論文の英文要旨

論文題目  Hannah Arendt or the site of political thinking

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1. For Hannah Arendt, the gain one might hope to get from political thinking was "neither definitions nor theories." It was rather "the slow, plodding discovery" and "the mapping survey of the region which some incident had completely illuminated for a fleeting moment."

My thesis "Hannah Arendt or the site of political thinking" aims at rediscovering this 'mapping survey' described by Arendt. More concretely, I have reinterpreted her political thinking by mapping out her literary intercourse with contemporary intellectuals of her own time and by textually inspecting the folds of this histories/stories. But my approach differs from a general approach based on 'person and thought.' It rather presupposes a methodological search in order to understand the peculiarity of her thought within the history of political thought, the novelty of her concepts such as 'action' 'plurality' 'beginning' 'public space' 'relation-to-the-world', and the sites from which they came into existence. Arendt, however, also called her 'new' method of 'mapping' an 'old-fashioned storytelling,' in regards to which so many prior theoretical analysis, trials and paraphrasings on Arendt's work have inevitably run into difficulties. This thesis is based on a full awareness of this methodological aporia.

2. The life story of Hannah Arendt was little known before the publication of Young-Bruehl's monumental biography in 1982. Even Arendt's close friends, who memorialized her life with such loving words on the occasion of Arendt's death in 1975, knew only fragments about her life. How should we understand the well-known gap between 'this loving reasonable creature' (Karl Jaspers) and its cool and controversial discourse? This thesis is based on the work of Young-Bruehl and the recent publications of her posthumous manuscripts and letters. My purpose, however, is not to write 'philosophical biography' as Young-Bruehl did. Unlike Young-Bruehl,
who concluded that the ‘thinking place’ is as inaccessible as the ‘thinking ego,’ this work inquires into how to illuminate and expose — using the texts and fragments left behind by Arendt — the site of political thinking, her existence as a writer.

3. Among Arendt’s contemporaries it was Jaspers and Heinrich Blücher who probably understand her political thinking the best and with the most precision and exactness. In my view, Arendt cultivated and developed her political thinking in the 1940s and would maintain this thinking until her later years. Her first dedication to Blücher was in her book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and also took an epigraph from Jaspers’ *Logik*, which read: “Weder dem Vergangenen anheimfallen noch dem Zukünftigen. Es kommt darauf an, ganz gegenwärtig zu sein.” Arendt’s later work *Between Past and Future* (1961), which she called as ‘exercises in political thought,’ was also dedicated to Blücher. But what is important here is not simply the relationship between Arendt and Blücher. What is necessary to inquire into is what they had in common in their political thinking, and what, precisely, it was that Jaspers saw and believed to exist between Arendt and Blücher.

In the preface of *Between Past and Future* Arendt quotes the aphorism, “Our inheritance has been left to us by no testament,” from René Char, and Tocqueville’s lines: “Since the past ceased to throw its light upon the future, the mind of man wanders in obscurity.” Both suggest that we have no solid foundation, tradition or criterion on which we can rely in the present, which Arendt regarded as a condition of our political thought. She writes as follows:

“thought and reality have parted company,…reality has become opaque for the light of thought …thought, no longer bound to incident as the circle remains bound to its focus…”

In our modern world, Arendt tells us, thought is no longer bound to incidents; she tells us that we no longer have the proper words to relate ourselves to the world. But Arendt also warns us that, should we fail to grasp a language that can properly articulate un-speakable past incidents inherited by our present time and condition; should we give up our struggle to produce a new sense, a new language, we risk losing not only the sense and reality of these past incidents, but also our present relation-to-the-world. We would risk falling into an abyssal world of illusions, a devastating crisis, a loss of reality. Falling to learn how to move in this gap between Past and Future would be tantamount to yielding to a ‘dark fate.’"
But did not Arendt acquire this new language, this form of 'story telling' and this sense of reality, from seeing and experiencing the horror of Nazism as a Jew — compelled to think between Jewish politics and the gas chamber — and living the life of a stateless refugee for 18 years?

4. My thesis is composed of 4 chapters.

In the first chapter, "Arendt as an intellectual in Exile," I have inquired into where Arendt, having seen and experienced the destruction of Europe and a destroyed tradition of European ideals, sought to find truth and reality, and as an emigré intellectual. Analysing articles and essays written in 1943-44, I discuss how Arendt, writing between being a 'historian and a political journalist,' discovered and aquired a new way to 'tell stories.' Many studies on Arendt ignore this aspect, and tend to narrowly focus on Arendt as an embodiment of European 'Bildung' or ascribe her outsider status simply to her experience of a German-Jew. This Chapter is partly an anti-thesis to such portraits.

In Chapter Two, "the political' and 'betweenness," I followed how Arendt developed her unique political thought through her confrontation with that which is called 'totalitarianism.' How can we relate her analysis of totalitarianism to the birth of concepts of hers such as 'appearance'? Here I examine Arendts 'Denktagebuch' edited by Ursula Ludz and published in 1993. The manuscript with the title 'Was ist Politik' which Arendt wrote in 1950 occupies an especially improtant place in my research.

In the third chapter, "Eichmann-controversy and 'the beginning," I trace the debates surrounding the 'Eichmann-controversy' to a different beginning, not limiting my discussion to the 1960s, but rather going back to 1940s. I also return to questions related to Arendt's relations and debates with intellectuals and friends. Arendt lost most of her Jewish friends after the publication of this controversial reportage on the Eichmann-trial in Jerusalem. So what kind of plinciple can we find in her controversial gest? Is there something more important to her than even her most intimate friendship? Here I focus upon the relationship between Arendt and Gershom Scholem and contrast their stance on this problem.

The last chapter "gest of 'a leaf in the wind'" has a somewhat different character from other chapters. It gains imagination from the metaphor with which Arendt described her life in her last years. She wrote to Mary MacCarthy as follows:

"I have often thought of myself — free like a leaf in the wind……let no 'autocratic will' interfere……there is, on the other hand, the whole
weight of the past (gravitas). And what Hölderlin once said in a beatiful line: Und vieles /Wie auf den Schultern eine/Last von Scheitern ist/Zu behalten.”

5. In every Chapter I examine the topoi of Arendt’s story-telling and aim to trace, with as much precision as possible, the site of her political thinking. I treat her manuscripts (letters and non-published essays), as well as her published works (books and articles), with the equal strength. The texts of Hannah Arendt — multifaceted, multi-dimensional, full of Parts, the folds — do not consist in sequences with beginnings and ends, but are rather fragmentary in nature, consisting in their parts, in their fragments. Is a discussion such as this possible within the habitus of the Academy? Indeed, we are again reminded that Arendt once called her new methods of political thinking as ‘old-fashioned storytelling.’ It is this methodological tension that supports the form of my thesis, which I believe is necessary to understand and which can, in fact, be understood. For it is a tension inherent in what Arendt once called a ‘thinking without banister’.