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Although Mongolians sought for independence and unity of Mongolia during the first half of the 20th century, they were divided into three nations, that is Mongolia, China and the Soviet Union (the present day Russian Federation). According to researchers in China, Inner Mongolia was incorporated into the People's Republic of China (PRC) as Inner Mongolia had been a part of China in the past history. The revolution of Inner Mongolia was viewed thus as part of the Chinese revolution and, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was regarded as the legitimate leader of Inner Mongolia revolution. The formation of nationalist movements of Inner Mongolia has been deemed as “Nationalist Separation Movements” in the modern history of China. Hence, the core elements in the modern history of Inner Mongolia are recorded as a result of instructions from CCP during the revolutionary period. The national self-determination policy and federation policy that were once advocated by CCP are interpreted as the influence of the Soviet dogmatism. On the other hand, Japanese researchers suppose the nationalist movements of Inner Mongolia as ethno-nationalism and explain the incorporation of Inner Mongolia into PRC as the succession of the domain of the Qing Dynasty. Nevertheless, preservation of Inner Mongolia as part of PRC is not clearly explained by historical reasons. As a result, many problems are yet to resolve.

This dissertation is based on historical sources collected by the author, which have not been used by other researchers, including the relevant documents of CCP and Kuomintang (KMT) during that period, related sources in Mongolian and Russian languages and interviews to witnesses of historical events. The author puts emphasis on the notion of ‘the regions’ where lived the Mongolians during the first half of the 20th century. He examines two axes, one of which is orientation for independence and autonomy advocated by Mongolian nationalists and the other pressure from PRC towards the corporation of Mongolia. The author also scrutinizes policies of various political parties, especially CCP and KMT, towards Inner Mongolia from 1920 to 1949.

The first chapter analyzes the activities of Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (IMPRP) and the policies of CCP and KMT towards Inner Mongolia until 1945. The analysis can be categorized into three categories. First, as the pioneers of Inner Mongolia revolution, IMPRP did obey the directions given by the Communist International during the pioneering stage. However, IMPRP had also advocated several self-
governing campaigns such as establishment of an autonomous state, reform of the aristocracy system, opposition to the Han Chinese migration into Inner Mongolia for land cultivation and so on. In the Nanjing Conference on Mongolian problems held in 1930 Mongolian campaigns for maintaining the league system, opposing of transforming Inner Mongolia to provinces and Han Chinese migrating into Inner Mongolia had reached its peak. Actually, the undertaking of the self-governing policy by prince Demchugdongrub in 1930 stood on the extended line of nationalist movements by IMPRP. On one hand, supported by the guiding policies of the Soviet Union and Communist International, the CCP at the initial stage conformed to the policies and thus, recognized that Inner Mongolia as an independent state with self-determined autonomy in November of 1927. The author suggests that the policy of recognizing Inner Mongolia as an independent state was abandoned by CCP in August of 1936, notwithstanding the existing views that the policy was abandoned after the breakout of Sino-Japanese war, or in accordance to publication of “A Theory of New Stage” by Mao Zedong in November of 1938. In addition, the decision to abandon the policy was not solely initiated by CCP but under the great influence of announcement of “Popular Front Tactics” by the Communist International in the seventh convention in July of 1935.

The second chapter discusses the core activities of IMPRP that comprises of the peak of nationalism and penetration of CCP political power into Inner Mongolia after August of 1945. The author proposed that the first general meeting of IMPRP, after its revival, was dated on August 28 of 1945, not on August 21 or September 5. The nationalists such as Khafungga, proclaimed “the Declaration of Inner Mongolia Liberalization” and set the union of Inner and Outer Mongolia as their final goal on August 18. However, after the proclamation of China-Soviet Friendship Treaty, IMPRP redirected to establishment of non-capitalistic democratic regime in Inner Mongolia instead in the first general meeting. They thought this political regime would become part of Chinese Federation. Furthermore, IMPRP desired to instill socialism system in Inner Mongolia, along with the provision to unite Inner Mongolia with the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR), in order to construct a free, strong, new and unified Mongolian nation state. Meanwhile, considering that all-communist parties in the world should stand as alliances, they thought IMPRP should work hand in hand with CCP. While making decision to further strengthen their activities in Inner Mongolia, leaders of CCP also paid close attention to reactions of the Soviet Union and MPR. The CCP had strategically employed the circumstances of Inner Mongolia and policies of Soviet Union and KMT to successfully convince nationalists of East Mongolia to accept the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Movements Union (IMAMU), which was de facto ruled by CCP (accepted by East Mongolia in April 3 Meeting in 1946). As a result, IMPRP and East Mongolian People’s Autonomous Government (EMPAG) were dissolved. Simultaneously, East Mongolians turned their spearhead against KMT.

The third chapter explores KMT’s policy towards Inner Mongolia especially in the post WWII period. Struggling in between Soviet Union, MPR and CCP, Inner Mongolia carried an essential weight to KMT while
strategically formulating its policies towards Inner Mongolia. Most of Inner Mongolians experienced high autonomy under cooperation with Japan in the 1930s, and those active nationalists maintained close relationships with the mentioned external powers. So, it was crucial to KMT to ingeniously unify Mongolians in order to hold up CCP and restore KMT’s influence in North China and Northeast China. Nonetheless, KMT had let a few good opportunities slipped by. KMT’s failure in response to Inner Mongolians’ requests and implementing policies that were inconsistent to Inner Mongolians’ demands, like allowing land cultivation by migrants from outside in Western Inner Mongolia, and establishing nine provinces in Northeast, had enraged Inner Mongolians to vigorously protest against KMT.

In the fourth chapter, the author confers the process of how CCP took root in Inner Mongolia firmly by undertaking “Battle of Two Ways” towards Inner Mongolians, demonstrating CCP actions and its victory against the Mongolian nationalists, which are almost omitted by most Japanese and European researchers. That is to say, CCP propagated for national unity meanwhile also termed national conflicts as class conflicts. On the other hand, CCP also criticized and labeled nationalists such as Khafungga as “Traitors”, “Surrenders” and “Exploiters” due to their arguments to restore IMPRP, to oppose “Land Reform” that granted farmers land regardless of their nationals and protest to preserve Mongolian rights. Inner Mongolian leaders such as Yun Ze who sided CCP, successfully rooted CCP political regime through series of brainwashing movements, class conflicts and “Land Reform”, and cleared away those Inner Mongolian nationalists. The establishment of Inner Mongolian Communist Party Activities Committee (IMCPAC) and the defeat of Mongolian nationalists created a path for “Battle of Two Ways” to get rid of preservation of Mongolian privileges and independence. As CCP direction promoted solely Mao Zedong’s thinking, CCP had painted color of totalitarianism on itself and simultaneously destroyed the high autonomous characteristics of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government (IMAG).

The fifth chapter focuses on discussion of “Land Reform”. After the establishment of IMAG, i.e. IMCPAC, CCP used “Land Reform” to call for masses to unify masse and termed national conflicts as class conflicts in order to sweep away the power of Mongolian nationalists from Wang-un Sum (capital of IMAG) to local regions. The “Land Reform” movement was not only restricted to agricultural areas but also affected semi-agricultural areas, semi-pastoral areas and pastures. As a result, East Mongolians lost their lands, which were collectively owned by Mongolians. Buddhism and temples which had been inseparable elements East Mongolians’ identities were also attacked. CCP was the only winner that was able to strengthen its political regime.

Conclusion. Although CCP held the banner of “national Self-determination policy”, the definition of the policy was often modified to best explain the interests of the party in response to the volatility of political situation. For instance, during the latter half of the 1920s, CCP
severely criticized the special committee of Inner Mongolia. However, in
the Sino-Japanese War, the party invited upper-echelon of Inner
Mongolians to cooperate with them against the Japanese army. Then, in
1946, CCP supported the establishment of EMPAG but soon after they
retracted their support and dissolved EMPAG. In 1947, CCP refused to
restore IMPRP. Again in 1949, CCP totally rejected their promise of
building a federal government for Inner Mongolians.

In reviewing of the CPP policies concerning Inner Mongolia, two facets
can be found. On one hand, when CCP sought alliance of Inner Mongolia,
they promised to grant the right of national self-determination and
autonomy to Mongolians and supported the policies of national self-
determination and federal nation on the surface in order to incorporate the
Mongolians. On the other hand, CCP put pressure on the Mongolian
nationalists when they tried to unite Inner and Outer Mongolia, to seek
independence of Inner Mongolia or to demand setting up a federal nation
in accordance with “National Self-determination Policy”. The CCP
deliberately confused the national conflicts with the class conflicts, and
finally overthrew the Mongolian nationalists. “Battle of Two Ways” in the
latter half of the 1940s was a typical example that revealed the real
intention of CCP in Inner Mongolia. In other words, CCP policies towards
Inner Mongolia that was disseminated publicly were inconsistent with its
actual implementation of the policies.

What claimed as “Sectarism and Secessionism” by CCP and KMT was in
fact conceived by Inner Mongolian nationalists as movements for
preserving their privileges and seeking independence and autonomy.
IMPRP that set up in 1920s, Prince Demchugdongrub in 1930s, and the
revived IMPRP by Khafungga and others after August of 1945, cohesively
advocated opposition against migration of Han Chinese for land cultivation
and rule by Han Chinese because history, traditions, social structure and
economy, and societal strata were completely dissimilar from Han Chinese.
Thus, they thought Inner Mongolia should set up its own autonomous
government. In the early stage of IMPRP, the party sought to establish an
autonomous nation under a federation. Prince Demchugdongrub, on the
other hand, was seeking a similar status of Canada and Australia in the
British Empire for Inner Mongolia in China. Khafungga proposed that all
Mongolians should be united. He thought at least Inner Mongolia should
become an independent state. When IMAG was established in 1947, they
did not give up their fight for their ideals. However, despite of strong
protest from Inner Mongolians, CCP refused to fulfill their rights to
national self-determination and federal government. The minority
nationalities’ rights were only limited to development of their native
languages and thus the practice of totalitarianism of CCP was justified. As
results, national policies of CCP were to encourage the unity of non-Han
Chinese and integrate their territory, which was de facto coincided with
KMT’s policies.