instigated by extremists against Israelisecurity forces and civilians in the Second Intifada. In the new era of globalization, the 21st century, Israel's designed strangulation of Palestinian political expression at both the political[1] and cultural[2] levels and its power in monopolizing the media coverage have resulted in the silence of Palestinian voice to a large extent. Under these circumstances, the suicide bombers were successfully depicted by Israel as terrorists, which has dramatically weakened the earlier gained support and set the Palestinian movement back onto a path from which it was almost unable to mobilize political support in the United States and Israel.

Furthermore, the Palestinians' emotional condition has also worsened since the outbreak of the Second Intifada. According to a mixed-methods exploratory study of a new construct of mental suffering in occupied Palestinian territory, participants exhibited an existential form of mental suffering: "feeling that one's spirit, morale and/or future was broken or destroyed, and emotional and psychological exhaustion" (Giacaman, 2016). These feelings were articulated when the participants were describing the rigons of the political and economic contexts in which they were living. In Giacaman's (2016) words, "despair is a construct that has been invoked regularly to describe Palestinian experience."

With the miserable images of suffering Palestinians in shocking reports and media coverage on their plight, and without access to knowing what is exactly happening in Palestinians' daily life, there might be a misconception among people outside Palestine that the Palestinians have sunk into a hopeless situation and have no way out of the deadlock however they struggle to resist the occupation. Consequently, there might even be an assumption that the majority of Palestinian people are losing or have already lost their hope and confidence in resistance after being through over seventy years of struggle since the Nakba in 1948.

However, despite such harsh conditions, Gazan psychiatrist Eyad El Sarraj, a late key informant and co-author of Giacaman's research group, still put it that the Palestinians do not falter when hearing

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1 "All modes of conventional political participation were blocked, political parties were banned, elections were halted, and all forms of political activity were made illegal and punished severely." (Nasser, 2004)

2 "Cultural strangulation was manifested in restrictions on freedom of expression, repression of education, suppression of literature and art, and the curtailment of symbolic national expression." (Nasser, 2004)

blasts of Israeli bombs, but resist in their silence with the hope that one day a message of justice and peace will be sent from Israel and that they will always be there (El Sarraj, 2012). Muna, one West Bank participant from Giacaman's study, also strengthened that the Palestinians will be immovable and resisting although they suffered a great deal living through those conflicts and intifadas (Giacaman, 2016).

Such deeply rooted hope in harsh conditions is embodied in Palestinian films in the post Second Intifada period. How do Palestinians cope with the occupation in their daily life? How is their hope represented in the films? How does this hope serve in their daily life? How do we understand this hope? This paper answers these questions by looking at the new symbols in Palestinian films *Ghost Hunting (Raed Andoni, 2017)* and *Omar (HanyAbu-Assad, 2013)*.

Methodology—Myth

Roland Barthes (1967) mentions that when he opens a fashion magazine, he finds two different garments being dealt with:image-clothing and written clothing, both referring to the same reality: the original clothing, the third garment. According to Barthes, these three different levels of garments are derived from three more general systems: substance, image and language. Similarly, in the case of a film, we would also find these three systems, albeit they are respectively transformed into stories, moving images and cinematic language. In other words, the structure of reality, its representation and signification in fashion magazines also exists in films.

Through the case of analyzing the ideology in fashion magazines from the perspective of the descriptions of garments in them, based on Saussure's semiology theory, Barthes sufficiently demonstrates myth. He points out that myth is a type of speech chosen by history and speech of this kind is a message (1972). The message can be verbal or visual. Speech, language and pictures all mean something because of the myth. In other words, myth is a structure of knowledge. According to Barthes, as fashion magazines present a certain myth of clothing fashion, so do Palestinian films in the post-Second Intifada period, which also tell the audience a certain myth of their fashion.

This paper looks at what myth is hidden in Palestinian cinema in thepost-Second Intifada period in the new era of globalization and how to interpret it through Roland Barthes's myth. It seeks to answer what myth/message the Palestinian cinema in the post-Second Intifada period is telling; how cinematic languages help to construct such a myth; what the historical foundation of the myth is and, in turn, how the myth leads the trend of history?

Myth can be broken down into two levels. The first level is the literal level which consists the signifier—the substance and the signified—the concept behind the substance. These two combine to

create the sign which is the literal meaning. This sign conveys meaning that becomes a vessel or an empty signifier in the mythical second level. The empty signifier then gives meaning through the new signifieds which are the attributes within the sign presenter. These attributes fill the empty signifier and create a myth surrounding the film.

As we attempt to discover the myth of Palestinian cinema in the post-Second Intifada period, the literal level sign is the ordinary objects, such as cactus, lighter, surf board, cello, which symbolize hope under harsh conditions including the spirits such as faith, endurance, fight. In the films, the sign—ordinary objects—also becomes an empty signifier to create the mythical new symbol of hope under harsh conditions in the next level. This is where the myth of the films begins to form. The signified in the mythical level is the Palestinian resistance down to mundane life. These combined create the myth that Palestinian resistance should be stirred in all forms; every Palestinian can exert his effort in his mundane life for the cause; that's where the hope for Palestinians lies and if we fight till the end, we will win.

New symbols

The symbols that typify the Palestinian cinema before the Second Intifada include the black-and-white checkered kaffiyeh, the rifle, Kalashnikov and hand grenade, the Muslim symbol of star and crescent, the map of Palestine, a stuck car, a blocked road, the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, pictures of Arafat, flags, kites and birds in the sky. These symbols have become iconic which remind the audience of Palestinian struggle as soon as they are shown in the films as they are straightforward, distinct and typical. Elia Suleiman's films have infiltrated new elements to these typical symbols. In Divine Intervention (2002), Suleiman employs virtually the entire inventory of these symbols. Compared with the "fictitious status of these symbols" in other Palestinian films before the Second Intifada, these symbols in Suleiman's films are uniquely inserted with humor, parody and absurdity, thus being subtly enabled to revive and expose the truth behind them (Gertz and Khleifi, 2008). For example, the red balloon that Suleiman sends up to soar over the roadblock and over Jerusalem, imprinting a caricature of Arafat's wrinkled face grinning widely, is an example of the symbols' double features—being ridiculed and rejuvenated simultaneously—in this film. It floats above the roadblock, leaving the soldiers there stunned and helpless, and then crosses the border, hovers over the Jerusalem skyline, over churches and synagogues, and finally lands on the Al-Aqsa mosque, liberating the imagination, hope, and the dream (Gertz and Khleifi, 2008).

In the post Second Intifada period, the new symbols of resistance, unity and hope in Palestinian cinema are ordinary objects that are derived from mundane life. Palestinian films in this particular

period empower ordinary objects in mundane life the meaning of resistance. For example, the surf board in film *Gaza Surf Club (Philip Gnadt & Mickey Yamine, 2016)* is endowed with the spirit of challenging the Israeli blockade of Gaza, while the cello played in ruins in film *Gaza (Garry Keane & Andrew McConnell, 2019)* reveals the unremitting pursue of nicety in a state of devastation.

Symbols of Hope

A. Cactus

In film *Omar (Hany Abu-Assad, 2013)*, the symbol of hope is the cactus. Cactus is the symbol of Palestinian endurance. It is a common indigenous plant growing freely acrossthe landscape despite harsh surroundings. It is a desert plant found everywhere. It is famed for its ability to thrive in intense conditions that would render a plant of lesser strength lifeless. The spiritual meaning behind the cactus is symbolized in its hard-protective exterior, its endurance and strength to survive in tough environments and situations. The cactus is adaptable, strong and endurant. Though it may not be recognized for its beauty, its real beauty and treasure come from within.

Handala by Al Ali.   "Like cactus, we are tough and patient." Sabaaneh, 2015.

Handala, a refugee child created by Naji Al Ali in political cartoons in the 1960s remains a potent symbol of the struggle of the Palestinian people for justice and self-determination. The child takes the cactus as a prototype. Mohammad Sabaaneh continue sand transforms this tradition and draws the image that captions "like cactus,we are tough and patient." The cactus, as Sabaaneh notes, has become a key symbol of Sumud—Arabic for "steadfastness", and the Palestinians are standing sturdy there like the cactus: not quite ordinary, but not the stuff of legend either.

The cactus appears three times in film *Omar*.

1. First time, it is set in the right corner of the background of a vacant land where the three childhood friends are sitting, having some leisure time after a self-military training.

2. Second time, it appears in the woods where the Israeli agents come to take Tariq's body, who was accidentally killed in a fight between him and Amjad, as Tariq is wanted by the agents. The number of cacti increases a lot so that they almost fill the whole background.

3. Last time, Omar traps Rami, the Israeli agent to a wood, still with many cacti in the background, with some intelligence information Rami is interested in and finally perishes together with him. This is the first time that the cactus comes into the front in a close-up shot when Rami shoots it.

The cactus runs through the film in the key plots. It reminds the audience of the tough and cruel situations the characters are in, and meanwhile manifests their continuous will and actions to resist occupation. The close-up shot of the cactus being shot is very impressive, as following it comes the

abrupt and thrilling ending in which the Israeli agent Rami is shot by Omar all in a sudden. In the shot, the cactus is trembling after being heavily damaged. It symbolizes the previous repeatedly aborted plans of the Palestinian resistance which seem to be kicking against the pricks. However, the final plot reversal powerfully strengthens and delivers the idea that however harsh the conditions are, the Palestinians will always strive and will never give up.

B. Lighter

The night of 16th November 2018 at London Barbican Cinema will always stay in my memory. It was at the opening night of the London Palestine Film Festival 2018 (LPFF 2018) when the documentary film *Ghost Hunting (2017)* directed by Palestinian filmmaker Raed Andoni was shown. It was in this film that I first surprisingly and delightedly saw the cinematic expression of the sparks of hope of Palestinians. The sparks were lit by a lighter.

The film tells the story of Andoni, the director who placed an advertisement in a newspaper looking for participants who had been imprisoned by the Israelis. After the casting call, they constructed a simulacrum of the notorious Al-Moskobiya interrogation center and then were assigned the roles of either prisoner or tormentor, through which they relived and recreated harrowing experiences from their time in Israeli detention facilities. The lighter appeared in the reproduced sequence where the participants are put into cells.

1. Gain in Power

One of the prisoners role-played by Ramzi Maqdisi keeps asking for cigarettes and fire from the jailors. And once, finally, a jailor gives him cigarettes but refuses to give him fire in the meantime. No matter how he begs for it, the jailor closes the little cell window and walks off decisively. The high angle shot of Ramzi reaching out his hand and looking up, begging the jailor for fire with raring eyes shows his lower position compared with the jailor's.

Finally, one jailor subconsciously lights Ramzi's cigarette when he checks the number of prisoners in each cell. As can be seen from the film clip, the moment when the jailor lights Ramzi's cigarette, their body positions are at the same level. In other words, with the lighter, with the action of the jailor lighting Ramzi's cigarette, their positions immediately become equal. Through the lighting process, Ramzi has raised his position from a lower one to an equal one, though the gain in power might be temporal.

It anticipates the situation when the one who holds the lighter is in a lower position. For instance, in film *Malena (Giuseppe Tornatore, 2000)*, there is a scene when the young and beautiful Malena is sitting in an outdoor cafe, as soon as she holds a cigarette between her lips, men around her fall over each other to light her cigarette in order to make up to her.

Such a power reversal between the one who begs for fire and the one who holds the lighter does happen in the following sequence of the film. If Ramzi's gain in power through the lighting process is regarded fleeting, then the following sequence strengthens and confirms such a gain with a power

reversal between the prisoner and the jailor.

The jailors are called together by the governor to be identified by Ramzi in order to find out who gave the lighter to him. The jailors are standing silently and nervously as if they were the prisoners. The film later tells us that if a jailor is discovered giving a lighter to a prisoner, he will be put into jail for at least three months. As a result, as soon as thejailor lights Ramzi's cigarette, he regrets. This time, it is the jailor's turn to beg for the litten cigarette back. After the interrogation, when the "kindhearted" jailor comes toRamzi's cell to thank him for not betraying him in front of the governor, Ramzi puts avictory smile and guffaws boisterously with ridicule, complacency and detestation for along time, and finally sneer: "Hey Jailor, the lighter has always been with me!"

As Amos Oz (2005) stated, "Israel and Palestine ... are like the jailer and his prisoner, handcuffed to one another. After so many years, there is almost no difference between them: the jailer is no more free than his prisoner." The lighter signifies the gain in power and even a power reversal for the prisoner. Through the lighter, the audience discover an absurd erasure of the structures of power in surprise and realize that the faith has always been rooted in the hearts of Palestinians. Even though they are imprisoned, they possess the spirit of victory.

2. Bridge

The lighter is a common accessory especially in the male social or business circle. In Hollywood films, asking for light is usually a pick-up line or gesture. It often serves as starting a conversation or getting two people closer instantaneously. During the lighting process through the cell window in the film, the prisoner and the jailor get connected and the fire, which symbolizes light, warmth, friendship and hope in the darkness, is transmitted from the jailor to the prisoner.

After refusing to give fire to Ramzi many times, the jailor finally lights his cigarette subconsciously once, as lending fire to light someone's cigarette is a simple, ordinary and subconscious behavior. Normally, people have no reason to refuse to do such a favor, but the rules in prison and the status between enemies forcibly cut it off. It is only after lighting Ramzi's cigarette that the jailor recalls the rules due to the relation between them as jailor and prisoner and as enemies. However, the light, warmth, friendship and hope have still been transmitted from the jailor to the prisoner through the lighter by human nature. In both the Palestinian and Israeli cinemas, we can often see friends sharing either the same cigarette or hookah, which straightforwardly conveys the deep friendship and affinity between them.

This sequence indicates the belief that although Palestinians and Israelis are on two opposite sides of the conflict, there are still chances for the peace, kindness and help—dialogue for reconciliation—to

flow in between via the greatness of human nature. In this case, the lighter serves as a bridge between the two rivals and symbolizes the possibility of making peace. When Ramzi gets fire from the jailor, he asks his fellow prisoners if anyone also needs fire. It shows that the hope is not only transmitted from the enemy but is also circulates among comrades.

Democracy, Personal Freedom and Islamic State Fighters

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Abstract:

Never before in modern history have foreign fighters gathered at the speed and scale as they have in the territory of the Islamic State (IS). While some argue that many of IS foreign fighters appear to have joined as a reaction to persistent and obstinate local conditions of autocracy, discrimination, and oppression, a considerable number of foreign fighters also come from developed countries enjoying high levels of democracy and personal freedom. Even after the demise of Islamic State in 2017, the IS foreign fighter phenomenon remains a source of severe security risk globally as those who have been involved in terrorist operations on the ground may continue their fight as "returnees" against targets in their homeland. This paper examines the effect of democracy and personal freedom on the

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outflow of IS foreign fighters to Syria, as well as their flow back home as returnees. While the effect of democracy appears to be insignificant, our cross-country regressions show that countries which a higher level of personal freedom (i) have a significantly larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million population) to join IS, and (ii) receive a significantly larger percentage share of returningforeign fighter. Our results are robust across different model specifications and account forpossible collinearity concerns.

Keywords: Democracy, Freedom, Terrorism, Islamic State, Foreign Fighters.

JEL Classification: D74　Conflict・Conflict Resolution・Alliances・Revolutions

F51　International Conflicts・Negotiations・Sanctions

F52　National Security・Economic Nationalism

H56　National Security and War

P48　Legal Institution

1. Introduction

Never before in modern history have foreign fighters (FF) gathered at the speed and scale as they have in the territory of the Islamic State (IS) (Hegghammer, 2013; Lang & Al Wari, 2016). European Commission's Radicalisation Awareness Network (2017) estimates that over 40,000 foreigners have joined IS from more than 110 countries both before and after the declaration of the caliphate in June 2014. The majority of foreign fighters come from Arab states, mostly from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco. Barrett (2017) argues that many of IS foreign recruits appear to have joined as a reaction to persistent and obstate local conditions of autocracy, discrimination, and oppression. Nevertheless, a considerable number of foreign fighters also come from developed countries enjoying high levels of democracy and personal freedom, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (The Soufan Group, 2015).

Even after the demise of Islamic State in 2017, the IS foreign fighter phenomenon remains a source of severe security risks to the sender countries. Expat fighters who have supported military, paramilitary, and terrorist operations on the ground may continue their fight as "returnees" against targets in their homeland. A study by the Soufan Center and the Global Strategy Network estimates that around 5,600 fighters have already returned to their home countries (Barrett, 2017). Almost 30 percent of the 5,000 European Union citizens who fought alongside the IS in Syria had returned home (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2017). A study by Hegghammer shows that between 1990 and 2010, one in nine Western foreign fighters' returnees subsequently became domestic terrorists

(Hegghammer, 2013). Hegghammer asserts that "Syria will prolong the problem of jihadi terrorism in Europe by 20 years" and that attacks by foreign fighter returnees are "almost inevitable". (Gardner, 2013). A recent Pew survey (2017) finds that the fear of an attack by IS ranks first in global concerns, just above climate change.

Former French Interior Minister Manuel Valls labeled the IS fighters returnees issue a "ticking time bomb" (Lynch, 2013). This bomb eventually struck Europe on May 24 2014, when a French IS fighter returnee, Mehdi Nemmouche, shot and killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. Nemmouche had spent a year fighting in Syria with IS linked militants before returning to Europe (BBC, 2014). Another Frenchman who had joined IS in Syria, Ibrahim Boudina, returned to France in January 2014 and was consequently arrested while allegedly planning an attack involving high explosives on several domestic targets (Cruickshank, 2014). Most importantly, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the Belgian mastermind behind the deadly November 2015 Paris attacks, is known to have spent time fighting along the ranks of IS in Syria in 2013 (RT France, 2015). Lister (2015, p.2) states that there are many other alleged plots linked to returned foreign fighters that have been detected and foiled in several western countries.

A debate is currently ongoing in much of the world, especially in Europe, on how to balance between personal freedom and national security. In her speech to parliament few days after Charlie Hebdo attack, German chancellor Angela Merkel called for enforcing additional security measures against terrorism, stating that her government must "without a doubt constantly honor the balance between security and freedom" (Somaskanda, 2015). Yet, Burkhard Lischka, the home affairs spokesman for Germany's Social Democrats, refused her suggestion, stating that "the last thing we need right now is a significant curtailment of freedom and civil liberties in favor of a supposedly higher level of security," he said. "Then the terrorists would have already achieved one of their goals." (Somaskanda, 2015). The EU has recently adopted new counter-terrorism measures, including adopting EU-wide rules for the collection of airline passenger data and enhancing external border checks. However, these counter-terrorism measures have often been slowed down by national sovereignty concerns, law enforcement barriers to sharing sensitive information, and personal freedom protection[1]. Certain governments have gone further and removed the citizenship of dual nationals fighting abroad in order to prevent their return (Van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016).

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1 For example, addressing the legal challenge posed by IS returnees in the Netherlands, Van Ginkel and Minks (2018) argue that terrorism provisions in the Dutch Criminal Code are unable to handle such threat. The authors note that the criminalcharge of "incitingto terrorism" (article 131, paragraph 2 Dutch Criminal Code) has no clear legal thresholdor boundaries. It could thus be argued that this behavior is considered "within the realm of the rights to freedom of speech or religion" (2018, p.67). For more on this, see Boutin (2016).

Interestingly, it seems that many around the world are willing to forgo some freedoms in return of better security measurements against terrorism. A survey released in December 2015 showed that 56% of Americans were more concerned that the government's anti-terror policies have not gone far enough to fight terrorism, compared with 28% who were concerned with losing personal freedom and civil liberties in the process (Pew Research Center, 2015). Another survey conducted by the market research group infratest dimap in 2015 revealed that 91 percent of Germans supported the enforcement of additional security measures, ranging from increasedpolice presence to identity checks (2015).

This paper examines the effect of democracy and personal freedom on Islamic State fighter's flow from and back to their home countries. Regarding foreign fighters flow to IS territory, we expect the prevalence of democratic institutions in a certain society to reduce the number of foreign fighters joining IS in Syria and Iraq. Democratic societies provide multiple channels to express dissent without the threat of government retaliation and allow for change through non-violent means. Hence, groups in democratic societies are more likely to pursue nonviolent alternatives to further their interest rather than the costly affiliation with terrorist groups such as IS. Thus, we expect democracies to have less outflow of foreign fighters than repressive ones.

On the contrary, we argue that personal freedom may increase the amount of outflow of Islamic radicals to join IS in Syria and Iraq. Free societies, as compared to repressive ones, allow more freedom of speech, association and movement, becoming less able to prevent terrorist group mobilization and as a result are more likely to experience radicalism and Islamic State recruitment. Regarding the return of foreign fighters back to their home countries, using a rational choice model, we argue that the ability to return home after joining IS is a major factor that is considered by IS fighters. Democracy and respect for personal freedom in a certain society may decrease the cost of returning for members of extremist groups, as fighters are less likely to return to countries where they could face harsher legal consequences for their terrorist activities. In that sense, for a given radical person, the cost of returning from IS will be less in societies that respect democratic institutions and personal freedom than in autocratic societies with low level of personal freedom. Building on this argument, we thus hypothesize that the prevalence of both democracy and personal freedom in a certain society have a positive effect on the number of radical fighters returning from IS territory.

Our results show that, while democracy has no effect on IS recruitment outflow, countries which a higher degree of personal freedom significantly have a larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million populations) to join IS. The different findings on democracy and personal freedom suggest that while the level of democracy does not affect joining IS, the prevalence of personal freedom as a democratic

institution does. As for the inflow (returnees), we initially find that democracy has a significantly positive effect on the number of IS returnees.However, democracy loses significance when personal freedom is added, showing a positive andstatistically significant effect. This suggests that the initially identified positive effect ofdemocracy on IS returnees is primarily driven by prevalence of personal freedom as ademocratic institution. Our results support the hypothesis that countries with a higher degree ofpersonal freedom send and receive more IS fighters.

Our study contributes to different strands of literature. First, we are first to empirically explore the link between democratic institutions and IS foreign fighters. While democracy and other related institutions (e.g. political freedom) have been controlled for in the few empirical studies on IS fighters (Abdel Jelil, Bhatia, Brockmeyer, Do, & Joubert, 2018; Benmelech & Klor, 2018; Gouda & Marktanner, 2018a; 2018b; Pokalova, 2018), no study has so far focused mainly on the (dis)incentives created by democratic environment on radical Islamists aiming to join IS. Second, a multitude of studies have dealt with the challenges posed by IS returnees totheir home countries (Barrett, 2017; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2017; Reed & Pohl, 2017; Renard & Coolsaet, 2018; United Nations Security Council, 2018). Yet, no empiricalstudy has so far empirically investigated the factors affecting IS foreign members to return backhome. Our study is the first to explore the determinants of IS returnees inflow to their homecountries. Finally, we contribute to the empirical literature on terrorism in general as we explorehow respecting for personal freedom affects the in- and outflow of IS fighters. Literature ondeterminants of terrorism has dealt with a multitude of rights and freedoms including politicalfreedom (Abadie, 2006; Brooks, 2009), political rights (Gaibulloev, Piazza, & Sandler, 2017; Li, 2005), rule of law (Choi, 2010), freedom of press (Melnick & Eldor, 2010; Rohner & Frey, 2007) and human rights (Piazza, 2017; Walsh & Piazza, 2010). Personal freedom, as demonstrated by freedom of association, of movement, and of religion has hardly been studied with relation to terrorism. Our study is the first to focus on the link between personal freedom and IS fighters, or terrorism in general.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section two reviews the relevant literature; we describe our theory and hypotheses in Section three; Section four presents our data and empirical strategy. A discussion of our empirical findings follows in Section five; and we conclude with a summary of our main results and outlook in Section six.

2. Literature review

No study has so far been conducted on the effect of personal freedom on the flow of Islamic

state fighters. Democracy, as well as some of its sub-component institutions including political rights and civil liberties, has been controlled for in the few empirical studies examining the phenomenon of Islamic foreign fighters. Interestingly, the results are found to be contradicting. While Benmelech and Klor (2018) find some evidence that most IS foreign fighters come from recognized democracies with very high political rights, Thomas (2015) and Abdel Jelil et al. (2018) show that civil liberties and political rights are negatively associated with IS foreign enrollment. This finding resonates with Krueger (2006) that shows that countries with a large Muslim population, close proximity to Baghdad, and low level of civil liberties or political rights are likely to have more of their citizens join the Iraqi insurgency. Other studies find no relation between democratic institutions and IS recruitment (Gouda & Marktanner, 2018b). Pokalova (2018) shows that more IS foreign fighters come from countries with higher Human Development Index levels, unemployment rates, and percentages of youth. However, the author finds political freedom to be insignificant. Using the Polity score as a proxy for both democracy and political rights, Gouda and Marktanner (2018a) find no significant relationship between this variable and the numbers of foreign fighters joining IS.

According to Choi (2010), existing studies on the relationship between democracy and terrorism are generally categorized into three strains: (1) the first examines the overall impact of democracy on terrorism; (2) the second investigates the effect of different sub-features of democratic institutions on terrorism; and (3) the third focuses on the relationship between democracy and specific subtypes of terrorist events. Regarding the first strain, two theoretical schools of thought study the relationship between democracy and terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Eyerman, 1998). The "strategic" school argues that democratic governments seeking to protect civil liberties and political freedoms are limited in their ability to monitor and detain terrorism suspects, prohibiting making extensive police sweeps to catch terrorists, and mustafford alleged terrorists access to a lawyer and a public trial (Dreher, Gassebner, & Siemers, 2010; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Gearty, 2007). Using Freedom House rankings, Gause (2005) shows that "free" countries experience approximately twice as many terrorist attacks as countries that are "not free". The implication is that democratic states are generally more vulnerable to terrorist attacks (Eubank& Weinberg, 2001; Li, 2005; Piazza, 2008a; Schmid, 1992).

The "political access" school argues that democracy alleviates grievances by insuring betterelectoral access and peaceful conflict-resolution mechanisms. Democratic societies protectingpersonal freedom, as well as political and human rights, have non-violent alternatives toexpress dissent and resolve conflicts. As conflicts are solved by using non-violent means, thereis

a lower probability of resorting to violence or terrorism to solve conflicts. Consequently, terrorism results when these legal means of political expression are inhibited (Brooks, 2009; Ross, 1993; Schwarzmantel, 2010; Windsor, 2003). The logic that terrorism emerges fromautocratic regimes has made its way into policy circles, especially in the USA. "The best antidoteto radicalism and terror is the tolerance kindled in free societies", George W. Bush (2005)remarked during a speech to the National Defense University.

Generally speaking, most empirical studies dealing with the first group find a positive relationship between democracy and terrorism in support of the strategic school (Campos & Gassebner, 2013; Chenoweth, 2010; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Eubank & Weinberg, 2001; Li & Schaub, 2004; Piazza, 2007). A small number of articles show a negative relationship, supportive of the political access school (Crenshaw, 1981; Eyerman, 1998; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010; Li, 2005; Shahrouri, 2010). Other articles find no significant relationship (Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011; Piazza, 2008b; Savun & Phillips, 2009). A handful of articles uncover an inverted U-shaped relationship in which some intermediate regime types in between autocracy and democracy displayed the greatest amount of terrorism (Abadie, 2006; Chenoweth, 2013; Gaibulloev, Piazza, & Sandler, 2017). Consequently, it could be argued that findings in the empirical literature about the relationship between democracy in general and terrorism are mixed and generally inconclusive.

The second strand of literature points to the possibility that democracy might concurrently attract and discourage acts of terrorism (Li, 2005; Li& Schaub, 2004; Schmid, 1992). By arguing that some features of democratic institutions encourage terrorist activities while others discourage them, this second strand of literature proposes a mixed effect of democratic sub-features on terrorist incidents. Thus, many studies examine the effect of individual features of democratic regimes on terrorism by avoiding aggregating all the distinctive features of democracy into a single composite index. For example, Melnick and Eldor (2010) and Rohner and Frey (2007) find that freedom of the press, allows terrorists and their supporters to publicize their grievances. Choi (2010) shows that maintaining a sound rule of law notably reduces the likelihood of any type of terrorist events. Testas (2004) finds that political repression is a positive determinant of terrorism in Muslim-majority countries. Li (2005) disaggregates democracy into two basic characteristics—democratic participation and constraints on the executive, arguing that these characteristics should affect terrorism in different ways. Citizens in a democracy are less likely to resort to terrorism since their grievances could be amended through legitimate political channels. Nevertheless, more constraints on the executive branch increase terrorism by limiting the government's ability to take

effective and aggressive counter-terrorism measures.

While the first and second strands of literature study the effect of democracy on the aggregate number of terrorist events, the third strand delves into specific subtypes of terrorist attacks. For example, considerable literature exists on the relationship between democratic institutions and suicide terrorism (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007; Santifort-Jordan & Sandler, 2014; Pape, 2003; Wade & Reiter, 2007). Others study the relationship between democratic institutions and assassinations (Mandala, 2017). Ivanova and Sandier (2006) shows that democratic regimes are more likely to be vulnerable to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism due to easy access to the necessary knowledge for obtaining such weaponry through institutions of higher learning.

Our study is linked to all the three aforementioned strands of literature. More specifically, we intersect with the first group when investigating the effect of democracy in general on IS fighters flow to and from their home countries. We are further linked to the second strand, as we examine the effect of a specific democratic institution, namely personal freedom, on flows ofIS fighters. Finally, we are linked to the third strand since we examine a specific type of terrorism, as demonstrated by joining the IS terrorist organization.

3. Theoretical arguments

According to Schneider et al. (2015), rational-choice models are the preferred theory of most economic analyses of terrorism (e.g. (Caplan, 2006; Enders & Sandler, 2002; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, & Klemmensen, 2006). Based on the rational model of crime (Becker, 1968), terrorists are considered rational actors who try to maximize their utility, given the benefits, and (opportunity) costs of terrorism, where the utility from terrorism is usually associated with achieving certain political and/ or economic goals (Enders & Sandler, 2002). Caplan (2006) provides a comprehensive analysis of terrorist rationality and finds that terrorists act more or less rational, so that "the rational choice model of terrorism is not that far from the truth and the Beckerian analysis of crime remains useful" (Caplan, 2006, p.101). With this in mind, we apply rational choice model on two types of decisions taken by an Islamist radical: First, the outflow of IS potential fighters to join IS in Syria, and second, the inflow (return) of fighters backto their home countries after they had joined IS ranks.

3.1 Outflow of IS fighters

Applying this concept to the outflow of IS fighters, a radical foreigner would join IS in Syria only when his benefit exceeds the cost of this action. Benefits of becoming a member in a terrorist

organization are numerous, including achieving a sense of community, status, providing a means of vengeance for past humiliations (Schaefer, 2007), as well as martyrdom (Abrahms, 2008). Costs include foregone utility from opportunities associated with non-terrorist activity, such as wages or similar material rewards linked to participation in the ordinary economic life in home country. Moreover, a potential IS terrorist's calculus of costs includes physical costs coming from apprehension possibility and penalty for terrorist offenses (Schneider, Brück, & Meierrieks, 2015).

While there is no consensus on the relationship between democracy and terrorism in general, we argue that democracy reduces incentives of an Islamist to join IS abroad. In nondemocratic societies, the lack of opportunities for political participation prompts political grievances and dissatisfaction among dissenters, motivating incentives to join terrorism organizations or to become a terrorist (Crenshaw, 1981). In contrast, democracy allows dissenters to express their policy preferences and seek amends (Ross, 1993). Different social groups, including Islamic political movements, are able to participate in the political process to further their interest through peaceful means, such as voting and forming political parties (Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 2001). Since democracy lowers the cost of achieving political goals through legal means, Islamists seeking to make Islam play a bigger role in public life should find membership of an illegal terrorist organization less attractive.

Li (2005) points out to another transmission channel between democracy and membership of terrorist organization. As widely democratic participation increases political efficacy of citizens,transnational terrorist groups will be less successful in recruiting new members in democracies than in autocracies. In other words, when citizens have grievances against certain foreignevents, greater political participation in democracies allows them to exert significant influence on their own government so that they can seek favorable policy changes more successfully.Thus, joining a terrorist group such as Islamic State and attacking foreign targets become less appealing options. It should also be noted that the Syrian civil war started as pro-democracy protests in March 2011. Protesters inspired by the Arab Springdemanded the resignation of president Bashar al-Assad. As a result, we expect that individualscoming from autocracies to bemore sympathetic to Syrian rebels. Such individuals might then be more likely to become foreign fighters.

Hypothesis 1: Democracy has a negative effect on the flow of IS fighters to Syria.

On the contrary, we argue that personal freedom has a positive effect on IS recruitment. Liberal-

democratic freedoms of movement and association, coupled with legal restraints on security forces and due-process safeguards, make it easier for potential terrorists to establish and join terrorist groups. Crenshaw (1981) notes, "[T]errorists view the context as permissive, making terrorism a viable option" (1981, p.383). In his testimony shortly after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. attorney-general John Ashcroft testified to a Senate committee that "terrorists exploit our openness [and] our judicial process." Ashcroft added that "terrorists are told how to use America's freedom as a weapon against us" (2001). Consequently, we argue that free societies, as compared to repressive ones, decrease a potential terrorist's cost of joining Islamic State in Syria, thus allowing greater IS recruitment and mobilization.

Hypothesis 2: Personal freedom has a positive effect on the flow of IS fighters to Syria.

3.2   Inflow of IS fighters

The inflow of battle-hardened returnees after IS demise in late 2017 has "sparked public anxiety and sown fears in many countries that open societies have become the favored targets for both homegrown and foreign terrorists" (Magen, 2018, p.111). A number of counter terrorism measures which aim to thwart IS returnees threat have been planned and enforced in many countries. These measures, including travel bans, impose significant restrictions on many fundamental freedoms and rights, including freedom of movement, freedom of association, the right to liberty, and the right to private and family life (Boutin, 2016, p.21). Nevertheless, democracies, as compared to autocracies, allow more freedom of movement and association and, in general, uphold rule of law. Even with the introduction of new counter-terrorism measures against IS returnees in specific, democratic states may be less able to prevent terrorist group mobilization and as a result more likely to experience more IS returnees.

Using a rational choice model, we argue that the ability to return home after joining IS is a major factor that is considered by IS fighters. Democracy and respect for personal freedom in a certain society may decrease the cost of returning for members of extremist groups, as fighters are less likely to return to countries where they could face harsher legal consequences for their terrorist activities. In that sense, for a given radical person, the cost of returning from IS will be less in societies that respect democratic institutions and personal freedom than in autocratic societies with low level of personal freedom. Building on this argument, we thus hypothesize that the prevalence of both democracy and personal freedom in a certain society have a positive effect on the number of radical fighters returning

from IS territory.

Hypothesis 3: Democracy has a positive effect on the inflow of IS fighters back home.

Hypothesis 4: Personal freedom has a positive effect on the inflow of IS fighters back home.

4. Estimation Strategy and Data

We empirically investigate the effect of democracy and personal freedom on (1) the amount of FFs joining IS (outflow of IS fighters), and (2) percentage share of returnees (IS fighters that return back to their home countries). Our models can be summarized as follows:

$$FFperMill_i=\beta_0+\beta_1 Democracy_i+\beta_2 PersonalFreedomIndex_i+\gamma X_i+\varepsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

$$RetperFF_i=\beta_0+\beta_1 Democracy_i+\beta_2 PersonalFreedomIndex_i+\gamma X_i+\varepsilon_i \qquad (2)$$

where i=country i

"Foreign fighters per million population" (FFperMill) in country i is our dependent variable in Model (1) while "returnees as a percentage of foreign fighters" (RetperFF) is our dependent variable in Model (2). We use a Tobit model as both dependent variables left-censored. This is the case in Model (1) as some countries have sent zero FFs and in Model (2) as some FFs sending countries have received zero returnees, as described above. However, both dependent variables are continuous for the non-zero observations.[1] X is a vector of control variables, which are described later. Regional dummies are only included when they are jointly significant.

We developed a cross-country dataset to test our hypotheses. Our dependent variables on Foreign Fighters (FFs) outflows to IS territory and FF returnees (FF that return back to their home countries) are collected from two reports published on the Soufan group (The Soufan Group,2015; Barrett, 2017). Table A.1 in Appendix A describes our data and sources. Figure 1 showsthe absolute number of FFs per region and Figure 2 shows the distribution of FFs by region. Themajority of foreign fighters (more than 90%) come from three regions, namely Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (40%), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) (29%), and WesternEurope (WE) (22%).[2]

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1 We run our regression using the open source software model "gretl" , whose accompanying manual also provides a technical description of the Tobit estimator.

2 Foreign Fighters come from 68 different countries, including 12 (out of 21) MENA countries, 17 (out of 29) EECA countries, 16 (out of 29) WE countries in WE, 9 (out of 37) EAP countries, 5 (out of 8) SA countries, 2 (out of 3) NAM countries, 4 (out of 48) SSA countries, and 3 (out of 42) LAC countries.

Number of Foreign

Figure 1: Number of Foreign Fighters per Region
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Soufan (2015, 2017).

While one half of the 68 FF sending countries have not received any returnees, the other half shows a strong variation in terms of the percentage share of returned FFs.[1] Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows the percentage share of returnees per FFs. Finland, Algeria and the United Kingdom received the highest share of returnees (50–54%), followed by Denmark (46%), Turkey (40%), Sweden (35%), Norway (33%), Germany (33%) and Austria (30%).

As a measure of a country's level of democracy, we use the polity IV project's polity score, developed

Figure 2: Regional distribution of Foreign Fighters
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Soufan (2015, 2017).

by Marshall et al. (2016) and published by the Center for Systemic Peace. Polity score ranges from –0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). MENA countries show the lowest polity group average of –2.66, while NAM and WE countries show the highest averages of 10 and 9.7, respectively. To capture the level of personal freedom, we use the 2017 Personal Freedom Index (PFI) by Ian Vásquez and Tanja Porcnik (2017), published by Cato Institute, the Fraser Institute, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom. The PFI is part of the Human Freedom Index and accounts for rule of law, security and safety and specific personal freedoms such as freedoms of movement, religion,

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1   We dropped Afghanistan from our sample because as there is an error in recordings of FFs in- and outflows.

association, expression, information, identity and relationships[1]. It includes data on 159 countries and takes a continuous score that ranges from 0 to 10, where countries with more personal freedom receive higher ratings (Vasquez& Porcnik, 2017). Again, WE and NAM show the highest average PFI score of 9.0, whereas the MENA shows the lowest average PFI score of 5.5 for the period 2011−2015.

In our cross-country analysis, we control for a country's GDP per capita to rule out that estimated effects of democracy or personal freedom are only reflecting the effect of a country's level of economic advancement. We alternatively use the Human Development Index for robustness checks. Our findings are not changed. Moreover, we account for the Muslim share of population and the geographic proximity by controlling for the distance between a country's capital and Damascus. To account for further potential sources of grievances, we control for

(i) income inequality using the Gini coefficient.

(ii) religious and language fractionalization which could fuel radicalization.

(iii) (thelogarithm of) youth unemployment.

(iv) an interaction term of Muslim population shareand youth unemployment, following Gouda and Marktanner (2018a). Regional dummiescontrol for non- observable regional fixed effects.

Table A.1 describes the variables that we use for our empirical analysis, their abbreviations and sources. It also indicates if any variable has been transformed by taking the logarithm to improve distributional characteristics. Table A.2 provides descriptive statistics for our variables based on our full estimation sample of 141 countries, which is restricted by the availability of independent variables. In the descriptive statistics, we additionally distinguish between FF sending countries and countries that did not send any FFs. A first look at the descriptive statistics shows that FF sending countries on average have a higher level of democracy, personal freedom and GDP per capita. However, as there are a number of differences between the two groups of countries and as the number of FF strongly vary among FF sending countries, a more rigorous empirical analysis is needed to analyze the effects of democracy and personal freedom on IS fighters' decisions. Moreover, the unsurprising strong correlation between our two main variables of interest, polity and PFI (r=0.7), as well as their strong

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1   While other freedom indicators use a positive liberty approach, the Human Freedom Index applies an approach of negative liberty. According to Berlin (1969), positive liberty refers to the possession of the capacity to act upon one's free will. On the contrary, negative liberty is defined as freedom from external restraint on one's actions. Vásquez and Porcnik (2017) argue that the concept of positive freedom suffers from subjectivity, since it is "more likely to mean different things to different people and thus cannot be measured independent of the goals that conflicting ideologies or groups might identify with freedom" (2017, p.12). Consequently, positive freedom may has considerably different meanings for an evangelist, a Marxist, an Islamist, and so on. On the other hand, negative liberty "comes in only one flavor— the lack of constraint imposed on the individual" (McMahon, 2012, p.10). As part of Human Freedom Index, PFI is thus an attempt to measure the degree to which the negative freedoms of individuals are respected in the countries observed. These freedoms include freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and so on.

correlation with GDP per capita, as shown in Table A.3, requires special attention to collinearity concern while conducting our empirical analysis.

5. Results

5.1 Outflow of IS fighters

Table 1 shows the Tobit regression results for various specifications of Model (1) on IS fighters' outflow. Due to the high correlation between democracy and personal freedom, we start in column (I) by estimating the impact of democracy (but not PFI) on FFperMill, while controlling for GDP per capita (lny), income inequality (Gini), youth unemployment (lnyuer), the Muslim population percentage share (Muslim) distance to Damascus (Dist), and regional dummies. The regional dummies are jointly significant in all model specifications of Table 1. Democracy does not show any significant effect on the fraction of a country's population that join IS. In column (II), we include our personal freedom variable PFI, which shows a positive and significant effect on FFperMill, whereas the effect of democracy remains insignificant. In column (III), we further control for religious and language fractionalization and in column (IV), we additionally account for the interaction term of the Muslim population share with youth unemployment, following results of Gouda and Marktanner (2018).

Table 1: Tobit Regression Results: Determinants of IS fighters' outflow
(Dependent Variable = Foreign Fighters per million population)

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
PFI		21.93 $(12.53)^{*}$	25.18 $(12.26)^{**}$	26.71 $(12.18)^{**}$
Polity	0.78 (1.66)	−0.51 (2.13)	−1.16 (2.07)	−0.82 (2.07)
lny	6.60 (8.18)	−1.41 (8.81)	−9.88 (8.94)	−7.43 (8.84)
Gini	0.14 (1.23)	0.39 (1.3)	0.18 (1.26)	0.42 (1.25)
lnyuer	5.20 (12.00)	3.18 (11.92)	1.85 (11.5)	−15.74 (12.92)
Muslim	0.83 $(0.28)^{***}$	1.03 $(0.31)^{***}$	1.22 $(0.3)^{***}$	0.38 (0.38)
Dist	−0.000 4 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	−0.001 (0.004)

(continued)

	(I)	**(II)**	**(III)**	**(IV)**
Relig			105.37 (35.19)***	62.98 (36.57)*
Lang			−53 (29.9)*	−78.69 (30.88)**
lnMUSxYUER				17.48 (5.6)***
EAP	−20.07 (39.44)	3.48 (40.34)	−5.88 (38.27)	3.71 (37.76)
EECA	−4.00 (26.25)	0.28 (25.43)	−25.63 (26.22)	7.26 (28.28)
LAC	−56.62 (47.12)	−24.59 (49.61)	−25.05 (46.89)	−8.18 (46.38)
SA	−34.18 (42.59)	−6.5 (44.7)	−10.14 (42.77)	4.66 (42.72)
SSA	−106.17 (43.70)**	−90.45 (43.91)**	−107.73 (44.68)**	−86.27 (44.18)*
MENA	21.35 (33.65)	60.26 (36.02)*	58.57 (34.19)*	71.21 (33.91)**
const	−96.76 (95.26)	−194.03 (116.96)*	−140.06 (111.13)	−186.28 (113.44)
N	141	134	130	130
Left-censored	86	81	77	77
Log-likelihood	−333.5	−318.19	−312.08	−306.48

Standard errors in parentheses, *=significant at 10%, **=significant at 5%, ***=significant at 1%.

While democracy remains insignificant across all model specifications, PFI shows a positive and statistically significant effect on FFperMill across all model specifications. The significance level of the PFI coefficient increases from 10% in column (I) to 5% when allowing for more controls in columns (II) and (III). Our results show that countries which a higher degree of personal freedom significantly had a larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million population) to join IS. The different findings on democracy and personal freedom suggest that while the level of democracy per se does not affect joining IS, the prevalence of personal freedom as a democratic institution does.

Regarding the magnitude of the effect of personal freedom on FFperMill, the marginal effect of

PFI on FFperMill needs to be computed.[1] Based on the regression results in column (IV),we calculate the marginal effect of PFI on FFperMill as

$$\frac{\partial FFperMill}{\partial PFI} = 6.14$$

Accordingly, a one-point increase in PFI increases the number of foreign fighters per million population by, on average, 6.14 persons per million population.

As to the control variables, the Muslim population share in a country shows an unsurprisingly positive and statistically significant effect on the fraction of population joining IS. While theeffect on youth unemployment is individually insignificant, the interaction term of the Muslimpopulation share with youth unemployment is positive and significant at the 1% level,supporting earlier findings by Gouda and Marktanner (2018). Furthermore, religiousfractionalization has a positive and statistically significant effect supporting the argument thatreligious fractionalization might fuel religious radicalization. On the contrary, language fractionalization does not fuel Islamic radicalization. In fact, the variable shows a negative and significant effect on FFpermill which might be the result of higher cultural openness. Regionaldummies capture unobservable regional characteristics and show a positive and significant effect of the MENA dummy and a negative and significant effect of the SSA dummy (ascompared to the reference group of North America and Western Europe). The GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient do not show any significant effect on FFpermill.

The strong correlation of PFI with Polity (0.7) and with GDP per capita (0.7), as shown in Table A.3, suggests that further analysis is needed to rule out collinearity concerns. In an additional analysis, were-estimate Model 1, while replacing PFI by the unexplained residual from an OLS regression of PFI against GDP per capita (lny) and polity score.[2] This orthogonalizing procedure of PFI presents a tougher test on the hypothesis regarding the effect of PFI on FFperMill as it attributes to each lny and polity their shared covariance with PFI and thus biases against finding a significant effect of personal freedom. Yet, even after orthogonalizing PFI, it remains positive and significant across all model specifications. Results are reported in Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix.

Despite showing now a positive sign in most specifications, the effect of democracy and GDP

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1   This is because regression coefficients in Tobit models cannot be readily interpreted as marginal effects as in Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models. Tobit regression coefficients capture a combination of an independent variable's marginal effect on whether a certain observation is non-zero and its marginal effect on non-zero observations.

2   This has the purpose of obtaining a measure of PFI that is independent of GDP per capita and polity. See Li (2005) for a similar approach. Using a Tobit regression instead of OLS shows similar results.

per capita remain insignificant across all specifications. The results confirm the robustness of our results on the positive effect of personal freedom. Even when unexplained by the level of democracy or GDP per capita, PFI remains positive, statistically significant and of similar magnitude as in Table 1.The new calculated marginal effect based on orthogonalized PFI (based on column III of Table A.5) equals 5.9 and is only minimally smaller than the corresponding calculated marginal effect based on unorthogonalized PFI from column IV of Table 1. This implies that the identified positive impact of a country's level of personal freedom on the fraction of its population that joins IS is not driven by the country's level of democracy or economic advancement.

5.2   Inflow of IS fighters

Table 2 shows the Tobit regression results for various specifications of Model 2, which investigates the effect of personal freedom and democracy on the percentage share of IS foreign fighters that return to their home countries (RETperFF). The analysis is naturally limited to 68 FF sending countries only as explained in section four. The sample size is further limited by available data on our main variables of interest and control variables. Table A.6 provides descriptive statistics based on our used estimation sample.

In column (I), we investigate the effect of democracy on the percentage of FF returnees, while controlling for GDP per capita (lny), the Muslim population share (Muslim) and distance to Damascus (Dist). We do not include regional dummies as, differently from Model 1, they are jointly insignificant across all specifications of Model 2. Democracy shows a positive and statistically significant effect on RetperFF in column (I), however, the effect of democracy becomes insignificant when PFI is included in column (II). On the contrary, PFI shows a positive and statistically significant effect at the 5% level. This suggests that the initially identified positive effect of democracy on FF returnees in column (I) is primarily driven by prevalence of personal freedom as a democratic institution. Our results support our hypothesis that countries which a higher degree of personal freedom significantly receive a larger percentage of IS fighters back.

Table 2: Tobit Regression Results: Determinants of IS fighters' inflows
(returned IS fighters as percentage share of fighters)

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)	(VII)
PFI		8.64 $(4.31)^{**}$	7.76 $(4.69)^{*}$	8.42 $(4.37)^{*}$	8.02 $(3.39)^{*}$	8.51 $(3.59)^{**}$	9.02 $(3.45)^{***}$
Polity	2.58 $(0.67)^{***}$	1.24 (0.86)	1.09 (0.82)	1.22 (0.87)	0.81 (0.67)	0.7 (0.62)	0.69 (0.67)

(continued)

	(I)	**(II)**	**(III)**	**(IV)**	**(V)**	**(VI)**	**(VII)**
lny	10.53 (2.79)***	6.51 (3.17)**	8.27 (3.52)**	6.57 (3.25)**	5.02 (2.48)**	6.18 (2.69)**	5.22 (2.49)**
Muslim	0.41 (0.13)***	0.47 (0.13)***	0.45 (0.14)***	0.48 (0.16)***	0.38 (0.10)***	0.38 (0.11)***	0.25 (0.13)*
Dist	−0.0020 (0.0009)**	−0.0018 (0.0009)**	−0.0012 (0.0010)	0.0018 (0.0010)*	−0.0013 (0.0007)**	−0.0011 (0.0008)	−0.0009 (0.0007)
Gini			−0.48 (0.47)			−0.21 (0.35)	
Relig			−11.5 (13.29)			−9.1 (10.04)	
Lang			16.3 (12.83)			17.83 (9.73)*	
Lnyuer				1.77 (5.53)			−3.80 (4.51)
lnMUSxYUER				−0.47 (3.00)			−3.91 (2.71)
Outlier					37.1 (8.61)***	36.7 (7.8)***	42.72 (9.33)***
const	−113.37 (31.48)***	−135.35 (34.26)***	−129.71 (44.72)***	−137.11 (40.54)***	−113.49 (26.95)***	−122.91 (34.22)***	−129.08 (32.34)***
N	59	57	53	57	57	53	57
Left-censored	28	26	23	26	26	23	26
Log-likelihood	−150.47	−147.93	−138.78	−147.88	−140.56	−130.33	−139.45

Standard errors in parentheses, *=significant at 10%, **=significant at 5%, ***=significant at 1%.

As to the control variables, results show that countries which a higher GDP per capita, with a higher Muslim population share and with a shorter distance from Damascus significantly receive more returnees. Moreover, our main results remain robust when allowing for more control variables. In column (II) we further control for the social heterogeneity factors religious fractionalization, language fractionalization and income inequality (Gini), which further reduces our sample size from 57 to 53 countries. None of these three variables, however, is significant. Neither are jointly significant $(F(3,44)=1.17)$, which is why we drop these three variables again in column (IV). In column (IV), we

control for labor market variables by adding youth unemployment (lnyuer) and its interaction term with Muslim population share with youth unemployment, which do not show any significant effect.

A look at a Box and Whisker plot (Figure B.2 in Appendix B) confirms at least the presence of three outliers for our dependent variable RetperFF. The three outlier countries are Algeria, Finland, and the United Kingdom. In columns (V) to (VII), we replicate the strategy of columns (II) to (IV) while including an outlier dummy. The effect of personal freedom remains positive and statistically significant while the effect of democracy remains insignificant in all model specifications.

Calculating the marginal effect of PFI on RetperFF- based on our preferred parsimonious model specification in column (II) -yields:

$$\frac{\partial RetperFF}{\partial PFI} = 5.05$$

This implies that a one-point increase in PFI increases the percentage share of returnees by, on average, 5.1 percentage points.

In a further step, we investigate whether the results are possibly driven by strong collinearity. Similar to our procedure for Model 1, we re-estimate Model 2, while replacing PFI by the unexplained residual from an OLS regression of PFI against GDP per capita (lny) and polity score. Results are reported in Tables A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A. Only when fully attributing the shared covariance between PFI and polity to the polity variable, the effect of the latter becomes positive and statistically significant (Table A.8). Yet, despite the tougher test on the effect of PFI after its orthogonolization, the effect of PFI residuals (unexplained by both polity and lny) remains statistically significant and positive. Its marginal effect on RetperFF is only marginally smaller than our computations based on Table 2 (4.8 compared to 5.1 above). To sum up, our additional analysis confirms that a higher level of personal freedom increases the number of returnees among IS fighters and that any positive effect of democracy on the number of returnees is primarily driven by personal freedom as a democratic institution.

6. Conclusion and Policy Implications

This paper examines the effect of democracy and personal freedom on the outflow of IS foreign fighters to Syria, as well as their flow back home as returnees. Our cross-country regressions show that countries which a higher level of personal freedom (i) have asignificantly larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million population) to join IS, and (ii) receive a significantly larger percentage

share of returning foreign fighters. Such relationship may represent a true dilemma for many governments around the world, especially in democracies. On the one hand democratic governments are bound by constitutionand democratic values to protect civil liberties. On the other hand, many governments aroundthe world are faced with the phenomenon of Islamic State recruitment and returnees. Karl Popper expressed thisdilemma, "the Paradox of Tolerance" several decades ago writing, "unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them." (Popper, 1966, p.265). We believe that governments facing foreign fighters' phenomenon should devote resources to understand the radical Islamists scene, learning to dialogue with its members and not to undermine the intolerant minority among them.

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APPENDIX

Appendix A: Tables

Table A.1: Data and Sources

Variables	Description	Source
Dependent Variables		
FFperMill	Foreign fighters per million population	Soufan (2015, p. 7) and Soufan (Barrett, 2017, p. 12). Soufan (2015) reports official and non- official counts, and Soufan (2017) revised 2015 counts. Some numbers are reported as ranges (for example, "100-200"), others with a "~", "+", "<" or ">" sign (for example, "~90," "104+," <10," or ">165"). Whenever available, we took Soufan (2017) data. If Soufan (2017) data was unavailable, we took available official count data from Soufan (2015). If neither Soufan (2017) nor official counts in Soufan (2015) data was available, we took the unofficial count in Soufan (2015). For numbers given with ranges, we took the midpoint of the range. Data provided with "~", "+", "<" or ">"signs were reported by ignoring the signs. Population data are 2011-2015 averages from the World Bank Development Indicator Database (WDI).
RetperFF	Returned Foreign Fighters per Foreign Fighters (%)	Calculated from Soufan (2017)
Main independent variables		
PFI	Personal Freedom Index. 2011-2015 average.	Cato Institute (Vasquez & Porcnik, 2017)
Polity	Polity2 score. A value which ranges between negative ten and positive ten. Values between negative ten and negative six indicate autocracies, values between negative five and positive five anocracies, and values between positive six and positive ten democracies.	Center for Systemic Peace
Control Variables		
lny	GDP per capita (constant $2010), 2011-2015 averages, logarithm	World Bank Development Indicators Database
Dist	Distance of Expat Jihadist's Home Country's Capital to Damascus	Mayer, Thierry, and Soledad Zignago. "Notes on CEPII's distances measures: The GeoDist database" (2011). dist_cepii.dta dataset
Gini	Index of income inequality. Latest available observation.	United Nations University's World Income Inequality Database (WIID).
lnyuer	Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate), 2011-2015 average, logarithm	World Bank Development Indicators Database

Table A.1: Data and Sources (Contd.)

Muslim	Muslim population percentage share. 2010 observation.	Association of Religion Data Archives (www.thearda.com/)
lnMUSxYUER	Interaction term of ln (Muslim × yuer +1), logarithm	
Lang	Language Fractionalization Index,	Alesina et al (2003)
Relig	Religious Fractionalization Index	Alesina et al (2003)
Regional Dummies	EAP=East Asia and the Pacific, EECA=Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA=Middle East and North Africa, NAM= North America SA=South Asia, SSA=Sub Saharan Africa WE= WesternEurope	The World Bank. We further split Europe and Central Asia into WE and EECA.
For robustness checks		
HDI	Human Development Index. 2011-2015average.	United Nations Development Programme

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics of full estimation sample of Model 1

Variable	Sample	n	Mean	Median	Min	Max	S.D.	IQR
FFperMill	All	134	13.47	0.00	0.00	350.16	44.76	3.75
	FFCtry=1	53	34.05	7.08	0.01	350.16	66.40	29.82
	FFCtry=0	81	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Polity	All	134	5.14	7.00	−10.00	10.00	5.25	6.20
	FFCtry=1	53	5.93	8.40	−10.00	10.00	5.53	5.90
	FFCtry=0	81	4.62	6.00	−9.00	10.00	5.02	7.60
PFI	All	134	7.17	7.13	3.57	9.48	1.33	2.15
	FFCtry=1	53	7.58	7.39	4.67	9.48	1.43	2.89
	FFCtry=0	81	6.90	6.77	3.57	9.22	1.19	1.62
y	All	134	13,692	4,531	233	105,800	19,991	12,822
	FFCtry=1	53	24,396	11,490	409	89,068	24,010	42,412
	FFCtry=0	81	6,689	2,985	233	105,800	12,810	7,937

(continued)

Variable	Sample	n	Mean	Median	Min	Max	S.D.	IQR
Gini	All	134	39.37	38.36	23.70	60.80	8.78	13.72
	FFCtry=1	53	35.87	35.20	23.90	60.80	8.04	10.99
	FFCtry=0	81	41.66	42.18	23.70	60.79	8.54	14.10
yuer	All	134	17.26	14.87	0.39	53.36	12.21	14.95
	FFCtry=1	53	18.53	15.26	0.39	52.28	12.38	14.53
	FFCtry=0	81	16.42	11.71	0.52	53.36	12.11	15.53
Muslim	All	134	22.27	4.00	0.00	99.00	33.30	28.00
	FFCtry=1	53	28.70	6.00	0.00	99.00	36.91	58.00
	FFCtry=0	81	18.06	2.00	0.00	99.00	30.22	20.00
Dist	All	134	5,780.50	4,820.50	85.94	16,286.00	3,778.70	4,839.90
	FFCtry=1	53	4,628.30	3,395.30	85.94	16,286.00	3,643.80	4,826.40
	FFCtry=0	81	6,534.40	5,740.70	328.73	15,900.00	3,695.00	6,143.70
Lang	All	130	0.40	0.39	0.00	0.92	0.29	0.53
	FFCtry=1	53	0.32	0.25	0.01	0.87	0.25	0.43
	FFCtry=0	77	0.46	0.46	0.00	0.92	0.30	0.59
Relig	All	134	0.44	0.46	0.00	0.86	0.24	0.43
	FFCtry=1	53	0.43	0.45	0.00	0.86	0.25	0.43
	FFCtry=0	81	0.44	0.50	0.00	0.82	0.23	0.44
HDI	All	134	0.70	0.73	0.34	0.95	0.16	0.27
	FFCtry=1	53	0.79	0.79	0.51	0.95	0.12	0.18
	FFCtry=0	81	0.63	0.63	0.34	0.89	0.15	0.25
lnMUSxYUER	All	134	3.68	3.91	0.00	8.21	2.63	5.80
	FFCtry=1	53	4.77	4.63	0.00	8.21	2.11	3.07
	FFCtry=0	81	2.97	3.02	0.00	7.90	2.70	5.21

Notes:

(i) Descriptive statistics are based on our full estimation sample (which corresponds to the regressions in Table 1).

(ii) FFCtry=1 are FF sending countries. FFCtry=0 are countries that did not send any FF.

Table A.3: Correlation Matrix (based on full estimation sample of Model 1)

	lnFFperMill	RetperFF100	Polity	PFI	lny	Gini	lnyuer	Muslim	Dist	Lang	Relig	lnMUSxYUER	HDI
lnFFperMill	1												
RetperFF100	0.58	1											
Polity	0.02	0.21	1										
PFI	0.15	0.36	0.70	1									
lny	0.33	0.45	0.42	0.70	1								
Gini	−0.39	−0.35	−0.17	−0.33	−0.29	1							
lnyuer	0.19	0.14	0.28	0.25	0.33	0.03	1						
Muslim	0.34	0.09	−0.39	−0.53	−0.34	−0.14	−0.03	1					
Dist	−0.39	−0.25	0.14	0.04	−0.03	0.51	−0.17	−0.35	1				
Lang	−0.23	−0.19	−0.27	−0.35	−0.46	0.18	−0.26	0.21	−0.15	1			
Relig	−0.09	−0.14	0.05	0.08	−0.04	0.21	0.03	−0.33	0.06	0.27	1		
lnMUSxYUER	0.44	0.18	−0.28	−0.34	−0.19	−0.19	0.17	0.74	−0.51	0.34	−0.04	1	
HDI	0.39	0.44	0.43	0.7	0.95	−0.37	0.35	−0.34	−0.04	−0.53	−0.07	−0.2	1

Table A.4: Orthogonalization of PFI in Equation (1) with regard to lny and polity
(Dependent variable: PFI)

	coefficient	std. error	t-ratio	p-value	
const	3.071	0.367	8.379	<0.001	***
lny	0.392	0.0435	9.025	<0.001	***
Polity	0.143	0.012	12.43	<0.001	***

N=144 R2=0.70

*** significant at <1%.

Table A.5 Tobit Regression Results using Residuals from Orthogonalization in Table A.4(PFIres)

	(I)	(II)	(III)
PFIres	21.93(12.513)*	25.18(12.263)**	26.72(12.185)**
Polity	2.63(1.9)	2.44(1.82)	3.01(1.83)
lny	7.19(8.19)	−0.01(8.00)	3.05(8.08)
Gini	0.39(1.3)	0.18(1.26)	0.42(1.25)
lnyuer	3.18(11.92)	1.85(11.5)	−15.74(12.92)
Muslim	1.03(0.31)***	1.22(0.3)***	0.38(0.38)
Dist	−0.002(0.004)	−0.003(0.004)	−0.001(0.004)
Relig		105.37(35.19)***	62.98(36.57)*
Lang		−53(29.9)*	−78.69(30.88)**
lnMUSxYUER			17.48(5.6)***
EAP	3.48(40.34)	−5.88(38.27)	3.71(37.76)
EECA	0.28(25.43)	−25.63(26.22)	7.26(28.28)
LAC	−24.59(49.61)	−25.05(46.89)	−8.18(46.38)
SA	−6.5(44.7)	−10.14(42.77)	4.66(42.72)
SSA	−90.45(43.91)**	−107.73(44.68)**	−86.27(44.18)*
MENA	60.26(36.02)*	58.57(34.19)*	71.21(33.91)**
const	−126.68(98.78)	−62.72(93.97)	−104.23(95.96)
N	134	130	130
Left-censored	81	77	77
Log-likelihood	−318.19	−312.08	−306.48

Standard errors in parentheses, *=significant at 10%, **=significant at 5%, ***=significant at 1%.

Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics of Estimation Sample of Model 2 (Dependent variable=RetperFF)

Variable	n	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum	IQ range
FFperMill	59	36.84	8.60	0.01	350.16	45.62
RetperFF	59	12.02	5.43	0.00	53.75	23.30
Polity	59	4.61	8.00	−10.00	10.00	10.00
PFI	57	7.40	7.35	4.32	9.48	2.93
y	59	23,810	11,490	409	89,068	41,144
Gini	55	35.77	35.20	23.90	60.80	11.07
yuer	59	18.70	15.56	0.39	52.28	15.58
Muslim	59	33.34	10.00	0.00	99.00	74.00
Dist	59	4,359	3,226	86	16,286	4,623
Lang	59	0.32	0.25	0.01	0.87	0.41
Relig	59	0.42	0.42	0.00	0.86	0.44
lnMUSxYUER	59	4.98	4.90	0.00	8.21	3.41
HDI	59	0.79	0.79	0.51	0.95	0.20

Table A.7: Orthogonalization of PFI in Equation (2) with regard to lny and polity

	coefficient	std. error	t-ratio	p-value	
const	2.17	0.70	3.12	0.00	***
lny	0.47	0.07	6.24	0.00	***
Polity	0.17	0.02	9.99	0.00	***
N	59				
R2	0.75				

*** significant at <1%.

Table A.8 Tobit Regression Results using Residuals from Orthogonalization in Table A.7(PFIres)

	(I)	(II)	(III)
const	−116.62(31.12)***	−112.88(40.23)***	−118.86(37.77)***
PFIres	8.64(4.31)**	7.76(4.69)*	8.42(4.37)*
Polity	2.69(0.7)***	2.39(0.79)***	2.62(0.72)***
lny	10.54(2.71)***	11.9(3.05)***	10.5(2.82)***
Muslim	0.47(0.13)***	0.45(0.14)***	0.48(0.16)***
Dist	−0.0018(0.0009)**	−0.0012(0.001)	−0.0018(0.001)*
Relig		−11.5(13.29)	
Lang		16.3(12.83)	
Gini		−0.48(0.47)	
lnyuer			1.77(5.53)
lnMUSxYUER			−0.47(3.00)
n	57	53	57
Left-censored	26	23	26
Log-Likelihood	−147.93	−138.78	−147.88

Appendix B: Figures

Note: Only FF sending countries that received at least one returned fighter are included in the list. The following 34 foreign fighters sending countries did not receive any returned fightersback according to Soufan (2017): Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Egypt,Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Serbia, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan.

Figure B.1: Returned foreign fighters per foreign fighters (%) by country (with at least one returned fighter)
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Soufan (2015, 2017).

Figure B.2: Box and Whisker Plot (Sample: IS Foreign Fighter Sending Countries only)

The National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2018–2040

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Abstract:

The article presents the main priorities of Kyrgyzstan until 2040, what goals it pursues, what kind of economy is needed, what measures to solve the problems of economic and political development will be carried out, and also how Kyrgyzstan will strengthen the role of the country in the world arena.

Keywords: Kyrgyzstan; National strategy; goals; Taza Koom

In August, the National Council of the Kyrgyz Republic, chaired by the President, adopted a National Strategy for the long-term development of Kyrgyzstan until 2040. During these years, the country plans to implement 244 projects with an overall cost of 21 billion USD in a variety of industries. The presented Strategy of 2018–2040 defines strategic guidelines for the development of Kyrgyzstan in the long-term, taking into account the specifics of the upcoming period. It formulates the image of the future of the country, the basic principles and ways to achieve development goals in all areas of the life of our society: spiritual and political, social, and economical. The sustainable development Strategy of 2018–2040 is the next stage and kind of a "road map" for Kyrgyzstan, and the tasks outlined in it are a logical continuation and the basis of the goals of the previous Strategy. The President emphasized that the main difference between the new Strategy and the previous one is the development of human potential.

Peace and prosperity for every citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic are at the heart of the 2018–2040 Strategy, and the country's priority is to achieve the following goals: 1. Social well-being, which

includes investment in health and education, equal opportunities for all segments of the population and a strong family institution and decent work; 2. Economic well-being and the quality of the environment for development, one of the main points of which is the development of export potential and the development of regions; 3. Public administration, the main points of which are human rights and freedoms, democracy, the rule of rights, and the rule of law, security, peace and order, the digital transformation of the country.

Among the immediate objectives of the Strategy, which are planned to be implemented in 2–3 years, is the implementation of judicial reform. According to the head of state, if Kyrgyzstan manages to establish a fair judicial system worthy of the people's trust, it will be one of the main factors in the country's development. In the next few years, it is also planned to give a powerful impetus to the development of the regions, which will later become the engine of the Kyrgyz economy.

1. Job creation, decent work, and stable incomes. Sustainable employment, which provides favorable working conditions and decent wages, not only improves the well-being of the population but also improves social well-being and stability in society. The goal will be achieved, in 2040, when 80% of the country's working-age population will be employed in their profession with decent wages and working conditions and Kyrgyzstan will enter the list of the top 60 countries with a high UNDP human development Index (in 2015, the Kyrgyz Republic ranked 120th out of 188 countries). It is planned to create 300,000 jobs in the coming years.

2. Increasing the export potential of laborious sectors of the economy. Given the size of Kyrgyzstan's domestic market, it is essential to develop and make full use of the export potential of goods and services produced in the Kyrgyz Republic. This will increase revenues to the budget and provide employment opportunities for the country's population. In 2040 Kyrgyzstan should significantly increase the share of exports in GDP and be in the list of the top 40 countries in the ranking of ease of doing business of the World Bank (75th place in 2017). Kyrgyzstan's position in the global competitiveness Index and the WEF world trade engagement ranking should improve three times (111th place in 2016–2017, and 113th, respectively).

3. Development of the country's regions. Due to the fact that the leading share of the population is in the regions and there are significant interregional differences in income and life conditions, state policy will focus on: the development of social and necessary infrastructure in the regions; the development of supporting cities which are also growth points; determination of development of priorities for each region, taking into account its specificity; determination of competitive advantages of each region in the field of agriculture and forestry for the development of regional cooperatives,

large farms, as 12 agro-industrial clusters; ensuring security, ideological integrity, cultural development of the country; ensuring a useful system of governance and interaction with the local population.

By 2040, the gap in the gross regional product per capita of the region should not exceed double between cities and villages. In the coming years, the industrial structural policy will be carried out in strategic sectors of the economy such as in agriculture and agro-industrial sector, as well as in the areas of light industry and tourism in order to create jobs, support the export potential and develop the regions.

4. Equal opportunities and strong institution of family, which is the environment of development and the essential institution of society through responsible parenthood and the strengthening of the role of the family in all aspects of the social sector. Essential principles for addressing social protection and insurance issues are respect for the right to a family environment and joint responsibility in cases of strenuous life and crises. State efforts will be focused on supporting the institution of motherhood and childhood, supporting disabled citizens and ensuring a minimum necessary level of social protection guaranteed by the state. Public policy measures will be aimed at the development of the market for social services of daytime or temporary stay with rehabilitation nature, which are an alternative to residential institutions. Insurance mechanisms will be strengthened in the pension system. Kyrgyzstan should double its position in the Save the Children Mothers' Index (107th place in 2013, while in the CIS countries the average value of indicators is 66). The share of pensioners with a pension below the survival minimum should approach to zero. The social progress index (social Progress Imperative) should include Kyrgyzstan for the first time in leading 50 countries (in 2014, the Kyrgyz Republic is the 93rd country out of 132 countries).

5. Security, peace, and order. In order to achieve the objectives of the Strategy, it is crucial to fully ensure security and confidence in the rule of law and justice system. Kyrgyzstan will aim to rank among the top thirty countries in the Rule of Law Index (78th out of 97 countries in 2014 according to World Justice Project). By 2040, Kyrgyzstan should be among the top 60 countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (150th out of 177 countries in 2013).

6. Foreign policy: an independent and creative foreign policy based on the strategic priorities and development goals of the Kyrgyz Republic, and designated national interests. The new Strategy also outlines the vectors of foreign policy: friends are the same. Special attention will be paid to the development of friendly relations with Kyrgyzstan's strategic partner – Russia. "Further strengthening of comprehensive cooperation with the countries of the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union), the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation organization) is our

strategic goal," said Zheenbekov.

Furthermore, the President feels that Kyrgyzstan has improved relations with its nearest neighbor China to a strategic level. Moreover, activities in this direction will continue. Kyrgyzstan will try to develop relations with Turkey, Japan, Korea, USA, and European countries.

7. The digitalization of the economy and the widespread use of innovative and advanced technologies encourage the growth of the country's competitiveness, welfare, and security of the population.

"Taza Koom" is a national digital transformation program aimed at creating an open, transparent and high-tech society at the level of a citizen, competitive business, a stable state, and strong international relations.

First of all, it is an effective and transparent system of public administration which builds a harmonious interaction with society based on free access and use of modern digital technologies. All areas of the state will be equipped with modern technologies that will ensure the implementation of the goals for achieving economic and social well-being, peace and order in the country. The program will have a positive impact not only on the public administration and the economy, but also on the education and health systems, the provision of social services, and the effectiveness of the judicial and law enforcement systems. "Taza Koom" will be a useful tool to eliminate corruption in the public sector by minimizing the impact of the human factor through the automation of administrative processes and procedures and the provision of digital public and municipal services.

I want to note the goals that can be considered achieved. First of all, it is impressive road construction. Newly constructed and reconstructed roads of Republic, without exaggeration, have strategic importance. The capital has also been transformed: the number of renovated and newly laid city streets both central and remote from the center-over the past few years has exceeded the number of those that have undergone reconstruction during the years of sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan.

Secondly, significant steps in the implementation of the extremely necessary and unprecedented in terms of the security of citizens project "Safe City" are encouraging.

Perhaps the main task of the state for the unimpeded growth and further development of Kyrgyzstan is the contradictory fight against corruption. This sore fills almost all areas, and the desire to get rid of it meets the active resistance of corrupt officials of various branches and levels. However, we need to be noted that the work under the previous Strategy still yields in optimistic results.

Initially, many officials reacted with doubt and distrust at the beginning of the fight against the overgrown branches of corruption. The process of its eradication began with difficulty, meeting

serious opposition since the socio-economic conditions in the country are such that there is favorable soil for the growth of this phenomenon. The primary condition for the creation of barriers against corruption, in my opinion, is the maximum reduction of the human factor in government agencies in the provision of public services. That is said, the state policy in terms of widespread digitalization, the main component of which is the program "Taza Koom", is directly aimed at minimizing and reducing the risk of corruption. Right now, citizens have the opportunity to use digital technology to apply to the registry office, get a passport, pay taxes, use a digital signature when preparing various documents and doing business, but not everyone knows about such opportunities. I already noted the positive trends in this direction, and I am sure that the change in the minds of the majority has already occurred and the implementation of tasks within the framework of the Strategy-2040 will continue more constructively, which will bring its results.

Besides, soon, the expansion of the corruption-free digital space includes e-government, profitable, transparent business, and a significant increase in foreign and domestic investment in various sectors of the country's economy. These, without a doubt, will raise the investment attractiveness of Kyrgyzstan, opening it to the world, so the program "Taza Koom", of course, is the core of the entire Strategy of development of the state and will be so in the foreseeable future. The Strategy lays down significant basic parameters for the growth of Kyrgyzstan not only in the economic but also in the foreign policy vector.

The Strategy discusses the formation of the principle of civic identity, so-called the Kyrgyz jarani, ideologically similar to well known in his time, the moral code of the Builder of Communism. Social development requires steadily closer to the principle of "serve the people" — clumsy the state management system should be opposed to change management. In this case, the state authorities, as expected, will serve the people and not vice-versa.

The Strategy interprets the basis of social development as a single set of the following elements: a creative foreign policy, the growth of the welfare of the people, the continuous development of culture, religious diversity, security, including internal, economic, information, military, environmental. Only with the coordinated work of all the mentioned elements can we unconditionally expect a synergistic effect, and only then can we talk about significant economic progress not only in quantitative terms but also in the qualitative category. Therefore, the desire to see Kyrgyzstan among the top fifty developed countries with above-average incomes will become real.

The existing judicial and legal system deserves a separate discussion. It should be noted that in the past few years, the financing of the judiciary has been increased almost five times, and its

employees receive high salaries. However, the practice of selecting judges still has to be improved: sometimes the positions are appointed not to professionals, honest, decent lawyers, but to those who have connections. It is necessary to note the undeniable advantages of the active implementation of the program "Taza Koom". Now materials of court sessions are often closed for acquaintance. Moreover, the terms provided by the procedural legislation are violated. In such a situation, a radical solution to the problem and an effective method of combating corruption and bureaucracy is digital justice with online broadcast. Also, it is still unresolved issue that has not been practically resolved so far in the judicial and legal system is personnel.

A significant place in the draft Strategy is given to security issues, both internal and external. Noting the increased combat readiness of the army and the border service of Kyrgyzstan, their ability to ensure the inviolability of borders and to reflect possible external threats, including extremist and terrorist ones, it must be noted that the security of citizens within the state leaves much to be desired. The reason for this is, in my opinion, a failed reform of law enforcement agencies. Public security means, ensuring the rule of law, the sense of security of each member of society from unlawful attacks. In this part, the thesis of the Strategy considers it necessary to carry out technical modernization of the system, improving working methods, thereby increasing the Index of trust in law enforcement agencies in society.

In current conditions, citizens are not only under threat to their physical health. The Strategy involves significant measures to ensure other types of security: information, cultural, religious, energy, economic, cybersecurity.

To achieve the goals and objectives of the Strategy 2018–2040, a systematic program-target approach will be applied, assuming the integrity and interdependence of the interaction of all elements that have an impact on the implementation of the goals and objectives. Reform programs will be implemented in related sectors that cover all areas of citizens' life to provide a stable and sustainable strategic framework for the implementation of the goals and objectives of the Strategy. Development programs are aimed at ensuring the dynamism of the processes of growth and development of the economy, social life of the population, as well as peaceful and safe living conditions for citizens. The program-target approach will allow providing purposefulness of program actions, to limit a circle of the most priority tasks and plans for their achievement. Within the framework of the programs, five-year development project will be implemented, allowing to solve the tasks of the program in stages.

Thus, I believe that the main course of the state is quite transparent, the decisive goals in the document are clearly outlined, and most of them are quite achievable provided that active and

systematic work on the implementation of the Strategy is carried out.

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The Cultural Expression in the Crossing of Borders: The Example of Contemporary Afghan Literature

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Introduction

This paper is an attempt to analyse the evolution of cultural expression in Afghanistan through a poetical work by Sayd Bahodine Majrouh (1928–1988). This work is entitled *Ego-Monster* and was gradually published between 1972 and 1983.

Poetry is a main medium of cultural expression, through which reflects authors' both interpersonal and social interactions, and their cultural thought. As French poet and philosopher, Paul Valéry (1961) puts it:

Poetry is an art of language. But language is a practical creation.⌈…⌉It has often happened, however, as literary history tells us, that poetry has been made to enunciate theses or hypotheses and that the complete language which is its own⌈…⌉has been used to communicate "abstract" ideas, which are on the contrary independent of their form, or so we believe.

Poetry is extremely significant in Afghan culture. It is not consigned to the fields of literature and court arts but rather is a common mean of expression used in the day to day aspects of life and all social circles. Majrouh's poetic work is a vast and astonishingly homogeneous ensemble, mainly focused on the questioning of human nature and society.

Ego-Monster is a more than four hundred pages prose poem, written and published in four different volumes. Though initially published in Persian Dari language, *Ego-Monste*r was translated by Majrouh himself in three other languages: Pashto, English and French (Moghani, 2008). He dedicated 11 years of his life to writing and translating his work. Its four volumes were published successively

between 1972 and 1983 and remarkably linked to Afghanistan's political events of the time. The last three decades of the 20th century is indeed a period of turbulence and violence in Afghanistan. One year only after the publication of volumes 1 & 2 of *Ego-Monster*, the Afghan Shah was deposed during a coup and the monarchy replaced by a republic. The third volume was written in 1978, just one year before the beginning of the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan. Majrouh was murdered in 1988, just only one year before the Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan, quickly followed by the rise to power of Islamist groups and a violent civil war.

Ego-Monster represents a straight continuation of classical Persian poetry but carries some major innovations:

– Its structure is that of thousand verses long classical epic poems, telling stories of love and battles. Heroes must overcome insurmountable barriers and fight monsters in order to reach higher levels of strength, power, or spirituality. Persian/Afghan epics always carry a moral dimension (ex: *Shahnameh* by Ferdowsi, c. 10th century); sometimes they even are actual spiritual and moral teachings written in the shape of poetic stories (ex: *The Seven Portraits* by Nezami Gandjavi, 12th century).

– Majrouh's poetic work explores a new dimension in traditional poetic epics: he takes a more political and social turn. He uses the mean of poetic epics to speak out against fundamentalism and call for exile as a new way to freedom.

Our research problem is to address: how Seyd Bahodine Majrouh's poetic epic *Ego-Monster* (1972–1983) has renewed the traditional style of cultural expression in Afghanistan and created an innovative approach to poetry?

Story of Majrouh's Ego-Monster

Ego-Monster is a chronological series in which the reader follows a kind of giant composite story. The first volume (1972) is about the story of the Midnight Traveller. He lives in an utopian land. His city is green and prosperous. Its people knows no hierarchy, no subjugation. The story begins one day when the Midnight Traveller leaves his city. After several adventures, he reaches a dark cave. He learns that a monster has seized the place and devoured its inhabitants. He understands that the people of his utopian city, living in pleasure and carefreeness, are far from thinking of how vulnerable they actually are if the Monster was to find them.

The second volume (1972) starts with the Midnight Traveller hastening to go back to his city in order to warn its people. Upon his arrival, he understands it is already too late. The Monster has

travelled in the shape of a black rider. He has reached the city and compelled its people to obedience. He has had a palace built for himself, and a temple adorned with his own figure. His statue represents him as half-human, half-monster. He forces elders and youngs to visit his temple, pray, kneel and sacrifice to him.

In the third volume (1978), Majrouh describes how the Monster succeeds to spread the poison of fear and suffering all over the city. He manages to deprive its people from their freedom of action and speech. They subjugate and turn into a still and silent crowd. They become spiritless, strengthless. They turn into sad, disembodied and ghostly figures.

The fourth and last volume (1983) is about the exile of the Midnight Traveller. He continuously wanders from a refugee camp to another, crying out in anger. In his painful exile, he seeks a new freedom and justice.

An innovative prose poem

In *Ego-Monster*, Majrouh blends the thematic and the narrative shape of Persian classical epics, and the genre of the portrait and descriptions that are specific to modern western novel.

Classical elements:

– As we mentioned before, *Ego-Monster* is a 400 pages narrative composed of a succession of dramatic episodes, with a hero and a Monster ...

Innovative elements:

– *Ego-Monster* is a prose poem. It is not written in the traditional manner of Persian poetry (rhythmical poetry).

– *Ego-Monster* brings in the genre of dystopia in Afghanistan and generally in Persian literature.

– *Ego-Monster* also brings in the genre of social science fiction in Afghanistan and in Persian literature. It depicts a disastrous situation that Majrouh considers to be a close future for his country. Though he never names it, it is clear to Afghan readers that Majrouh actually refers to his own country and the rise to power of Islamists, embodied by the Monster character.

However, despite borrowing some western literary genres (portrait description, utopia, dystopia), *Ego-Monster* cannot be properly considered as a novel. It still remains in the line of Persian traditional long epic poems, to which he integrates some highly innovative elements.

Majrouh himself mentioned in his lifetime that he did not intend to write a novel. His own translation of *Ego-Monster* in Pashto shows in a clear manner that he meant to write it as a poetry. The French self- translation was also published under the title of *poésie*.

Symbolic dimension of *Ego-Monster*

What/who is the harmful and oppressive Monster the evocation of?

The first volume is a first-person narrative. The Midnight Traveller opposes the Monster. In traditional epics, monsters are steps in the journey of heroes. Heroes must face and overcome monsters in order to reach higher levels of power, love or spirituality. However, Majrouh's Monster is a creature of such power and violence that it cannot be faced of fighting against.

There is no such monster in classical Persian literature. Even its appearance does not ressemble classical epic monsters. Majrouh describes the Monster as a half-human half-monster creature. Its eyes are two cups of blood, burning with flames anger and hate. He presents himself as the Conqueror of the World. He wears as black cloth and rides a horse. Persian legends and epics know no such monster. This is the reason why many readers of Majrouh recognized in the *Ego-Monster* a portrait of islamist warlords. Indeed, it is commonly said that Majrouh once met one of these islamist warlords, in the course of a diplomatic meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan. The warlord asked him "Who *is Ego-Monster* about? – It's you." answered Majrouh (Rubin, 2016).

Ego-Monster is the story of an egocentric tyrant, who manipulates the truth, negates reality and spreads false informations. It uses violence to dehumanize humans. The Midnight Traveller's mission is to give existence and the world its real purpose back, save humans from manipulation of the senses and set them free again.

A dystopian fiction

Ego-Monster supposedly tells an epic story of a hero and a monster crawling out of a dark cave. But it actually is an anticipation of Afghanistan's future and a sharp analysis of Afghanistan's next generation political system. *Ego-Monster* is a speculative fiction in the line of George Orwell's masterpiece *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Through this dystopian fiction, Majrouh anticipates the rise to power of Islamist groups in his country. He denounces the reality of Islamism and its devastating consequences.

Ego-Monster is more of a sociological study written in the form of prose poem. Under Majrouh's delicate and poetic prose lies the story of an extremist power, savage and omnipresent. Majrouh's monstruous character is driven by an un-named ideology and rules with an absolute power and control a city that was formerly free. The very last free inhabitant is the Midnight Traveller, who leaves and wanders from a place of exile to another.

Majrouh delivers a strong warning. He regards his poetry as stage from which to talk to a wide range of men and women. This is the reason why he chose to translate it himself into several languages: first, for his Afghan countrymen (Pashto and Persian Dari being the two national languages of Afghanistan), and then, in English and French for the another part of the world. As he does not name Afghanistan, its people or the ideology of the Monster in the story, Majrouh attempts to make his discourse universal and denounce all forms of fundamentalism.

Majrouh's scenario, which – it is believed – aimed at warning against Islamist ideology and its mafia-like system of power in the hand of warlords, actually showed up to be a remarkably sharp prediction.

Humans become dominated and abstract

Dystopia offers an opportunity to exaggerate the consequences of fundamentalism and warns against it. Through the dramatic description of the subjugated city, Majrouh draws an accurate portrait of the political and social situation in his country. Inhabitants of the former utopian city have been divided into two groups: dominant and dominated men. The Monster rules and the people obey. The dominated men yield and step aside in front of the Monster to such an extent that they are no longer a "people", they become a crowd. Since the Monster leaves the inhabitants no freedom of action, they become dehumanized and disembodied. They have only but two choices left: subjugate or rebel. Majrouh's "dominated men" have chosen subjugation. They no longer have the strength to fight for their ideals or the advancement of their society. Majrouh is satirical but not absolutely pessimistic. Just as Nietzsche's *Übermensch*, Majrouh's dominated people are still able to write a new chapter in their national history. According to *Ego-Monster*, there shall be no such things as absolute and unlimited power and domination. There always is a chance for dominated people to reach a higher level of Humanity and free themselves.

By giving the Midnight Traveller a voice, the author creates in his story what Claude Lefort (1986) calls an "empty space": a way out for the dominated men. As opposed to the dominated men inside the city, the Midnight Traveller still possesses a sense of critical thinking and the ability to act and interact with his fellowmen. He still believes in the human race and tries to talk to his countrymen and show them a way out of their subjugation. His actions and his fight against tyranny and inertia allow to maintain hope.

Majrouh's call to exile

At the very moment the dominated people submit, give up to the dominant and accept inertia,

they actually start to look for a way out of submission. They look for a world of exile in thoughts.

This is the exile Majrouh calls to in volume 4. He wrote this last volume during his own exile to Peshawar (1980–1988). The change in his discourse is loud and clear. After anticipating the future of Afghanistan under islamist fundamentalism, Majrouh proposes a solution through the Midnight Traveller's voice.

The Monster tries to remodel the human mind to create a monotonous and inert thinking, through which humans would lose any possibility of free thinking and action. Majrouh proposes exile as a solution. The Monster looks for inertia, but exile means dynamic change and mobility. Majrouh's discourse is that though exile is itself a suffering, it still leaves hope for a better future, a new utopia. To Majrouh, the real cause of suffering is inertia and subjugation, not exile. By describing how exile opens doors to another world and counterbalances inertia, Majrouh proposes exile as a new utopia. Doing so, Majrouh goes back to the genre of utopia which dominated the first volume.

The chance given to dominated humans to free themsleves through exile is a true outcome to Majrouh's tragedy. The new perspective he gives is filled with hope and dynamic. Majrouh's innovation lies in his thought process. In this key stage of the story, the utopian conception of exile his set as an important step to reach freedom.

Therefore, Majrouh's anti-fundamentalist discourse hides an utopia. The thought of this utopia creates a new aim and is able to overthrow extremist powers. In order to experience Majrouh's utopia, humans must go through physic exile, as it is the only way to create a dynamic change and break the inertia initiated by the Monster.

Conclusions

This presentation has attempted to analyse the evolution of cultural expression in Afghanistan, through one of its major mediums: poetry. Majrouh's work is a remarkable example of the evolution of poetry as a mean of cultural expression. Majrouh uses prose poetry to warn his contemporaries and offers those who are subject to fanaticism and domination a way to free themselves.

Majrouh is a doctor in philosophy but he expresses himself as a poet, without necessarily carrying a philosophical focus. Majrouh first exaggerates his description of the result of domination on men. They are shown as almost abstract figures, silent and bodyless. The dystopian genre allows him to describe and criticize fundamentalism. His poetry is used as a tool to reach freedom. Poetry guides miserable and subjugated men to exile and to a new utopia.

As an intellectual and a poet, his approach to the question is more of a critical approach. He

criticizes the vertical power system and unidimensional world to come. He predicts this system of power will bring a new category of men, who easily accept and merge into the new tyrannical power. Majrouh teaches through poetry how dominated men can free themselves. His approach of the subject is innovative and fascinating, bringing more and more researchers to study his works.

Majrouh has predicted a new kind of fundamentalism that he never saw himself in his lifetime, as he was murdered in 1988, two years only before the beginning of the civil war and the rise of Islamist warlords to power. The great significance of his work lies in its almost prophetic dimension: Majrouh is a remarkable visionary. He has foreseen the civil war and Islamist system of power, similar to a mafia, or also called "islamo-gangster" that took place only years after his death and to some extent still remains today in contemporary Afghanistan.

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The Impact of the Absence of Chinese Popular Culture in Tanzania on the Social Interaction of Local Chinese

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What is culture? There're three different definitions of this concept: the general process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development; a particular lifestyle of a period or a group of people; intelligence, especially the works and practices created by aesthetics (Williams, 1985). In any aspect, culture is always a unique intellectual creation belonging to a fixed group and has its unique representation. Based on the above definitions, it is not difficult to see that culture is social, which requires researchers to penetrate the social interactions between different groups when exploring cultural interactions. When interacting with different social groups, popular culture often appears as an "icebreaker". Maybe a Chinese person has never been to Japan, but it wouldn't prevent him/her from understanding Japanese culture and Japanese society through popular music, movies, comics, animation and other channels. Similarly, a Tanzanian who has never been to China, it does not prevent him/her from understanding Chinese culture and Chinese society through the above channels and the information he/she receives from it will directly affect the real interaction between him/her and Chinese.

As the most remote partner of China's "Belt and Road" initiative, Tanzania has always been a long-standing "old friend" image in the hearts of ordinary Chinese. As early as in the 1970s, Chinese cross-talkers took the theme of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Assistance Project and rehearsed the new comic dialogue "Friendship" which combined many Swahili words. This is one of the earliest imprints of Swahili culture in the hearts of contemporary Chinese. At the same time, China

Radio International also sent broadcasters to Tanzania for study and training and tried to conduct Swahili broadcasts in the local area. At the end of the 1980s, China and Tanzania faced the biggest transformation since the founding of both two countries. The cultural exchanges between them once tended to freeze. In 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Tanzania, which opened a new chapter for bilateral exchanges between the two countries. At the same time, not only private enterprise businessmen from Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang and other places of China but also several Chinese state-owned enterprises went to Tanzania to engage in commercial activities. Nowadays there are currently about 60,000 to 100,000 Chinese living in Tanzania[1]. Many of them even live in Tanzania all year round. They only return to the homeland of the Far East like a migratory bird during the Spring Festival every year. Overseas Chinese not only bring commercial vitality to the local area but also bring unique Chinese culture to this land. However, after more than 10 years of development, the radius of life of Chinese in Tanzania is still small, and social interaction with local people is mostly limited to commercial activities. Using the Dar Glory community in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the author attempts to explore how the absence of Chinese popular culture affects the quality of social interaction between the two parties.

1. The spread of Chinese popular culture in Tanzania

Before talking about the quality of communication, here's a brief history of the spread of Chinese popular culture in Tanzania. Due to China's unique political system and cultural censorship system, the real-time for the development of contemporary Chinese popular culture is after the 1980s. By analogy, the spread of Chinese popular culture in Tanzania should be after this time node.

To understand the development track of Chinese popular culture in Tanzania, we must mention the life history of overseas Chinese in Tanzania. In the vertical direction, the Chinese have a total of three different development periods in Tanzania. Among them, the Chinese people who have the closest relationship with Chinese popular culture in Tanzania are the Tanzanian Chinese in the third period, that is, Chinese businessmen who traveled to Tanzania after the 1990s. The Chinese in this period were different from the refugees, laborers in the first period or the aid cadres and workers who have a governmental background in the second period, but Chinese businessmen who went overseas after China's reform and opening up and economic marketization. To a certain extent, they can be said to be the most open-mind group of Chinese at that time. Joining these people with Dar es Salaam is

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1 The source of the data was an official of the Chinese Embassy in Tanzania who did not want to be named.

not only Chinese goods, but also popular music, TV series and even video games from China.[1]

However, unlike Bollywood movies, Premier League football matches, Bongo Flava, and even Netflix TV series, these popular cultures from China do not seem to have caused much of a wave in Tanzania. So in 2009, along with the launch of China's "National Image Public Relations Strategy" (陈焱, 2009), the Chinese government invested 45 billion yuan to expand overseas media. This kind of official stimulus has also given Chinese investors a strong investment interest in the cultural industry. According to the statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, in 2018, the Chinese cultural industry realized an added value of 387.37 billion yuan, an increase of 10.3 times over 2004. The value-added of the cultural industry in 2005–2018 grew at an average annual rate of 18.9%, higher than the current average GDP price increase over the same period. The rate of increase in the cultural industry as a percentage of GDP increased from 2.15% in 2004 to 3.36% in 2012 to 4.30% in 2018, and its share in the national economy increased year by year (张兴华, 2019). Along with the rapid development of the cultural industry in China, Chinese popular culture has begun to seek resonance in Africa under the guidance of the market and the government. The most typical example is China's digital TV operator, the Si Da era, which has been developing markets in Africa since 2002. With the

Figure 1: Cultural Background of Content delivery of Startimes

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1   When there searcher investigated in DaresSalaam, he even saw the Chinese video game "Little Fighter Learning Machine" in the past century at some Chinese businessmen's offices.

platform of Si Da Media, popular culture such as Chinese TV dramas, movies, and reality shows began to spread in Africa, including Tanzania. According to the official website of the company: "Startimes (Tanzania) Company actively implemented the *Chinese Culture Going Global* strategy. In 2013, it built its own STV Kungfu (Kung Fu Channel) and STV C1 (Chinese Channel), broadcast 24 hours a day. Out, it is loved and welcomed by the local African people." The author, therefore, contacted Mr. S, who is in charge of the brand image of the company and hoped that he could introduce the ratings and types of Chinese content in Tanzania during the 2013–2019 Si Da era. There's a statistical chart of the company's content delivery in Africa:

It is not difficult to see from the above table that even in the Startimes which is Chinese founded enterprise, when content is published in Tanzania, the content with Chinese cultural background takes only 5%. Despite the promotion of the Chinese government's *National Image Public Relations Strategy* and the *Belt and Road Initiative* in recent years, Chinese popular culture has begun to enter the African market. However, compared with the content of other cultural backgrounds, Chinese popular culture and its products still belong to "subculture" in Africa, and the knowers are embarrassed. Take the Chinese TV series *Doudou na Mama Wakwe Zake* as an example. In the official propaganda context of China, the drama is a pioneering work of Chinese popular culture on Tanzania. China's Chinanews.com, People.com, and Xinhua Daily Telegraph have all reported on the broadcast and subsequent development of the show in Tanzania. In these reports, there is no lack of exaggerated description of the drama and a divergent description of the phenomenon caused by the drama. For example, the *Communist Party of China News Network* has quoted the *Beijing Daily* titled *Doudou na Mama Wakwe Zake in the hot African* report, which has a large-scale coverage of the play in Africa and behind-the-scenes footage. The reporter of *Xinhua Daily Telegraph* also wrote in the report: *In Tanzania, people can't forget the scene of the tens of thousands of people in 2012 to watch the Chinese TV series Doudou na Mama Wakwe Zake* (张漫子, 2018).

Contrary to the official report of Chinese governmental medias, from the perspective of the local community, the show *Doudou na Mama Wakwe Zake* does not seem to be so resounding in the Chinese imagination. In JamiiForums, which is Tanzanian largest Swahili online forum, from the name of the post title, there has only one post related to the show in the past five years. The post has only one reply and only one word in the response.[1] When searching for the show on Google, the most relevant sites are related to China Radio International or Chinese media. Here's a short chart of results based on

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1   https://www.jamiiforums.com/threads/tamthilia-ya-kichina-dodou-na-mama-wakwe-zake.1236874/

■ Chinese ■ Swahili

Table 2: *Doudou na Mama Wakwe Zake* related searching reports

Google and other search engines:

From the above picture, even the Chinese TV series represented by *Doudou na Mama Wakwe Zake* was broadcasted in Africa, but there are two distinct paradoxes between overseas and Chinese comments. In the case of Google search results, the related results come about 50, and after more than 50, it is not strongly associated with the show anymore. Among the 50 search results, the information sources from China (8) are listed on the front page. The source of information from Africa is mainly the introduction of TV stations or the introduction of private social media by TV station staff. However, unlike the Swahili search results, if you search for the "Doudou ma Mama Wakwe Zake; Tanzania", the relevant results will be far more than 50, and there are more than 550 results in Bing search related keywords. Of course, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that African local audiences will not be able to discuss or publish relevant information on a large scale due to time or technical reasons. However, judging from the existing results, it is indeed debatable whether the play is popular in Africa. The *Doudou na Mama Wakwe Zake* is the representative work of Chinese popular culture into the African market. The effectiveness of its dissemination has already been the case. The actual impact of other projects is evident and will not be repeated here.

2. The impact of the absence of Chinese popular culture in Tanzania on Chinese social interaction

As mentioned earlier, trade between China and Tanzania has grown rapidly since the 1990s. In

2013, China-Tanzania economic and trade cooperation has maintained good momentum. China has become Tanzania's largest trading partner. According to the statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China, the bilateral trade volume between China and Tanzania was US$3.69 billion in 2013, an increase of 49.5% over 2012. Among them, China's exports to Tanzania were US$3.14 billion, and imports were US$550 million. The Chinese side mainly exports machinery and equipment, vehicles, daily necessities, etc., importing mineral products, wood, sisal fiber, raw cowhide and seafood (房硕, 2015). It is not difficult to see from the above data that the economic and trade exchanges between China and Tanzania are mainly concentrated in the fields of raw materials and machinery processing. In other words, although popular culture is circulated in two economic forms: the financial economy and the cultural economy, it is limited by the scale of financial and cultural exchanges between China and Tanzania, and the spread of Chinese popular culture in Tanzania. It is slower, and this is reflected in the published content of the Startimes Company in the African region. The social interaction of Chinese in Tanzania has also been affected in this absence. The author interviewed Chinese residents in the Dar Glory community and compiled the relevant impacts as follows:

Table 3: Chinese social interaction experience in Dar Glory community

Interviewee	Age	Career	Sex	Description of interaction in local society
Tai	29	Sub-manager	Male	"We have nothing to chat with the locals except for work. I once tried to listen to Bongo Flava, and my head was almost drop down by it. The locals didn't like to listen to our music as well. After three years, my driver still prefers Swahili broadcast rather than Jay Chou."
Yang	36	Self-employed persons	Male	"The cultural level of them (referring to local employees) is too low, and they got great pressure on their life, how could they take other time to learn Chinese even Chinese popular staffs? It would be enough to have a regular life."
Gao	52	Company consultant	Male	"Although we want to mingle with local employees, it is really difficult for people who have different cultural backgrounds and classes to resonate with each other."

In the survey, the author selected three Chinese people who had different ages and different occupations to follow up. The trio repeatedly mentioned that: "*it is difficult for Chinese and local people to understand each other and culture is different.*" Limited by language, these Chinese cannot understand Bongo Flava (a kind of hip-hop Swahili music from Dar es Salaam); unable to

understand Tingatinga painting; unable to understand the unique community culture of Bao chess and Swahili people. In the same way, the locals can't understand why Chinese people are spending their time on Tiktok, Kwai (two of the most popular short video platform in China) every day; they can't understand why Chinese people are not greeting with them as local; they can't understand why not every Chinese will take Kungfu. The lack of effective communication channels is becoming a major obstacle in the social interaction between the two sides. It magnifies the gap between Chinese and locals due to cultural differences so that the two sides couldn't face each other's cultural background or consciousness before a face-to-face social interaction. The form lacks basic understanding. This misunderstanding makes the two sides often face many problems in social interaction. The following are the actual cases that appear during the research:

One day, Mr. Tai and his friends went to the local Korean restaurant to eat and heard the local employees of the restaurant point to them. Mr. Tai has lived in Tanzania for a long time and knows a little about Swahili. He heard that the restaurant staff said that they were "Chinese cockroaches eating dog meat." As a dog-loving person, Mr. Tai thought that it was an insult to him. He got up and argued to the employee. The scene was very tense. Later they even got fought, and the weekend party that should have been relaxed and happy eventually ended up with an unpleasant trip to the local police office.

In fact, in China, there are just a few areas and ethnic groups that have the tradition of eating dog meat. But why do local employees decide that all Chinese people eat dog meat? If he has a little understanding of Chinese social media, it is easy to find that most Chinese do not eat dog meat, and even more firmly oppose the custom of eating dog meat. Although popular culture itself is a "commercial culture", many cultural critics have been criticizing their entertainment. However, as a mirror image of the real-life of most groups, many stereotypes of the community can be broken through popular culture. The author observed an interesting phenomenon during the survey: When he tried to translate some of the highlighted posts in the *Jamii Forums* to the interviewees, their perception of the locals was improved. For example, interviewees showed great interest in a post that sighed at the high price of the room charge in Dar es Salaam, because the social problems and concerns caused by the issue of high housing prices are not different between China and Tanzania. Interviewees understand the local people's lives through translation work and achieve mutual understanding. This is a reflection of the positive feedback generated by the Tanzanian online

community culture in the Chinese community.

Also limited by language, educational background, and information access channels, Tanzanian locals couldn't effectively understand Chinese contemporary society through Chinese popular culture as well. Although the *Doudou na Mama Wakwe Zake* mentioned in the previous paragraph has caused some influence in the local area, still, it opened a window for the local people to understand contemporary China. However, from the data of the Startimes Company's content published in Tanzania, the influence of the company is in doubt, and in the following years, the project also lacks coherent launch and investment. It is difficult to assert how much the Chinese TV dramas affected in Tanzania and how much it helped the Chinese community to build its image. In the Dar Glory community, which is almost full of Chinese residents, the author asked three non-Chinese people: community workers, community residents and third-party nationals. The relevant information is as followed:

Table 4: How the Non-Chinese think about Chinese Popular Culture

Interviewee	Age	Career	Sex	Description society of interaction with Chinese
Ali	24	Gatekeeper	Male	"Every day I can see Chinese people going out together. They always act together and don't have much communication with me. The TV series you mentioned did broadcast before, I have seen it, but TBC 1 suddenly stopped the TV show and I never looked at it again."
Kasimu	40	Driver	Male	"My employer doesn't like to listen to our broadcast when I drive. He brought a CD. It's your Chinese song. I think it's okay, but I can't understand what the song. I want to say that Chinese pop songs sound strange to me. "
Ray (Dutch)	43	Investor	Male	"I'm sorry I have never seen a Chinese TV series, but I have seen a few Jackie Chan movies. It's very interesting. I haven't been to China yet, maybe in the future, but I often watch Chinese news on BBC channel."

In the process of talking with the interviewees, it can be known that Chinese popular culture is in a weak position in Tanzania. In a Chinese-dominated community, non-Chinese groups still have no concept of contemporary Chinese popular culture. Even if there is, there is no inner demand that they want to know spontaneously. So, the author selected the Chinese social media Weibo, Tiktok, Tencent's mobile game and translated their contents, introduced them to the interviewees, their interest in these popular cultural products and the spiritual world of the Chinese in the community has

increased significantly. The commercialization and materialization of popular culture are here to play a role as a binder. In this context, people from different cultural backgrounds are potential consumers. The materialistic popular culture gives these different groups a platform for equal dialogue. Here they are consumers of popular cultural products, all of which are consumed. The process was influenced by the subtle influence of the product and reached some consensus. At the same time, different cultural backgrounds make them less likely to fall into the trap of commercialization when interpreting popular cultural products. For example, when a Tanzanian watches a Tiktok video, regardless of how the commercial is recommended, he is unlikely to buy the cosmetics or clothes recommended by KOL. The disadvantages of consumerism in the process of communication of popular culture products are restrained by the different cultural backgrounds of the audience. The natural attributes that reflect the pursuit of contemporary social values have been correctly applied and become a window for others to understand their culture and society. In this context, the dissemination of popular culture has positive significance, and it will also provide a certain basis for trust in the social interaction between its ethnic groups and others. However, it is pity that the absence of Chinese popular culture in Tanzania makes this foundation of trust impossible.

3. Conclusion

Culture makes the world full of meaning. The importance of culture is reflected in its ability to help human organize themselves and regulate social practices. This meaning of culture does not deny the existence of materiality. Cultural products will also have an impact on the various changes in human social relations through their material characteristics. But materiality itself is silent. It cannot express its value by itself. It can only be obtained through human initiative and is always entangled with power relations. Although materiality empowers and limits the way things are directed, culture is not a purely material or commercial private property but is always a complex mixture of meaning, materiality, and social practice. The same thing has different meanings in different contexts and social practices. In other words, culture is not just equated with the materiality of silence; culture is always social, material and symbolic (Storey, 2018). The spread and development of Chinese popular culture in Tanzania is too thin compared to the trade relationship between the two countries. Why the mass culture as a commodity has not played its due role and has not become a catalyst for enriching the social interaction between the two peoples. The reasons are complex and diverse. However, in the light of the existence of this problem, how to carry out cultural exchanges between the two countries will be a question that

should be further considered by relevant experts and scholars.

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Gujarati Navigation: Diu Malacca/ China Trade and Portuguese Rivalry (16th Cent. Portuguese and Urdu Sources)

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The naval fights and commercial war that took place between Indian and Portuguese powers along the Gujarati coast during the first half of 16th Cent., mainly around the key port of Diu, were essentially fought to secure the monopoly of trade with the Far East and China through Malacca. Indeed according to early European and Portuguese travellers, prior to Portuguese violent assaults the Diu, Malacca/China trade was mainly, since long, in Gujarati hands. Early 20th Cent. Urdu historiography of Gujarat compiles local testimonies confronted with Arabic and Persian language travelogues and chronicles but is seldom translated and read by English medium historians, as far as medieval navigation and trade are concerned. The 16th Century Portuguese travellers and chroniclers also described that fierce naval and commercial rivalry but of course often with opposing point of views (although they share some common sources).

The Chinese porcelain and silk trade between Malacca and Gujarat is not directly documented in 16th Cent. Portuguese sources and Urdu sources that we have at hand are not very precise for that matter. A notable exception is the manuscript *Livro / Book of Duarte Barbosa* (c.1521) that contains a report of the naval and commercial network that linked southern Africa, the Middle East, India (mainly through Gujarati ports) and China via Malacca (quoted below as *Barbosa*). Confronting Maulana Nadvi's Urdu historiography of Gujarat, who does not quote European sources but relied on Arabic and Indo Persian sources, with Barbosa's book in those matters is indeed revealing (we quote Nadvi 1958.2). Although all available sources relate the crucial naval battles and negotiations that took

place in Diu, they rarely state what was at stake: the taking over of the Gujarati trade, particularly its Far East commercial exchanges. Instead they relate naval encounters, sometimes unsuccessful, hard negotiations on the fortified island, and two costly military sieges of that fortified island. We shall also quote Barros in this respect (Barros 1553).

What was the importance of silk and porcelain imports into India through Diu, and conversely, what was specially manufactured and exported to Java and Malacca during the reign of Bahadur Shah Gujarati (1526–1537) according to what we know of Gujarati fleets?

To what extent did the Portuguese took hold of silk and porcelain and luxury trade from the Gujarati ports? For what purpose considering their obsession for the monopoly of spices trade? To what extent Chinese ships (and crew?) coming from Java and the Far East were involved in those days for that purpose?

Wes hall try to answer these questions by supplementing whatever information we have through the above mentioned sources with other modern resources such as museum catalogues of rare pieces available in India and Portugal. For the sake of clarity let us have a look at a *map of Gujarat* and at *two chronologies* regarding the Sultans of Gujarat on one side and, on the other side, about the Portuguese and Gujarati rivalry in Diu.

Chronology of the Sultans of Gujarat (1449–1552) (from Nadvi 1958.1)

1459–1511 Mahmud Shah Begrā.

1511–1526 Muzaffar Shah II.

1526–1537 Bahadur Shah (called Bahadur Shah Gujarati) after a dynastic struggle.

1537–1552 Mahmud Shah after a dynastic struggle.

Chronology of Portuguese and Gujarati rivalry in Diu 1509–1546

Diu being the strategic port of Gujarat for the trade between the Red Sea and Malacca (Barros 1553) (Correia 1975) (Castanheda 1554–1979).

1509, February (2nd-3rd Feb.) Naval battle at the bore (estuary) of Diu: the fleet of the Portuguese Viceroy Francisco de Almeida defeated the Turkish fleet supported by the Gujarati fleet.

1509, February (4th–20th) Fifteen days of negotiations with the *Shah Bandar of the port,* Malik

Ayaz, Francisco de Almeida not being able to conquer the city. Agreement is signed for freedom of Gujarati navigation in exchange of hard reprisals against the remnants of the Turkish fleet, and seizure amounts of money from the merchants.

1509 September Diogo Lopes reaches Malacca and establishes a *factory* or trading post 1509 November the Malacca trading post is, after two months, blocked and attacked by the Gujarati merchants whose interest were mainly represented by the *Nahuda Beguea* (Begrā[1]) a Gujarati *Captain of the navy* to the Moorish King at Malacca. The *factor* and eight Portuguese kept as prisoners (Barros, Dec.II, Liv. VI).

1511 Conquest of Malacca by Afonso de Albuquerque then main emporium of the Gujaratis for the Far East, Gujarati traders are dispossessed.

1511–1533 various military attempts and negotiations for the building of a Portuguese fortress in Diu.

1513 Afonso de Albuquerque well received at Diu by Malik Ayaz Shah Bandar for six days. His boats were repaired in Diu's arsenal. Jorge de Albuquerque (nephew of Afonso de Albuquerque) leaves for Malacca, carrying Gujarati textiles (Correia II, 259).

1513 Malik Ayaz and Afonso de Albuquerque agree on having a Portuguese *factory (feitoria)* or official trading post in Diu.

1514 Failure of a Portuguese embassy to the King of Gujarat for the building of a fortress at Diu 1530 Malik Saka, Shah Bandar of Diu, in disfavour with the Sultan Bahadur Shah Gujarati approaches the Portuguese governor Nuno da Cunha for safe passage to the Gujarati Court of Surat but, once reinstated, refuses to collaborate with the Portuguese ships.

1531 Nuno da Cunha, new governor is missioned by Lisbon to attack Diu and build a fortress.

1533 The Sultan Bahadur Shah Gujarati under military pressure from the Mughals allowed the building of a Portuguese fortress in Diu in exchange of military (maritime) help from the Portuguese.

1533 (c. December?) Nuno da Cunha goes to Diu to meet Bahadur Shah, who refuses to meet him. 1535 Bahadur Shah Gujarati, being now against the Portuguese fortress in Diu, is murdered by Nuno da Cunha's men.

1538 First siege of Diu by Gujarati forces, but the Portuguese fortress could not be conquered, all attacks were repelled.

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1 Nahuda Beguea: ⌈ não xudā > nāxudā ⌉ Indo Persian and Urdu: lord of the ship Beguea defined as the main noble Moorish family in the Portuguese text could be Begrā like the former King of Gujarat Mahmud Begrā. For Indo Persian (and Urdu) maritime terms including nahuda, junco /chunk, and não refer to S. S. Nadvi's glossaries (Nadvi S. S. 1958).

1546 Second siege of the Portuguese fortress at Diu by Gujarati and Ottoman forces, with stronger maritime and land forces than previously. The fleet of governor Dom João de Castro victorious over the Gujarati forces, freed the fortress and the island of Diu remained in Portuguese control.

For this paper we invite the reader to consult Maulana Nadvi's *Cultural History of Gujarāt* or *Gujarāt kī Tamaddanī Tārīkh* (in Urdu c.1928, published in 1958, p.17 onwards) and refer to our above mentioned 2016–2017 publications. Maulana Nadvi's Cultural History of Gujarāt [Note: in square brackets Anglo Indian modern names and nouns are added to our translation whenever possible and if necessary].

The (Gujarati) Sailing Fleet (introduction) (Nadvi 1958.2)

The Southwest coast of Hindustan is situated on the shores of the Arabian Sea and Gujarat is in the middle part of it. That is why every King of Gujarat had to maintain a sailing fleet for the safety of the country as well as external commercial purpose. In the very beginning Ahmad Shah the First [founder of the dynasty and converted to Islam] ordered [ocean] sailing fleet to be made and used it in the war of the Maha'i River region. The port of Cambay [Khambāyat] was its main mooring post. Mahmūd the First made it even stronger and, in order to beat the Malabar Pirates who were ransacking the seas he ordered a fleet out of the Port of Ghugh [Gogha] that came back victorious.

In those days ships were built in *Khambāyat* [*Cambay*] and armed with all kinds of war material, when a fleet departed to attack the port of Dābhūl [Dabhol, south of Mumbai now in Maharashtra] then it comprised three hundred warships. It is at the time of the reign of that king that [heavy] guns were mounted on warships and they inflicted a severe defeat to the Portuguese fleet during a naval battle (p.18). Malik Ayaz Sultani was the admiral of that fleet. In the sixteenth century AD, [the Gujarati King] Sultan Bahadur gave more priority to his war fleet. And he had all kinds of ships built in Khambayat: Turki as well as Portuguese, and he made the *island of Diu the main centre of his fleet*. The admiral of that fleet, Malik Tughān was residing there. And he was such a formidable and powerful enemy at sea that during the whole time of his tenure, the Portuguese would not dare to sail towards Gujarat. Had not the Portuguese committed treason with Sultān Bahādur [*in Diu, 1535*], he would have chased them out of the Indian seas and Hindustan would never have to witness that [conquest].

Different kinds of ships would have different kind of names. Among the warships they would have a *Birisht* [*The Cutter*] or a *Ghurāb* [*The Crow*] (p.18). A passenger ship would be called a

Safariyā [*a Travelling ship*] and would be often mentioned as *sambūq* [*a conch*]. In all there were three kinds of vessels: warships, commerce and passenger ships. Among those they would have specific names, for example for the category of passenger ships one would have a vessel named *Madīnā* [the Holy City of *Medina*] or *Zohrā* [*the Shining,* feminine name] but also *Changezī* [*from Gengis Khan*]. Refer to *The High seas Fleet of Gujarat* below:

The High seas Fleet of Gujarāt (Nadvi 1958.2, p.265 sqq)

The geographical position of Gujarāt [Gujarat]: A part of South West Hindustan, the country [of Gujarat] is by nature positioned in such a way that the Arabian Sea surrounds it, it has Oman in front, on its right is the Persian Gulf, and on the left the Strait of Aden, Aden being the old port of Yemen, Hadramaut is situated in front of Gujarat and Bahrain is the maritime centre of the Persian Gulf. Because of these natural positions the intercourse of Gujarat with Arabia is a natural fact. From Gujarat the way into Sindh [Sind] was also open, and ships would go from here [Gujarat] to the ancient harbor of Dewal [Debal], so that both maritime and land routes to the Dakkan [south of Hindustan] would be open. On the East [of Gujarat] the land route to Marwar, Malwah, Khandesh, etc., was there and the caravan trade was active, going and coming. To sum it up Gujarat having land on one side and the ocean on the other, indeed had an excellent geographical position: There were constant and frequent comings and goings of ships from Europe, *Egypt*, Arabia, Shām [Syria], Iraq and *Iran*. Ships going to Lanka [Sri Lanka], Madras [Chennai], Bengal, Assam, Burma, and *China*, would necessarily have to call at one or another harbour of Gujarat, and from the very beginning that was reason of the happiness and prosperity of this country.

The ancient ports of Gujarat [p 184]: [Note: in square brackets Anglo Indian modern name are added whenever possible]

Ports of the Muslim Era [p 191]: According to what I wrote above, Gujarat is facing exactly Arabia, and more precisely because of Arab [maritime expansion, their ships would go trading up to *China, and back, loaded with commercial goods*, and they had to call and stop in the Gujarati harbours for different purposes, first for trading their commercial goods and secondly for voyage supplies and drinking water.

When Islamic rule was established in Gujarat and when the autonomous Gujarati Sultans tried to develop this country then so many harbours were opened in Gujarat and Kathia war, so much so that in the [Persian Chronicles]

Mir'āt i Sikandari, *Mir'āt i Ahmadi*, and *Zafar ul Wala* it is precisely written that in the times of

the Sultans of Gujarat their were eighty-four established harbours⌈port of call⌋. But I was not able to find the names of all those eighty-four ports, however after proper investigation, below is listed what I could ascertain⌈...⌋.

Those ports were of three categories: The first class ports were those where heavy and very big vessels⌈jahāz⌋ would enter, like Gogha, *Dev*⌈*Diu*⌋[1], Broach, Derawal, Somnath, etc. Second class ports were those where middle size vessels would enter. There class ports where mostly without permanent installation where very small ships, such as boats⌈kiśtī⌋, spoons/dingy⌈ḍongī⌋, canoes /flat bottom boats⌈hoṛī⌋ could moor. Those moorages are generally called *ghats*⌈ghāṭ⌋ in Bengal, Bihar, etc. Sometimes big ships would come from the sea and moor there at high tide, they would unload their goods and load again and wait for the return of the flux⌈for sailing⌋. Those ships would be caught on broad side while mooring, and because of their weight would reach dry land.

The Administration of the Ports (ibid p.186 to 188): How were the Gujarati ports administered? It is difficult to answer that in a definite way. However rewards⌈for that⌋ are mentioned several times in the chronicles, indeed in the era of the Rajas⌈i. e. before the Muslim Sultans⌋, the re was a Maritime Department (Authority) with an appointed minister⌈wazīr⌋for that, consequently during the reign of Siddharāj Solanki (in 1143 AD/538 H) a minister named Bhār Mal was on this post. He would come every month from Pattan to Khambhat⌈Cambay⌋,and every port had also an officer with whose permission ships could come and cast anchor. For commercial ships that officer's permission was enough, but would that be a ship carrying passengers who would intend to stay in this country, then that officer had to seek permission from the Raja. There was also a custom office that would check the goods of the merchants and collect the corresponding duty. That custom office would have jurisdiction on both export and import. Big harbours like Khambhat or Bharuch would generate a great income, no wonder the Chinese visitor Hong Shiang[2] would write that *at Bharuch the neighbouring Rajas would keep a very close look at him because of his riches and property.*

We do have information on the Maritime Department of the Islamic era from the testimonies of passengers and visitors. During the reigns of the Khaljī and the Tughlaq not much progress is to be seen in those matters, but during the times of the Gujarati Sultans there was infinite improvements: the officer in charge of the administration of the seas was called *admiral*⌈amīr al bahar, *prince of the sea* in Arabic, Urdu: amīr ul bahar⌋that title was equivalent to *minister of the sea*⌈Urdu: wazīr e bahar⌋

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1 Diu is quoted a first class port and again in the chapter on Trade quoted below.

2 A member of Zheng He's expedition? For details of Ming Chinese navigation ref to Williams, Lea E., Note on Ming Policy as related early Portuguese Activities in the Far East, 1985.

he functioned directly under the King. During the reign of Ahmad Shah the Firstin 834H/1430AD, Mukhlis ul Mulk was amīr al bahar. In the beginning the office of harbour master or *shah bandar* 〔śah-e -bandar > śah bandar〕, and the post of admiral/amīr al bahar 〔Urdu: amīr ul bahar〕 would be held by the same man who would administrate both the harbour and the fleet. In the times of Sultān Qutub ud Dīn up to 861H/1456 AD Khwaja 'Ala ud Dīn was the shah bandar, in 862H/1457 the shah bandar at Diu was Ismā'īl Nā'eta and in 857H/1472, that is during the reign of Mahmud i 'Āzam 〔Mahmūd the Great〕 Farhat ul Mulk Amir Tuğān was appointed admiral/amīr al bahar. During the reign of Sultān Muzaffar from 926H/1519 up to 928H/1521 AD, Malik Ayāzremained amīr al bahar, then in 968H he had a son but in the beginning the reign of Bahādur Shah he 〔Malik Ayāz〕 was made governor 〔hākim〕 of Sūrath 〔Surat〕 and Mahmūd Āqā was appointed amīr al bahar in his post, then Qawwām ul Mulk became shah bandar (hākim / governor) of Diu and in 937H/1530 AD Malik Tuğān Bin Ayāz, after that Mustafa Bahrām Rūmī Khān became shah bandar and Diu, Surat, Rander 〔Rāndher〕, Thane, Daman, all 〔these ports〕 were under his government. After that Khudāwand Khan Safar Sulaimani became amīr al bahar, and after his martyrdom, when Khudāwand Khan was appointed, in 946H, Amīr Sheikh Burhān ul Mulk Binbāni was amīr al bahar, in 955H NāsirHabsh Khānwas shah bandar of Diu. After that Diu and Daman were occupied by the Portuguese, Broach, Surat, Khambhat, a few 〔other〕 ports were left, and they came into the hands of the Nobles ofthe Realm 〔Umrā〕〔i. e. after the death of Bahādur Shah Gujarati〕〔...〕

When a merchant ship came, the captain would sent the list of goods to the shah bandar, and if the shah bandar thought it proper he would also inform the Sultan and the King 〔Sultan〕 would purchase whatever good he fancied and then he would allow the merchants to proceed of the sale for the rest of the cargo. Until the shah bandar was not completely confident and satisfied, he would neither allow the ship to enter nor go 〔out of the harbour〕. And for the passengers a license to circulate 〔Urdu *parwānā e rāh darī*〕 was needed. Indeed without permission of the shah bandar, neither ship could enter the harbour nor go out.

Three kinds of ship would be under his jurisdiction: first merchant, second passenger, and third war ships. In the passenger ships, in addition to the necessary equipment, so many goods would be loaded on board as to ballast the ship at sea. In principle war ships where in the jurisdiction of the amīr al bahar, but in the harbour the loading and ballasting, repairs and cleaning the supply of voyage provisions etc would need permission from the shah bandar. In the final chapter of Mir'āt i Ahmadī there is a list of different departments, and from which we can figure that the total number of the employees of the port could reach three hundreds.

A note on paper making and silk industries in Gujarat according to Maulana Nadvi's *Cultural History of Gujarat* (ibid.)

Our Urdu chronicler of Gujarat has a detailed chapter on the industries (i.e. factories and manufacture) in the main cities like Ahmadabad, Surat and Cambay: in particular he quotes the *cloth industry* for weaving, tailoring, embroidery (with gold and silver) in cotton, wool, as well as silk as being important and typical Gujarati luxury goods for export within India and abroad. More precisely he quotes precious silk cloths made in the times of Bahadur Shah Gujarati. Maulana Nadvi also mentions the weaving, painting, and printing of pictures on silk cloth, those days. He adds the silk and pollen cloths were specially made for export to Egypt (Cairo) and China (Peking) (ibid. 52, 53).

Maulana Nadvi also comments on the excellence and brightness of Gujarati paper during the 16th Century with many workshops (factories) in several Gujarati towns for many varieties of paper in size, colour and thickness (including gilded paper). He quotes Khambayat as being the main centre for high quality paper production, followed by Ahmadabad. He goes on saying that (in 16th Century) Gujarati paper was sold all over India and abroad (ibid. 56–57). Given the old relationship of China and India as far as paper making and block printing are concerned it is difficult to imagine that Gujarati traders would not be interested in Chinese paper and vice versa. Incidentally we know that Indian paper was highly appreciated by the Portuguese authorities of Goa: Afonso de Albuquerque in 1515, for example provide their writer Gaspar Correia *thirty five mounds of paper to take away to the Straits* ⌈ *Ormuz* ⌉ (manuscript reproduced and mentioned by José Pereira da Costa in his introduction of Gaspar Correia's *Crónicas de D. Manuel e de D. João III*, p. XXI, the anglo Indian weight *mound* (Urdu *man*) being about hundred Troy pounds nearly nine hundred kilograms.

A note on trade in Gujarat according to Maulana Nadvi's *Cultural History of Gujarat* (Nadvi 1958.2):

Maulana Nadvi has a short chapter on the *Gujarati trade* and about *the island of Diu* he specifies that during the reign of Mahmud Begrā, Khambayat was the first trading port and *the island of Diu the second one in importance before ... Surat* he also goes on saying that in the reign of Bahadur Shah it was even more important, he quotes huge quantities of perfume being traded as indicative figures and says that in the year 1530, every year more than one hundred commercial ships and one thousand passenger ships would come to this harbour (ibid, 63). It is important to note that Maulana Nadvi had a separate passage on the financial incomes of Gujarat in pre-colonial times (including the gross

import of the ports) where he regrets the lack of research of the British (colonial and other) historians on the subject, and he quotes *Mir'āt i Ahmadi* and other chronicles of India in Persian (Nadvi1958.2, p.75–76) with some precise figures for that purpose underlying the huge revenues of Gujarati ports during the reigns of the Sultans Mahmud Shah Begrā and Bahadur Shah Gujarati, which is again a precious indication of what was at stake in Diu.

A significant episode of the maritime and commercial rivalry in Diu by Barros:

We now need to quote the Portuguese chronicler João de Barros about a significant episode of the maritime and commercial rivalry in Diu which I translate from the reprint of original Chapter V of the *Segunda Década* dealing with negotiations between Alfonso D'Albuquerque and the Gujarati Shah Bandar Malik Ayaz in August 1513 describing a kind of reciprocal gunboat diplomacy (Barros 1553 p 377–378, Book 8), paragraph, punctuation and annotations in square brackets are mine:

⌈ Barros explains why the Governor Albuquerque had to come to Diu with his fleet ... ⌉ When Malik Ayaz lord of Diu saw with his own eyes Affonso D'Albuquerque with such a big fleet, a thing that he was very much afraid of and because he was a sagacious man, he ordered with great haste to fill boats with fresh provisions of meats, bread, rice, fruits, and green vegetables, and along with those things he ordered that a messenger should be sent to him: saying that men who had been at sea were longing for nothing else than greenery and refreshment from the land. ⌈ ... ⌉⌈ D'Albuquerque ⌉ was hoping to have a foot in the city through trade and a factor that he left in the city and also hoping to convince the King through his ally Malik Gopi, to let him have a (colonial) factory and a fortress built in Diu ⌉⌈ ... ⌉⌈ a negotiation was taking place ⌉ Malik Ayaz ⌈ ... ⌉ who was working against the interest of the King of Cambay (as we shall see now), on his own initiative let D'Albuquerque know that he was above all willing that the King of Portugal should have a factory in Diu and that he would agree to concede a place for that purpose but he was afraid that the Kingof Gujarat would not agree. D'Albuquerque, seeing that after three days of waiting for him Malik Ayaz was not trusting him enough to go and meet him personally, set sail a morning ⌈ to the harbour ⌉ but because the Moor was so astute and haughty that he avoided meeting D'Albuquerque on the fixed time, and he did not want that to happen while he was furtively in the harbour because then he would have had to show himself only on a pair of *fustas* ⌈ light boats ⌉⌈ and meet D'Albuquerque ⌉ on board of the ⌈ Portuguese ⌉ *náo* ⌈ sea faring ship ⌉.

So he would show the greatness of his status with this manner: he came out with a fleet of up to a

hundred of rowing ships, all of them so much provided with ⌈ eating ⌉ vessels ⌈ louçainha/precious and expensive pottery, porcelain ⌉ just like they would go for a wedding but also so much equipped with artillery, munitions and arms just like they had to fight. When D'Albuquerque came to know through a *fusta* that he had sent ahead, how ⌈ Malik Ayaz ⌉ was coming to meet him, he came back to his encounter to receive him with the whole of his naval fleet and the embraces that took place from one party and the other were from all the pieces of artillery that every party had brought.

And because it is befitting of the malicious as well as of honourable persons, Malik Ayaz did not want that they would meet closer than D'Albuquerque leaning forward on the board of his ship and himself down aboard a *fusta*. And from there he explained profusely why he did not want ⌈ D'Albuquerque ⌉ to come and meet him while he was in the harbour of Dio ⌈ Diu/Div ⌉. So much so that D'Albuquerque said afterwards about him that he had never seen a better man from the Palace who would not only deceive a wise man but also leave him happy after ⌈ negotiating ⌉. As for the other matters that the treated upon through messages, he ⌈ D'Albuquerque ⌉ found him so cautious ⌈ ... ⌉ And as a way of farewell Affonso D'Albuquerque gave him ⌈ back ⌉ four noble Moor men and in addition he left him in Diu two *náos* that he had captured during that crossing with all their people and shipment because they were from the land, something that he ⌈ Malik Ayaz ⌉ appreciated a lot. ⌈ ... ⌉ (Barros 1553 p 377–378)

Our comment: from this passage form Barros' *Second Decade* we can deduce a few things especially if we compare it with the historical affirmations brought by Maulana Nadvi (quoted above):

First it appears that the Portuguese had no clear perception of the functions of the *shah bandar* who was of course rich and powerful but in no way would have acted against the interest of his Sultan, and in the case of Malik Ayaz we know that he had still the status of a slave, having been purchased when he was a young Georgian boy converted to Islam. He was indeed a very fine official from the Palace (as suggested by Barros who is reluctant to see a fine diplomat in a Moor be him a man from the Palace).

Secondly Barros gives the building of a classical *factory with a fortress* at Diu as the main aim of Albuquerque's attempts and as the goal of the negotiations taking place with Goa's Vice Roy which is half true: they were desperate for controlling inter Indian trade and Far East Indian trade largely in the hands of the Gujarati (Hindus and Muslims alike). In fact these 1510–1513 years were difficult times for the Far East Portuguese cum Indian trade through Malacca and their attempt to have a commercial foothold in China for the much coveted silk and porcelain was failing. And they were realising that the Gujarati rich and fine clothes and their other refined goods such as

special paper were the only buying power in Malacca for clove, the Chinese silk and porcelain goods ; and that Chinese trade in and through India was still in the hand of mostly Muslim Chinese traders collaborating with Arab and Indian traders (mostly based in Gujarat). Here we may refer to the above quoted passages of Maulana Nadvi's *Cultural History of Gujarat*, indeed Gujarati Urdu writing historiographers were familiar with Chinese travelogues and navigation accounts written/translated in Arabic.

Thirdly and finally when Barros with some irony says that Malik Ayaz fleet was looking like a *wedding party* because it was loaded with *louçainha* ⌈ refined and costly porcelain pieces ⌉ to go and meet Albuquerque's armada for negotiations, and the wedding metaphor subtly goes on with the term *embraces* one wonders if besides the necessary show of force (the ships were also over loaded with weapons and artillery) there was not an attempt to provoke and seduce the Portuguese with Chinese porcelain (*louçainha)* that they were not able to trade from Malacca and beyond. And Barros adds that during the multiple attempts for direct negotiations out of the harbour, Malik Ayaz used to give many *pieces* as good will present to the Portuguese captains, *doubling the presents in consideration with the degree of nobility.*

Could it be that Malik Ayaz was making commercial offers? And particularly with Far Eastern and Chinese goods that the Portuguese were failing to obtain directly (contrary to the Dutch in the following century) since the island of Diu was the ideal Indian emporium given its geographical position and its all weather moorings (contrary to Cambay it would not get silted with the river sands). And Malik Ayaz' efforts to seduce the Portuguese nobles with Gujarati and Chinese goods might not have been convincing enough since they wanted to secure their monopole along with the spice trade from and for the Far East.

A Portuguese report on the trading of the Kingdom of Gujarat and of the port of Diu by Duarte Barbosa (c. 1509–1513)

We do not know much about Duarte Barbosa, born in Lisbon, he was most probably a *new Christian / Cristão Novo*, as he came to India first as a *lingua* (interpret and translator) when he was very young and later as *escrivão* ⌈ colonial *writer/*Crown notary ⌉ mostly in the *Factory* of Cananor as asserted by Correia in the preface of his *Lendas* (Correia 1975, 2). In his *Livro das coisas da India* he described whatever ports and cities he observed between South Africa and Malaysia with a hearsay description of China and its trade and, similarly some lines on Japan. His manuscript written c. 1509–1521, was first printed in Italian in 1563, is here quoted as *Barbosa*, following Neves Águas

Portuguese edition of the *Livro* in 1993[1]. His testimony is trustworthy and is corroborated by many Indian and Asian chroniclers.

1. In his note on *the beautiful city of Cambay* ⌈ Khambayat ⌉ he refers quite a few times to the *cotton and silk industry* ⌈ manufacturing ⌉ of the city not only by weaving, tailoring, and embroidery but also about *silk cloth painting* (*Barbosa*, 67).

2. In his note on the port of *Reinel (Rander)* which he qualifies as *very peaceful and rich with beautiful houses because the Moors* ⌈ *Muslims* ⌉ *from this city trade with their sea faring ships* ⌈ *naus* ⌉ *with Malacca ... Sumatra and Pegu ... for many sorts of spices, drogues many kinds of silks, ... all kinds of spices, drogues, perfumes, silk cloths and porcelain ... and many other merchandises. The inhabitants have big and beautiful naus that they sail for this trade, and whoever wants to have at hand things from Malacca and China must go to this place where he shall find them in better conditions than from any other place, and at a good price. He then says that in the houses of the front* ⌈ *sea front* ⌉ *they have some kind of shops with open cupboards (prateiras) all full of rich, beautiful and new fashion porcelain pieces* ⌈ *in display* ⌉ (*Barbosa, 69*).

3. In his note on the *Island of Diu* which he might have visited around 1509 when the Portuguese Viceroy Francisco de Almeida's defeated the Turkish fleet off Diu without attacking the city, and in 1513 when Albuquerque negotiated for a trading post in Diu with Malik Ayaz, as he first refers to the excellent maritime position of the harbour for its trade with Africa and the Red Sea but also with the Malabar Coast and Malacca and then reports about *Maliquans* ⌈ Malik Ayaz ⌉ [2] *as the governor of the city for the King* ⌈ Sultan ⌉ , *a great cavalier, and an old man, astute and with great knowledge.* A portrait that fits perfectly that great shah bandar and diplomat as also depicted by Barros (vide supra). Barbosa also notes that many kinds of spices like sandal wood, nutmeg and clove were coming from Malacca but we must underline another information: he mentions many other goods and particularly *many* ⌈ *kinds* ⌉ *of silk* ⌈ *muitas sedas* ⌉ *that they import from China through Malacca.* He then mentions that *silk cloths* ⌈ *chamalotes* ⌉ *made in Cambaia are exchanged in Aden against horses and wheat.* The very term of exchange (*inreturn*) being significant about the Gujarati trading network.

4. In his *final note on the Kingdom of Cambaia with a brief report on the merchandise (goods)*

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1 O Livro de Duarte Barbosa, introdução e notes de Neves Águas, Publicações Europa-América, Mem Martins Portugal, 1993 (following an anonymous incomplete Portuguese manuscript of the Livro and an Italian translation and printed edition by Ramusio, Venice, 1563)

2 I interpret Maliquans as being derived from the name of one his successors in 1530 Malik Tuğān Ayāz < Malik Tuğān Bin Ayāz, the Livro de Duarte Barbosa 1993 edition is a compromise between the Portuguese manuscript of the Livro and the Italian edition by Ramusio, quoted above and its editor is silent about what seems an obvious misread.

that are there, he does refer about the Indian network for trading horses coming to Gujarat, but again he insists on the importance of the cloth industry and trade both for cotton and silk, mentioning again fine silk painting and he also quotes such items as semi precious stones (coralline), Indian herbs, opium and other natural products such as *anil* (indigo) *that are of great value in Malacca and China* (ibid. 71).

5. Finally, in his note about the *City and Kingdom of Malacca* the first thing that he points out is the geographical position of the Moorish kingdom of Malacca facing China and Java where the Chinese trade is very active. He notes the beauty and extraordinary capacity of the *nao juncos*, the Chinese merchant ships that are common in Malacca and in Java, he reveals some technicalities of those ships. He points out the *powerful Moorish foreign merchant community* ⌈ actually mostly Gujaratis ⌉ and mentions many times the import and export of Gujarati goods: namely luxury clothes *panos de Cambaia* drogues and spices (including opium and incense from Aden). Those goods are exchanged with *various kinds of silks, including rough silk, many kinds of porcelains* etc brought by the *juncos orbig junks.* He mentions the exchanging of goods between Gujarat and China in Malacca, in the same terms that he did for the trade at Diu (*em retorno*). And, just as inhis final *note on the Kingdom of Cambaia* he equally points out the great value of goods offered by the Gujarati merchants when taken to the Chinese market.

6. In his chapter about *O Grande Reino da China/the Great Kingdom of China* Barbosa says that he has no *information* (meaning he could not visit China) but he collected information on the kingdom of China from *mourose gentios, homens de crédito/Moors* ⌈ *Muslims* ⌉ *and Gentiles* ⌈ *Hindus or Buddhists, perhaps also Chinese Muslims* ⌉ *trustworthy persons* ⌈ rich merchants ⌉ and thus came to reveal more details about the Chinese ships and has even a (supposed) technical explanation for the brightness of porcelain. In any case he says that ⌈ Chinese people ⌉ make *great quantities of porcelain which are good merchandise for all parts* ⌈ of the world ⌉. He adds that the Chinese *are also great privateers,* ⌈ *and* ⌉ *they navigate up to Malacca with all kinds of goods from China that sell very well and they carry away iron, ... pepper from Sumatra and Malabar, just like the Venetians use to do in our parts* ⌈ *Europe* ⌉. *They also take away opium, incense, coral, clothes from Cambaia and Pulicat* ⌈ in Tamil Nadu ⌉. Regarding the Chinese merchant navy we may also refer to Williams' *Note on Ming Policy as related early Portuguese Activities in the Far East* (Williams 1985, passim).

N. B. Barros, Decada II, Book 6, pp 257–259, and 290, also mentions the importance of the Gujarati traders and ship masters dealing with the Chinese traders in Malacca, and even notes that Gujarati ship masters ⌈ nāhudā ⌉, were making use of Chinese sea faring ships ⌈ *junco de Mouros/*

Muslims ⌉, as was the case of Nāhudā Begrā and Nāhudā Ismael mentioned as *captain of a junk*.

A complementary note: The use and display of rich porcelain in Portugal (16th Century)

The use and display of rich porcelain in festivities in Portugal (imported from India) was already common in early 16th Century, precisely we hear of royal ceremonies and festivities in 1502 for the birth of crown prince D. João *with an astonishing display of many costly porcelains* as reported by Gaspar Correia in his *Crónicas de D. Manuele de D. João III (até 1533)*, p.14, 1502. In the same *Crónicas* we hear that at the death of Vasco da Gama (Christmas of 1524) the inventory of his personal *Great House* ⌈ treasure ⌉ being sent to Lisbon mentions a great *apparat of* ⌈ *drinking and eating* ⌉ *vessels (baixelas) and embroidered bed clothes and rich tapestries* that must have included embroidered silk and rich porcelain pieces. This information comes as complement to our previous remarks in this regard, particularly concerning Albuquerque's behaviour at Malacca and Diu. In any case it is a fact that during the whole 16th Century the Portuguese Court of Lisbon was importing via India many precious pieces of Chinese porcelain (Blue and white Ming period vessels were particularly appreciated and often mounted on silver) at a time when the process of making porcelain was mysterious, and the Court of Lisbon was trying hard to keep the monopoly of its import. If we consult later testimonies on the subject, we can only conclude on the importance of Chinese luxury goods such as Ming porcelain pieces, imported from India (Gujarat) in the years 1500–50, as instruments of prestige and diplomacy, by the Court of Lisbon even during the 17th Century (vide the Lisbon exhibition catalogue by A. M. Hespanha, et al. (*A Herança/The Heritage of Rauluchantim*, 1996, pp 113 and 129.)

In our recension of Barbosa's testimony we underline the fact that porcelain and silk from China and even Japan, were mostly exchanged against Indian and Gujarati goods *(panos de Cambaia spices)*. Indeed this system is also clearly mentioned by the Portuguese records who evoke the trade in Malacca as being *all based on exchange without any* ⌈ *official* ⌉ *coin struck by the* ⌈ *then* ⌉ *Malacca muslim Raja* though the Portuguese did try and failed to impose their own, locally made, currency in Malacca in order to capture the local trade (*Comentarios de Albuquerque* Part III, Cap XXXII, 157). Referring to Diu Malacca and China Chapters his description of Chinese merchant navy (about the *juncos/junks* and their function) is indeed revealing for the commercial routes and implications in the Gujarati navigation which dated from the 14th Century and even before, a fact confirmed by the presence of a large group of 13th Century Chinese blue and white porcelain dishes excavated in the kitchens of

the Tughlaq dynasty palace, one such rare piece was exhibited in Mumbai in 2017 (ref to exhibition catalogue *India and the World 2017*). The Gujarati trade route was then very active.

While quoting the importance of porcelain and silk (including precious cloth imported from China and painted in Gujarat) a trade that was indeed an important royal monopole, Barbosa does not forget the general aim of the Portuguese naval (aggressive) expeditions in those days: to secure the whole spices trade between Lisbon, the Red Sea, the Indian Gujarati and Malabar Coast and Ceylon and capture the trade with Malacca and beyond. And that was the case for hardly half a century. The decline of Goa and, of course of Diu from the second half of seventeenth century with the growing power of the Dutch also meant the decline of the Chinese connection with Diu.

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Cultural Convergence and Divergence in Chinese and Spanish Linguistic Policies

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1. Two top languages

Throughout the twentieth century linguistic policy measures have been taken in both China and Spain with crucial modernizing effects. Despite obvious differences in population, these two countries share a unique condition: among the world languages, Spanish and Chinese, like English, are spoken by large populations. Ostler (2015, 526) ranks Chinese as the first in his "top twenty languages", in terms of millions of speakers, and Spanish as the fourth, after English and Hindi. Ostler's "simplest, biological criterion for success" needs to be supplemented by the fact that English is the global language, the undisputed first and only world language (De Swaan 2001). Chinese and Spanish share a second trait, the fact that both have shown in modern times a remarkable level of linguistic convergence in a linguistic community spread over a very large territory. The striking fact in the case of Spanish is the divergent case of Spanish in Spain, very different from the convergent cases of both China and the Spanish-speaking Americas.

2. Chinese convergence

Language manement in China during the 20th century focused on the spread of a national spoken and written standard by means of the Chinese script (very slightly simplified) and the creation of an official alphabetic ortography (or romanization scheme). According to Spolsky (2014, 165), "the project is still far from complete;" he quotes Saillard (2004) stating that in 1984, "only 50% of the population was assumed to speak it." In 2004, the percentage was 53%, down to 20% for fluent

speakers of Standard Chinese (Chinese Ministry of Education 2004; Duanmu 2007, 5).

Even if some authors write (Spolsky 2014, 168) of a recent reversion from pluralistic to assimilationist language policies (Beckett and Postiglione 2012), or the move from linguistic diversity to language harmony (Minglang Zhou 2008), there has been a constant trend in Language management in China: since the May Fourth Movement (1919), the goal of language management has been a language community with an oral and written standard.

In the previous situation, as Yuen Ren Chao (Levenson 1977, 3) said in an interview, as a child he was able to talk in the Northern dialect, "an imperfect kind of Peking dialect," but was taught to read only in the Southern (Southeastern), Changzhou pronunciation (in the Wu dialect; p.57): The pronunciation of Chao's father, a magistrate who had passed the provincial juren examination, "sometimes had to be corrected by my mother, who spoke better Mandarin" (Levenson 1977, 5). In 1925, Chao recalls, "We [...] decided that we'd better take the natural speech of Peking city" as "national language" pronunciation (Levenson 1977, 78, 76).

The People's Republic of China adopted that standard of pronunciation, changing the name to "common speech", and achieved the three goals of language reform: a standard spoken language, an alphabetic writing system, and vernacular writing (Duanmu 2007, 4). Before the reform, most people spoke a variety of dialects (or topolects), could not read the character script, and could not write in the classical language. Today, there is a standard pronunciation and reading is learned with the aid of the official alphabetic pronunciation, while writing is carried out in a modern language connected to the classical language standard by means of the character script.

Ostler (2005, 167) claims that the language "Chinese, despite its billion speakers, might consider that it too has now entered a perilous path," like Coptic in Egypt did, as "it has no longer actively sustained" Confucian values. On the contrary, Chinese language reform has achieved both literacy in a modern spoken variety and cultural continuity through the Chinese script and the living presence of the classics.

Chinese thus shows a consistent cultural convergence: Chinese culture and language centers abroad are called Confucius Institutes, and Tang (classical) poetry is taught to children at home and recited at cultural events abroad. Language and culture management in China thus displays a successful convergence.

3. Spanish outer convergence and inner divergence

For Chinese, there is a millennial imperial history of cultural convergence, supported by a

constant historical factor: the Chinese script, an active cultural phenomenon shared by China and the Sinosphere. For Spanish, a colonial and imperial history has spread the Spanish culture throughout America. However, cultural traditions are completely different.

It is shown that results in linguistic policy are due to cultural convergence in the case of Chinese versus a dual condition for Spanish. There is cultural divergence in the case of Spanish in multicultural Spain (Helfrich 2008), as opposed to cultural convergence in the case of Spanish in the Americas, a unifying factor within a rich multicultural and multilingual environment, including a pluricentric approach (Bierbach 2000, RAE 2009) and a very diversified language contact situation (Hamel 2008). As Mar-Molinero and Stewart (2006: 3) point out, two salient features of Spanish today are "the policies of the Spanish government in promoting the global spread of Spanish, and the role of the US Latino Spanish-speaking population in its promotion." The Spanish Royal Academy's alliance with the Association of Spanish Language Academies strengthens convergence, that is, as Paffey and Mar-Molinero (2009, 170) remark, "policies which emphasize unity."

From the viewpoint of Spain, there is both outer convergence and inner divergence. There is convergence among Spain and the Spanish-spaeaking Americas, as Bernardez (2010, 1) shows: "Spanish has ceased to have a single point of reference; again, both inside and outside Spain. Some decades ago, the model of what may be termed 'Central Castilian' was seen as the ideal to be followed everywhere. Its 'essence' was kept by the Academias de la Lengua Española existing in all countries where the language is spoken. More recently, however, the situation has changed so much that the recently publish Gramática Académica has included variation as a naturally acceptable part of the language." There is also inner divergence in multilingual Spain, as Helfrich and other show.

A successful linguistic policy of Chinese as a common language thus has similar results to the outer convergence of Spanish, that is, the successful policy of integration of Spanish as a common language in different countries of America together with Spain. The paradox of inner cultural divergence in Spain is shown to account for the resulting multilingual policies, against the backdrop of global convergence associated with the English language.

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To the Third Continent: The Representation of Women in Cuore and Its Adaptations

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Introduction

Cuore, which means "heart" in Italian, is a children's book written by Edmondo De Amicis, first published in Italy in 1886. The book describes the life of an all-male elementary school class in late nineteenth-century Italy, as seen through the eyes of twelve-year-old Enrico. The story consists of three elements: Enrico's diaries, letters from his family, and monthly stories told by his teachers at school. The author intentionally sketches an idealized portrait of children, filled with ideas of sacrifice, philanthropy, and patriotism, for the purpose of strengthening unified Italy's new national identity. In 1902, Sugitani Daisui tried to translate *Cuore* into Japanese, but eventually produced a largely Japanized adaptation, whose title is translated as "A Schoolboy's Journal". A few years later, in 1910, Sugitani's work was adapted to Chinese by Bao Tianxiao under a title that is translated as "The School Life of Xiner."

At the dawn of modern Italy, boys gained considerable freedoms and started being treated as little adults; on the contrary, girls were still seen as little more than mothers-to-be. In the world of *Cuore*, girls are excluded from the category of "children" and are expected to follow a completely different path, whose main purpose is to prepare them for motherhood. As a girl was growing up, her options were limited to transitioning from daughter to mother, and she was largely confined to her home throughout the process. This not only reflected the spirit of the Catholic faith and the belief in Mother Mary, but also assigned females with specific educational roles: they could educate their own children at home, or they could be public educators but limited to elementary education. In the

Japanese adaptation of *Cuore*, the ideology of being a "good wife and wise mother" and the morals of Confucianism are evident in the female characters' speech and behavior. The Chinese adaptation keeps the idea of "good wife and wise mother", but more than the sense of loyalty to one's family, it reflects the traditional morals of Chinese feudal society.

This paper focuses on the cultural representations of female characters in *Cuore* and its Japanese and Chinese adaptations through an analysis of their authors' intensions and the way in which their respective political and social environments are reflected in these literary texts. Furthermore, I propose to demonstrate how morals and social ideologies are reflected in the idealized portrayal of women. By means of an analysis of the transformations of the text from the original to its Japanese and, from that, to its Chinese adaptation, this paper aims to shed new light on cultural representations, as well as gender issues in each of the societies in question.

Cuore: From Daughter to Mother, Ultimately a Guardian Angel

Giuseppe Mazzini, a prominent activist for the unification of Italy, emphasizing the importance of family, described women as the angels of a family with the ability both to give birth and to educate children.[1] Mazzini sees family as the motherland of people's hearts, and the establishment of the Italian motherland depends on the achievements of both men and women performing their duties. We know that after the unification of Italy, society viewed women as a symbol of maternity, and they were limited to acting in the confines of their families. Thus the world of *Cuore* is basically constructed from the viewpoint of men belonging in the bourgeoisie, as are patriarchal families as a whole.

In the *Cuore* universe, we can categorize the female characters into three roles: daughter, mother, and teacher. Starting with the role of the daughter, let us focus on Enrico's elder sister, Silvia, who has an educational role much like her mother, thus also symbolizing maternity. As mentioned earlier, the girls in *Cuore* are excluded from the category of "children". Expected by his father to be a promising new Italian boy, Enrico's perception of Silvia is based on the ideology of males belonging to the bourgeoisie. In his diary entry titled "Sacrifice", Silvia is described as a mother with a big and noble heart, who will without any doubt sacrifice herself to be a little mother for the family's sake.[2] The idea of a "big and noble heart" is inspired by the humane yet religious ideals of philanthropy, sacrifice,

1 Giuseppe Mazzini, "The Duties of Family," in The Dutiesof Man and Other Essays, trans. Jones. Thomas (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1907), 60–67

2 Edmondo De Amicis, Cuore: An Italian Schoolboy's Journal; A Book for Boys, trans. Isabel F. Hapgood (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Company, 1895), 231

and compassion. In this sense, Silvia's family can be seen as an ideal miniature of newly unified Italy. Both Enrico and Silvia—the former in the outer world of society and the latter in the inner world of family—are doing their duty toward the nation, as models of boys and girls seen from a patriarchal point of view. However, the concept of maternity is not limited to the domain of family but extends to school and the nation. Enrico's father exclaims that motherly love is the most precious kind of human love, and it is exactly the kind of love that motherland Italy has given to all Italian citizens.[1] The idea of the mother symbolizing the motherland transcends gender boundaries and seems to have become an absolute presence beyond the confines of patriarchal society. As the unity of a dispersed family symbolizes the unity of Italy, naturally, the mother—being the center of the family—symbolizes the nation. In "an episode about the death of a boy's mother" the teacher reads out to all the schoolboys a letter written by Mazzini in which he comforts a friend who has also lost his mother. We can see here how the image of mother is sanctified as a guardian angel: "Her transformation has placed a guardian angel in the world for thee, to whom thou must refer in all thy affairs, in everything that pertains to thee."[2]

What are the essential qualities that an ideal mother should have to produce ideal children? De Amicis's answer is a combination of the Italian unification spirit and the Catholic ideal of sacrifice. This image, inspired by Mother Mary, reveals women's maternal yet divine qualities, even though a mother's divinity is still based on patriarchal ideals. For example, the diary entry titled "The last day of the carnival"[3] narrates the story of a man who, after helping a lost girl named Maria return to her mother, takes out a gold ring with a large diamond and puts it on Maria's finger, saying, "Take this; it shall be your marriage dowry." His words eliminate Maria's role as a child and assign her with a woman's duty, as defined by patriarchal ideology, namely to become a wife and then a mother. As her name implies, this nearly six-year-old girl is expected to someday behave like Mother Mary, that is to say, as the guardian of her family and at the same time, as a mother with endless love and compassion for not only her own family but also society at large.

The third female role represented in *Cuore* is that of the teacher. In one episode, a gravely ill female teacher is compelled by her sense of duty toward the children to sacrifice herself and remain at school until her very last breath.[4] Considering the social conditions in Italy of the day, female teachers

1 De Amicis, *Cuore*, 294

2 De Amicis, *Cuore*, 222

3 De Amicis, *Cuore*, 139−42

4 De Amicis, *Cuore*, 305−9

were, in fact, under the pressure of the domestic ideology constructed by men and Catholic morals. Although they were allowed to work outside their home (where they could make the best use of their maternal abilities), their wages were lower than those of men. In addition, they had to participate in the church's activities. The death of the female teacher here can be seen as a metaphor of the betrayal of the sacred and motherly character of women. Once she steps out of the family domain, she is seen as a betrayer of social expectations, and death is the only way to atone for her lost morality and reputation.

A Schoolboy's Journal: "Good Wife and Wise Mother"

Before going on to analyze the Japanese adaptation *A Schoolboy's Journal*, we need to first take a look at the social and political conditions in Japan during the Meiji period. As Japan was entering the modern era, the developing notion of the gender division of labor led to a division between education for boys and education for girls, and the idea of a "good wife and wise mother" infiltrated girls' schools. This idea differs from the western concept of maternity, drawing from the morals of Confucianism. Even though by the 1870s, the Western education system had been introduced to Japan, the idea that a female ought to be a good wife and a wise mother, inspired by Confucian morals, which supported the nationalism of the Meiji government, became the core principle and objective of girls' education. While boys were expected to adhere to the virtues of humanity, justice, loyalty, and filial piety, girls were bound by the notions of obedience and chastity.

In the preface of *A Schoolboy's Journal*, Sugitani explains that he has omitted those episodes of the original work that, in his view, were unsuitable for Japanese customs and morals (for example, he omitted all the letters from his family). Stories that he thought were likely to be misinterpreted or made inappropriate reading at home were also eliminated or rewritten. Hence, perceptions of the mother and the female teacher either disappeared or were changed in favor of the "good wife and wise mother" ideology. What is more, the adaptation reflects realities of women living in Japan at the time. As mentioned earlier, female teachers in the original book represent maternity outside the domain of family, but in reality they are bound by the restrictions of both Borghese patriarchy and Catholic authority. In contrast, in Japan, most girls who chose to attend higher normal school to become teachers belonged either in the upper middle class or in the old blue-blooded aristocracy, and they commonly married men from the elite. Conversely, the reason that many girls pursued higher education was to broaden their knowledge and culture to prepare for moving to another "family" and achieve the objective of being "good wives and wise mothers". If "The death of the teacher" in *Cuore* pictured the image of a teacher who sacrifices herself for her students like a mother for her children,

in *A Schoolboy's Journal*, the spirit of sacrifice is in some way eclipsed, for her death is the result of her loneliness: she is so lonely that she would rather accompany the schoolboys than stay at home to convalesce.[1] Although maternity is also utilized for the purpose of national education, considering the social environment in modernizing Japan, it is difficult to imagine that a female teacher would devote her life to children. According to Nagahara Kazuko (2012), while female teachers took the lead in women's social participation, substantially contributing to improving the status of career women, the "good wife and wise mother" ideology also urged women to support the Japanese imperial system and militarism.[2] If that is the case, compared to female teachers in Italy, who were expected to embrace the values of Catholic kindness, those under the influence of Confucian morality and the "good wife and wise mother" ideology might have been socially more active.

Another adaptation that I find intriguing concerns an episode that in *Cuore* tells the story of a boy who is abused by his father, while in *A Schoolboy's Journal* the son is abused by both his father and his mother, as "his parents are extremely cruel people."[3] This suggests that in the household domain, if the mother could not perform her role effectively, she might arouse the father's violence. In modernizing Javan, women were assigned with educational functions that originated from maternity; thus the father's violence can be interpreted as stemming from the mother's incapability. In brief, a cruel mother without the virtues of charity, obedience, or modesty could disrupt the image of a happy family.

The School Life of Xiner: The Sense of Loyalty to One's Family

The descriptions of the mother's and the female teacher's roles in *The School Life of Xiner* basically follow the keynote of *A Schoolboy's Journal*. However, Bao not only changed some female characters' speech and behavior but also added scenes that do not exist in the Japanese adaptation. I would like to pay attention to three instances. The first is the episode I just mentioned above about the child battered by his parents. In *The School Life of Xiner*, Bao portrays a boy who has lost his biological mother, and his cruel stepmother, for the smallest mistake, beats him so severely that he even develops a heart disease. To understand this rescript, we must first consider the author's

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1 杉谷代水：《教育小説学童日志》(下の巻)，春阳堂，1902，151. Sugitani Daisui〔A Schoolboy's Journal Volume 2〕(Shunyoudou, 1902), 151.

2 永原和子：《近现代女性史论—家族・战争・平和》吉川弘文館、2012. Nagahara Kazuko〔*Historical treatise on modern females: family, war and peace*〕(Yoshikawa Koubun-kan, 2012).

3 杉谷代水：《教育小説学童日志》(上の巻)，春阳堂，1902，16. Sugitani Daisui〔A Schoolboy's Journal Volume 1〕(Shunyoudou, 1902),16.

own life experience, which affects his perception of womanhood. Both in his biographies and his autobiography, we see him frequently praising his mother and grandmother's kindness and virtues. On the other hand, in the episode "Visiting the grave,"[1] which he wrote, he expresses the intense regret and grief of a son for failing to perform his filial duty toward his poor mother, who sacrificed herself serving her ill mother-in-law for over ten years. From this and other episodes, we can see that, in the author's view, only a stepmother can treat a boy violently; even the father only uses violence because of the stepmother's influence on him.[2] The son himself does not comment on his stepmother but does try to defend his father, saying that all the punishments he got from him were justified by his own misbehavior. These stories offer a glimpse into traditional Chinese ethics, as they reveal the stark difference between the father and the stepmother regarding "filial piety", a core value in a society where blood relations are of central importance.

Secondly, both in the original book and in the Japanese adaptation, the episode "Shipwreck" portrays a boy who sacrifices his life to save a girl from a shipwreck. In the Chinese adaptation, the girl never marries but instead dedicates the rest of her life to doing her filial duty toward her parents, while taking up a vegetarian diet and embroidering Buddhist images. The boy and girl, being unrelated, board the same ship coincidentally. The girl's determination to maintain her chastity and never to get married in order to repay her debt to the boy makes her a typical figure that represents the "faithful yet virtuous woman" (烈妇/贞妇) under traditional Chinese morals.

The third instance concerns Xiner's relationship with his younger sister. Even though in the Japanese adaptation, the author has changed Silvia's character from elder to younger sister, her speech and behavior have only slightly changed. But in *The School Life of Xiner*, when the younger sister realizes that the family is facing financial difficulties, she immediately goes to ask for Xiner's help and advice: "Mother, brother has something to discuss with you." "Brother told me that we need to tighten our belts and not waste a penny." "Brother suggested that you do not make more clothes for us because that would be a waste."[3] Different from the two other works, Xiner, as the older brother, adopts a positive attitude and takes on a leading role even though he only speaks through his sister. This phenomenon can be explained by the reversed seniority, or it may be a consequence of perceptions of gender differences. In other words, females other than mothers have almost no right to

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1 包天笑:《馨儿就学记》马持盈注译, 台湾商务印书局, 2009 年 2 月, 286. Bao Tianxiao［The School Life of Xiner］(Commerical Press Taiwan, 2009.2),286.

2 包天笑 op. cit. 29, 176.

3 包天笑 op. cit, 347-8.

speak at home, and when they want to express their opinions, they need to ask for the men's consent using modest language. I believe that this change in the depiction of the sister reflects the Confucian ideal of "three obediences and four virtues" (三从四德) and at the same time, patriarchal authority.

Conclusion

In *Cuore*, the ideal of the Italian woman follows a path that leads from daughter to mother to angel. Girls are not depicted as actors in the development of the nation; their role is limited to that of mothers-to-be, and their nature as children is ignored. In other words, looking at the trajectory of girls growing up, it can be said that they are confined to certain sexual obligations and responsibilities from the very beginning. This phenomenon was common in modernizing Japan and China as well. In Japan, girls were bound by the "good wife and wise mother" ideology, and in *A Schoolboy's Journal* a boy-centered world is established by eliminating parts of the original contents. On the other hand, in *The School Life of Xiner* Bao alters the female characters and presents a rather different view of womanhood. The author has a strong attachment to the ethics and morals of the traditional Chinese society, and with his alterations of plots and female characters, he attempts to reinforce men's social authority.

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From the Prophet's Companion to Monotheist Romance Hero Hamza-nama in the Global Context

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The *Hamza-nama* or the romance of Amir Hamza is a popular romance of Arabian or Persian origin. The hero of the romance, Hamza b. 'Abd al-Mutallib (d.625), is a historical figure who was the uncle of the Prophet Muhammad. According to the romance, he served the Sasanian Emperor, Anushirvan, who was historically called Khosrow I (r. 531–579). Hamza marched as far as India, China, Europe or Morocco, and fought with polytheist enemies, who were obliged to become monotheists or to be killed after being defeated by Hamza.

Although the romance can be called the most-read romance in the Muslim World from the Middle East to South East Asia or Xinjiang in pre-modern times, the romance has not attracted suitable attention from researchers. When one compares it with the Arabian Nights or the Alexander Romance, one must say that the study on the Hamza Romance has been quite weak.[1] For example, only a few Urdu versions were translated into English language.[2] This might be partly because the romance does not much relate to the West, or the romance has an Islamic religious flavor, or the romance was written in so many languages that sometimes it is not considered as national literature in each country. However, if we assume that the term "globalization" does not only mean the phenomenon started by

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1   The pioneer of this field is Van Ronkel's thesis: PH. S. Van Ronkel, *De Roman van Amir Hamza* (Leiden, 1895). Other studies focus mainly on the work in Urdu literature or Art history of South Asia. For example: Frances W. Pritchett, The Romance Tradition in Urdu: Adventures from the Dastan of Amir Hamzah (New York, 1991); John Seyller, *The Adventures of Hamza: Painting and Storytelling in Mughal India* (Washington, D.C., 2002).

2   The unabridged translation of the 19th century Urdu version is: Musharraf Ali Farooqi, *The Adventures of Amir Hamza: Lord of the Auspicious Planetary Conjunction* (New York, 2008).

the Western expansion in the age of discovery, the romance well represents cultural expressions under globalization.

This paper discusses how and why the romance prevailed among the Muslims from the Middle East to South East Asia, and what the romance represents to them.

1. The Romance and History

Hamza b. ʿAbd al-Mutallib as a historical figure is well described in Hadith literature and the biographies of the Prophet Muhammad. He was the paternal uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, and one of the early converters to Islam. He was a magnanimous person and a brave warrior; he initiated the first holy war in Islamic history. However, Hamza drank too much and his bad behavior when he was drunk was among the reasons that Prophet Muhammad prohibited alcohol for Muslims. He was killed in the battle of Uhud in 625, and the prophet grieved profusely after his death. He lived around Mecca and Medina in the Arabian Peninsula.

However, in the romance, Hamza's activity extended far beyond the Arabian Peninsula. He was born in Mecca. Before the emergence of Islam, he went to Mada'in or Ctesiphon in today's Iraq, and served the Sasanian Emperor Anushirvan. Hamza fell in love with Mehr-negar, the daughter of the emperor, and accepted the emperor's orders in order to marry her. A wicked adviser of the emperor sent various armies to Hamza, and tried to kill him to prevent his marriage with the princess. Hamza marched all over the world including China and Europe and fought with enemies. Hamza's fight was not only for his marriage but for spreading monotheism. Although he was called Muslim in the romance, in fact, he was a follower of the Abrahamic i.e., monotheist religion. When Hamza subdued a polytheist or Zoroastrian enemy, he made the enemy choose one of two options: To be killed or to convert to monotheism. If the enemy says "there is no God but God, and Abraham is the friend of God," he becomes monotheists and his life is spared.

The romance reminds us of early Muslim conquest from the Middle East to Spain or to Central Asia. However, although Hamza is described as Muslim, he did not need to obey the shariʿa because he lived before Muhammad's revelation. He always had a party after a battle and drank alcohol. He had more than four wives. In other words, this is a Muslim parallel world that the audience can enjoy without considering the restrictions stipulated by the religion of Islam.

Naturally, religious scholars criticized the romance as it told a false story about the uncle of the prophet. In the 14th Century, the famous Hanbali scholar, Ibn Taymiya criticized Turkomans in Syria for they narrated a false story about Hamza. In the 16th century, the famous Ottoman Hanafi

jurist, Ebu Suud ruled that the storytellers of the Hamza romance should be punished by law. In the 17th century Iran, Mohammad Baqer Majlesi, the Shiʿite authority, wrote that an untrue story such as the Hamza romance must be prohibited. In spite of the fact that the romance has religious flavor the authorities of three schools of Islamic law had severe attitudes toward the Hamza romance.

In spite of criticism by religious scholars, the Hamza romance survived and prevailed over vast Muslim regions as far as Xinjiang and South East Asia. In the Middle East, the romance found a large audience in the Ottoman and the Safavid empires. A writer named Hamzavi (d.1411–2) composed the 24 volume *Hamza-nama* in Ottoman Turkish prose. The founder of the Safavid Empire, Shah Isma'il (d.1524) invited a storyteller, Takaltu Khan—a master of *Hamza-nama* performance to the court. The shah loved *Hamza-nama* so much that he named his sons after the figures in the *Hamza-nama*. Under the Ottomans and Safavids, *Hamza-nama* was the most popular story told in coffee houses.

2. South Asia

The *Hamza-nama* reached South Asia as early as the 15th century. In fact, the existent oldest Persian manuscript of the work is believed to be from Gujarat, West India in the same century.[1]

Persian was an official language of the Mughal Empire. For this reason, a bulk of Iranian literati migrated to India under the Mughal rule. One of them, Darbar Khan, the son of Takaltu Khan, served the Mughal Emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605). The emperor asked Darbar Khan to narrate for him the story of Amir Hamza. Akbar also ordered the composition of the illustrated manuscript of *Hamza-nama*. The manuscript, once containing 360 miniatures, is considered a masterpiece of Mughal painting, parts of which are now preserved in various museums in the world. The recto sides include miniatures while the verso contain the text of the story.[2]

Another source related to *Hamza-nama*, a Persian work, *Tiraz al-Akhbar* (The Workshop of Traditions), was compiled in Patna, North India in 1631–2. This is the manual for recitation of *Hamza-nama*. The author, 'Abd al-Nabi Qazvini, migrated from Iran to India when he was early twenties. Just like other Iranian migrants to Mughal India, he wanted to be a Persian poet, who would enjoy the patronage of the Mughal notables. Unfortunately, he was not so gifted as a poet; he had to find something different instead. He discovered the recitation of *Hamza-nama*; he was familiar with the work from his childhood and memorized it. Subsequently he spent ten years in India, engaging in

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1   *Qissa-i Amir Hamza*. Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, MS. or. folio. 4181.

2   For the details, see Seyller, *The Adventures*.

trade and performing the work. His recitation of the *Hamza-nama* was received well and praised by the notables and received their praise. Moreover, he decided to compile a manual for the recitation. In this book, he explained in detail how to describe kings and *vazir*, how to portray landscape in spring or how to insert Persian poetry into the recital. The manual cited 39 major literary works and the poetry of 90 Persian poets. The manual indicated what was necessary for the recitation of *Hamza-nama*.[1]

The *Hamza-nama* not only prevailed in North India but also in the Deccan Plateau. Another migrant from Iran, Hajji Qissa-khan (i.e. storyteller) Hamadani, came to Hyderabad, Deccan with some books related to the *Hamza-nama*. In 1613–4, he compiled an abridged version of the *Hamza-nama* titled *Zubdat al-Rumuz* by the order of 'Abd Allah Qutb Shah of the Golconda Kingdom. The work indicated that the *Hamza-nama* and its storytelling prevailed in South India, and this was related to the migration of Iranians and Persianate culture.

The tradition of the recitation of *Hamza-nama* continued until the early twentieth century. A gazetteer of the city of Delhi, first published in 1847, stated that the storytellers recite *Hamza-nama* at the north gate of the congressional mosque in Delhi every evening at that time. Three hundred years after Akbar's time, the *Hamza-nama* telling found audience among ordinary people in Urdu language and was performed in public spaces. The translation of the Persian *Hamza-nama* to Urdu language started in the late eighteenth century. The forty-six-volume Nawal Kishor Press edition published between 1883 and 1917 contained many new stories invented in North India.[2] One of the most popular stories of Indian origin is the *Tilsam-i hoshruba* i.e. spell of fascination.[3] The *Hamza-nama* was also translated into other Indian languages such as Hindi, Telugu, Bengali and Panjabi.

3. South East Asia

The Hamza romance went beyond the Indian Subcontinent and the Persianate regions, where Persian language had strong presence. First, the romance was translated into Malay language. Van Ronkel found a Malay manuscript of *Hamza-nama*, which contains notes in Persian handwriting.[4] Without doubt, the translation of the romance was done directly from Persian to Malay.

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1   For details of the work, Pasha M. Khan, *The Broken Spell: Indian Storytelling and the Romance Genre in Persian and Urdu* (Detroit, 2019), chapter 3.

2   Edited by Shaykh Tasadduq Husayn, Muhammad Husain Jah, and Ahmad Husain Qamar.

3   M. H. Jah, *Hoshruba*, trans. M. A, Farooqi (n.p.2009).

4   Van Ronkel, *De Roman*, 94.

Early mention on Malay Hamza romance is found in the *Malay Annals* (*Sĕjarah Mĕlayu*).[1] In 1511, when the Portuguese attacked Malacca, Sultan Mahmud tried to encourage his soldiers and gave them the book of the Hamza romance for reciting. In other words, a Malay version of the *Hamza-nama* had already existed in the court of the Malacca Kingdom in the early sixteenth century. Since Malay language was the lingua franca in Maritime Southeast Asia, the Hamza romance was further translated from Malay to other languages in South East Asia such as Javanese, Makasar, and Sundanese. The Javanese version was transformed into poetry.

Various types of performances related to the Hamza romance developed in Maritime South East Asia. The puppet theater, Wayang Golek, in Central Java was one of them. According to the traditions, the Wayang Golek was created by Sunan Kudus for performing the Hamza romance in the 16th century. Since the puppet theaters in Indonesia was said to be influenced by Chinese puppet theaters, and the word Golek was derived from Chinese gui-rei-xi (傀 儡 戏), one may say that the Wayang Golek was a product of both Middle Eastern and Chinese traditions. Also, in Lombok island, the Hamza romance was popular for the shadow play, Wayang Sasak. On the other hand, the legends of Indian origins including the Mahabarat and the Ramayana were also popular for puppet theaters and shadow plays in the neighboring regions, and competed with the Hamza romance.

The Malay opera named Bangsawan, which flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century also had the Hamza-nama as part of their repertory. The model of this theatre was the Parsi theatre of India, where also the Hamza romance was played. Moreover, sometimes Wayang Golek was performed by human as a dance theater in Yogyakarta at the sultan's court; in 1879 and 1989 such performances were reported.[2]

In South-East Asia, the Hamza romance inspired different types of performances, which were influenced by, or competed with Chinese and Indian traditions.

Conclusion

The Hamza romance was brought from the Middle East to South East Asia through Persian and Malay languages. We know Persian was an important cultural catalyst in pre-modern Eurasia and so many discussions on Persianate culture have been done and still are going on.[3] However, what is interesting here is that the Hamza romance easily went beyond Persianate societies. Why was the

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1 C. C. Brown, trans. *Sĕjarah Mĕlayu or Malay Annals* (Kuala Lumpur, 1970), 162−163.

2 Felicia Hughes-Freeland, *Embodied Communities: Dance Traditions and Change in Java* (New York, 2008), 70−71.

3 As a recent example, Nile Green, *The Persianate World: The Frontiers of a Eurasian Lingua Franca*(Oakland, 2019).

romance accepted by so many people from different cultural and language backgrounds?

One reason is, of course, related to the religion of Islam. The spread of Islam encouraged peoples' reception of the romance of Prophet's uncle. Also, the romance overlapped with early Muslim conquest and had some religious flavor. Even so, the content of the romance was far from orthodox Islam, as we can see from the negative reactions of the Islamic legal authorities. It might be too simplistic to emphasize the religious element of the romance as the reason of its reception.

We might see the common Muslim popular culture behind the prevalence of the *Hamza-nama*. People liked the work because first it was attractive entertainment, and, also appealed to their Muslim identity. As a form of entertainment, the work was translated into the languages of non-Muslims such as Georgian, Hindi, and Telugu. Further, the romance inspired puppet theaters, shadow plays, and dance theaters, which also related to Chinese and Indian traditions. The Hamza romance produced a variety of representations and local stories in each region. Although the forms of its expressions varied in different regions, the romance itself was globally accepted and represents global expressions in Asia and the Middle East.

Arabic Prosody, Translation and Culture: A Comparative Study of Prosody between Classical Chinese and Arabic Poetry

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Abstract:

Poetry is an art suiting both refined and popular tastes, which condenses a large amount of literature and linguistic knowledge. No matter what kind of language we speak, its poetry always be full of magic things such as musical rhyme. For this reason, poetry becomes much easier to be recited and read, and its meaning will leave a deep impression on readers' mind naturally. This paper will use comparative approach to compare the characteristics of Classical Chinese poetry with Classical Arabic poetry in three domains including rhythm, meter and rhyme, in order to reveal the differences and similarities between them and assist the learner to have a further study and research in this field, especially for mutual translation for both kinds of poetry.

Key words: Classical Chinese prosody; Classical Arabic prosody; Comparative poetry study

Due to a rich prosodic variation in the poetry, every line is brimmed with a beautiful melody. To some extent, both traditional Chinese and Arabic poems[1] aim to pursue three main goals, that is, bringing about the beauty in poem forms, contents as well as rhythms. If we read or sing the following classical Chinese and Arabic verses respectively, it should be easy for us to feel the complete differences between the poetry and prose[2].

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1   The traditional Arabic poetry can date back to the period before the advent of Islam in 610 C.E. as Lu (2006:5) said, at that time all poems were created and spread orally among the social classes.

2   The most distinguishing features between the prose and poetry is the prosody (Youyong Wang, 2014: 180).

Changling Wang:

秦时明月汉时关，万里长征人未还。平平仄仄仄平平，仄仄平平仄仄平。

Abu alqa: sim aSSa'bi:

إِذَا الشَّعْبُ يَوْمًا أَرَادَ الْحَيَاةَ، فَلاَ بُدَّ أَنْ يَسْتَجِيبَ الْقَدَرْ

إذ ششع ب يومن أراد ل حياة، فلا بد د أن يس تجيب ل قدر

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We live in a world where there are thousands of sounds repeating around us every day, like the murmuring of a running river, merry whistling of birds, blowing of breeze, and ringing of bells. All of those sounds always have a deep impact on our emotions at any time, weakly or strongly. Thus we may feel joyful like a child, even burst with excitement; We may feel sad and fail to fall asleep during the night; We might get immensely relieved and sign with complicated feelings. The sound of poetry is one of the thousand sounds that existed in this world. In the ancient Chinese and Arab societies, poetry was very popular among all the social classes, in that it could satisfy their aspirations to enjoy the beautiful melody inside the lines or words. Sometimes poetry's rhythm can be quick and light, sometimes it can be bright and cheerful, and sometimes it can be a little shy. When we do some readings or sing a poem, our emotions will be affected and changed by the variation of its forms, meters or rhythms, just as we heard various sounds from different places. Poetry's melody leads us to feel our life and taste our dreams.

What is the rhythm of classical Chinese poetry? The length of a meter in Chinese poetry depends on the number of Chinese characters. The classical Chinese poetry can be divided into several types based on the number of its characters, such as a bi-character poem, tri-character poem, four-character poem, five-character poem, seven-character poem, and nine-character poem. Usually, we are very familiar with five-character and seven-character poems. The five-character quatrain contains 20 characters totally and the seven-character quatrain contains 28 characters totally. By contrast, five-character octave contains 40 characters totally and seven-character octave contains 56 characters. As for the long-verse poem, it seems there are no strict constraints for the character number used in it.

In classical Chinese poetry, each Chinese character usually stands for one syllable, so every two or three syllables compose one foot. Therefore, we can find that a poem is written on the basis of strict sequences and combinations of those feet or syllables. It is widely accepted that the syllable can be regarded as the smallest unit of the foot. When dividing the foot, we need to take two principles into consideration, i.e. the proper syllable combination and the full meaning of words. As for the

four-character poem, there are two feet in it, both of which are made up of two syllables. The five-character poem consists of three feet, the syllable sequence patterned in every line can be two syllables first, then two syllables, and lastly one syllable, or two syllables first, then one syllable, and lastly two syllables (221; 212). The seven-character poem often consists of four feet, the syllable sequence patterned in each line can be like this: two syllables come first, two follow them, then two, and lastly one syllable or two syllables come first, then two follow them, then one syllable, and lastly two syllables (2221; 2212).

The syllable in classical Chinese poetry can sound in two ways: even and oblique tones. For the traditional Chinese, there are four tones to pronounce them as Yongyi Wang suggests (1994: 8), namely the even tone (the first tone), the rising tone (the second tone), the entering tone (the third tone) and the falling tone (the fourth tone). After the development of Chinese, there are also four tones appearing, including the level tone (the first tone), the rising tone (the second tone), the falling-rising tone (the third tone) and the falling tone (the fourth tone), but the entering tone hasn't been available already. The even tones in Chinese mean very smooth and steady without the tendency of falling or rough parts, thus, the level tone and the rising tone often produce a strong and forceful effect on our hearing. Besides, the pronunciation of them will cost a long time. By contrast, the oblique tones mean slant and narrowness, which are characterized by shortness and clearness in terms of pronunciation, properly matching with the features of rising tone and falling-rising tone in the modern Chinese. When even tones link with oblique tones naturally in a line, reading it will produce the sound that goes up and down, lingering in the air, so as to reveal the rich rhythm existed in traditional Chinese poetry.

What is the rhythm for Arabic classical poetry? There are no constraints for Arabic words in poetry, but there are some constraints for the number of word letters, thus Arabic poetry can be divided into 28-letter poetry, 30-letter poetry, 40-letter poetry, and 42-letter poetry. It is worthy of being noticed that the seven-letter complete and incomplete meters are equal to the five-letter complete and incomplete meters in terms of total letters. In Arabic poetry, the foot can be long or short according to needs, whose basic unit is called the prosodic segment. It contains a linking pile, split pile, slight cord, and heavy cord. Besides, the prosodic segment consists of some motion and quiescent letters. In one Arabic verse, the vowels link with consonants to manifest the rich various rhythm hidden in Arabic classical poetry. Arabic meter belongs to the quantitative meters, thus the pronunciation length of each foot will affect the rhythm of the poetry, which is different from other languages. For instance, English poetry belongs to the qualitative meter system, the stressed part links with the light part in the poetry

to produce the rhythm. In Arabic, the part representing the long pronunciation in a word is heavier than that of a short one. When we read this part in a poem, it will take more time than that of a short one also, which will cause the change that occurs in the interval between the long and short.

In the Chinese classical poem, the meter forms will be increased by changing of even and oblique tones. Among those poems, five-character quatrain, five-character octave, seven- character quatrain, and seven-character octave totally have sixteen forms, but there is no terminology to distinguish these forms. Chinese octave poetry aims to produce a kind of opponency for characters that represent the even and oblique tones between two half lines. It also aims to produce a kind of matching between the second and the third line, which are so-called jaw line and neck line, but in the quatrain poetry, the method of matching is always not necessary except opponency. In classical Chinese poetry, the opponency means creating the opposite element, and link means creating the same element, so even tone links with even tone, and oblique tone links with oblique one. The later line should link with the former one and use the same kind of character for both even and oblique tones as Li Wang mentioned in his book (1978: 334). The matching method in Chinese classical poetry prefers to make matching for characters, the property of words, and even and oblique tones.

Please look at the following pattern of even and oblique tones for the five-character quatrain:

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In classical Arabic poetry, there are sixteen forms for meters. Only one of them should be used in poetry just like the rule of classical Chinese poetry. According to the similarity of prosodic segments, they can be put into five circles. Every kind of forms can produce more various branch forms. After the study, Yanglu Li (2018: 171) finds there are two kinds of laws to control the form changing. The one is free changing rules, and the other is fixed rules. The free rules contain the second letter deleting method (aliDma:r), the second letter quiescence method (ala'Sab), the second motion letter deleting method (alwagaS), the second quiescent letter deletion method (alkhabn), fourth quiescent letter deletion method (aTTiyy), the second and fourth quiescent letter deletion method (alkhabl), the fifth motion letter deletion method (ala'gal), the fifth quiescent letter deletion method (algabD), the seventh quiescent letter deletion method (alkaff). The second kind is named fixed deletion rules (ali'lla), which change the light cord, linking pile, and split pile through quiescence, deletion and adding methods. These rules often happen in the last foot of the first half line, the second half line or both half lines together in a poem, which contain: the light cord deletion method (alhazf), the quiescent letter

deletion method in the light cord with quiescence (alqaSr), the spilt pile deletion method (aSSulamu), the seventh motion letter deletion method (alkasaf), the first letter deletion method in the linking pile (attashshi':th), the linking pile deletion method (alHazhazh), the quiescent letter deletion method in linking pile with quiescence (alqaTae'), the compound method of the light cord deletion and quiescent letter deletion in the linking pile with quiescence (albatr), the compound method of the light cord deletion and the fifth letter quiescence (alqaTf), the seventh letter quiescence method (alwaqaf), the quiescent letter adding method following the linking pile (attazi:l), the light cord adding method following the linking pile (attarfi:l), the quiescent letter adding method following the light cord (attasbi:gh).

The classical Arabic poetry has its own system of terminologies for its prosodies. In the circle of difference (the first circle) (almukhtalif), there are the long meter (aTTawi:l), the extended meter (almadi:d) and the outspread meter (albasi:t). In the second circle the linking circle (almu'talif), there are the exuberant meter (alwa:fir) and the perfect meter (alka:mil). In the third circle the entering circle (almujtalab), there are trembling meter (arrajaz), the running meter (arramal) and the trilling meter (alhazaj). In the fourth circle the similar circle (almushtabi), there are the swift meter (assari:e'), the flowing meter (almunsariH), the nimble meter (alkhafif), the similar meter (almuDa:rie'), the lopped meter (almuqtaDib) and the amputated meter (almujtathth). In the last one the united circle (almuttafig), it contains the tripping meter (almutaqa:rib) and the continuous meter (almutada:rak). The classical Arabic poetry never requires the using of opponency in the first and second half line of a poem. From the perspective of rhetoric, opposite elements are appearing in the whole poetry.

In the case of rhyme in poetry, classical Chinese poetry can use the rhyme in the first half line and the second half line. In addition, every full line (the even half line) has a rhyme at the end of the foot, rhyme on the consonant letter of the last character. This letter is a part of the character of even tone, thus the whole poetry should be built on the same even tone. There is no permit to change the rhyme in any line of the poem as is the basic rule to compose it. In classical Arabic poetry, there is also something like rhyme, every full line (even half line) is built on the same rhyme letter. The length of rhyme is different from one poem to another. Sometimes a rhyme has several letters and sometimes it is an entire word. Besides, classical Arabic poetry also aims to utilize one united rhyme also, so there is no permit to change the rhyme in any line of a poem. No matter what kind of poem it is, Chinese one or Arabic one, they both use the rhyme, thus the poem will produce more harmonious repeated sounds.

Conclusion

There are some differences between classical Chinese and Arabic prosody. The classical Chinese prosodic pattern is changed through the repeated even and oblique tones behind the characters. But it doesn't look like the English poem, which depends on the stressed and light sound. Besides, every character is a syllable. However, it is the same as the classical Arabic poetry in some aspects such as the foot, that is, the foot is regarded as the basic unit of meters. When writing poetry, the poet is able to use the foot he wants according to his needs. The Chinese character syllables and the Arabic prosodic segments are the basic units for both feet. Each part of the meters are well organized, so it is not hard to gain some regular rules to regulate poetry. However, it seems that Arabic prosodic segments incline to produce more forms to arrange the position of motion letter and quiescent letter. Secondly, the Chinese character which stands for one syllable also is made up of vowel letters and consonant letters, while the Arabic prosodic segment is made up of motion letters and quiescent letters. In fact the motion letter consists of vowel and consonant. Thus the prosody of both kinds of poetry is varied by patterning different syllables (or letters inside the words). Thirdly, the even tones and oblique tones are not only the representative of poem length but also the representative of its tone, while the prosodic segment in the classical Arabic poetry can't reflect the tonal variation. Both classical Chinese and Arabic poetry are built on the regular changing and repeating of feet. From the perspective of rhyme, both kinds of poetry have their own unique rhyme, which is very smooth and harmonious. Arabic is a kind of hypotaxis language, thus a large number of personal pronouns are used to show the subject or object, i.e. their using frequency is very high. Chinese is zero anaphora language, thus a lot of zero personal pronouns are used so that the whole poetry becomes much unhindered, the words become simpler and the meaning is very clear. Whatever classical Chinese poetry or Arabic poetry we read, we find both of them have the opponency characteristics. In Chinese poetry, even tones and oblique tones are kinds of opponency, while in Arabic poetry, motion letter and quiescent letter are kinds of opponency, but the opponency is not as obvious as that in Chinese poetry. In conclusion, the poet always tries to change the tone of Chinese character or position of Arabic letter or use different prosodic matching methods to write Chinese poetry or Arabic one.

When a translator wants to translate the Chinese poetry to Arabic, or oppositely from the Arabic poetry to Chinese, it must be painful to do so, especially the poet wants to save the original form of the poetry, such as rhyme, meter, and rhythm. In fact, it's almost impossible for any translator to do so, and the translator in most situations can't be a poet either. Nevertheless, he may manage to convert

the Chinese poetry style to a Arabic one or oppositely from Arabic poetry style to a Chinese one. Naturally, we will fail to see the original sequences for Chinese characters after the translation. But if someone can translate Chinese poetry into a pure Arabic style or very close to it, he or she will be thought of as a successor in this field, because the translation successfully keeps the taste of poetry, and vice versa. For some people who work in the field of criticism, this kind of conversion may not a perfect change or just the last choice, but it can't be denied that the translated poetry has been reached a high level of likeness to some extent. Translating the poetry is hard, harder than climbing up to the sky. The translator needs to care about beauty in poetry form, meaning, and music. (See the preface by Jikun Zhong, 2019) If we deeply learn two kinds of poetry contexts, then do more comparative studies in detail, we will find more similarities and differences in all the aspects between them, such as rhyme, prosody, rhetoric, etc.. Next, the translator may do a better job to translate the classical Chinese and Arabic poetry interchangeably.

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Mutual Recognition and Self-Identity in Intercultural Communication—A Cross-Cultural Study Based on Chardin's Travels in Persia

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With the increasing opportunities of communication between different cultures and civilizations, particularly through conquest and commerce, since the 16th century, people in different parts of the world have become more and more aware of each other. European travelers and merchants, and, less frequently, travelers from the Islamic world and China, wrote a series of travel journals and correspondences to record their perception of the "other". The Europeans, owing to their own mindset, described a "different" Islamic world out of the real Middle East, whereas people of the Middle East viewed the West as "infidels" and they led a "barbarous" life. Although hundreds of years has elapsed, misconception and prejudices remain largely unchanged. Under the age of globalization, it is meaningful to make a foray into the way of communication between the West and the Islamic world. In terms of this, we can point out the differences as well as summarize experience useful for our inter-cultural communication.

Here we take Jean Chardin's *Travels in Persia* as an example to analyze this topic. Chardin proves to be a great writer of knowing culture and people in Iran well. Centering on the Safavid court as well as interactions of different groups of people in Isfahan, not only could he be detailed when recording the events related to intercultural communication, but also provide us with a global perspective. In addition, the 16th and the 17th centuries were the inception of large-scale inter- communication between Europe and the rest of the world, so Chardin's work, composed in the late 17th century, is a good example for better understanding this great trend of international

communication. We then decide to analyze it in three perspectives, namely, history, comparative literature and political culture. Through history, we have an idea of the way of communication between Safavid Iran and Europe, and based on Safavids' strategy of dealing with the Armenians, we know that the government should take the responsibility to maintain stability and order in the course of inter-cultural communication. By means of comparative literature, a clear picture describing the "otherness" of the Orient in Westerners' eyes is presented to us, and we can understand that there is not without reason that people in the West of this day still have such a big misunderstanding of the Islamic world. Finally, thanks to the analysis of Chardin and Foucault's perception of the Iranian political culture, we can better understand the similarities and differences between the Islamic world and the West in terms of people's political life. These analyses provide us with a more comprehensive picture of the complexity of inter-cultural communication.

Analysis of an Armenian Merchant's Conversion on the Perspective of Intercultural Communication in the Late Safavid Era

Xu Weijie

Question: Why did Chardin tell the Armenian bishop that he'd better not ask the Christian countries or the Pope for help?

Background:

The merchant, one of the richest men in the Safavid Empire, was forced to convert to Islam, pushing the Armenians into consternation. They were afraid of failing to protect their own faith. Western missionaries suggested the Bishop write a letter to the Pope for help, whereas Chardin disapproved of it. He raised two reasons: first, what the West could offer were no more than dispatching diplomats and writing letters; second, it did no good to the relationship between Christians and Muslims (Chardin: 136–137).

As a matter of fact, since the reign of Abbas the Great, concessions and privileges had been bestowed on the Armenians. Not only could they enjoy autonomy, but also shared monopoly of economic resources. Coercive conversion was seldom in the Safavid Empire against the Armenians.

Be that as it may, with the decline of Safavid trade (Newman: 95) and the penetration of Western companies as well as the tribal forces of the surroundings in the late 17th century, the government was vigilant of the Armenians as agents of communication between Iran and the West. The government thus ought to take actions to protect Iran. Besides, the conversion of the merchant was beneficial for the parity of economic distribution between Christians and Muslims. In the short run, maybe it would ignite furor among Armenians, but in the long run, harmony would remain. As a merchant, Chardin

understood that only when the Western merchants were in harmony with the Safavid government could they enjoy the environment of free trade.

Introduction:

The increasing frequency of interaction between the Safavid Empire and the West was the incentive for the Safavids to change the policy. Under global cultural communication, it is meaningful to delve into it, for it can provide experience for us.

1. Part I: the dilemma of the Safavid Empire in interactions with the world

2. Part II: the Armenians as agents of Safavid communication with Europe

3. Part III: the Conversion of the Merchant in the eyes of different parties Conclusion

Text Mining: Oriental Images by an Observer and an Imaginer—Travels in Persia and The Revolt of Islam

Yang Lei

Questions: 1. What are the differences between oriental images created by an observer and an imaginer? 2. From a narrative perspective, how an observer and an imaginer created those differences?

Background: The Orient has remained a mystery for the West for thousands of years. Dr. Samuel Johnson once stated that the Christian world and the Mahometan world are two objects of curiosity and others remains barbarous (1793). The word "orient" originated from a Latin "Oriens" that means the place where the sun rises. From etymology, sunrise sends positive messages. Scholars have been studied Orient through various perspectives, yet oriental images established by the westerners are quite negative and irony. Michael Curtis stated that the oriental image created by the west was deliberately to ignore the positive writings which contributed to the understanding of the area (15). To investigate oriental images in European in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the essay compares oriental images through unique perspectives by an observer and an imaginer (a romantic poet) from narrative perspectives combined Python. Jean (John) Chardin traveled to Persia as a jeweler merchant and he was fluent in Persian during his travel. He observed that the power of climate to build customs, writing "the cause or origin of the customs and habits of the Orientals lay in the nature of their climate" (qtd. in *Orientalism and Islam*). In *Travels in Persia*, he built an Orient outside the world through four dimensions, which are three-dimensional space and time.

Percy Shelley is a British romantic poet whose works are widely read by audience across the world. In *the Revolt of Islam*, Shelley created an Orient through Laon and Cythna's journey to the East after the failure of revolution. Although Sir Chardin and Shelley created oriental universes, their methods, images, and purposes are different.

Structure:

Part I provides literature review of orientalism and an introduction of Sir Jean (John) Chardin and Shelley's writings and activities about the Orient.

Part II demonstrates the differences of oriental images created by Sir Chardin and Shelley from quantitative analysis combined with text mining and Python. They both created oriental universes outside the real world, but large differences remain.

Part III analyzes their oriental images through different narrative methods and writing skills they adopted. Sir Chardin has established a universe outside the real world by three-dimension space and time and writing skills of zoom in and zoom out. Shelley's oriental universe was built through a romantic story in a poetic style.

Part IV concludes the essay by providing the purpose behind Chardin and Shelley's oriental images.

Personal Research Plan

Jing Lingyu

Question: Why did John Chardin and Michel Foucault perceive different political cultures of interaction between Iranian society and government in the late 17th century and 1978? from Western perspectives?

Background: John Chardin visited Persia for commerce in the 1670s during the rule of Safavid dynasty. He thought the Persians are "the most civilized of the peoples of the East" and "very philosophical over the good and bad things in life and about expectations for the future".

However, the Safavid Shahs ruled their land in a despotic manner but people always followed the laws and rarely rebelled the state. The political culture of Persian people was obedient so Chardin called it "civilized" in a positive sense. His report influenced some Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu. In 1978, French philosopher Michel Foucault visited Iran to support Iranian Islamic Revolution during the rule of Pahlavi dynasty. The Iranian state was still despotic but more modernized. However, the Iranian people openly rebelled the regime for many reasons and Foucault called it "anti-discipline" in a positive sense. The two French visitors both made positive comments on the Iranian political cultures for different reasons and they both agreed Iranian people should decide themselves.

Introduction:

Whether Safavid or Pahlavi dynasty, Iran was facing a decisive choice-being West or East? Whether obedience or rebellion, the Iranian people demanded a modern way of life, although Chardin and Foucault perceived it as pre-modernity and post-modernity.

1. The Safavid despotism

1.1 Civilized or disciplined?

1.2   Autocratic or limited?

2. Foucault and Iranian Islamic Revolution

2.1   Modern or post-modern?

2.2   Revolution for better life or resistance as exercise

3. The stability of political culture-case of Iran

4. Conclusion

Aegyo: From Cuteness to Cultural Identity Marker

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Introduction

I distinctly remember the first time I saw the "fingers heart" on a Republic of Korea's[1] TV talk show—the simple gesture, made by crossing the thumb and index finger to form a little heart, was unfamiliar to me. Being both Korean and Korean American, I did not understand the reason why South Korean celebrities often turned to performing these types of gestures to garner attention. It certainly seemed far different from the American celebrities, who, when appearing on TV shows did not do much but talk. Then it struck me—was it a cultural difference? This began my journey towards investigating the gestures and speech forms that constitute the *aegyo* phenomenon, a South Korean register (Agha 2005) and performance (Goffman 1990) that is used in both South Korean media and society.

The 'fingers heart" used by South Korean celebrities on the media is just one of many different gestures categorized as *aegyo* that are mostly used to show affection to the general public who are their fans, or to promote their images as celebrities. *Aegyo* does not include just gestures; there are linguistic features too. Although *aegyo* as a register was first used by celebrities starting in 1997 by S.E.S, a K-pop female group to portray themselves as cute, the more recent globalization of K-pop has expanded the role of *aegyo* to include other functions, such as displaying the changing gender roles and relations in South Korea (Cho 2005: 148).

Aegyo is often portrayed in an exaggerated manner in the media to promote interest and prolong

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affection between the celebrities and their fans, but it does appear in everyday life to influence how men and women interact with one another. While previous literatures on *aegyo* define the phenomenon as "a Korean term for a type of charming, cute behavior that may refer to both linguistic and nonlinguistic behavior" (Strong 2012: 29) or an "adoption of childlike charm and innocence as a feminine trait for the benefit of men" (Puzar 2011: 84), I argue that *aegyo* is not simply a "cute", or "feminine trait" used only by women with men. Rather, *aegyo* is a social skill used in many ways— a skill used to lighten the mood in a social setting, to ask for forgiveness from close friends, to make requests to superiors at work, to seem modest in front of others. *Aegyo* is thus a way to perform identity by constructing a particular type of social persona; this social persona, albeit different for men and women and contextually dependent on the performance, is crucial in proving one's relatability. Finally, through the globalization of South Korean media such as K-pop and broadcast dramas, *aegyo* has become a "register" (Agha 2005), or a cultural identity marker and a salient pragmatic device, spoken and performed by both Korean men and women alike.

I spent a month in Seoul, South Korea recording interactions of 31 men and women between the ages of 18 and 27 in groups of three to six at three university campuses—Yonsei University, Korea University, and Sangmyung University. Through their group conversations that ranged, I investigated how single-gender and dual-gender social groups enact *aegyo*. I also interviewed them regarding their ideas about the relationship between the linguistic features of *aegyo* and broader sociocultural practices, or what is known as language ideologies in the anthropological literature (Schieffelin et al. 1998; Kroskrity 2000). By transcribing the data from 23 conversations and interviews, I discovered that *aegyo* can be differentiated into specific features of "spoken *aegyo*", "gestural *aegyo*", and the larger categories- "everyday *aegyo*" and "mediatized *aegyo*". "Spoken *aegyo*" is thus a type of *aegyo* that is spoken, "gestural *aegyo*" is *aegyo* that is performed through hand and body gestures, "mediatized *aegyo*" is *aegyo* performed in the media, and "everyday *aegyo*" is *aegyo* performed in everyday life by society. Also, across the spoken and gestural features are also gender distinctions. In other words, the ways in which males and females perform and speak *aegyo* draw on different features and have different uses. Although there are different types of *aegyo*, they all aim to have the same effect of being utilized as a broadly defined social skill. Furthermore, in the last 10 to 15 years, national media has been heavily influential in making *aegyo* a part of the recognizable "Korean" identity and in this process, separating the associations of *aegyo* from stereotypes of femininity. My ethnographic study of the *aegyo* phenomenon is the first to describe empirically and bring awareness to the changing practices of *aegyo* indexed by the shifting gender norms introduced by globalization in South Korea.

In this essay I ask the following question: what role does language play in the reproduction and

transformation of normative gender roles and relations among college aged students in Seoul, South Korea? I draw from various literatures on gender roles in South Korea to underpin its correlation with Korean culture and language as well as provide support for my argument. Furthermore, I discuss attempts to define *aegyo* within the context of the English language. The remainder of the paper examines a transcript of each different type of *aegyo* to corroborate my argument that the *aegyo* phenomenon is an index of changing the gender norms in South Korea (because my research took place in South Korea, henceforth any mention of "Korea" will be alluding to South Korea and not the entire Korean peninsula unless specified otherwise). In the conclusion I discuss why this research is important in advancing knowledge of gender relations in South Korea as well as pushing for more concrete studies on Korean youth culture and language practices.

Cuteness and Consumption: From *Kawaii* to *Aegyo*

The Japanese *kawaii* cultural phenomenon helped to kick start the cuteness movement in South Korea via influx of Japanese from 1970–1990. Once Japanese cultural products such as Japanese pop music started to enter the South Korean market, they spread throughout Korea's youth culture, creating a pan-*kawaii* phenomenon that jumpstarted the cuteness movement (Iwabuchi 2001: 200). This "cuteness" began to progress from being just "cute" to the concept of *aegyo* that has societal factors and implications. Interestingly enough, some of my interviewees, such as HA and YK (2017), had informed me that the word "*kawaii*" in Korea has "negative connotations because it's usually used for things that are too excessively cute to the point of being gross or creepy". The *kawaii* concept is often said to be similar to *aegyo* and it is indeed true that *kawaii* started the "cuteness" culture in South Korea. However, the two are not to be associated with one another because *aegyo* has transformed to become its own distinct concept.

Korean *aegyo* is derived from combining two Chinese characters together: *ae* (love) and *gyo* (beautiful) (Han 2016, 13). It is quite difficult to define; however, it is recognized in academic literature as particular kind of cute; it is a "Korean term for a type of charming, cute behavior that may refer to both linguistic and nonlinguistic behavior" (Strong 2012: 29) or "a kind of coquettish or 'cute' style within... wider Korean society" (Han 2016: 9). In contrast to these statements, I believe *aegyo* cannot be limited to the terms of "cute" or "charming". *Aegyo* is a unique and clearly distinguishable aspect of the Korean identity; the *aegyo* series of behaviors and speech register circulated in everyday life as meaningful signs and often iconic gestures.

Furthermore, the use of *aegyo* reflects a certain aesthetic that, although Puzar argues is "usually embodied in the adoption of childlike charm and innocence as a feminine trait for the benefit of men"

(Puzar 2011, 84), is not entirely restricted to women. Nevertheless, because of the over-feminization of women in South Korea, referred to as "Dollification" by Puzar in his *Asian Dolls and the Westernized Gaze: Notes on the Female Dollification in South Korea* article, *aegyo* is societally accepted to be inked to women (Puzar 2011: 86). Over-feminization, or "dollification" is the making of "living dolls" in everydayness and popular culture that is the result of the normalized and mainstreamed gendered procedures, narratives, and events (i.b.i.d). This is "the partial reproduction of social immobility or the pre-programmed limited mobility of women within the weakened but still maintained patriarchal order of Korean society" (i.b.i.d).

However, *aegyo* has evolved to recreate traditional gender stereotypes, especially as expressed in the K-pop industry, and in doing so becomes a register and performance that transgresses the typical Korean gender roles (Han, 2016: 10). Asif Agha states that there are several important dimensions of register formation. There are repertoire characteristics, pragmatic use, and social domain(s) of the register (Agha 2005). The pragmatic device and the social domain of the register apply to *aegyo*. The stereotype of *aegyo* is that it is a feminine register that is linked to the idea of cuteness. However since the recent globalization of the "hallyu wave" (Korean wave) that rocketed K-pop and popular Korean culture to international appeal, the *aegyo*, which is an important part of the media, is now recognized as being used by men who perform and speak it as well (Jung 2011). Thus, *aegyo* has also become an important part of Korean cultural identity that expands past the Korean borders and is increasingly globally recognizable and enregistered (Agha 2005).

Gender Roles in South Korea

The *aegyo* phenomenon is related to gender roles in South Korea because it highlights the importance of emotion and intimacy as binding factors in producing and reinforcing social relations. The Korean self is in fact socially entrenched, created, and situationally negotiated—the self is not opposed to society but rather, constituted by it. The fluidity and lack of boundedness reflects as well on the ways that gender, a primary aspect of self, is experienced and understood (Hoffman 1995: 114). Thus, *aegyo*, as a social skill, blurs previously assumed-to-be distinct male and female spheres and erases their categoricalness and separateness.

These female and male spheres originated from the Confucian modes of thought deeply rooted in South Korean society. In South Korea where Confucianism influences everyday rituals and practices in society, women can be at a disadvantaged position. One of the tenets of Confucianism requires acts of obedience from women. Their lives were centered around the men they had familial relations; their obedience was to the father when young, then to the husband when married, and finally to the son

when in old age (Gelb and Palley 1994: 3). Thus, a hierarchical social structure consisting of a large patriarchal family system prevailed above all else. An understanding of the changing roles and statues of women in Korea throughout history requires some sense of the significance of this Confucian moral code in its evolution. It was during the Yi Dynasty (1392–1910) that a "Confucian moral code was first introduced into Korea, which led to a deteriorating position for women between the years 1486–1636" (Gelb and Palley 1994: 5). Confucianism became more firmly entrenched in Korea throughout the following years and the Confucian precepts were used to justify a subordinate position for women (Gelb and Palley 1994: 18). This history showcases the emphasis placed on the collective rather than on the individuality, which reveals the inability for women to step out of their historically entrenched gender roles to strive for a different type of identity.

The post-World War II era brought dramatic changes in the social structures to South Korea as the nation adopted an American-style constitution during its development as an industrial giant. There was a growth in educational opportunities for both men and women, and as the second-wave women's rights began to emerge in most other nations, this encouraged Korea to follow. Much of the rhetoric of Western (and especially American) democratic thought was integrated into the discourse of women's movements as these activists called for improved and impartial conditions for women (Molony 2004: 82). However, the conditions and expectations of the American liberal democratic thought, which placed immense importance on the individual and individual freedom, contrasted with Korea's, where there was great emphasis placed on the individual's conformity to the group. As Abelmann (2003) states, "consciousness of hierarchy and loyalty to the family, work place, and nation [took] precedence over equality and independence" (43). Thus, the traditional values based on centrality of "relationships, hierarchy, distinctive roles and duties of women, and the importance of conformity to group values" challenged Western traditions "with the resultant gap between the expectations and reality for those women seeking Western-style equity in their lives" (Choi 2009: 11).

During the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the country adopted a Western constitution that guaranteed equal treatment between genders. Article 11:1 of the Korean constitution indicates: "All citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on account of sex, religion or social status" (Gelb and Palley 1994: 27). Thus, to the casual observer, it may seem that industrialization, modernization, and democratization in the last century have brought changes in female lives in Korea so that they may not at first appear to be disadvantaged or oppressed. However, the system still tends to remain gender stratified that is akin to the traditional Confucian principles that restricted their movements so

heavily before (Choi 2009: 23). The traditional values have been tested by economic and demographic changes since the 1950s and the Confucian value base has been since modified with the rising modern feminist movement (Cho 1998: 52). However, this conflicts with the cultural importance placed on relationships over the individual that is still being used to justify distinct gender roles that tend to restrict women in economic and political environments in South Korea (Park and Lo 2012: 149).

Although the study of men in South Korea is not as comprehensive and extensive as the study of women, it is still crucial to understand the ways in which femininity and masculinity are changing through language such as the *aegyo* phenomenon and the media. The traditional mentality of the patriarchy has long been rooted here and may still be present today. According to the Global Gender Gap Report produced by the World Economic Forum, an index that measures gender equality, Korea ranked 116 out of 145 countries (2016). Although in terms of pay and gender roles Korean men may seem to be dominant, when looking at the social actions and behaviors of Korean men they appear to shift their gender behavior quite easily, moving between culturally idealized "feminine" expressions of submissive dependency and "masculine" expressions of dominance and assertiveness, depending on the demands of the situation—and *aegyo* is one of the ways in which this flexibility in gender expression has been detected (Jung 2011). The media has helped facilitate such flexibility with the emergence of Korean dramas in which men are no longer only portrayed as dominant figures but rather ones who are also responsible for traditionally female jobs-childcare and household work. Additionally, *aegyo* being utilized by male celebrities who are "typically thought of as the ideal men" within the younger male population makes this shift in gender roles easier to be perceived as acceptable (GY 2017). The use of *aegyo* by both Korean men and women in media help shed light on its acceptable uses transcends any Westernized concept of femininity and masculinity. Thus *aegyo* is an integral part of the creation of the "Korean self" in being the common denominator for both genders when it comes to social interaction. Traditionally, Confucian principles degrade women to lower social standings, *aegyo* helps look past such gender dichotomies and allows for a better understanding of what it means to be inherently "Korean".

Different Registers of Aegyo

To explore the *aegyo* aesthetic in context of gender and how it is represented in South Korean society, it is important to note its different types: everyday and the mediatized, gender-specific, and spoken and gestural. These categories provide further understanding into why *aegyo* is able to provide a way in which the two genders, made distinct because of the traditional Confucian principles, can have a social interaction of equal footing. *Aegyo* is a social skill used by men and women between one another for, but not limited to, things such as: avoid arguments, make certain requests, and ask for

forgiveness. The concept of performance might also be useful in understanding *aegyo* because these types of behaviors are connected to one's demeanor, self-presentation, and "facework" (Goffman 1990). Through conducting various interviews and going through video recordings, I have discovered that *aegyo* really is a performance based behavior that allows men and women to transgress South Korean gender stereotypes and create "the Korean self" that is socially embedded, shaped, and situationally negotiated. Goffman states that performance is part of the everyday, and the practice of *aegyo* in these behaviors seems to be primarily exhibited through both linguistic and non-linguistic markers.

The everyday and mediatized *aegyo* are the two branches that stem from the concept of *aegyo*. The everyday and mediatized then proceed to separate into gender-specific, *which* is then split into spoken and gestural *aegyo*. Each type is dependent on the type of situation, the age and gender of the user, and the purpose of the interaction. Every individual I had interviewed had stated that *it* must be used appropriately, and strongly denied the association of *aegyo* with femininity. Hence, I could safely assume that *aegyo* is not just about cuteness or femininity, but a layered concept that is inherently a marker of the Korean cultural identity.

Mediatized *Aegyo*:

While I had previously believed that mediatized *aegyo* and societal *aegyo* were similar to one another, this was proved to be untrue after my interviews as well as my observation during casual conversations amongst my participants. Mediatized *aegyo*, as most of my interviewees had stated, are too "exaggerated", "superficial", and "dramatic" because "*aegyo* in the music industry, talk shows, and in dramas are mostly for the enjoyment of their fans or to garner a wider fan base." (DH 2017). A few examples of mediatized *aegyo* can be seen below, performed by both female and male celebrities, emphasizing my point that mediatized *aegyo* is not about femininity or just about being cute but rather about portraying a favorable disposition and persona for the audience. Media *aegyo* is generally used to promote a Korean celebrity-if a certain gesture is popularized by society after a celebrity is seen doing it, that celebrity becomes the new "it" person for a long time. Thus, it is no wonder that *aegyo* seen on television or the internet is exaggerated— it must be enough to catch the eyes of the nation. Mediatized *aegyo* is separate from the everyday, societal *aegyo* because it is "not a representation of conversation *aegyo* or how [people] talk or act in real life" confirmed HY (2017). Many male and female interviewees stated that societal *aegyo* is different because it is more "natural" and "subtle" and "so inherent within the culture that it is second nature." (GY 2017). Many interviewees also stated that societal *aegyo* is "culturally taught" and cannot be "learned or forced". However, certain mediatized *aegyo* gestures and speech can indeed gain popularity within society, such as the recent "making a heart by putting the index finger and thumb together" gesture (BJ 2017). Yet because

there is the underlining understanding that this specific *aegyo* gesture is from a certain celebrity, it is impossible to separate this gesture from the media itself. Thus, it is still categorized as mediatized *aegyo* and is seen as such in society.

Female mediatized *aegyo*:

The most common *aegyo* gestures by female celebrities: the peace sign, making a heart with the index finger and thumb, and placing the hands close to the face to draw attention to the facial expression.

Male mediatized *aegyo*:

The most common *aegyo* gestures by male celebrities are similar to the ones performed by the female celebrities. Some of the most distinct features of these *aegyo* gestures would be putting the hands close to one's face, the peace sign, or making a heart with one's fingers of arms. It was also interesting to note that a few of my male interviewees of various age groups stated that because *aegyo* was popularized by male celebrities throughout the years, it has normalized *aegyo* to it being more appropriate to be used by men within the society.

Everyday *Aegyo*:

As mentioned above, societal *aegyo* is different from mediatized *aegyo*, and this is the register of *aegyo* that I focused on for my research. Because the media is broadcasted and televised quite publicly, understanding mediatized *aegyo* is quite straightforward. However, *aegyo* being used in society is more difficult to decipher, for every situation and person the type of *aegyo* being spoken or performed is different. It is crucial to, however, not to correlate the *aegyo* shown in the media with societal *aegyo*, which is why I believe is the reasoning behind *aegyo* being wrongly understood or defined by scholarly articles or by other cultural groups.

The words repeated over and over by various interview participants when asked about everyday *aegyo* were "subtle" "natural" and "unconscious". One of my female interviewees, DY, stated it this way, "*aegyo* being used in conversation or in society has so many different functions, but it's mostly to form bonds and relationships... I think to us [college students] this is important because at our age so many people are doing different things, taking different classes but *aegyo* is like the one common ground that we are all aware of... it's a Korean thing and we're all Koreans so..." (2017). A few of the functions of *aegyo* within a conversation could be to display modesty, express respect, or ask to be taken care of—however one thing was clear: there is always an appropriate time and place to use *aegyo* because it is a social skill, and such skills cannot be taken out of context. Furthermore, the importance placed in forming "bonds and relationships" amongst one another could be connected to

the collective group mentality that prevails in South Korea.

Gender-specific *Aegyo*:

Within everyday *aegyo* and mediatized *aegyo* are two separate categories of male and female *aegyo* (gender-specific aegyo). It is no question that *aegyo* is used by both men and women, but the manner in which these two genders utilize it is different. Most male and female interviewees claimed that performing and speaking *aegyo* really depends on the person's character rather than the person's gender, but they did mention a few gender-specific characteristics.

Male-specific *aegyo*:

Men in South Korea use spoken *aegyo* more than gestural *aegyo*. If they do use gestural *aegyo*, it is more often than not the mediatized gestural *aegyo*. Most men also do not use *aegyo* when talking to their same-aged male friends other than "for humor or to lighten the mood of a conversation" (SO and DH 2017). During my own observation of *aegyo* within the same-aged male participants, this held to be true. It also noted that there often appeared to be one or two men within the group who were subconsciously responsible for picking up social cues such as long pauses due to a certain tension who then used *aegyo* to relieve this tension by making others laugh or switching the topic of conversation. When asked whether or not my own observation was accurate, HJ, UB, JM, and HD, four 22-year-old men who had been in conversation with one another agreed. HD told me that, "usually it's one or two people in the group. For us today it was UB and HJ... but on any other day it could have been me or JM or UB again. Even if it's not the same person doing it all the time, it's mostly for the same purpose of making all of us laugh." (2017).

This is also not restricted to just male-male relationships. For male-female friendships or cross-gender gatherings this "humorous and alleviating tensions" function being performed by a male is pretty common (SW 2017). As SW puts it, "I think *aegyo* in the context of humor is to create this atmosphere of camaraderie almost. It's like they laugh because they can relate to my humor. If they didn't understand my *aegyo* then they wouldn't laugh. It signifies friendship and a bond." (2017).

However, it must be noted that when in a various age group, the younger men tend use *aegyo* more, typically to "show a certain respect to act 'like' a subordinate... usually it's almost a request for the older males to look at them [younger males] favorably" (SW 2017). One female interviewee, GK even stated that in her opinion and observation while interning at a local business company, that "men are more likely to use *aegyo* when they are at a company or when they're in the work environment because it makes it easier for them to ask for forgiveness from their older superiors... women do it too, but men use it more in this situation than they would in any other situation" (2017).

While observing one 18-year-old male, SO, in conversation with his 24-year-old counterpart, DH, I noticed the kinship term of "hyung" being used. The two were already friends before they had come in for the interview—as I had stated above, kinship terms used amongst non-familial relations expresses a certain personal bond. However, SO combined this kinship term and elongation (one of the linguistic markers of *aegyo*) to ask for favors or to coax an answer out of DH. Thus, I understood that with the older-younger male relationships, *aegyo* was typically used by the younger males. No longer was *aegyo* just for humor or to lighten the mood for amongst conversation but it was rather to deliver a certain persona.

Men also use both gestural and spoken *aegyo* more often when they are with their significant others because the "endearing gestures and use of skinship (touching)", two distinct markers of gestural *aegyo*, are deemed to be more "appropriate" to use with their significant others than with their male or female counterparts (HA 2017). The terms "endearing gestures" and "skinship" will be explained later in the "gestural aegyo" section. Furthermore, male-female friendships rarely have *aegyo*. The only time this would be socially acceptable is if the two were romantically interested in each other, or if one likes the other in a romantic way. Other than this situation, it is "strange and weird" if a woman or a man uses *aegyo* to a friend of the opposite gender the one enacting the *aegyo* is not interested in (YK, 2017). If *aegyo* is used in this way, however, it creates misunderstandings; thus, this corroborates the necessity for the "right time and place" of *aegyo*.

Female-specific *aegyo*:

Like male-specific *aegyo* characteristics, there are also female-specific characteristics of *aegyo*. However, females have "a broader spectrum of the time, place, and reason to use *aegyo*" (HJ 2017). For men it seems to be to express humor or lighten the mood of the conversation amongst a same-age group or cross-gender group, and for a younger male to show respect or a likeable persona to an older male. For women, as my various female and male interviewees informed me, the uses of *aegyo* can range from "making requests to others, asking for forgiveness from friends, expressing a desire, subtly requesting to be taken care of" to male-specific characteristics of "showing respect, creating humor, and facilitating conversation". Females also tended to use gestural (such as "endearing gestures and 'skinship" stated above) and spoken *aegyo* more freely than their male counterparts from my own observation of various conversations taking place in cross-gender, single-gender, various-age, same-age groups.

The functions *aegyo* used in the same-age group of females I observed were various and diverse. There was *aegyo* used for modesty in one conversation, *aegyo* used for humor in another conversation,

and *aegyo* used to signify disagreement. However, one thing was clear: for women in the same-age group, it seemed that *aegyo* was being used to prolong relatability or to prolong this collective group identity. Modesty in the form of gestural or spoken *aegyo* was to divert the attention from oneself back to the group. Humor in the form of female *aegyo* was similar to the males in the same-age group utilized it. The disagreement through *aegyo* was so that the disagreement would not be taken so seriously and to prevent confrontation or conflict later in the conversation. *Aegyo* was being used in subtle ways by the females of the same-age group to be used for the group and by the group rather than it being a singular characteristic for the advantage of an individual.

For women in a various-age group setting *aegyo* was used more strategically, using the kinship term of "unni", similar to the male-specific *aegyo*. "Younger females", says SK, "tend to use 'unni' because it emphasizes the older female's higher social standing due to her age and also this use of 'unni' is endearing so the older females will look at the younger females using it more favorably" (2017). This specific *aegyo* feature makes it easier for the younger women to form a social bond with the older women than it is to do without because of how salient and rooted the age hierarchy is in South Korea.

Male-specific *aegyo* and female-specific *aegyo* seem to be similar to one another, but there is a negative stigma specific to women who use excessive *aegyo*. When women do this they are called a "fox" or a "sly fox wagging her tail". Societal *aegyo* is supposed to be natural and yet when it becomes too obvious and done at the wrong place at the wrong time, it can be unfavorable, prompting others to use this certain term. For men who use excessive *aegyo*, this term does not apply but instead it is seen that they are too "immature" because of their inability to pick up on social cues.

Spoken *Aegyo*:

Spoken *aegyo* is one of the two sections stemming from gender-specific *aegyo*. The features of spoken *aegyo* were described by my female and male interviewees as "higher voice pitch" "nose-sound" "tongue shortening" "elongation of words". The "nose sound", directly translated from Korean, is made by pressing the tongue to the roof of the mouth to create a sound made mostly by the nose to create a sound similar to this symbol "~", as a few of my interviewees tried to explain to me on paper. The "tongue-shortening" is to make "words sound rounder by adding a certain noise to the end of the words" (EJ, NY, HR, and YS 2017). In Korea, shortening of the words is common; "the morphological processes to coin new words synchronically are to combine root and the root, or the root and the affix..." (Yeon and Brown 2015: 64). These spoken features are what makes *aegyo*, distinctly _aegyo_, and makes it recognizable to the South Korean populace.

The spoken *aegyo* could also include kinship terms and calling oneself in "the third-person" (HY 2017). The kinship terms are most commonly used in relationships involving younger and older counterparts. The kinship terms most commonly used by younger females is "unni" for older female and "oppa" for an older male. For younger males, it is "nuna" and "hyung" respectively. The kinship terms emphasize the Korean collective identity but when used in spoken *aegyo* it also generates "a feeling of compassion or closeness to the other", enabling a social bond (GK 2017). The third-person aspect once again speaks to the Korean collective, for the speaker is no longer situating oneself as a singular subject but one placed within a particular social context by removing the personhood that would be related to a first-person pronoun.

Gestural *Aegyo*:

The features of spoken *aegyo* are usually combined with the spoken *aegyo*. The gestures include "endearing gestures" that many of my interviewees had explained, as well as "skinship", which is another feature that my interviewees brought up over and over when asked about the physical aspect of *aegyo*. Skinship is a term made by "combing the words 'skin' and 'relationship' together... it's a term we use casually to mean touching but in a way that can only be used between people who already have a bond with each other" (NY 2017). When asked about "endearing gestures", the answers were diverse amongst participants. Some said it was "widening the eyes" "pouting the mouth" which were related to animated facial expressions. Others mentioned more body expressions such as "casual touching of the hand" "hugging" "linking arms with someone else". In these various answers was the common feature of *aegyo* being used to create a likeable social persona.

Examples of *Aegyo* Registers

Transcript #1 (06:30–06:52)

This transcript takes place inside a Yonsei University classroom. There are four participants, two male, two female, all 21 years old. They have been friends since the start of their freshman year due to their busy schedules in the final exam period, had not been able to meet for a few weeks. In this conversation, they catch up with one another, discussing their plans for winter break, what they have been planning for their respective club activities, gossip about mutual friends, and plans for the coming weekend.

DY: female

BJ: male

SW: male

SM: female

*Note: highlighted sections are *aegyo* and gestures are within parentheses

DY: Communications.... Communications? (Looking out the window then back to her group) Oh yeah we have a pretty unni (older sister) in our communications department. So that's why (puts her hands to her chest to indicate that it's her department and nods)

[Pause five seconds]

BJ: Oh [I see so that's what it was::?] (purses his lips and looks at her with downward cast eyes while putting his hands together as if saying he's jealous of her department having a pretty girl)

SW: [Yeah::::!] (claps his hands) Applause? for DY!? Yeah::::!(Meanwhile BJ gives her a thumb up with a wink and touches her arm)

(Laughter)

SM: Ah this is so funny::

(Pause)

SW: That's great? Your department must be so happy::

BJ: [yeah::]

Analysis of Transcript #1:

In South Korea, it is not uncommon to brag about a person who is pretty whether it be someone in their university studies department, someone from their high school, or someone they are related to. This idea of individual beauty not belonging just to the individual but rather, to an extended community is connected to the idea of community over individuality (Holliday and Elfving-Hwang 2012: 59). This "bragging about a person who is pretty" can be seen in the beginning of this transcript when DY talks about a "pretty unni" who is in her department. This "unni" although directly translates to "older sister", is not related to her and yet she brags about her as if the department has a certain asset that the other departments are not fortunate enough to have. Afterwards, there is a pause due to there being a slight tension between the two girls; DY briefly looks at SM's reaction, who looks jealous, then looks away as if she is ashamed she just said this (I interviewed them afterwards to ask them about this moment and both sheepishly confirmed my observations).

Noticing this awkwardness and tension, SW and BJ use *aegyo* in order to lighten the mood—their gestures, high-pitch registers, and lengthening of words are highlighted to indicate *aegyo*. These features emphasize their mock jealousy and admiration that causes laughter amongst the group. By making the feelings of jealousy and admiration that everyone was (probably) feeling or have

noticed being felt by SM within the group even more overt and obvious, SW and BJ allowed for the conversation to move past this topic. It may even be that SW and BY were poking fun at DY for making such a comment that may have been out of place—just previously they had been discussing mutual friends that they know that are in each other's departments (because they are all in different departmental areas of study). These men, regardless of the gender of their audience, seemed to use *aegyo* as a comedic mediation tactic to prevent anyone from feeling excluded.

Transcript #2: (08:09–08:29)

Same participants as Transcript #1

SW: But you know how there are times when you go out to drink::? (puts hands together and repeatedly hits table for emphasis) And when there are times like that

SM: [yeah those are the times when you just can't go to class the next day::?]

BJ: [yeah you have to go home early]

Laughter

SW: I get home right at like 2:30? (Laughter) And then right when I lay down my head to sleep for a little::(Laughter) I get up again in what feels like a couple of seconds and say to myself oh I have to go:: (During this entire time, SW is acting out the scenario, provoking laughter)

(Pause)

BJ: Hm but you probably can't go to class in that state?::

SW: Oh? You think so??

Analysis of Transcript #2:

In this transcript, we see SW enacting *aegyo* through gestures. While talking about going home after drinks and such, he is acting out the story in a sort of parody. This adds a comical and relatable persona—being college students, the other three can relate to this story and the actions that he makes initiate laughter because these actions and the story are relatable. To emphasize the relatability, he adds the gestures at the end of the sentences that are lengthened. This combination of the spoken and gestural *aegyo* is common. *Aegyo* seems to be a marker of "double voicing" (Bakhtin 1975 (1981)). Although SW is acting out and talking about his own experience in a serious tone, the spoken and gestural *aegyo* makes it so that he creates a scene that is more relatable and comical and adjusted to take into account their counterparts' own views and concerns.

Transcript #3: (1:13–1:47)

This transcript takes place at Korea University amongst three women—all 19 years old. They discuss their plans for winter break as well as efforts they are making to further their academic goals as

students. SH and HY had mentioned in their interviews that HJ, the other girl in the group, had the most amount of *aegyo* and she typically uses it the most in their group. Thus, she is seen as the natural mediator for arguments and someone "who will go far in life because she is able to use *aegyo* well and effectively to her favor" (SH and HY 2017)

HJ: female

SH: female

HY: female

*Note: highlighted sections are *aegyo* and gestures are within parentheses

HJ: Oh? Me first? (Laughter and looks at SH who's sitting next to her)

SH: Let's just have a conversation, a conversation::

(Laughter and HJ covers up her mouth with her hands)

HJ: (Sweeping her hair back) So recently I started volunteering::.?

SH: Where?

HJ: Do you guys know DreamTouch Portal?

HY: Oh::? I heard of that:::

HJ: Oh? You know?? So I had to go through an English course:: And for February:: I'm going to start interning:: (trails off and looks at her friends)

HY: [Oh:::?] (Mouth ajar)

SH:[Oh;;;?] (Mouth ajar)

HY: Are you planning for graduate school?

HJ: [Eyah::::] (covers her mouth with her hands in embarrassment)

SH: [Well she's good at studying::] (As she looks at HY)

HJ: Oh no no:?, Just an intern, intern. Just an intern:: (As she waves her hand frantically before her face as if to wave away and deny any praise)

SH: [No it's because she's good at studying::] (As she looks at HY)

HJ: No it's just something everyone does::? Totally!

SH: Did you:: register for it?

HJ: Eung:: (nods) All second-years-I registered for it when I was in first-year!

Analysis of Transcript #3:

In this transcript, the *aegyo* can be seen as an affective as well as a communicative resource. HJ uses

it to portray modesty when her friends mention her accomplishments. The interview data with her two friends HY and SH had previously stated that HJ will "go far in life" because of her ability to effectively use *aegyo* as a social and communicative skill. This skill can be seen in this conversation because the *aegyo* HJ uses has a twofold purpose: to create modesty and prevent future conflict between herself and her friends. HJ uses *aegyo* to create relatability through being modest. By denying her individual accomplishments HJ diverts the conversation from herself to the others once she realizes that the others cannot relate to the internship opportunities that she earned. This feature of *aegyo* showcases the collective vs. the individual ideology that permeates throughout Korean society. When HJ chooses to mask her individual accomplishments in front of her friends who cannot relate to her internship opportunities, she is also continuing the rapport among her friends and keeps the conversation from being focused on herself, which could prove to be a point of conflict for her friends as it could be seen as selfish or even provoke jealousy. This transcript is another example of the double-voiced discourse in that HJ is guarding herself against criticism—if she had not performed *aegyo* here her friends would have thought her as too vain and selfish; in doing so, she would prevent future confrontation and conflict, another marker of double-voiced discourse (Bakhtin 1975 (1981)).

Conclusion

This research started with the question of: what role does language play in the reproduction and transformation of normative gender roles and relations among college aged students in Seoul, South Korea? Through research I discovered the concept of *aegyo*, also known as the "Korean cuteness phenomenon" and how scholarly articles had correlated this concept to the concept of femininity. I did not believe this to be true based on what I had seen in the Korean media. However, because there was still a chance that mediatized *aegyo* and everyday *aegyo* were not performed or spoken in the same way, I went to Seoul, South Korea over the months of December and January to conduct my research. With the help of 31 Korean male and female university students from three various universities in Seoul, I formed the hypothesis that *aegyo* is in fact not at all related to cuteness or femininity but in fact a way to perform identity by constructing a particular type of social persona that is able to transcend gender roles.

By analyzing the interviews as well as the conversations of cross-gender and single-gender groups in my research, I was able to distinguish *aegyo* itself as a layered concept of various registers: everyday, mediatized, gender-specific, spoken, and gestural. Each register plays a significant role in creating this persona that can be seen as a unique Korean identity marker. The transcript analysis also

allowed me to realize the common factors in the conversations I had recorded: *aegyo* is a social skill indeed, but more specifically it is used primarily to indicate relatability amongst same-gender and opposite-gender groups through double-voicing and voicing contrasts (Bakhtin 1975 (1981)). Hence, *aegyo* blurs the distinct male and female spheres that have been set in place by Confucian ideologies that still prevail to this day.

I believe this research is important because South Korea, although in the recent years has made moves towards gender equality, still struggles with keeping the two genders apart. I thought perhaps if I could shed light into how the idea of uniformity and collective identity prevail above all else in the Korean language, I could help in producing a new types of gender relations in South Korea. I might just be an undergraduate student and what I am able to do has limits—yet I would like to be the change I want to see and this research allowed me to have hopes for a better future for South Korea.

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