

## **The Difficulty and Importance of Local Ownership and Capacity Development in Peacebuilding**

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### **SUMMARY**

The principle of local ownership is an established doctrine in international society. It is so in the field of international peace operations or a wider area of international cooperation. However, there are difficulties in achieving the principle in reality. Particularly because recent international peace operations often take place in fragile states, the achievement of local ownership is a highly critical as well as difficult goal. The perspective of “capacity development” is often emphasized in the field of developmental aid and has also been referred to in peacebuilding activities. But as in developmental aid, capacity development programs for peacebuilding also face theoretical as well as practical difficulties. This paper takes the position that international peacebuilders should not and cannot abandon the principle of local ownership and the perspective of capacity development, while it is a matter of course that we need to take into consideration the limits and the difficulties in conducting peacebuilding in accordance with the principle and the perspective. The paper thus

identifies and analyzes the nature and predicaments of the principle of local ownership in peacebuilding and then discusses what kind of policy implications for capacity development ought to be found as a result.

## **Introduction**

This paper discusses “ownership” in the context of peacebuilding. It goes without saying that the principle of ownership is not exclusively confined in the field of peacebuilding. So the paper starts with identifying the general understanding of the issue of ownership in the international community. Then the paper seeks to locate it in the context of peacebuilding by arguing that ownership is problematic as well as indispensable. The paper goes on to illustrate existing institutions and policies of peacebuilding that seem to be relevant to the issue of ownership.

### **1. The Role of Ownership in Peacebuilding**

#### **1-1 The Concept of Ownership in International Society**

The concept of ownership, which originally means one’s right over his or her property, is a widely circulated concept in international society, while it is not particularly supported by a legal ground. The concept of ownership is not necessarily difficult to understand in general terms. But it is also difficult to identify its clear definition that allows us to use it in a particular sense in the sphere of international society. The concept of ownership seems to be referred to usually in the relationship between a certain state and external actors; it contains connotations opposite to intervention or interference by foreigners. For instance, when external actors dictate particular types of economic policies through developmental aid, the government of the state may claim on restoration of “ownership” to protest against international influences. This kind of confrontation is rather familiar in contemporary international society where the discrepancy of economic and political power between states is evidently conspicuous. Interactions between donors/aid agencies/politically and economically advanced states and developing countries is continuously intensive and often take place in highly sensitive areas in the world like conflict-torn societies. The tension between multiple actors in international society is thus described in terms of the concept of ownership when a certain actor intends to illustrate the unequal relationship between confronting parties. Ownership in this context is used by domestic forces as a tool to protest against

international forces.

The reason why the concept of ownership is often used this way is because it has an established moral power, although there seem to be many who doubt its validity and importance in practice. The current structure of international society appeared as a result of the decolonization process. Prior to the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the world was politically as well legally divided by a limited number of powers in the forms of colonization and imperialism. The moral ground of such old international order was lost during the Cold War period. Both of the capitalist and communist camps headed by the United States and the Soviet Union accommodated the demands for independence in non-independent areas against European colonizing powers. Decolonization inevitably started as a result of the decline of European powers after the Second World War and rapidly and drastically changed the world in a short period of time.

Self-determination is the word that was literally introduced in the Charter of the United Nations and established as an inviolable principle of international law.<sup>1</sup> The UN Charter remained vague as regards the subject of self-determinations, since it only designated “people” as the holder of the right of self-determination. But whoever exercises it, international society importantly obtained a legal and moral logic to distinguish between “self” and “others” as the criterion of legitimate governance. The conceptual weapon led to a new world in which all the colonized territories became independent and any form of colonization is no longer justifiable.<sup>2</sup> We live in the post-decolonized world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. No matter how much we are engaged in the discourses of “neo-colonialism” or “liberal imperialism,” we presuppose the fact that the world can no longer go back to the pre-decolonized world.

The concept of ownership has a special moral implication in such a post-decolonized world. Former colonized territories should not only be granted independence, they should also be allowed to have full-control power over themselves. The principle of self-determination is applicable not only at the single moment of decolonization; it must be so continuously without any break. Thus, ownership must always be maintained and guaranteed in every single country, even if it is not always granted to any minority groups. Ownership has acute political significance when presented in the context of relationships between power-holders and others; between developed countries and developing countries; Western states and non-Western states, etc.

But it is not true that ownership is just a moral principle and does not have a substantially justifiable ground. It is true that the great discrepancy exists between states in light of economic, military and political power that tend to incur interventions by states and international organizations in many ways. But it is also illusionary to assume any single state or states as well as international organizations can permanently sustain other political communities if not ignoring and exploiting economically and politically poor conditions in such communities. It is evident that the United States cannot perfectly look after Iraq; the United Nations cannot permanently take care of Darfur. What they usually do is to promote local actors who can maintain stability in such volatile regions, simply because external actors cannot be eternally committed to such gigantic attempts of governing the most violent areas of the world. Ownership is then emphasized by intervention forces as a necessary logic to plan a long-term strategy.

## **1-2 The Importance of Ownership in Peacebuilding**

The rather general observation of the status of the concept of ownership naturally leads us to the more focused observation of the role of ownership in peacebuilding, which this paper understands as a set of activities to create social foundations for durable peace.<sup>3</sup> The principle of ownership is understood in the context of peacebuilding as local people's actual leading role as well as their feeling about their leading role in the process of creating social foundations for durable peace. This principle certainly has vital importance in two ways.<sup>4</sup>

First, this shapes the moral framework of international peacebuilding activities. No matter how deeply international actors get involved in the process of peacebuilding, they never abandon the framework of sovereign nation states as a basis of formation of international as well as domestic order. They never stop expressing their respect for local ownership. No international peacebuilding is organized outside the framework morally constituted by the principle of local ownership.

Second, the principle determines the strategic framework of international peacebuilding activities. No matter how long international actors remain involved in the process of peacebuilding, they never enjoy direct results of peacebuilding. The way they take responsibility for the results of peacebuilding is up to their policy preference. But

local society inevitably has to enjoy fruits of peacebuilding and suffer from failures of peacebuilding. Local society cannot escape from taking responsibility in dealing with the aftermath of peacebuilding. Thus, it is quite logical to say that peacebuilding cannot become successful until local society really acquires will and capacity sufficient enough to build and maintain durable peace.

With these reasons the principle of local ownership is one fundamental issue in peacebuilding and constitutes its deciding elements.

### **1-3 The Problem of Ownership in Peacebuilding**

Despite this moral and strategic importance, it is quite often said that the application of the principle of ownership in reality faces many difficulties. This paper analyzes that the problems concerning the ownership principle in peacebuilding arise mainly due to the following two reasons.

First, local people might lack or do not have a sufficient level of will to peacebuilding. In order to respect or even develop local ownership we have to identify those local people who are willing to exercise ownership to build peace. In reality it is sometimes difficult to find such forces in local society. Or otherwise, we may find that such peace-willing people are in an extremely weak position. The reason of the difficulty in applying the ownership principle in such cases is the lack of sufficient level of will to peace in local society or deficiency in utilizing those who have the will to peace. What is required in such cases is the development of the necessary will to peace and the empowerment of those who have such will.

Second, local might lack or do not have a sufficient level of capacity for peacebuilding. Even if local people are willing to exercise ownership according to the needs of peacebuilding, the lack of political, economic and social capacity in terms of human, institutional, material and financial resources to execute necessary roles could hinder the process of peacebuilding. The reason of the difficulty in applying the ownership principle in such cases is the lack of sufficient level of capacity for peace in local society or deficiency in utilizing those who have capacity for peace. What is required in such cases is the development of the necessary capacity for peace and the empowerment of those who have such capacity.

Pointing out these general issues, the paper further considers various issues. First, the principle of local ownership must be applied in accordance with specific and original circumstances of concrete cases of peacebuilding. Each conflict has its own distinct circumstances. The ownership principle loses its importance without being applied in accordance with the distinctive circumstances of concerned local society. While keeping the universally transferrable moral and strategic frameworks, we have to overcome the difficulty in applying the ownership principle to correctly meet very distinctive needs of local society.

Second, there is usually a gap between the implementation system of international peacebuilding activities and local society. Peacebuilding takes place in a gigantic manner when the international community is engaged. Naturally, the more the needs and size of peacebuilding get greater, the more international actors tend to get initiatives. Once a system based on international standards is solidified, it gets more difficult for local society to take lead roles. There is also a danger of different interpretations of ownership between international and domestic actors. In the worst case, domestic forces might appeal to the principle of ownership when they reject the course of peacebuilding set out by international actors.

Third, there is a wide variety of actors of ownership. In war-torn societies it is quite often the case that the government is fragile or in transition, lacks legitimacy, contains multiple confronting forces, and becomes disruptive. While the importance of the central government cannot be overemphasized in the process of achieving durable peace in a conflict-ridden society, local governments and civil society organizations should not be underestimated. We ought to apply the ownership principle from a broader perspective by various kinds of actors as relevant to peacebuilding.

A crucial point with regard to these difficulties is the flexibility to interpret orientations of ownership. It is not sufficient to simply *respect* ownership. It is more important to introduce the moral and strategic perspective to *foster* ownership considering the possible and desirable course of its development. Ownership is an inviolable principle, but a difficult principle to fully develop. If those states that tend to claim on the ownership principle are newly independent states where the social foundation for durable peace is not sufficiently solid, it is not strange that the principle demands a perspective of its own development.

In our contemporary world, armed conflicts have been taking place mostly in newly independent states that came into existence in the process of decolonization. It is natural that they still need to foster the way they constructively exercise ownership. The appearance of an armed conflict might be derived from a certain bad application of ownership in newly independent states. If so, the key to successful peacebuilding could reside in the way we foster ownership in local society. The ownership principle fostered through the process of peacebuilding should not be interpreted negatively; it can be fostered rather positively. It should not be based on rejection of “others;” it must be pursued for better self-realization, which ought to be supported by self-confidence and developed through capacity development by enlargement of choice and freedom of the “self.”<sup>5</sup>

In this context it is important to widen the spheres of “self” for fostering local ownership. Ownership is not a principle for the national government to exclusively monopolize local ownership, which ought to be open to the entire people in local society. Decentralization, community development and civil society assistances by developmental aid agencies are all relevant to fostering local ownership from a broader perspective. Fostering local ownership for peacebuilding ought to be planned and coordinated from such a broader and comprehensive perspective.

With all these difficulties and orientations concerning the application of the ownership principle, we ought to plan and coordinate peacebuilding activities in order to constructively foster local ownership for the overall goal of peacebuilding.

## **2. Fosterers of Local Ownership**

Once we adopt the understanding of local ownership in peacebuilding as the principle to be not only respected but also fostered, we strategically are able to examine the roles and functions of external actors for the goal of peacebuilding. This paper call them “fosterers” of local ownership by making a distinction with subjects/bearers of local ownership like national and local government, local civil society organizations and local communities. This section is intended to provide an overview of “fosterers” of local ownership especially in peacebuilding-related fields.



## **2-1 International Organizations**

The United Nations has multiple functions to foster local ownership in conflict-ridden societies for the purpose of peacebuilding. UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established in December 2005 with peacebuilding as its main task. Its organizational committee is composed of 31 member states and its country-specific meetings discuss Burundi, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. PBC is a forum-style organization and does not implement programs by itself. But its role to recommend strategies of peacebuilding should not be underestimated.<sup>6</sup> PBC was instructed by the Security Council and the General Assembly that emphasized the national government has primary responsibility for peacebuilding strategies while “ensuring national ownership of the peacebuilding process.” This was stated apparently for the purpose of indicating that PBC should not interfere with national jurisdictions.<sup>7</sup> Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) is intellectually committed to better implementation of peacebuilding strategies. In addition, Peacebuilding Fund appears to be an important tool to achieve policy goals for peacebuilding.

UN Peace Operations including peacekeeping missions as well as political and peacebuilding missions have particular roles in fostering local ownership with its special functions. The missions contribute, first of all, by implementing operations to reform domestic institutions including Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR). Second, the missions usually help local actors implement the peace/political processes, which is expected to strengthen capacity of local stakeholders. Third, when the missions take administrative responsibility, they significantly get involved in capacity development of local personnel. Peace operations are sometimes channels for local people to obtain knowledge and skills to develop human resources.

UN specialized agencies are of course relevant to fostering local ownership. Among others UN Development Programme (UNDP), emphasizing “human development” and “human security,” is implementing programs for capacity development relevant to this paper’s focus<sup>8</sup>. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also pays attention to capacity development especially as regards host

countries.<sup>9</sup> UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) is said to contribute to enhancement of local ownership through programs on protection of children from violence and social integration of former child soldiers.<sup>10</sup> Agencies like World Food Programme (WFP) contributes by securing basic human needs<sup>11</sup> and those like UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) contributes by providing training opportunities to local stakeholders.<sup>12</sup>

It is not only United Nations that is working for enhancement of local ownership in peacebuilding-related fields. Other international organizations like regional organizations have recently been very active.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been engaged in multiple peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In addition, it is engaged in security sector reform for the military as well as the police. It has been training the African Union troops in Darfur, Sudan and Iraqi security forces outside Iraq.<sup>13</sup>

The notable engagement by the European Union (EU) is EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina which has been training local police since 2003. The EU's peacekeeping force, EUFOR, has been helping local police to fight organized crimes as well as local military to reform its institutional structure.<sup>14</sup>

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) promotes democratic governance with Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) as its focal point, which especially encourages civil participation in democratic culture by emphasizing the values of tolerance, human rights, rule of law, peace and security. The fact that OSCE has multiple field missions in post-conflict areas is of importance in light of its contribution to capacity development for peacebuilding.<sup>15</sup>

In contrast to the organizations composed of developed countries, the case of the African Union is somewhat different. AU itself partly constitute a subject of local ownership. Its role for regional peace through its mechanism of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is intended to take responsibility for peace in Africa as the pan-African organization. But its various concrete measures including the continental early warning system and the African standing army are still at a premature level.<sup>16</sup> In this context the efforts made by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), Economic

Community of Central African States (La Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale) (ECCAS/CEEAC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and Inter-Parliamentary Union, IGAD (IPU-IGAD) are all relevant to capacity development and enhancement of local ownership of peacebuilding.<sup>17</sup> Efforts by the Organization of American States (OAS), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in Latin America, Asia and the Pacific are relevant as local initiatives for peace.<sup>18</sup>

The roles of developmental aid agencies are considerable. For instance, the World Bank's researches on community-driven development (CDD) and local-level empowerment are oriented toward its long-term commitment to enhancement of local ownership.<sup>19</sup> Asia Development Bank (ADB) and Asia Development Fund (ADF) are engaged in assistances in governance with emphasis upon legal, judicial and policy reforms.<sup>20</sup> African Development Bank (AfDB) and African Development Fund (AfDF) also provide governance assistance and promotion of civil society organizations.<sup>21</sup> With the help of AfDB, African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) is engaged in capacity development assistance.<sup>22</sup> Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) emphasizes the aspects of democratizations.<sup>23</sup>

It is noteworthy that Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) keeps attention to peacebuilding issues. In the context of development effectiveness in fragile states DAC recognizes that "Fragile states confront particularly severe development challenges such as weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crisis, persistent social tensions, violence or the legacy of civil war." Thus, state-building is a central objective to tackle the issue of fragile states. "The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national reformers build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions. Progress towards this goal requires joined-up and coherent action within and among governments and organisations."<sup>24</sup>

"The DAC Guidelines: Helping Preventing Violent Conflict" in 2001 stated "Speed and 'efficiency' in development operations may sometimes need to be sacrificed to some degree for greater stability and peace, as well as local 'ownership.'" It also states that "Be transparent, communicate intentions, and widen and deepen dialogue

with partners at all levels in order to ensure ownership.” It argued that “External actors – multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental – individually and collectively need to identify and support local capacities for preventing and resolving conflict issues and for finding innovative solutions, even in the most grave conflict or post-conflict situations....Donors should give particular consideration to understanding and, where appropriate, supporting indigenous and customary peace-building capacities and other potential connectors, such as women’s organisations with the potential to play bridging roles. These can have a major impact on building solidarity and boosting local confidence and capacity.”<sup>25</sup>

## **2-2 International NGOs**

Numerous NGOs are engaged in various activities to enhance local ownership from the long perspective.<sup>26</sup> Among others are the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) on capacity development for transitional justice,<sup>27</sup> International Alert, Search for Common Ground, and ACCORD on conflict resolution,<sup>28</sup> Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC),<sup>29</sup> etc.

## **2-3 Donor Countries**

The United States is engaged in capacity development programs in its own peculiar commitment to “nation-building.”<sup>30</sup> With the advent of the War on Terror, the US dramatically increased the budget for ODA.<sup>31</sup> As regards its “fragile states strategy,” United States Agency for International Development (USAID) intends to “enhance stability,” “improve security,” “encourage reform,” and “develop the capacity of institutions” by saying that “in some cases, lack of political will to foster greater effectiveness and legitimacy of government institutions may be driving fragility. Supporting reformers outside the government may contribute to political instability in the short term, but may, in the medium to long term, avoid violent conflict and state failure. Support for economic activities that lead to job creation, improved family incomes, and better functioning markets can, in most cases, contribute to greater economic stability.”<sup>32</sup>

Canada, using the concepts of “responsibility to protect” and “human security,” tends to emphasize the obligations on the side of the international community. It also uses the inter-ministerial approach of “3D” composed of Diplomacy, Defense, and Development.<sup>33</sup> The United Kingdom during the Blair administration enhanced its interest in the sphere of conflict prevention with special reference to SSR, small arms collection, etc.<sup>34</sup> Germany through Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Das Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung [Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development] (BMZ), Civilian Peace Service (CPS), and Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze [Center for International Peace Operations] (ZIF) is engaged in SSR, peace education, etc.<sup>35</sup>

An example of local capacity development as a result of multi-donor efforts is Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC).<sup>36</sup>

### **3. The Policies to Foster Local Ownership**

Next, this paper looks at policies of peacebuilding to foster local ownership. Ownership does not have its own special program. Rather, it is really a cross-cutting issue that can/must be reinforced by various kinds of policies. This section is intended to examine how existing policies of peacebuilding are expected to contribute to enhancement of local ownership.

#### **3-1 Assistance in the Political Process**

Even peacebuilding assistances are often regarded as technical issues that can be dealt with through technical assistance in developmental aid. But as this paper argued, political will would constitute a vitally important aspect of peacebuilding. Without the policy concern to foster political will to peace in domestic society, it is difficult to grow up sustainable local ownership. The external actors may help develop will to peace by conducting assistances in political processes.

Brokering a peace agreement itself an assistance in cultivating local ownership since it is expected to contribute to forming a political framework for durable peace.

Recent peace agreements tend to contain provisions on how to form political systems and provide a “roadmap” to do so. Thus, it is important to input the perspective to cultivate local ownership for healthier development of the political process in the peace agreement basically made between warring parties. Inviting broader domestic parties or even holding a “national dialogue” meeting would facilitate popular participation in following political processes.

Even after brokering the peace agreement, there are instances to foster local ownership to facilitate the peace process. Once the peace agreement is signed by warring parties, the political process to facilitate popular support of the framework of the peace agreement ought to be promoted. In addition, external actors ought to pay attention to the relationship between domestic forces, ministries, political parties, etc., and organize coordination mechanisms to develop policy-consultation processes. External actors furthermore help domestic forces to have contacts with neighboring countries.

Through developmental aid, donors can make efforts to facilitate effective policy consultations among key domestic actors as much as possible. The PBC is cultivating a new sphere by actively inviting not only governmental circles but also civil society organizations in the process of consultation. It is an area in which PBC has a great potential to cultivate a new sphere of promoting local ownership.

### **3-2 Assistance in Political System**

Assistances in legal system reforms are often introduced as major tasks of peacebuilding. It guarantees a fair framework for popular participation in the political process, while the challenge is to balance international standards and local customs/needs/reality.<sup>37</sup>

Assistances in political parties should not be underestimated for the purpose of developing local ownership. Party politics is an internationally established mechanism to cultivate formal voices of political will, while politicization from the donor’s side must be avoided carefully.<sup>38</sup>

Electoral assistance is a widely established process of peacebuilding. Without an election, it is difficult to grant a sufficient level of legitimacy to a governing body. It

constructs a healthy relationship between the government and the governed. External help is needed beyond the point of mere electoral monitoring. It is important to facilitate local actors to obtain capacity to develop a sustainable electoral system and a management mechanism.<sup>39</sup>

### **3-3 Assistance in Political Culture**

Promoting political values like human rights, rule of law and peace itself could contribute to desirable development of local ownership. Assurances in democratization may be described as such value-oriented measures. Through assurances in democratization, donors may take selective approaches on the targets of assurances.

Getting rid of obstacles in protection of human rights would constitute one crucial element of developing local ownership for peacebuilding. While even humanitarian agencies are committed to promoting human rights, some special measures are recently introduced in the forms of ad-hoc war crimes tribunals, International Criminal Court, hybrid courts, etc. International aid agencies protecting norms of international humanitarian law traditionally took neutrality as a major principle, while the international trend after the “Brahimi Report” is put priority on impartiality over neutrality.<sup>40</sup> In any event it is necessary to understand human rights promotion is one crucial element of promotion of local ownership.

In addition to the promotion of political values and legal norms, promotion of peacebuilding related skills are sometimes introduced. Workshops on conflict resolution would be one such example.

### **3-4 Security Sector Reform**

Inappropriate security sector is a major obstacle to development of local ownership.<sup>41</sup> It is a policy to create one important foundation for durable peace. DDR is a familiar operation to create one legitimate national military component. Training military personnel is also crucial, since individuals in fact matter in terms of management of military forces. Financial measures for appropriate equipments, payments, etc. ought to be recognized an important aspect of peacebuilding.

Law enforcement agency has crucial importance in promoting local ownership for peacebuilding. One legitimate police system is required for sustainable peacebuilding. Coordination between the military and the police or with some other groups would be also a necessary aspect of peacebuilding. Again, training and financial measures are introduced to better develop law enforcement agency. The concepts of “democratic policing” and “community police” may function as conceptual guidelines for police reforms.

### **3-5 Judicial Reform**

Without judicial reform, SSR does not have any impact. The judiciary tends to be corrupt in many countries due to the way they exercise their power in closed circles, which must be eliminated for development of local ownership. In line with SSR, judicial systems ought to be adjusted in accordance with the same standard. But promoting and utilizing local resources are emphasized.<sup>42</sup> Many innovative attempts of “transitional justice” including *gacaca* in Rwanda have been tried. Truth and reconciliation commissions ought to be identified as a peacebuilding measure in this context. Training lawyers in a broader sense to cover many professions including correction officers is also regarded as a crucial element.<sup>43</sup> “Outreach” activities being tried by the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) can have a significant impact upon community level peacebuilding.<sup>44</sup>

### **3-6 Administrative Assistance**

Many programs for capacity development of governmental officials have been introduced. They ought be identified in the context of local ownership for peacebuilding. Lack of human resources is sometimes one major obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding as a result of poor education, brain drain, etc. From the perspective of local ownership capacity development programs ought to be arranged on the basis of local resources/customs. In some cases one cannot deny the validity of Direct Budget Support (DBS) as part of enhancement measures of local ownership.

The recent trend among aid agencies is to promote decentralization as part of



developmental aid.<sup>45</sup> It is desirable if it leads to poverty reduction, democratization, increase in efficiency. In the context of peacebuilding, decentralization could contribute to local ownership if excessive centralization may have been a hotbed of conflict.

### **3-7 Support for Civil Society**

Support for civil society can be regarded as a grass-root level promotion of local ownership. Assurances in local NGOs constitute one pillar of this aspect, while it is sometimes difficult to promote only healthy NGOs for the purpose of peacebuilding.<sup>46</sup> Assurances in media is of importance, since the role of media to popular promotion of local ownership is one critical topic.<sup>47</sup> Cultural exchanges may be pursued with the expectation that they also promote a grass-root level capacity development.<sup>48</sup>

### **3-8 Humanitarian and Developmental Aid**

Humanitarian and developmental aids have vital roles in promoting local ownership. For instance, securing basic human needs (BHN) would support a foundation of sustainable living conditions. Direct empowerment measures for minority groups as well as vulnerable groups constitute a reinforcement of capacity development in fragile states.<sup>49</sup> Even developmental aid for infrastructures may be identified as a social fosterer of local ownership.

## **4. Concluding Remarks**

This paper is still a preliminary work to further develop the idea of local ownership in the field of peacebuilding. This paper did not simply advocate or criticize the importance of local ownership. Instead, it sought to broaden the scope of the concept. The principle of local ownership is an indispensable concept, while it is not really widely respected. Peacebuilding cannot be successful without sufficiently being linked to the principle. On the other hand, peacebuilding cannot be successful only by being linked to the principle. What is required is to fully understand the importance and the

difficulty that reside in the principle of local ownership. The paper thus tried to clarify and broaden the conceptual as well practical scope of the principle of local ownership. This paper did not provide any clear-cut answer, since it is difficult to exhaust all the possibilities and limits of such a broad concept as local ownership in peacebuilding. Nevertheless, the paper is expected to contribute to further developing our understanding the issues concerning the principle of local ownership.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The Charter of the United Nations, Article 1 (2). See also the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 14 December 1960, UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV); Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 14 December 1962, UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII); Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1970, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV).

<sup>2</sup> The remaining issue at the moment is whether certain particular territories constitute colonized territories as in the case of the Falkland Islands.

<sup>3</sup> Hideaki Shinoda, *Peacebuilding and the Rule of Law* (Sobunsha, 2003).

<sup>4</sup> Whether ownership is claimed and exercised by local “society,” “state,” “government” or “people” is a matter of serious consideration that requires attention. However, the present paper does not distinguish between these subjects or at least does not exclude any local subject of ownership, since the purpose of the paper is to provide a general overview of the role of local ownership in peacebuilding from a broad perspective.

<sup>5</sup> See Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Carlos Lopes, Khalid Malik, “Overview: Institutional Innovations for Capacity Development” in Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Carlos Lopes and Khalid Malik (eds.), *Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems* (London: Earthscan Publications, 2002) at <<http://www.pnud.org.br/pdf/Capacity%20for%20Development%20-%20New%20solutions%20to%20old%20problems.pdf>>, p. 14. See also Carlos Lopes, “Should We Mind the Gap?” in *ibid*.

<sup>6</sup> Hideaki Shinoda, “The Establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission,” *International Law and Diplomacy*, Vol. 105, no. 4. (Japanese)

<sup>7</sup> See General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/180, 20 December 2005 and Security Council Resolution S/RES/1645(2005), 20 December 2005.

<sup>8</sup> UNDP-WHO, “Armed Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP): Support to Community Based Violence Prevention Programmes Project Document,” 2004 <[http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/armed\\_violence/pro\\_docs/AVPP\\_Pro\\_Doc\\_signed.pdf](http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/armed_violence/pro_docs/AVPP_Pro_Doc_signed.pdf)>; UNDP, “Securing Development: UNDP’s Support for Addressing Small Arms Issues,” 2005 <[http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/sa\\_control/securing\\_development.pdf](http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/sa_control/securing_development.pdf)>; UNDP, “Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice: A Crisis Post-Conflict Programmatic Approach,” <[http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/jssr/ssr/UNDP\\_2003\\_JSSR\\_Approach.doc](http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/jssr/ssr/UNDP_2003_JSSR_Approach.doc)>; Nicole Ball, “Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP,” UNDP, 2002, <[http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/jssr/ssr/UNDP\\_Ball\\_2002\\_SSR\\_Concept\\_Paper.doc](http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/jssr/ssr/UNDP_Ball_2002_SSR_Concept_Paper.doc)>; and “Conflict Analysis Tools” and “Guidance and Lessons Learned” at <[http://www.undp.org/bcpr/we\\_do/integrating\\_conflict.shtml](http://www.undp.org/bcpr/we_do/integrating_conflict.shtml)>.

<sup>9</sup> UNHCR, “Capacity-Building” at <<http://www.unhcr.org/protect/3d3d1e614.html>>.

<sup>10</sup> UNICEF, “Child Protection from Violence, Exploitation and Abuse,” <<http://www.unicef.org/protection/index.html>>; UNICEF, “Children Associated with Armed Groups,” <[http://www.unicef.org/protection/files/Armed\\_Groups.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/protection/files/Armed_Groups.pdf)>.

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