

Summary of Dissertation in English	
Dissertation Title	Kōsaka Masataka, Nagai Yōnosuke and the Diverging Paths of Japanese Realism: The Postwar Intellectual in the Age of the Security State
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This thesis examines the intellectual history of Japan’s pioneer realist scholars, Kōsaka Masataka (1934–1996) and Nagai Yōnosuke (1924–2008), tracing their approaches to ‘national security’ during the Cold War. It follows their convergence in the 1960s, when both upheld the US-Japan Security Treaty as the foundation of the archipelago’s stability in the face of neutralist alternatives. Their paths diverged in the 1980s, when rising ‘military realists’ challenged their position. Through their writings, this study investigates a question confronting the postwar Japanese state: Whether it should develop into a ‘normal’ national security state modelled on the American example, as the military realists urged, or preserve the distinctive qualities of what Nagai came to describe as the Japanese ‘moratorium state.’

Underlying this inquiry is a tension in the social contract between individual and state security. Shaped by European intellectual traditions, Kōsaka and Nagai became the Japanese interpreters of an entangled American national security ideology, and in doing so they defined the contours of their distinctive realist scholarship characterised by its liberal-conservative inclination and its acceptance of interdependence as a structural condition for postwar Japan.

The lineage begins thus with Euro-American modernity. Thomas Hobbes argued that individuals submit to sovereign authority to escape the ‘state of nature,’ while leaving the hierarchy between ruler and ruled unresolved. Liberal thinker Baruch Spinoza then clarified that the state’s legitimacy rests on safeguarding individual rights. Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt rejected this view and reinterpreted Hobbes as a *katéchon*, a figure who restrains catastrophe while delaying redemption. He concluded that Hobbes endorsed decisionist sovereignty yet opened the door to its eventual dissolution in the manner Spinoza had advocated. Condensing Hobbes’ ideas to the maxim *protego ergo obligo* (‘I protect,

therefore you obey'), Schmitt thus reaffirmed realist theory by defending the primacy of the state as a barrier against liberal modernity.

Schmitt entered American political theory via Weimar Germany exiles such as Hans Morgenthau. In the United States, Morgenthau's ideas merged with a Hamiltonian preference for strong executive power and New Deal technocratic ambitions to strengthen the state, producing a framework that checked democratic procedure with a preparedness ethos. Pearl Harbor reinforced this orientation, showing the dangers of unpreparedness. The 1947 National Security Act created a network of institutions, giving rise to a 'national security state' vested with exceptional authority. This configuration placed liberal democratic values in tension with the state's strategic interests, striving to prevent the United States from becoming a 'garrison state' in its contest with the autocratic Soviet Union. Consequently, the *age of the security state* – the Cold War – is conceptualised here as an era where security-seeking became the dominant international principle for both superpowers.

Postwar Japan faced particular historical circumstances – the legacy of the wartime 'national defence state,' Article 9, and profound anti-war sentiment – that precluded the adoption of the US security model. Although Japan signed the US-Japan Security Treaty and revised it in 1960 amid widespread public opposition, the government pursued economic growth while relegating security to the margins through a posture effectively defined by subordination to American strategic priorities. This reliance allowed Tokyo to ignore domestic controversy but left its security stance externally determined. It was in response to this tension between external demands and domestic pacifism that Kōsaka and Nagai formulated 'strategic realism' in the 1960s.

Rejecting the vision of a neutral Japan proposed by Sakamoto Yoshikazu, they championed the 'Yoshida Doctrine,' coupling the US alliance with limited rearmament. Their effort effectively sought to defend the depoliticisation of the security arrangement, framing it as a necessity for regional balance rather than an ideological stance. Japan's 'semi-sovereign' status could be justified as typical for non-nuclear states in the nuclear age, while its development as a 'trading state' focusing on maritime commerce within the Western bloc offered an outlet for nationalism and prestige. In this way, they articulated

a mainstream conservative consensus that privileged economic growth and societal stability over renewed militarisation or staunch independence.

This 'strategic realism' was first confronted by the 'Beheiren' Vietnam anti-war movement led by Oda Makoto. Oda advanced the 'victim = perpetrator' mechanism, arguing that by accepting protection under the Security Treaty, Japanese citizens were complicit in the violence in Vietnam. Beheiren thus sought to reassert the 'individual principle' against the 'state principle' beating beneath the Schmittian *protego ergo obligo*, persuasively highlighting the democratic deficit inherent in the Japanese realist project and ensuring that security remained a contested moral and political question.

The 'mainstream conservative' consensus was nonetheless most challenged by the rightward shift (*ukei-ka*) during the 1970s and 1980s. Factors such as the 1973 Oil Shock, the end of *détente*, and the reemergence of the 'Soviet threat' during the 'New Cold War,' coincided with American demands for greater burden-sharing. In this climate, 'Japanese Gaullists' such as Etō Jun, Fukuda Tsuneari and Shimizu Ikutarō appealed for autarkic and romantic visions of Japanese security, while 'military realists,' exemplified by Okazaki Hisahiko, advocated for intelligence-driven militarisation within the American alliance.

Kōsaka's thinking shifted in this period. As a government adviser for Ōhira Masayoshi, he drafted the 1980 Comprehensive Security Strategy, which sought to integrate military, economic, and energy concerns in a form suited to Japan as a trading state in an increasingly globalised world. The strategy's flawed implementation during Suzuki Zenkō's administration convinced him that Japanese leadership had developed distorted understandings of military matters, a tendency that hindered clear responses to a changing international order. His subsequent work with Nakasone Yasuhiro to refine the concept of comprehensive security drew him toward approaches in which military power occupied a more prominent place. After the Gulf War, he aligned this view with the push to normalise the Japanese state, moving ever closer to the position of the military realists.

Simultaneous to Kōsaka's involvement in policymaking, Nagai defended the postwar status quo and distinguished his 'political realism' from both Gaullists and military realists in the intellectual realm. He criticised their inflated threat perceptions and

their doctrinaire reliance on ‘national security’ to resolve a deeper crisis of confidence in the postwar state, warning that the pursuit of ‘normalcy’ risked producing a ‘grotesque’ national security state lacking the politico-theological and historical conditions that moderated the authoritarian tendencies of this model in the United States. He viewed the American example as unstable: The country was mired in its own ‘crisis of confidence’ through an expanding preoccupation with national security, and a Japanese national security state threatened to unsettle the interdependent order that had enabled Japan’s prosperity. In response, he upheld the Yoshida Doctrine as a prudent civilisational path. Postwar Japan’s existence as a ‘moratorium state,’ he argued, preserved its distinctive way of life and shielded its society from the intrusive demands of national security ideology.

The dissertation frames the Nagai-Okazaki debate as a contest over Japanese realist thought. Okazaki, claiming an objective outlook, dismissed Nagai’s defence of the ‘moratorium state’ as overtly abstract. Their divide fractured the realist camp: Okazaki pressed for a top-down ‘normalisation’ of the state to meet ‘New Cold War’ American demands, whereas Nagai defended a framework grounded in the normative and political limits of the postwar settlement, which he believed continued to command public support.

Military realists became orthodox by appropriating the older mainstream’s pro-American stance while abandoning its concern for domestic constraints. They sought to replace that caution by amplifying perceived threats and utilising national security as an elite discourse intended to coax society into surrendering its postwar way of life in the name of its own paradoxical protection. In resisting this shift, Nagai acted as a Japanese *katéchon*: A restraining force holding back the dissolution of postwar Japan as a civilisation while also delaying its reemergence as an independent national security state. In doing so, he articulated the final defence of a once-distinctive vision of Japanese realism, defined as much by its resistance to technocratic securitisation as by its Cold War origins. By recovering this divergence within Japanese realism, the dissertation questions the teleological narrative of Japan’s ‘normalisation,’ revealing it instead as the outcome of an intense intellectual struggle in which the meaning of ‘normalcy’ itself hung in the balance over Japan’s *realistic* trajectory