Development of Parliamentarism in the Modern Islamic World

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Chapter VII  Popular Sovereignty and Republicanism in Iran’s Postrevolutionary Electoral Democracy

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Introduction

The 1979 “Islamic Revolution” (Envelâb-e Eslâmî) marked a historic threshold both in the history of Shi’ite Islam and in the national history of Iran. While one recognizes the contingent and multifaceted nature of the processes and the outcomes of the 1979 revolution, its primary significance with respect to the former may well be said to have lain in the fact that the revolution handed the reins of the modern Iranian state to ‘Âyatollâh Rûhollâh Khomeynî and his direct followers. In the short-term, this enabled them to prevail over the opposition forces of various kinds and declare the ‘Âyatollâh’s own doctrine of the “mandate of the jurisprudent” (velâyat-e faqîh) the fundamental principle of statecraft in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). As for its long-term effects, the supporters as well as the critics of ‘Âyatollâh Khomeynî and his legacy have argued that neither the Shi’ite religion nor its clergy would remain the same after experiencing the incumbency of a modern state. For example, one of his supporters argued that the religious government in post-revolutionary Iran, together with its official doctrine of the absolute mandate of the ruling jurisprudent (velâyat-e motlaq-e faqîh), was the most important factor accelerating the process of secularization, in both senses of the profanation of the sacred and the separation of religion from politics. On the other hand, some domestic critics of his legacy have expressed concerns over the apparent detrimental effects arising from limiting the “contents” of the religion to what came to be called “jurisprudential Islam” (Eslâm-e faqâhât) through the promotion of its “official interpretation,” and from bringing about a “governmental religion” (dîn-e dowlâî)


2  Sa‘îd Hajjâríyân, Az Shâhéd-e Qodsî tâ Shâhéd-e Bâzârî: ‘Orfî-shodan-e Din dar Sepehr-e Siyâsat (From the sacred witness to the profane witness: The secularization of religion in the sphere of politics) (Tehrân: Tarh-e Now, 2001 [1380]), 92–122.

at the expense of “faith, spirituality, and passion.”

For the national history of Iran, those who took the reins of the postrevolutionary state declared that the 1979 revolution was the culmination of two popular movements in the previous hundred years: the “antidespotic Constitutional Movement” in the 1900s and the “anticolonial Oil Nationalization Movement” in the 1950s. The fact that the principal slogan of the 1979 revolution, “Independence, Freedom, and the Islamic Republic” (Esteghlal, Azadi, va Jomhuri-ye Eslami), contained both the “anti-imperialist” and political-freedom-seeking components—in addition to the Islamic one—provides a prime facie indication of the multifaceted nature that the 1979 revolution arguably had.

Writing in the fifth year into the postrevolutionary period, former prime minister of the provisional government and self-avowed “religious-nationalist” Mehdi Bazargan (1907–95) asserted that, after the overthrow of the monarchical regime, the followers of Ayatollah Khomeyni had negated “nationalism and nationalists” (naf-e melligerâ‘i va meliyyun) and started a “kind of anti-Iran movement” (yek-now-e nehzat-e zedd-e Irân). Had he been right about this assertion, however, the 1979 revolution and Ayatollah Khomeyni’s grip on the postrevolutionary polity would have adversely affected the prospect of democratic transition and consolidation in post-1979 Iran—possibly more so, given its broad scope, than a host of targeted measures that he and his followers effected against a selection of their domestic opponents. For, more than anything else, such a project would have seriously damaged “national unity,” a condition that one of the forerunners of democratic transition study singled out as the only “background condition” that a transition to democracy in developing countries may require.

The goal of this chapter is to revisit and reexamine the 1979 “Islamic”

5 QA 1979, preamble.
Revolution from one particular perspective, that is, to see how the revolution arguably prepared a future consolidation of an electoral democracy that Iran’s postrevolutionary political elite constituted in its wake. My reexamination of the 1979 revolution here will not be comprehensive, nor will it cover all the elements that had relevance to establishing a democratic political system immediately after the fall of the monarchical regime in February 1979. Rather, it will be highly selective for the following reason.

I have argued elsewhere that it is better to consider the second parliamentary election held in April and May 1984, and not the series of “founding elections” held in 1979 and 1980, the actual beginning of the struggles toward democratic consolidation in the IRI. Certain background conditions may be pointed out here as part of its justification. By the summer of 1983, the following three conditions were achieved that paved the way for the postrevolutionary political elite to institute anew an electoral regime that arguably held the potential of being consolidated at a later stage.

First, the waves of oft-violent crackdowns on the opponents of the Khomeinists’ postrevolutionary helm—ranging from the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) to the National Democratic Front (NDF) to the Muslim People’s Republic Party (MPRP) to the People’s Mojahedin Organization (MKO)—were mostly over by the end of 1982. To complete the series of extensive political purges, the IRI state extended the arrests and crackdown to the “regime-friendly” Tudeh Party early in the following year.

Second, by this time, the IRI state had finished its purges of the labor organizations and placed them under its control. The Islamic Republican Party (IRP) initiated the purge of the secular leftist elements from the burgeoning labor activism and its organizational formations during the tenure of the provisional government in 1979. ’Ali Rabī’ī and ʿAlī Rezā Mahjūb, the two former strike organizers whom the pro-Khomeynī clerical leaders co-opted into the IRP structure, were instrumental in purging the leftist members from the umbrella organization called “Labor

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9 Matsunaga, Struggles for Democratic Consolidation, 63–124.
12 Rahnema and Nomani, The Secular Miracle, 248–49.
Although the legal regime that enabled the government to control the “Islamic Labor Councils” (showrâ-hâ-ye Eslâmi-ye kâr) was not put in place until early 1985 due to the opposition from the conservative faction among the postrevolutionary political elite, the purge of the secular leftist elements was more or less complete by the summer of 1983.

Third, the campaign later named “cultural revolution” had similarly targeted the universities and purged them of the Western-oriented and secular leftist faculty members. Initially consisting of vigilante attacks on Marxist and other secular elements on the university campuses, the campaign was given a formal structure in June 1980 when Ayatollâh Khomeynî established a seven-member “Cultural Revolution Headquarters.” The campaign ended up closing the entire higher education system for the full two years (1980–82) and prevented many university faculties from admitting new students for three consecutive years (1980–83). When the minister of culture and higher education reopened the universities in the fall of 1982, nearly half the faculty and other teaching staff had apparently either left or been purged.

It is important to note, however, that these crackdowns and purges did not render the remaining political forces inside the IRI a homogeneous monolith. As they


16 Rahnema and Nomani, The Secular Miracle, 223–30. When the universities were closed, Hasan Habibi was minister of higher education. They were reopened by Mohammad ‘Ali Najaft, minister of culture and higher education in Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Mûsavî’s cabinet.
turned out, the divergent politico-ideological tendencies that remained *unpurged* in 1984 (including the Freedom Movement of Iran [FMI] and its allies\(^{17}\)) came to equal the *whole* spectrum of the postrevolutionary political elite—that is, those who were allowed to enter electoral politics and/or public sphere debate in the IRI—throughout the period under examination in this chapter.

Against this backdrop, in the remaining part of this chapter, I will revisit two aspects of the 1979 revolution that arguably had direct relevance to the electoral democracy constructed in the IRI and its potential for consolidation. They are: (1) the constitutional affirmation of the nation’s right to sovereignty; and (2) the adoption of “republicanism” in terms of the institutional arrangements and of discursive orientation.

1. The Nation’s Right to Sovereignty

Ayatollah Khomeynī, when temporarily exiled in France, more than once contended that the postrevolutionary regime would be an “Islamic republic” that relies on “public opinion.” And Article 6 of the 1979 IRI Constitution later adopted this particular concept and phraseology, and related it to holding presidential and parliamentary elections as well as national referenda. During the same period in his exile, Ayatollah Khomeynī also asserted the right of the Iranian nation to determine its own political system. For instance, in an interview with *The Financial Times* in early November 1978, Ayatollah Khomeynī declared as follows:

> It is among the principal rights of every nation to have [control over its own] destiny (*sarnevesht*) and to determine the form and kind of its own political system.\(^{18}\)

On the day he returned to Iran, Ayatollah Khomeynī brought up this theme as part the very first topic in his first public speech at the *Behesht-e Zahra* cemetery, declaring again that “the destiny of every nation is in its own hand” (*sarnevesht-e har mellat [be] dast-e khodesh ast*).\(^{19}\) The people purportedly exercised this right when they voted overwhelmingly for the as-yet-undefined “Islamic Republic” in a

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\(^{17}\) The latter include those who now call themselves “religious nationalists” (*mellī-mazhabiyyān*), such as ‘Ezzatollah Sahabī and Habibollah Peymān.


\(^{19}\) SN 4:281–82.
national referendum in late March 1979. The day before the referendum, Ayatollah Khomeyni in a message to the nation had declared as follows:

This referendum will determine the destiny of our nation (sarnevesht-e mellat-e mā rā taʿīn mī-konad)...My vote is for the Islamic Republic, and I request that you help Islam, help your own country, help your own nation, and vote for the Islamic Republic. But you are free. With freedom, [go and] decide your own destiny.

Leaving aside the issue of to what extent the votes in this referendum served to “determine the form and kind” of the postrevolutionary political system, what is important for the purpose of this chapter is that the above discourse was not abandoned even after this referendum. Later in the same year, pro-Khomeyni majority members of the Constitution Experts Assembly incorporated the theme—which was not in the preliminary draft prepared by the provisional government—into the text of the constitution. And very significantly, they did so in the context of demarcating sovereignty as a political right (haqq-e hākimiyyat). The draft text of what became Article 56, which a subgroup of the assembly led by Ayatollah Beheshti and Hojjat ol-Eslam Bahanar prepared, read as follows:

The right to popular sovereignty (haqq-e hākimiyyat-e mellī), which is that very right to determine [its] social destiny, is a universal right that God has given to all the individuals of the nation so that they may exercise directly or by way of assigning or electing the eligible individuals in full observance of the laws...

After open session deliberations, however, the majority members of the

20 One of the chief decision makers as well as the spokespersons of the postrevolutionary order, Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari in an interview with the state TV before the referendum only sketchily stated that the Islamic Republic would be a republic in its form and Islamic in its content, but also suggested that the republic being Islamic would not present any inconsistency with the principle of popular sovereignty or democracy. Morteza Motahhari, Pirāmīn-e Engelāb-e Eslāmi (On the Islamic Revolution) (Tehran: Sadrā, 1998 [1377]), 80–83.

21 SN 5:219.

22 The critics, for example, have argued that the authorities were disingenuous in their campaign for obtaining affirmative votes, misinforming the voters about what they were voting for (Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran, 25–27).

Constitution-writing Experts Assembly eliminated the term “the right to popular sovereignty” largely because some of its more conservative members feared that it might unduly constrain the prerogative of the ruling jurisprudent (valī-ye faqīh). For those who subscribe to the so-called “divine appointment” (entesāb) argument of the mandate of the jurisprudent deny any role of the people, be it in selecting him or adding to his legitimacy.24

In the end, the text that the assembly adopted read as follows:

Absolute sovereignty over the world and mankind (hākemīyat-e motlaq bar jahān va ensān) belongs to God, and He also made the human the sovereign of his/her own social destiny” (va ḥam ā ensān rā bar sarnevesht-e ejtemā‘ī-ye khīsh hākem sākhīt-e ast)...The nation will exercise this God-given right (haqq-e khodā-dād) in the manner set forth in the following articles.25

And the articles that followed stipulated that the three governmental powers—the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary—are separate from each other and that they exercise their powers under the “mandate” (velāyat) of the ruling jurisprudent (Article 57); that the legislature will be composed of the “representatives elected by the people” (Article 58); that direct national referenda may be organized on very important economic, political, social and cultural issues (Article 59); and the part of the executive power that the constitution did not directly task with the leader will be exercised by the president, the prime minister and, the [cabinet] ministers (Article 60). These provisions made it clear that the “popular” sovereignty that the 1979 constitution spoke of went much beyond the initial determination of the form and type of the postrevolutionary political system; they did relate it to the formation of a representative government through direct, popular elections.

As the above-quoted text of Article 56 makes it clear, however, the Experts Assembly, in addition to eliminating the term “the right to popular sovereignty,” also modified the purport of “popular sovereignty.” The above-quoted draft text attributed the “God-given right to sovereignty” to individual members of the Iranian nation. By changing the subject of the last sentence of the article from āhād-e mel--lat to mellat, the Experts Assembly sought to purport that it was the Iranian nation as a collectivity, not its individual members, that has been credited this “sovereignty.” Accordingly, the title of the chapter that preceded the article was also changed from “the popular sovereignty (haqq-e hākemīyat-e mellī) and the powers arising

25 QA 1979, article 56.
therefrom” to “the nation’s right to sovereignty (haqq-e hākemiyat-e mellat) and the powers arising therefrom.”

This episode highlighted two problematics that the discourse of popular sovereignty came to encounter in the context of the IRI. One problematic was that, in the postrevolutionary discourse, popular sovereignty came to be discussed not only in bounded terms, but also as something that may be cancelled out by the prerogative of the ruling jurisprudents. During the debate in the Constitution Experts Assembly, while some of the more “progressive” pro-regime clerics—such as Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, Mohammad Yazdi, and ‘Ali Tehrani—found no contradiction between the prerogative of the ruling jurisprudent and the principle of popular sovereignty, the more “conservative” clerics—such as Hojjat ol-Eslām Abol-Fazl Müsavī-Tabrizi (Seyyed Reyhāni) and Ayatollah ‘Abdollāh Javādí-Āmolī—clearly disagreed. For example, Ayatollah Javādí-Āmolī flatly denied that the “God-given right to popular sovereignty” that the draft text of the article mentioned had anything to do with the claim to political representation (vekālat). To this date, the disagreement on this very issue has persisted among the prominent clerics supportive of the Islamic Revolution and the IRI, fueling in turn the wider political discourse and debate in the context of the IRI on representative democracy (mardomsālār), the mandate of the jurisprudent, and the relationship between the two.

Another problematic related to the collective conception of popular sovereignty that Article 56 of the 1979 constitution formally adopted. The change from the individually inclined conception to the collective one may have been a setback, at least in the short run, if the immediate goal of the 1979 revolution had been to achieve a modern, Western-style democracy underpinned by individualism. But a


different conclusion would be reached if the relevant question was whether the 1979 revolution had the impact of negating the preexisting Iranian nationalism and of starting a kind of "anti-Iran" movement to the extent that it undermined the prospect of democratic transition and consolidation. For a careful reading of the discourse of an "Islamic Revolution" that the Preamble of the 1979 constitution adopted suggests that the collective conception of popular sovereignty likely had the effect of boosting the sense of Iranian nationalism—through a newly constructed Islamist-nationalist conception of the "Muslim nation of Iran" (mellat-e mosalmān-e Īrān).  

The narrative that the Preamble of the IRI Constitution adopted meticulously constructed a discourse that highlighted the basic continuation as well as the revolutionary transformation of the Iranian nation as the primary agent of the political change that led to the 1979 revolution. As noted above, the Preamble set forth a view that the 1979 "Islamic Revolution" was the culmination of the two previous Iranian national movements. It also identified the "Muslim nation of Iran" as the collective actors of each movement. While these propositions set the context of a continuous national struggle, the narrative attributed the failure of the past movements to the absence of an Islamist ideology. The relevant part of the Preamble reads as follows:

The fundamental characteristic of this [1979] revolution, as compared to the other movements of Iran in the last hundred years, was that it was ideological and Islamic (maktabī va Eslāmī būdan-e ān). The Muslim nation of Iran, after going through the antidespotic Constitutional Movement and the anticolonialist Oil Nationalization Movement, learned this heavy lesson that the basic and definite reason for the failure of those struggles was the fact that they were not ideological. Although the previous movements adopted an Islamic line of thought and the combatant clergy played a fundamental role in leading them, the actions came to a standstill as the movements became distant from the authentic Islamic positions. At this juncture, the awakened [collected] conscience of the nation realized, under the leadership of marja‘-e ‘āli-qadr-e taqālid Ayātollāh ol-‘Ozmā Khomeynī, the necessity of pursuing the authentic ideological and Islamic line for the movement (khatt-e nehzat-e asīl-e maktabī va Eslāmī). And this time, the combatant clergy of the country—who had always been at the front row of the mass movements (nehzat-hā-ye mardomī)—and the [ideologically] committed writers and intellectuals attained a new momentum under his leadership.  

29 By "Islamist," I refer to the position of someone who advocates certain "ideologized" version of Islam. 
30 QA 1979, preamble.
Then the Preamble in its following part describes how the “alert and responsible social groups” in the society raised the “level of combative and ideological alertness and awareness” of the Muslim nation of Iran by drawing on “inspirations from the revolutionary and fruitful Islamic ideology.” The ensuing demonstrations and bloody street battles, according to this narrative, was a direct reflection of the deepened and widespread “awareness and determination” (āgāhī va ‘azm) of the Muslim nation of Iran.31

It is notable that in addition to introducing a discourse on the revolutionary genealogy, the above narrative also reconstituted a new “Islamist” national identity. While the narrative did emphasize its “Islamist” ideological facet, the new collective identity was, to the extent that it emphasized the continuity with the previous national movements, neither antinationalist nor anti-Iranian. Put differently, those who took the reins of the IRI state did not reject the preexisting Iranian nationalism; they transformed the latter by reconstituting it on the basis of an “Islamist” national identity. Therefore, at least on the level of the emerging discourse, the 1979 revolution was hardly an Islamic revolution that negated the preexisting sense of Iranian nationalism; rather, it was “an Islamic revolution of the Iranian nation.”

Having discussed the above, a case may be made that the collective conception of popular sovereignty adopted in the 1979 constitution still paved the way for its gradual transformation into a more individual-based one. My argument is twofold. On the one hand, indications and analyses abound that the collective conception of popular sovereignty initially served not so much the cause of political freedom and representative democracy as the “populist” bent that Āyatollāh Khomeynī exhibited upon returning to Iran in 1979.32 For example, the narrative in the Preamble of the 1979 constitution interchangeably used the terms the “Islamic community” (ommāt-e Eslāmī), the “Muslim people” (mardom-e mosalmanī), “our nation” (mellāt-e mā), “our Muslim nation” (mellāt-e mosalman-e mā), and the “Muslim nation of Iran” (mellāt-e mosalman-e Īrān). Equating the Iranian “nation” with the “people/mass” (mardom), a more populist-leaning term, was concordant

31 QA 1979, preamble.
with the usage of other similarly leaning terms that Āyatollāh Khomeynī newly acquired and generously used, such as “class” (tabağe), “revolution” (enqelāb), “the oppressed” (mahrūmīn), and “the dispossessed” (mostaz'fīn). In addition to the populist usage of such formerly Marxist terms, the collective conception of popular sovereignty also undoubtedly served the “multiclass nature”—a common characteristic in the Third World populisms—of postrevolutionary Iranian populism, despite its rhetorical emphasis on the underclass. As the results of the series of referenda and the elections in the first years after the revolution showed, it also initially helped bolster the “plebiscitarian” tendency of electoral mobilization, another characteristic of populism in semiperipheral politics.

On the other hand, in addition to initially serving as a boost for the populist rhetoric and mobilization, the collective conception of popular sovereignty that the constitution adopted likely had longer-term effects as well. In this connection, what also seems particularly relevant is the impact of the strategy with which Āyatollāh Khomeynī and his followers sought to start revolutionary political change back in 1970. As the above-quoted narrative from the Preamble suggested, the strategy that Āyatollāh Khomeynī advocated in his historic 1970 lecture in Najaf was to “awaken the nation” by way of “propagation” (tablīghāt). Addressing his clerical students, he enjoined as follows:

We are obliged to take it seriously to form the Islamic state (hokūmat-e Eslāmī). Organize our first activity by way of propagation. We must proceed through propagation. All over the world, it has always been like this. A few persons sat together, thought about it, made their decision, and followed it up by propagating [their cause]...[No movement] had troops and power under their command from the beginning; [all movements] had started by way of propagation. They have condemned brutalities and oppressions; they alerted the nation; and the people understood that these brutalities were wrong. Little by little, the scope of the propagation expanded until it acquired all the groups in the society and the people became awakened (bidār) and active. Then we will reap the result.


Although the passage above suggests that this strategy of "awakening the nation" was simply a means and not a goal in itself, the process involved—once started—likely acquired a life of its own. For that matter, the experiences of the successful takeover of the modern state in the 1979 revolution and of the ensuing plebiscitarian political process most likely added to the sense of empowerment in the minds of many ordinary and activist Iranian citizens who participated in these processes. The effect was likely stronger especially among the younger participants, who had also been influenced, prior to the 1979 revolution, by nonclerical, radical revolutionary ideologies advocated by 'Alī Shārī'atī (1933–77), the People's Mujahedin Organization (MKO), and others. For them—some of whom later became both active and influential in the reformist camp during the presidency of Mohammad Khātāmī (1997–2005)—whether the conception of popular sovereignty was formulated in individual or collective terms probably did not matter as much as their own sense of empowerment in the wake of achieving a revolution.

Such a sense of empowerment, and also of ownership of the revolution, seemed to have, in part, contributed to some remarkable demonstrations of support by the voters for the electoral process and, by extension, for the political system of the IRI. A case in point was the third presidential election in October 1981, held six weeks after a bomb attack killed both the incumbent president and prime minister. In this election—a second presidential election in just five months—the number of the votes cast increased by more than two million and the turnout by 10 percentage points as compared to the previous election earlier in that year. This demonstration of a strong and seemingly spontaneous popular support would have been unlikely if the postrevolutionary political process had not sustained some sense of “empowerment” and “ownership” among substantial portions of the electorate.

In this context, it is also possible to consider some of the public remarks of Āyatollāh Khomeynī in the postrevolutionary period not simply a "populist" rhetoric, but a genuine affirmation of the popular sovereignty and empowerment that the 1979 revolution was said to have achieved for the nation—and, by extension, for its individual members. For example, after the lengthy process of constructing the procedural consensus before the second parliamentary election, Āyatollāh Khomeynī in an address to government officials remarked as follows:

"Today it is not that the people consider the government as separate from themselves or consider the elections "ordered" (farmāyeshī) and extraneous (az gheyr). Today the people know that the government is from themselves and [that] the elections also are from themselves."

Against this backdrop, the constitutional affirmation of the nation’s right to
sovereignty “over its social destiny” was much more than a simple legal statement. Rather, combined with the effect of the prerevolutionary strategy of “awakening the nation” and the postrevolutionary experience of electoral democracy during its initial years, it constituted a strong political statement—one with a potentially positive impact on the prospect of consolidation of the IRI’s electoral democracy.

2. “Republicanism” of the Islamic Republic

If we understand what a republic is about primarily in the Madisonian tradition of limited government with checks and balances, the political institutions of the IRI that the 1979 revolution and the ensuing constitution-making process brought forth may be said to have certain fundamental difficulties to qualify as one. For one, the head of the state—the ruling Islamic jurisprudent (vali-ye faqih) whose constitutional mandate includes the command of the armed forces and the appointment of a host of judicial and oversight officials—does not have a term limit once in office. More fundamentally, the doctrine of an Islamic state headed by a “just jurisprudent”—ruler was not—at least, as originally advocated by Ayatollah Khomeynî in 1970—premised on the need for external institutional “checks” to prevent the system from degenerating into tyranny. The argument then was that Islamic rule was the rule of law (hokūmat-e qānīn) and that the job of the chief executive was to justly implement the “divine ordinances” (akhām-e elāhī).

The 1979 IRI Constitution, nevertheless, provided for external institutional checks for both the ruling jurisprudent and the president. Article 111 tasked an elected Assembly of Experts to determine whether the sitting leader has become incapable of performing his legal duties or otherwise become lacking any of the necessary conditions stipulated for him in the constitution (Article 109). Although the first election of the Leadership Experts Assembly was not held until December 1982 and its primary task then was widely understood as naming a successor to Ayatollah Khomeynî rather than serving as an oversight body vis-à-vis the sitting


38 Whether his is an elected office or not is a matter of controversy inside the IRI, and both sides of the dispute apparently have a strong case. Although the Leadership Experts Assembly elected the current leader ‘Ali Khāmene’î by a majority vote in June 1989, the revised constitution of 1989 speaks only of “determining” (ta’in), not “electing” (entekhāb), the leader as part of the assembly’s responsibility (QA 1989, article 107).

39 Khomeynî, Hokūmat-e Eslām; idem, Velāyat-e Faqih, 32–39. In a message issued a few months before the revolution (17 ‘Azar 1357), Ayatollah Khomeynî seemed to be simply suggesting that under the Islamic state, should the head of the state transgress, Islam would dismiss him (SN 3:69).
leader, it is still significant that the procedure, or the institution mechanism, for a potential dismissal of the incumbent leader had been provided for in the 1979 constitution.  

As for the president, Article 122 of the 1979 constitution declared that the elected president was responsible vis-à-vis the nation. The office of presidency has a term limit of two consecutive four-year terms (Article 116). And Article 110 tasked the leader to dismiss the president, while taking the interests of the country into consideration, in the event that the Supreme Court issued a verdict on the violation by the president of his legal obligations or that the parliament passed a vote of his “political incompetence” (‘adam-e kefâyat-e siyâsî-ye û). The first elected parliament exercised this right on 21 June 1981 (31 Khordâd 1360), resulting in the dismissal of the first elected president, Banî-Sadr, on the following day. The constitution also provided the parliament, whose deputies are directly elected for a four-year term, with the opportunities for interpellation (estâzâh) and passing a vote of no-confidence in the entire cabinet or individual cabinet ministers (Article 89). Therefore, while questions remained as to the office and the mandate of the leader, the institutional setup for the executive and legislative powers that the 1979 IRI Constitution prescribed was consistent with the broad republican principle of limited and divided government.

More importantly, however, a case may be made that naming the postrevolutionary political system a “republic” (jomhûrî) had a greater significance than these specific institutional arrangements, given its impact on subsequent public and theoretical discourse. The effects are clear on a range of relevant issues—from the politico-cultural legacies of dictatorships to the sources of legitimacy of the postrevolutionary political system to the role of civil society institutions therein. A case in point is an argument made by Sa‘îd Hajjâriyân (1954—), who emerged as a key “reformist” theoretician in the mid-1990s.

In a series of published articles and interviews, Sa‘îd Hajjâriyân put forward an argument that put the 1979 revolution in the context of the historical efforts in Iran

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40 After its 1989 revision, Article 107 now also states that the leader is equal before the law with the rest of the individuals in the country. Article 142 of the 1979 constitution stipulated that the Supreme Court (and after the 1989 revision, the judiciary chief) investigate the assets of the top officials including the leader and the president and their spouses and children, before and after their incumbency.

toward democratization. Relating it to the historical process of democratization in England starting from the Magna Charta of 1215, Hajjāriyān characterized the Constitutional Revolution of Iran—which achieved, among others, a royal decree from Mozaffar od-Dīn Shāh in 1906 for convening a parliament—as the efforts “from the above,” or by the elite, to limit the absolute power of the shah. In Iran, however, these efforts in what he called the “constitutionalist route” (rāh-e mashruṭīyat) did not succeed in democratizing the power structure and, after the 1953 coup d’état, had reached an impasse (bin-bast).42

By contrast, the 1979 Islamic Revolution was the culmination of an alternative approach toward democratization, that is, the “republican route” (rāh-e jomhūrīyat) that had historical precedent in the French Revolution of 1789. Since the republican route was revolutionary, rather than reformist, in orientation and was characterized by the participation of the masses, its success in Iran meant that the political power structure had been transformed in a way proportionate to the growth and maturity of the masses, ushering in the “republican era” in Iran. Given these developments, argued Hajjāriyān, the principle of republicanism (asl-e jomhūrīyat) now became the light by which to discern the proper understanding of “Islam, Islamic jurisprudence, the mandate of the jurisprudent, the philosophy of occultation, allegiance, public interest, constitution, and a host of other topics.”43 With this argument, Hajjāriyān in effect made the case that the naming of the Islamic Republic was not accidental; it reflected the level of maturity on the part of the Iranian nation as a political actor, to which he attributed the success of the 1979 revolution as a breakthrough in the historical struggle for democratization in Iran.44

Another example of political discourse that the “republican” framework had an apparent impact can be found among the speeches of Mohammad Khātāmī after he was elected president in 1997. Speaking on the third anniversary of his election in May 2000, for instance, President Khātāmī suggested that Āyatollāh Khomeynī, while staying in the Paris suburb in 1978–79, was serious about establishing an Islamic republic and not any other form of Islamic government. Khātāmī, who was at the side of the Āyatollāh in France, argued that it was an Islamic republic, not just an Islamic state (hokumat-e Eslāmī) nor a caliphate (nezām-e khelāfāt), that Āyatollāh Khomeynī called for. Khātāmī underscored the point by recounting how he personally observed Āyatollāh Khomeynī “reject” the call by the radical Islamist group Hīzb at-Tahrīr for declaring a caliphate.45 While attributing the selection of

44 Ibid.
45 Khātāmī had referred to this episode before at a meeting with some conservative political party members in 1998. Seyyed Mohammad Khātāmī, Ahzāb va Shourā-hā (Parties and councils) (Tehrān: Tarh-e Now, 2001 [1380]), 17. The Islamist group mentioned was neither Shi’ite nor Iranian, but a Pan-Islamist group started by a Palestinian named Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī in Jerusalem in 1949.
the republican form of the political system primarily to Āyatollāh Khomeynī and his religious values, Khātāmī used the fact that the people overwhelmingly voted for it in the 1979 referendum to argue that his election in 1997 as well as the subsequent reformist electoral victories were the reconfirmation of the choice made in the 1997 revolution.

He declared that it was clear by then even to the most skeptical observer that the results of the 1999 local councils and the recent 2000 parliamentary elections were the evident confirmation of his 1997 election. He then rhetorically asked what the people wanted in these elections. His answer was: it was the Islamic Republic. That is, the people voted for him and his supporters because they wanted their vote to be the “determining factor” (ta’īn-konande), which according to him was what the republic was all about.46

These are just two examples from public and theoretical discourse, which came to flourish in the postrevolutionary period despite a variety of hurdles and restrictions that existed both in terms of entering and engaging in a public discussion.47 In the wake of the formal abolition of monarchy, public discourse on the significance of the 1979 revolution and establishing an Islamic republic came to include such claims that the Islamic Revolution marked a historic turning point away from the “2500-year-long” tradition of despotism in Iran.48 This does not certainly mean that those who made such claims did not see problems still lingering even after the establishment of the IRI. Some theorists as well as politicians, including Hajjārīyān and Mohammad Khātāmī, did come to caution that certain legacies of despotism had been revived, in the postrevolutionary period, under various pretenses.49

Still a tentative conclusion may be drawn that the adoption of “republicanism” in the wake of the 1979 revolution was important not only for the specific institu-

47 Some of the hurdles and restrictions, as well as the efforts to overcome them, are discussed by Farideh Farhi (see her “On the Reconfiguration of the Public Sphere and the Changing Political Landscape of Postrevolutionary Iran,” in *Iran at the Crossroads*, ed. John L. Esposito and R. K. Ramazani [New York: Palgrave, 2001], 57–74).
tional arrangements that were discussed, but also for its impact on public and theoretical discourse. As discussed above, the latter can be seen in some of the arguments that emphasized the establishment of the Islamic Republic as a landmark historical achievement in favor of popular sovereignty. As such, the “republican” framework of the postrevolutionary political system arguably constituted one of the positive factors that the 1979 revolution gave rise to and positively affected the prospect of democratic consolidation in postrevolutionary Iran.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I first identified three conditions that provided suitable background for the postrevolutionary Iranian elite to institute an electoral regime in the summer of 1983. They were: (1) the suppression of the Kurdish uprising and the elimination of the secular left political forces; (2) the purge of secular left elements from and reorganization of the labor movement under the supervision of the Islamic Republican Party; and (3) the purge of secular faculty members from and the Islamization of higher education institutions under the banner of the Cultural Revolution. I made the case that while these crackdowns and purges did not render the remaining political forces insider the IRI a homogenous monolith, they prepared a suitable ground for political contestation through an electoral regime by eliminating those forces that the ruling elite considered fundamentally opposed to the IRI system.

I then identified and examined two aspects of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the political system that emerged from it that had relevance to the prospect of consolidation of electoral democracy in the IRI. First, I examined the legal and political implications of the constitutional affirmation of the nation’s right to sovereignty, and argued that the relevant constitutional articles adopted did provide for the formation of a representative government through direct, popular elections. I also argued that despite the collective nature of the conception, the formal adoption of the right of the Iranian nation to sociopolitical sovereignty enhanced the sense of empowerment and also of the ownership of the revolution, contributing positively to the postrevolutionary experience of the Iranian nation with its electoral democracy. Second, I examined the “republican” framework that the 1979 revolution gave rise to with the abolition of monarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, and its possible contributions to the prospect of democratic consolidation. I argued that in addition to the specific institutional arrangements, the adoption of the republican framework has had a positive impact as evidenced by certain reformist theoretical and public discourses that appeared a decade and half later. Although my examinations elsewhere found that despite the opportunities created by the electorate, the Khātami-era elected reformists failed to consolidate Iran’s
electoral democracy, the fact remains that the 1979 revolution paved the way for the constitution and a potential consolidation of an electoral democracy in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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