Proceedings of the ASC – TUFS “Kickoff” Symposium

Frontiers of African Studies

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African Studies Center – Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
Frontiers of African Studies
African Studies Center – TUFS
“Kick-off” Symposium

Frontiers of African Studies

◆ Venue: Large Conference Room (Administration Build. 2F), Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
◆ Language: English
◆ Admission: Free
◆ No pre-registration is needed.
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◆ Organized by African Studies Center - TUFS
African Studies Center - TUFS “Kick-off” Symposium

Frontiers of African Studies

African Studies Center (ASC) – Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS) was established in April 2017 as a Japanese research center on contemporary Africa. After seven months since the establishment, we are going to hold a “kick-off” symposium on November 3rd, 2017.

In this symposium, three eminent guest speakers as well as Japanese Africanists will present their views and ideas on the achievement and future challenges with regard to their research fields, concerning mainly 1) politics and international relations, 2) economy and development, 3) environment and climate change. In addition, prominent Japanese Africanists will be invited to serve as discussants.

Program

9:30 - 10:00  Registration

10:00 - 10:30  Welcome speech & Introduction
Hirotaka TATEISHI (President, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)
Shinichi TAKEUCHI (Director, ASC – TUFS)

[Session 1] Politics and International Relations
Chair: Makiko SAKAI (Associate Professor, ASC – TUFS)
10:30 - 11:00  Speaker 1
Adebayo OLUKOSHI (Director for Africa and West Asia, International IDEA)
Africa: Changing Politics in a Changing World
11:00 - 11:30  Speaker 2
Yumi NAKAYAMA (Lecturer, ASC – TUFS)
Migration Governance: Migration within and from Africa
11:30 - 11:45  Comment
Mitsugi ENDO (Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the University of Tokyo)
11:45 - 12:30  Discussion
12:30 - 13:15  Lunch

[Session 2] Economy and Development
Chair: Yasuo MATSUNAMI (Specially Appointed Researcher, ASC – TUFS)
13:15 - 13:45  Speaker 3
Kojo AMANOR (Professor, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana)
Markets, Politics and Land Administrative Reform in Africa: What can African Studies Contribute?
13:45 - 14:15  Speaker 4
Kazue DEMACHI (Lecturer, ASC – TUFS)
Periphery or Battleground: Africa in the International Economy
14:15 - 14:30  Comment
Yoichi MINE (Professor, Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University)
14:30 - 15:15  Discussion
15:15 - 15:30  Coffee Break

[Session 3] Environment and Climate Change
Chair: Hitomi KIRIKOSHI (Specially Appointed Researcher, ASC – TUFS)
15:30 - 16:00  Speaker 5
Denis SONWA (Senior Scientist, Center for International Forestry Research)
Forest and Climate Change Response in Africa
16:00 - 16:30  Speaker 6
Takanori OISHI (Lecturer, ASC – TUFS)
Sustaining Forest Livelihoods in an Era of Climate Change: Dialogue beyond “Participation” and “Community” Arguments
16:30 - 16:45  Comment
Ueru TANAKA (Professor, Research Institute for Humanity and Nature)
16:45 - 17:30  Discussion

17:30 - 18:00  General Discussion
Chair: Shinichi TAKEUCHI (Director, ASC – TUFS)
18:10 - 19:10  Reception
◆ Venue: Café Castalia (AGORA Global 1F)
◆ Admission: Free
◆ No pre-registration is needed.

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Welcome speech for the symposium ‘Frontiers of African Studies’

Hirotaka Tateishi
President, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

Thank you very much for participating in today’s international symposium, “Frontiers of African Studies”. In particular, I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to our distinguished guest speakers who have come a long way from Africa, and to the prominent Japanese Africanists who will be serving as commentators at this meeting. Please allow me to say a few words on this memorable occasion.

This is a ‘kick-off’ symposium commemorating the establishment of the African Studies Center at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, the ASC–TUFS. The ASC just opened in April of this year, but this university has a long history of African studies. In 1964, the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa was established here and has actively carried out basic research on Africa’s languages, cultures and history since then. Later, in 2012, an Africa course was launched in the School of International and Area Studies. Dozen of students specializing in African studies graduate from this school every year. The establishment of the African Studies Center further strengthens the role of this university as an important centre of African studies in Japan.

The ASC was created against the background of a rising Africa. The region has seen significant economic growth since the mid-1990s. In fact, its total GDP has almost doubled in two decades. The influence of African countries in world politics has been also rapidly growing. Africa is certain to play a critical role in tackling global environmental problems.

In this context, the importance of African studies cannot be exaggerated. An in-depth understanding of Africa is indispensable in building a close and constructive relationship with the countries in the region.

The objective of establishing the ASC is twofold. One is to enhance research on the problems that Africa is currently facing, and the other is to strengthen Japan’s academic network with Africa.

Our university has accumulated considerable research on basic problems related to African languages, cultures, and history. Working from this basic research, the ASC will be focusing on current topics in Africa including economic development, conflict resolution, and environmental protection. In this symposium, to which we have invited eminent scholars of African studies, young researchers belonging to the ASC will be presenting their papers. I believe that this is an excellent opportunity for them to work with world-class scholars and thereby further develop their research capabilities. Conducting high-quality research is our top priority.

Another important role of the ASC is to forge an extensive network of Africanists. Africa is a vast continent with 54 countries, almost a fourth of all countries in the world. It is imperative for the ASC to develop relationships with researchers in these countries. As the host of this event, I will be greatly pleased if you take this opportunity to foster close ties with your fellow academics in the international community.
Welcome speech for the symposium ‘Frontiers of African Studies’

The ASC–TUFS is a very young institution, born just six months ago. It is quite small, particularly in contrast to the largeness of the many and diverse problems that currently beset Africa. Your assistance and guidance will be indispensable for the ASC researchers as they set about to find solutions. I ask for your support, cooperation, and advice to this new-born research centre. It is my fervent hope that the ASC will grow someday to be one of the most important centres for African studies in the world.

With the participation of the eminent scholars who are our guests, the discussion of this symposium is certain to be extremely fruitful. I believe this event marks not only the launching of the ASC, but also that of a new and exciting era of African studies in Japan.

Thank you very much.
Introduction to the international symposium
‘Frontiers of African Studies’

Shinichi Takeuchi
Director, African Studies Center – Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

On behalf of the African Studies Center, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (ASC-TUFS), I would like to express a hearty welcome to all participating in this symposium entitled, ‘Frontiers of African Studies’. In this brief introduction, let me explain the basic aims of this academic meeting as an organiser.

As the president of TUFS pointed out in his welcome speech, the major objective of the ASC is to conduct research on Africa’s actual problems. This symposium was planned to raise awareness and deepen understanding of contemporary problems in Africa, particularly those related to its politics, economies, and environment. I do not want to emphasise that Africa is full of problems. Certainly, Africa is confronting a number of challenges today, similar to how Japan also currently faces many difficulties. In over-emphasising ‘African predicaments’, there is the danger of too hastily seeking solutions before accurately understanding the problems. Research should be conducted as much to find solutions as to understand realities. We need to understand what is happening before proposing solutions. This is even more important because Africa is changing very rapidly.

While Africa currently faces various challenges, they can be tentatively classified as three major topics, namely 1) politics and international relations, 2) economy and development, and 3) environment and climate changes. These are the titles of the three sessions in this symposium. I emphasise that these titles do not mean disciplines or methodologies disconnected from each other. Instead, they indicate three closely connected research fields. Today, six papers deal with various problems in these fields. While the scope of each paper is different, they share common perspectives and research interests. I am convinced that the six presentations and discussions to follow will bring about a deeper understanding of contemporary Africa.

1. Main issues in contemporary Africa

I start by presenting a brief overview of the current challenges in Africa. Regarding politics, democracy and conflicts are two major and intertwined issues. Following the end of the Cold War, Africa saw a drastic transition from one-party or military rules to multi-party democracies in a short period. Currently, an overwhelming majority of African countries have adopted a democratic government system. However, institutional changes have not ensured the substantial progress of democracy. There are many de facto authoritarian regimes disguised as democratic systems.

A recent important debate has been on whether democracy has been side-lined in Africa. There are a series of debates on this problem (Cheeseman 2015). Some researchers argue that democratisation in Africa has been stagnant since the 2000s (Harbeson 2013). In fact, a number of African countries such as Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, and Rwanda abolished the limit of the term of their presidential elections. It seems as though autocratic personal rules strengthened in these countries. However,
the story is not that simple, as democratic elections have also been successfully carried out in many countries including Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria. Even if some indicators regarding democracy tend to have been stagnant and/or aggravating since the mid-2000s, democratic values have been consistently appreciated in Africa, where people stand in long queues to vote. This seems to contrast the situation in some countries in the ‘First World’, where trust in democracy has been undermined in the face of rising populism.

In African studies, the issue of the state and how it is governed is a central subject of research (Bayart 1993, Herbst 2000). Specific concepts such as neo-patrimonial rule have been developed to explain the realities of politics, rules, and governance in Africa. Analyses of armed conflicts have focused on these aspects of politics. Most African conflicts have been internal wars within the state. In other words, they take place as contestations against the state and are triggered by the state’s lack of capacity to provide public goods. As such, African states remain at the centre of the debates in conflict studies.

Furthermore, scholars have pointed out changes in the characteristics of armed conflict (Straus 2012). Compared to the 1990s, when Africa faced frequent serious armed conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, the number of victims has decreased since the 2000s. This is not to say that Africa has succeeded in conflict resolution and peace building activities. Rather, the nature of conflict has transformed. Furthermore, the number of great civil wars has decreased since the 2000s, excepting in Mali, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. However, local-level conflicts regarding resources such as land and water have increased.

In these two decades, we have witnessed efforts by African countries to contain armed conflicts in the region. The establishment of the African Union in 2002 represented a landmark in this regard. The institutionalisation of conflict resolution has progressed considerably at the regional organisational level since then. However, these efforts have faced difficulties in producing remarkable results, as evident in the serious situation in South Sudan. Note though that these efforts have also had positive outcomes. Gambia’s relatively peaceful regime change at the beginning of this year would not have taken place without the effective intervention of ECOWAS. Regional organisations in Africa have increasingly played important roles not only in terms of politics. One example is the progress of economic integration through regional organisations. While progress has been generally slow, institutionalisation of the economy in each African region deserves special attention.

Regarding the African economy, recent rapid economic growth is an important subject of research. Since the mid-1990s, Africa has experienced strong economic growth and the size of its total GDP has doubled. How do we evaluate this consecutive economic growth? Clear thus far is that the mechanism of this rapid economic growth has differed from that of Asian predecessors. In East and South-eastern Asian countries, foreign direct investments (FDI) in the manufacturing sector were a driving force of economic growth. In Africa, the FDI in the mining sector has significantly boosted the economy. While the growth in the manufacturing sector enhances development of the middle class through the distribution of salaries for workers, rapid growth in the mining sector is likely to widen the income gap, benefiting a smaller number of beneficiaries. We need to observe the consequences of this pattern of economic growth in Africa.

This pattern of rapid economic growth has been sustained in the context of globalisation and neo-liberalism. Rapid economic growth at the macro-level has had an enormous impact on African societies. The rural African landscape has drastically transformed in a couple of decades. The most striking change is the proliferation of large-scale land deals, through which a huge swath of lands has
been transferred from rural communities to other actors including foreign companies and national political elites. To explain this drastic rural change, policies on private property rights have been a key factor. Influenced by donors and their liberal ideology, policies for establishing private property rights are actively promoted in Africa, facilitating privatisation and marketisation of the land. While we do not know the exact consequences of these drastic rural changes, they should be carefully examined, particularly in the context of the rapid increase in Africa’s population.

According to the United Nations World Population Prospects revised in June 2017, the population of the African continent will exceed 4 billion and equal that of Asia including China and India at the end of this century. Nigeria will have a population of 800 million people, and Ethiopia 250 million. The large size of these countries indicates their economic and political importance. Undoubtedly, Africa will strengthen its position in the future politics and economy of the world. However, obviously, this is not only good news. The UN forecasts that in 2100, Mali’s population will be around 80 million, almost equal to that of Japan. It is difficult for us to imagine whether the economy and environment of the country will be able to sustain a population this size. At this stage, we can say that technologies for peaceful management will be imperative in terms of politics as well as economies and environments in Africa.

Although protecting the environment and climate change cannot be argued without knowledge of the natural sciences, they are deeply related to the social sciences. The drastic decrease in the number of elephants in Africa is strongly related to legal regulations of ivory in Asian countries including Japan, and of course to rapid economic growth in China. Outbreaks of armed conflicts in Darfur and Mali were undoubtedly connected with severe and repeated droughts in the Sahel region. There is broad consensus that building a good relationship with local communities is imperative for the success of conservation policies. In short, understanding the political economy of environmental problems is important in seeking feasible solutions.

2. The frontiers of African Studies

Why do we study Africa? This question may sound naïve, and may have various answers. However, I think this is an important question to raise, particularly when a foreigner like me studies Africa.

First, we conduct research to tackle the problems African people now face. We sincerely hope that our research contributes to combating problems such as chronic poverty, serious armed conflicts, environmental degradation, and the diminishing wildlife. At the same time, we understand that such problems are too complex to solve in a short period, and that hasty prescriptions are often dangerous and create other problems. Still, contributing to resolving the current problems in Africa in the long term is our major motivation to conduct these studies.

Furthermore, understanding the realities in Africa has been a strong motivation for our research. Why do we want to understand this? Fundamentally, the reason is simply that what happened in Africa is very interesting, fascinating, and so terrible that we feel compelled to study the situation further. Essentially, the motivation is selfish, as it is not for Africa, but for ourselves. Regardless, I appreciate this selfish motivation to gain a better understanding for several reasons. First, research activity is generally so hard that it is difficult to continue laborious work in the long term without a selfish motive. In addition, better understanding is indispensable for better prescription. An in-depth understanding is a precondition for good policy making. Last, a better understanding of Africa leads to a better understanding of the world, of Japan, and of ourselves. The nature of African studies, and
area studies in general, is substantially reflective. When we study Africa in depth, our perspective of
the world will broaden and be better balanced than before. This provides us with clearer views for our
own society.

I would like to emphasis that there are a number of motivations for African studies. While
many researchers participate in this symposium, their motivations for research might differ. In my
opinion, this is an outstanding merit of an international academic meeting. Different motivations
generate different perspectives, methodologies, and arguments. We will surely be able to learn from
the discussions among us. I believe that through this exchange of different views and ideas, we can
explore the frontiers of African Studies.

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Session I
Politics and International Relations
Africa: Changing Politics in a Changing World

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Abstract
Like the international system in which it is embedded, Africa is in throes of multiple and multi-dimensional change. Most of this change is taking place simultaneously at different levels and is driven by factors that are mutually reinforcing. The sources of the change which the continent is undergoing are both domestic and external and the change process is underwritten by a variety of local and global actors. The broad contours of change such as it has been unfolding over the last six decades have been well documented and debated in the literature. What has historically provoked dispute and disagreement - and continues to do so - is the interpretative frame by which the dynamic and import of change are understood. This essay suggests that the dominant and long-standing approach in African Studies of treating the continent as a specimen apart for which special analytic tools and conceptual frames are required has no justification in theory and practice, and has run its course. African Studies can no longer simply be reduced to a domain for a competitive recounting of pathologies about a continent, especially because the questions about which it is pathologised are present elsewhere but are understood and characterised differently. Change in Africa, as change elsewhere in the world, proceeds in a contradictory manner comprising an admixture of advancements and regressions in a complex dialectic that embodies - and endows - specificities but which does not justify a one-sided narrative about the African world as an unyielding terrain of pathologies.

Keywords
Change in Africa, African politics, African studies, Characterising the changes, Africa and the West
Introduction

Over the last three decades, the contemporary international system has witnessed significant shifts that suggest the beginnings of the end of the Western-led global order that emerged and was consolidated after the Second World War. That global order cemented a Pax Americana on the basis of which much of world affairs were to be organised in the post-1945 period. The most prominent institutional expressions of the Western-dominated order were - and symbolically - remain the United Nations and most of its family of organisations, including, notably, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Although debates are rife about the nature of the new order that is emerging, there is now very little disagreement that the previously unassailable dominance enjoyed by the United States both alone and with its core allies is under severe strain as new centres of power have emerged or re-emerged into global significance and, in so doing, triggering a process of re-alignment of interests that is still underway (Ikenberry 2008, Jacques 2009, Turner 2009, Wade 2011, Layne 2012, Rachman 2016, Layne 2018).

Amidst the changes taking place in global affairs, different regions of the world are also grappling with changes of their own. In this regard, the African continent has witnessed and is the site of ongoing changes that have touched on all aspects of politics, economy, and society. As with the changes taking place in the international system, there is no agreement on how best to qualify and grasp the changes going on in Africa both generally and with specific regard to politics. The task of characterising the changes occurring is not made easy by their unevenness and the dispersed or seemingly disconnected ways in which they are unfolding. That task is at the heart of debates in African Studies about the progress and prospects of the continent some six decades after the march to independent statehood began. In reviewing the context and content of the changes taking place in African politics, this essay offers a broad critique of some of the dominant interpretative approaches in the African Studies literature and suggests that the time has come to transcend the tendency to characterise power and governance on the continent as a domain of the exotic and esoteric that requires particular forms of characterisation for understanding it.

A World in the Throes of Change

There may be no consensus about the exact point in time when the wheels of change in the contemporary international order began to turn – and it may even be futile seeking one – but it would not be far-fetched to trace the roots of changes to the decade of the 1970s. This was a period of stagflation in the leading economies of the world, a context which partly underpinned the decision of the Richard Nixon administration in the United States to devalue the dollar and terminate its peg to gold as to mark the formal end of the Gold Standard - or what was left of it. The intellectual and political assault which was launched by the Chicago Boys against the dominant Keynesian post-Second World War global economic policy framework for domestic policy-making and global economic governance was fed and also fed into the lacklustre performance of economies around the world to pave the way for what Paul Krugman and others have characterised as a counter-revolution in development thinking and policy making (Krugman, 1992). By the end of the decade of the 1970s, with a constellation of conservative governments in power in the US (Ronald Reagan), UK (Margaret Thatcher), Canada (Brian Mulroney), and Germany (Helmut Kohl), the neo-liberal age of free-wheeling and unidirectional market liberalisation was ushered in even as the state was assailed on various fronts with a view to rolling back its frontiers and cutting it down to size (Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995, Mihevc 1996, Olukoshi 1998, Mkandawire and Soludo 1999).
In the course of the 1980s, as the radical free market ideas championed by Milton Friedman and his associates in the Chicago School moved from the realm of ideas into the world of policy-making and political action, the neo-liberal triumph was packaged and presented as a Washington Consensus on the basis of whose doctrinal precepts, economic – and eventually social – policies were to be conducted around the world. The IMF and the World Bank, two institutions borne out of post-1945 Keynesian development thinking and mandated to play key stabilising roles in global economic governance, were recast to become both bearers and enforcers of the new Washington Consensus. It was a task which they undertook across Africa and the rest of the global South using an array of conditionalities clauses whose intent was to foist the neo-liberal policy framework on beleaguered and/or reluctant governments as structural adjustment programmes. These policies comprised a set of orthodox measures and tools designed to free markets and retrench the state. They stood in contradistinction to the heterodox policies that Keynesianism promoted as part of efforts at better managing the boom and bust cycles of capitalist accumulation that had provoked the Great Depression of 1929 (Sodersten and Reed 1994, Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, Stiglitz 2002, 2006, 2010).

At the same time as the neo-liberal orthodoxy was gaining in hegemony around the world and quickly assuming the status of the new orthodoxy to which countries were required to conform from the 1980s onwards, significant developments were also unfolding in the geo-political arena that carried far-reaching consequences for global politics. Easily one of the most important of these developments was the chain of inter-related events that resulted in the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the reunification of Germany in October 1990, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 along with the formal winding up of the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON. These events combined to mark the formal end of the historic East-West Cold War as we knew and experienced it for much of the 45-year period from 1945 to 1990. The bipolar structure of global power organised around the competing military-strategic, economic, and politico-ideological interests of the old Western and Eastern blocs immediately went into decline even as Russia and its erstwhile allies in the defunct Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact/COMECON busied themselves with managing their complex - sometimes chaotic - transitions away from communist central planning and the single vanguard party political model towards more liberalised economic and political systems.

With the end of the classic Cold War came a process of realignments of interests around the world that ushered many countries in the old Eastern bloc led by the defunct Soviet Union into independence, including countries carved out of the old Yugoslav Republic as it also dissolved into various countries. One immediate outcome of the developments was the opening up of the European Union to an enlargement towards the Eastern Europe with a view to the rapid incorporation of many of the countries that were previously part of the Soviet Union into its integration project. At the same time, the Russian Federation, readjusting itself to the post-Soviet era, took measures to secure its immediate neighbourhood through cooperation arrangements with some of the countries with which it shares boundaries. Furthermore, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) through which mostly - though not exclusively - newly independent countries, many of them African, sought to navigate an autonomous middle ground and space amidst the sharp East-West polarisation of the Cold War years began a slow death that was accelerated by the death in 1980 of one of its remaining original prime movers, Josef Broz Tito, and the subsequent collapse of Yugoslavia.

Triumphalist claims such as those initially made by scholars like Francis Fukuyama (1992) about the ‘defeat’ of the Soviet Union and its model of state-led and communist-inspired central planning under the supervision of the vanguard party by the Western liberal political and economic
model gained resonance in many circles in many circles around the world. However, as many critics pointed out and subsequent events demonstrated, they turned out to have been both overstated and premature. Nevertheless, they did provoke short-lived global policy and political conversations about the harnessing of a post-Cold War peace dividend from which the world economy as a whole might benefit and to which countries such as those of Africa could look in order to lift themselves out of a prolonged state of underdevelopment. Although there were considerable motions in the global aid community led at the time by the Group of Seven (G7) countries to step up development assistance, the verdict by the end of the 1990s was that the peace dividend had not been delivered. Also, with the end of overt East-West ideological-military competition for strategic alliances around the world – Africa having been one of the main Cold War battle fields – and the initial retrenchment of Russia’s global reach, Western countries felt comfortable to pursue a new political conditional in their dealings with African countries.

The essence of the new political conditionality was to encourage the ideological-political allies of the West at the height of the Cold War to accede to domestic pressure for governance reforms by opening up their political systems. These pressures built up in intensity both on account of the hard-biting effects of the deflationary structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank on the populace across Africa and the harsh measures that different governments deployed in order to overcome citizen resistance to deep and prolonged austerity amidst collapsing living standards, declining public services, and decaying physical infrastructure. In Africa, as elsewhere in Latin America and Asia, discontent against the twin processes of austerity and repression boiled over and translated into street protests that came to be known as the ‘IMF Riots’ of the 1980s. On account of the sustained resistance to and violent protests against austerity and a pattern of immiserisation, some long-standing dictatorships buckled and fell in a first wave of regime changes in the global South. From Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines to Anastacio Somoza in Nicaragua, Gafar El Numeiri in the Sudan, and Jean-Bedel Bokassa in Central Africa Republic, to cite a few of them, several of the symbols of post-1945 ‘strong man‘ politics were driven out of power and into the dustbin of history.

The popular pressures for political reforms that gripped Africa and which played out during the 1990s as to culminate in the restoration of electoral pluralism in most countries were part of a broader vector and indicator of change in post-1945 world affairs, namely, the third wave of democratisation in the international system which Samuel Huntington (1991) documented. Beginning in the lead up to the mid-1970s in Southern Europe, spreading to Latin America and Asia-Pacific in the 1980s, and Eastern Europe and Africa from the end of the 1980s into the 1990s, the third wave of democratisation also fed into the emergence of and was, in turn, reinforced by a new phase in globalisation propelled by a revolution in information and communication technologies (ICTs). This ICTs revolution contributed significantly to the accelerated integration of economies, especially financial markets, around the world, exponentially increased the velocity of cross-border capital movements, extended the frontiers of global commerce, facilitated the emergence of new cross-border political, social and cultural communities, launched the world into the age of the global media and real-time news, and helped propel an assortment of non-state actors unto the world stage as important players.

The emergence into prominence of non-governmental actors with a capacity to mobilise and act on a global scale was a significant new development which added to the erosion of the monopoly of the state as the sole effective and overwhelmingly dominant actor in world politics. Soft power may always have been present in world affairs, evidenced, for example, by the influence exercised by the church but the structured global role which non-governmental actors came to enjoy in setting, shaping
and monitoring international agendas and standards of behaviour around development issues and global public goods has been a novel one. Over time, even the monopoly of the state over military weapons and its ability to project hard power was to be severely challenged by an assortment of transnational organised criminal groups trafficking drugs, people, and weapons, and fanatical religious organisations raising armies to wage war within and across national boundaries. Simultaneously, a new generation of private military contractors licensed by the US government as part of a doctrinally-inspired programme for the privatisation of war came into existence and began to offer their services for hire, often secretly, by governments around the world. Yesterday’s mercenary logic was repackaged into a new profit-oriented private business domain specialised in the markets for war around the world.

Globalisation also carried with it a generalised redistribution of economic power and political influence whose sum total has been a major and continuing shift of capacity and influence away from the West and towards the East. At the heart of this ongoing shift in the locus of global economic power is the re-emergence of China as an economic powerhouse and a leading pole of global economic growth. China’s re-emergence has been accompanied by a gradual expansion of its political influence and the enhancement of its global reach through a rapid and continuing enhancement of its military capability, the spread of Chinese soft power, and the deployment of its trade, financial and investment prowess worldwide, including through the New Development Bank, the Construction Bank, and the ambitious new silk road and belt initiative. Along with China, India is another re-emerging power whose ongoing transformation carries global implications and adds to the weight of Japan, the East Asian Tigers, and the Gulf states, as well as the efforts by Russia to reassert a global role to give a distinctively non-Euro-American character to the reconfiguration of global economic power and political influence that is unfolding.

Significantly too, contemporary globalisation, even as it has opened new frontiers and integrated markets with propulsion from technological innovations and sustained economic liberalisation, has also generated new heights of inequality within and between nations. Inequality as a fallout and discontent of globalisation has intensified alongside persistent problems of poverty. Although large numbers have been lifted out of poverty in recent years, especially in China, poverty levels have remained quite high around the world, including Africa and the Indian sub-continent. Poverty and inequality have, in turn, fuelled a dynamic of exclusion and a politics of marginalisation some of whose effects have been played out in complex experiences of conflict, criminality, extremism, displacement, migrations, xenophobia, and populist politics witnessed in different places around the world. The picture that emerges is of an increasingly globalised world that is successfully integrating markets and scaling ever new technological heights but hobbled by persistent poverty, soaring inequality, an inability to promote inclusive growth and development, and costly failures to accommodate and manage diversity.

The end of the old Cold War temporarily opened up prospects for a stemming of the global arms race but that slowdown turned out to be rather short-lived. In the context of the realignment and redistribution of power among countries and regions around the world, a new arms race has been triggered and various key players in the international system are opening new geo-strategic frontiers. Underpinning the new arms race is a desire to deter and contain potential or actual rivals, and enhance capacities for forward-deployment as may be required by circumstances. Thus, as Russia has been re-asserting a global role and investing in the modernisation of its arsenal, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that once seemed moribund has been revived and has been proliferating a
strategic deterrent presence across Eastern Europe. Similarly, as China has been rapidly building up its military capability and establishing military bases offshore and abroad, the United States has responded in kind by reaffirming its Asia-Pacific alliances and presence, and driving a project of militarisation around the world, including the entire seaboard of the African continent (Lundestad 2013).

Summing up, it would seem that although it may still be premature to proclaim a decisive end to the era of Pax Americana, evidence of the deep and continuing erosion of the American-led and Western-dominated post-1945 order is overwhelming and growing. This has already produced a new multi-polarity that opens new spaces for state and non-state actors to manoeuvre in world affairs. At the same time, it has made world politics much more complex than it has ever been given the range of interests that are at play at any one time on any major issue, and the delicate balances that must always be struck among them to avoid a wholesale systemic breakdown or a direct confrontation among the most powerful. The multilateral system as established after 1945 under the umbrella of the United Nations continues to survive though buffeted and strained by multiple pressures from diverse sources that partly speak to the imperative for comprehensive global governance reforms in general and a reconfiguration of the United Nations Security Council in particular.

An Africa Experiencing Multiple Changes

Change such as it has been going on in world affairs has been refracted into the Africa and fed into the domestic fabric of the countries of the continent alongside internal structural and conjunctural contradictions that generate pressures of their own for change. Both the external and internal drivers and dynamics of change, including their points of convergence and divergence, have generated new questions and recast old ones about the state, citizenship, and politics that have challenged existing structures of governance and the adaptive capacity of leaders. From severe strains to the integrity of the boundaries of the nation-state and mounting domestic pressures for politico-administrative reforms to the revival of various shades of identity politics and demands for greater participation and inclusion, governments and political leaders have been buffeted with calls for far-reaching change. The quality, speed, and relevance of the responses offered by governments and political society have varied from country to country. However, on aggregate, the impression is strong among the generality of citizens that a widening gulf seems to separate those entrusted with state power from the citizens in whose name that power is supposedly exercised.

At independence from the second half of the 1950s onwards, the countries of Africa, most of them categorised as low-income economies, uniformly embarked on state-led models of development. This was so regardless of the official ideological leanings they professed in the context of the Cold War politics of the time. Without exception, whether claiming to the socialist, marxist, capitalist, market liberals, or humanistic, they invariably adopted an active interventionist role for the state and took measures to involve the governments in the commanding heights of their national economies. This they did through, among others, the creation of public enterprises, the nationalisation of strategic economic assets, and establishment of state investment vehicles for joint venture activities with foreign investors. Development planning was also widely practiced and policies aimed at indigenising/Africanising economies were pursued together with tariff policies designed to substitute certain categories of imports with domestic production. The development policies carried out by the countries were largely in accordance with the prevailing Keynesian wisdom of the times around the world (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999)
Although most of the countries attained independence on the basis of multiparty systems of politics, ruling elites were soon to argue that the overwhelming need to prioritise development, accelerate national integration, and focus national energies on the twin project of state and nation-building made it necessary to temporarily suspend or even outrightly abandon competitive politics and, instead, embrace single party regimes. Multiparty politics, it was suggested, was alien to African culture, tended to reinforce ethno-regional and religious divisions, contributed to fanning the embers of secession, and generated cyclical instability and violence. Moreover, competitive politics among multiple parties was premised on zero-sum calculations that ruled out the idea of a ‘loyal’ opposition and the ideal of magnanimity in victory. By the same token, the principle of majority rule and minority rights had little or no place since winners tended to take all and losers invariably lost all. The one-party system was, therefore, advocated as an alternative that allegedly offered a much better chance of promoting national unity and overcoming underdevelopment, as well as ensuring the political stability necessary for progress.

On the face of things, and given some of the early experience of post-independence violence, the argument for a shift from a multiparty system to a single party regime may have seemed impeccable. However, in most cases, single party rule very quickly degenerated into rampant and unreconstructed dictatorships that neither delivered unity nor development -and which in time became itself a driver of conflict and instability as discontent and disaffection gained ground against the personalisation of centralised and concentrated power by rulers who themselves played parochial ethno-regional and religious politics. The coup d’état became a frequent occurrence in different countries of the continent, sometimes instigated or enabled by the East-West Cold War rivals in their competitive search for pliable regimes which could be counted as political allies and relied upon to offer strategic footholds. Thus it was that the first two decades of African independence were characterised by a ubiquitous statism in economic and political governance. The projects of unity and development were constituted from above and the state assumed the role of the sole legitimate and effective driver.

The groundwork for the emergence of a new phase in post-independence politics and development was laid during the course of the 1970s when, as part of the policy efforts to overcome stagflation in the world economy, the recycling of the petro-dollar surpluses of the OPEC countries that were cumulated after the oil price revolution that began in 1973 left the international system awash with liquidity. The excess liquidity was converted into various credit arrangements from which African countries benefitted in what was a prelude to a pile up of external debt that became unsustainable and was generalised into a balance of payments crisis (Sodersten and Reed 1994, Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995, Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). That crisis left most African countries vulnerable to the adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Besides their deflationary thrust, the adjustment programmes were also anti-state. The 1980s saw crisis-ridden African economies subjected to extreme shock therapies that shook the foundations of the state-led model of development and destroyed the post-colonial social contract between state and society. Popular resistance to the adjustment policies was met with repressive measures as governments became more authoritarian. Instability was rife across the board and demands for broad-ranging political reforms became louder as the 1980s wore on.

By the end of the decade of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, mass street protests, beginning from Cotonou in Benin Republic and rapidly spreading to other African countries, compelled governments to abandon single party systems, military regimes, and civilian-military diarchies, and convene sovereign national or constitutional conferences to debate and adopt a new
consensus-driven framework for governance. This process also translated into the reinstatement of multiparty politics, the restoration of individual and group freedoms, rights, and liberties, efforts at curbing presidential powers, instituting new checks and balances, enabling various governance bodies to serve as independent, non-partisan arbiters and protectors of the public interest. Constitutional provisions were also made for the creation of national human rights commissions, national election management bodies, constitutional courts, etc. Investments were made in electoral system reforms with a view to enhancing confidence it and opening up possibilities for broad-based participation. In some cases, special dispensations were adopted to encourage the participation of women in politics and their representation in various public institutions, including parliament. Decentralisation policies were also introduced to delegate or devolve power to newly-enabled second and third tiers of government.

In all, it would be fair to argue that the 1980s/1990s in Africa witnessed concerted efforts aimed at a radical and accelerated reversal of the statist model of development and governance that characterised the first two decades of independence. The pursuit of free market economic reforms under the tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions and various bilateral donors was subsequently accompanied by a liberal system of electoral pluralism driven by multiple political parties. Indeed, an important part of the work carried out in the course of this period focused on how to better underpin the drive for market-based reforms with complementary governance political-institutional reforms that were packaged as a campaign for ‘good governance’. As suggested by the World Bank after a decade of structural adjustment reforms, to have tried to carry out far-reaching market economic reforms without a commensurate effort at undertaking governance reforms was like having ‘Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark’.

However, despite the promise that the liberalisation of markets would, after some initial pain, restore Africa to the path of economic growth and social progress, many of the countries either suffered economic and social regression or remain trapped in a prolonged state of stagnation. Poverty remained widespread, unemployment grew, factories collapsed as the continent de-industrialised, the physical infrastructure decayed in too many places, social policy was retrenched along with the social expenditure of the state, and inequality grew. Even as dire economic and social conditions prevailed, competitive politics appeared, on the face of things and at one level, to gain ground – and to even yield the fall of some long-term rulers, the peaceful alternation of power from one ruler to another, and eventually alternation from one ruling party or coalition to another as some oppositional forces gained ground and won competitive elections. Elections became ubiquitous, the media terrain – print and electronic – was liberalised, civil society groupings active in different domains were licensed to organise and operate openly, etc. Legal and judicial reforms were accompanied by security sector reforms carried out with the express purpose of strengthening the prospects for democratisation. Specific measures were adopted in many places to encourage the greater participation and representation of women in politics and public affairs.

Some commentators, focusing exclusively on developments on the African political terrain of the 1990s were to proclaim – way too hastily – that the continent was undergoing a ‘second liberation’ (Olukoshi and Wohlgemuth 1995). Although many an ancient regime lost power in the face of popular pressures for change, there was, at another level, a plethora of challenges which saw transitional politics in some of the countries of the continent degenerating into the intra-state conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s which were characterised by Mary Kaldor and others as Africa’s new wars (Kaldor 2012). Claiming a huge toll in lives and properties, these intra-state conflicts were mainly fought with various
light weapons, created large-scale internal displacement and refugee problems, pitted armed civilian
groups against conventional armies and against one other, witnessed the recruitment and deployment
of narcotised child soldiers and female combatants on a large scale, saw the security forces of the state
going rogue and becoming soldier-rebels or ‘sobels’, involved the trafficking of drugs and various
natural resources by different warlords and factions, and often entailed the use by all sides of scorched
earth policies, the wanton rape of women and girls, and the despoliation of the environment (Kandeh
2004).

In the worst cases, the violent conflicts that unfolded in different parts of Africa during the 1990s
resulted in the full or partial erosion of central governmental authority over varying periods of time
in places like Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Guinea Bissau, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, to cite some of the best known cases. In many other countries, although central
governmental authority remained by and large in place, violent instability was widespread. From the
Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the Casamance region of Senegal, and the Algerian civil war to the
multiple conflicts that wrecked the Sudan, the war in Congo-Brazzaville, and the conflict in Uganda
involving the Lord’s Resistance Army, various countries were faced with armed conflicts that took
toll in lives and property. The various conflicts all added up to create the image of a continent
in a perpetual state of violent conflict and disorder. The situation was to become a key focus of
the international community mainly under the auspices of the United Nations as various conflict
management and peace-building initiatives were launched aimed at restoring stability.

Beyond the cases of the countries where troubled transitions degenerated into civil war, there
were also concerns that gradually built up with regard to the reach and depth of those that appeared on
the face of things to have made some success of their adoption of electoral pluralism. Questions and
contestations have built up and persisted with regard to the integrity of elections, some of these taking
a violent turn. Political parties have remained mostly weak and dependent on ethno-regional and
religious constituencies. Internal party democracy has mostly been in deficit and intra-party violence
over positions has been rife. The system of checks and balances has not functioned as effectively as
was initially hoped, with the executive dominating parliaments and judiciaries that have remained
pliable and easy to manipulate. Corruption and mismanagement by public office holders, including
those elected by the citizenry, has been a common feature of politics and public administration.
Elected governments have appeared to be overwhelmed and hobbled in the delivery of quality and
accessible services. Across the continent, governments have struggled to deliver the much-awaited
dividends of democracy to the citizenry. Amidst this, attempts have multiplied – some of them already
successful - to roll back media freedoms and civil rights, rein in civil society groupings, and amend
constitutions to remove term limits to the befits of incumbents.

Underlying the discontents of ongoing democratisation processes and the apparent inability of
elected governments to deliver cogent socio-economic results to the bulk of the populace has been
the persistence of neo-liberal policy frames in the design of public programmes and expenditures.
Regardless of the fact of manifesto programmes presented by political parties to the electorate and the
alternations achieved from one government to the other or from incumbent ruling parties to opposition
ones, macro-economic policy has remained unchanging and the scope for social policy severely
constrained by inflation-targeting considerations. The consequence is what Mkandawire has described
as a proliferation of ‘choiceless democracies’ whose inability autonomously to pursue policy priorities
that speak to the citizenry and the demands of a given context has hollowed out the spirit of a second
liberation which some felt in the 1990s when long-serving dictatorships and single party regimes
began to give way to a new generation of leaders and a multiparty system (Mkandawire 1999).

The unidirectional market-liberalizing structural adjustment economic policies that were introduced in the late 1970s into the early 1980s and which persisted into the 1990s and beyond, exacting social costs along the way, stood in diametric opposition to the logic of and requirements for the democratisation of the political space. The core of economic policy-making was effectively taken out of or insulated from the democratic process even as the kinds of negotiation and compromise that yield policy heterodoxy were blocked to ensure the triumph of a pre-determined orthodoxy. The consequence has been a direct one: Amidst the motions and rituals of democratisation from the 1990s onwards, the result that has been registered across the board is that ‘plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose’. And nothing perhaps better symbolised the complexity and contradictions of the contemporary African political transition than the fact that as it unfolded in the 1990s and the world celebrated the formal end of Apartheid with the inauguration in 1994 of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically elected President of South Africa, a genocide of unspeakable proportions was going on in Rwanda.

If the economy and its ability to deliver tangible social benefits to the populace has been one of the Achilles heels of the experience of African democratisation, the tide seemed to become much more favourable at the dawn of the new millennium when, after some two decades of decline and stagnation, countries across the continent began to register GDP growth. Not only did economies start growing again, this growth, averaging 5 to 6 per cent annually, was sustained for almost eight straight years until it was dampened by the onset in 2007/2008 of the global financial and economic crises that became the Great Recession. Considering that Africa’s return to the path of growth occurred at the time of lacklustre growth performance in Europe and the United States, exuberant narratives soon proliferated celebrating the rise, at last, of Africa. The metaphors used to depict this were many but easily the most prominent was the notion of Lions on the move popularised by McKinsey (2010, 2016).

According to the Africa Rising narrative, not only was economic growth taking place on the back of sound macro-economic indicators and improved governance institutions, domestic markets were also expanding rapidly based on improving purchasing powers propelled by a growing and globally-networked middle class. The frontier nature of African economies and incentives put in place by governments to improve the environment for doing business meant that investors could harvest rates of return that are superior to what is on offer elsewhere in the world. Evidence of the attractiveness of African economies for investors included spectacular stock market returns, healthy foreign exchange reserves, generally stable exchange rates, rapidly improving ICT infrastructure and penetration, increasingly sophisticated banking systems and domestic capital markets, generous tax rebates, and limited capital controls. Improved investments in education and public health amidst the youthfulness of the continent’s population is bound to assure a steady pool of skilled labour needed by investors (Mahajan 2009, McKinsey 2010, 2016, Economist 2011, Perry 2012, Robertson 2012).

Considered at a broad level, the Africa Rising narrative spoke to the rapid changes taking place in Africa which ought to be acknowledged. The rapid population growth which the continent in experiencing, with about 60 per cent of that population younger than 35 years of age clearly carries significant long-term implications for politics, economy, and society. So too does the accelerating shift of population from the rural to urban centres across the continent and the on-going emergence of megacities in different parts of the region. Yet for all the potentiality which these changes offer and the possibilities which a return to economic growth seemed to promise, the Africa Rising narrative understated the fact of the commodity-driven nature of the GDP growth that occurred in the first
decade of the new millennium and the precariousness of such a dependence. Little wonder that once
the Great Recession set in and the commodity boom which countries had enjoyed in earlier years
turned into a bust, the impact was immediate as growth fell below 3 percent per annum and exchange
rates, external reserves, and balance of payments came under pressure even as stock markets suffered
severe instability mainly in a downward direction. The commodity-driven growth that Africa enjoyed
may have yielded higher revenues for governments but it did not translate into the onset of a structural
transformation in the economies of the continent.

Even as growth episodes go, the experience which Africa recorded in the first decade of the new
millennium and the Africa Rising narrative built on it have been challenged on the grounds that the
level of growth was not high enough to make a significant difference on poverty. The consequence
was that even as Africa was purportedly rising, the absolute number of the poor was also growing.
The benefits of the growth that took place, even as it fell way below the potentiality of the continent,
were also not evenly distributed. As a result, inequality increased. Failure to take advantage of growth
to leverage the diversification of economies away from their narrow commodity base and dependence
meant effectively that economies remained overly vulnerable to external shocks and efforts at domestic
value addition did not happen in any significant way. Thus it was that the growth that took place did
not generate employment on a scale that could make a dent on the crisis of unemployment in most
countries, especially youth unemployment. Matters were not helped and continue to be exacerbated by
the parlous state of the physical infrastructure in too many countries whose effect has been to make the
cost of starting and running business to be high for most budding entrepreneurs (ECA 2013, Rowden
2013).

Politically, some African ruling parties, especially in Francophone countries, attempted to profit
from the Africa Rising narrative whilst it still de rigueur by presenting plans for emergence from low
to middle income status to their citizens. These plans may have come across as statements of ambition
but in the face of harsh domestic socio-economic realities, rampant corruption among the political
elite, and growing inequalities, they did not seem to inspire much immediate trust and hope in the
generality of the populace as to constitute a possible basis for a new state-society bargain. Rather,
amidst a climate of uncertainty, the pressure has built on the youth in a large swathe of the continent
to migrate in order to seek supposedly greener pastures elsewhere. The desperation to escape grinding
poverty and exclusion, and concern about the absence of some hope for a future at home has translated
into human tragedies across the Sahara and the Mediterranean as hordes of migrating youth undertake
perilous journeys away from the continent. The situation has also translated into vulnerability by the
youth to alternatives offered by criminal gangs, drug cartels, and insurgency groups mobilising in the
name of religion to challenge the secular state and all that it stands for. Across the entire Sahel and
to the Lake Chad basin, from Central Africa Republic to East Africa and the Horn, restive groups
populated by the youth are waging insurgencies that challenge the existing order and seeking to
supplant it with a theocratic ideal.

Understanding Change in Africa
Clearly, from the foregoing, change such as it has happened in Africa has been a mixed bag. Signs of
advance have been interspersed with stagnation and reversal. Progress where it has happened has been
slow and fragmented, and has required considerable effort to sustain. Interpreting the African world in
such a context has been an enduring challenge for African Studies as evidenced by the succession of
interpretative frames that have been advanced over the years to try to make sense of the trajectories of
the continent. These interpretative frames have historically been embedded within a binary opposition of Afro-pessimism and Afro-optimism. For the Afro-optimists, every hint of progress and success has been seized upon to proclaim a season of hope in Africa while for the Afro-pessimists, the all too frequent experience of political crisis and development failures simply serve as fodder for a déjà vu of an enduring gridlock on the continent. The tragedy for the Afro-optimists is that change and progress are not unilineal either in Africa or indeed anywhere else and the dynamics that produce or obstruct transformation at any point in time are tied to relations of power that are not easily given to logical sequencing of outcomes. As for the Afro-pessimists, it is equally their tragedy that their penchant for seeing Africa as little more than a dark spot in a dynamic world is all too frequently shattered by glimpses of the potentiality embodied by the Africa when its energies are periodically unlocked and the message that they convey that the underdevelopment of the continent is not a fatalistic condition to which it is condemned for all time.

Arguably, the oscillation between Afro-optimism and Afro-pessimism that has been integral to discourses about Africa are as diversionary as they are irrelevant to the actually unfolding politics of development taking place across the continent. Beyond the dualism of Afro-optimism and Afro-pessimism, three broad and inter-related approaches have predominated in the literature about contemporary politics in Africa and what may or may not be changing about it. To one degree of the other, the three approaches draw inspiration from theories of modernisation and in many respects are updated adaptations of them. One category of the literature focus on the resilience of tradition and ethno-regional allegiances in African politics, the second concentrates on neo-patrimonial dynamics in the African political arena, while the third focuses on the instrumentation of disorder by political elites for self-gain.

Regarding the body of literature which focuses on the deadweight which ethno-regionalism constitutes for African politics, the argument is that, historically as contemporaneously, politics and participation in Africa has been underpinned, conditioned and polarised along ethno-regional lines some of whose roots hearken back to ancient ‘tribal’ rivalries. The consequence has been that the political landscape has been generally fragmented with parties drawing support from primary ethno-regional constituencies and mobilising support less on the strength of their programmatic initiatives and more through an appeal to primordial sentiments (Lentz 1995, Bates 1974). Not only is the task of state and nation-building made that much more difficult in such a context, the building of consensus around policy and politics is also rendered near impossible. Politics tends to be a zero-sum winner-take-all game and as such the stakes involved in competitive elections are very high as much for winners as for losers. Not surprisingly, electoral violence is rife in the system and ruling factions using an admixture of carrots and sticks to hold on to power. Nepotism is embedded in the political culture and feeds corruption. In instances where religious identities are brought into the mix of ethno-regional politics, the struggle for power becomes even more toxic. Multiparty politics may have initially offered a pathway towards the modernisation of politics. However, the promise was short-lived and a dynamic of the ‘re-tribalisation’ of politics has been in evidence.

While, without doubt, African countries, like most other countries around the world, multi-ethnic and multi-religious in composition, it is not clear why the expression of ethnic and other identities on the continent should be seen as a specifically African pathology that is not only unique to the region but also uniquely dysfunctional in the region. In the absence of such clarity, ethnicity has been treated in the African context as extremely rigid and unchanging, conferred with a weight that overwhelms every other identity that individuals carry in a world of multiple identities, denied of its
civic dimensions, and seen as a domain that is impermeable. Furthermore, analysis has been carried on as though years of post-colonial nation-statism in Africa has counted for nothing, including public policies for forging greater national integration and individual choices exercised by a significant number to cross established boundaries through, for example, marriage and sites of labour. When, as often happens, political processes defy all expected ethnic pathologies, the temptation has been to see such developments as aberrations. Thus it is that the ethno-regional reading of contemporary African politics has diminished our understanding of the dynamics of diversity management and coalition-building on the continent (Mafeje 1971, Ake 1993, Nnoli 1998).

Building on the theme of nepotism and corruption which are rife in African politics, the literature on neo-patrimonialism focuses on the network of relations, be it within the state or in society, that has transformed politics into a web of patron-clientelist relations that effectively stymie the normal functioning of institutions, enthroned ‘big manism’, and reduced the public treasury to a giant trough into which elites freely dip their snouts. Political competition such as it exists is a game that is played out between different elite factions each of which seeks to keep a grip on its constituents through the distribution of prebends. Economic policy is oriented to serve the rent-seeking impulses and imperatives of the elites and their ever-growing appetites for resources necessary for oiling their political machineries. Politics itself is hardly about serving a public purpose and more about grabbing power for the sake of power and prestige. State-based neo-patrimonialism organised from above by political elites corrupts societal forces and dissipates pressures from below for reform. Society-based neo-patrimonialism coming from below places pressures on public officials and institutions as to undermine their capacity to function according to standards of transparency, predictability, and effectiveness expected of them. In both cases, whether arising from below or from above or even a combination of the two, the neo-patrimonial logic perverts democratic norms and principles. Thus it is that efforts at democratisation that began in the late 1980s into the early 1990s has neither advanced sufficiently nor met the basic requirements to qualify as being described as truly democratic (Bayart 1993, Van de Walle 2005, Bach and Gazibo 2012).

The neo-patrimonial approach has, easily, been the most popular interpretative framework embraced by Africanists to explain the failure both of recent market-based economic liberalisation efforts and experiments with political liberalisation to yield the outcomes expected. What has been problematic about the neo-patrimonial approach, however, is its packaging and presentation in the African Studies literature as primarily, if not exclusively an African problem which speaks in comparative terms to a distant past in Western political culture that was overcome through reforms and institution-building. Its claim about the omnipotent and omnipresent sway of neo-patrimonialist pressures and forces in African politics and development is thus anchored on the absence or weakness of institutions in what effectively becomes a circular argumentation which, heads or tail, can only lead to one predictable conclusion. Also, where in Africa, neo-patrimonialism is seen as a (congenital) disease afflicting politics and development on the continent, elsewhere around the world, similar patterns of relations among actors are celebrated as evidence of an abundance of the social capital that makes for successful polities and an embedded system of trust that underpins them. Remarkably, the neo-patrimonial approach has been deployed across disciplines to seek to explain every facet of politics, economy, and society in Africa. In so doing, its claims to being a universal frame of analysis reduce it to an omnibus construct which captures as much as it misses and robs it of an ability to deliver the nuance that the complex dynamics of change in contemporary Africa demand (Mamdani 1990, Mkandawire 2001, Pitcher et al. 2009, Mkandawire 2015).
In a bid to transcend the weaknesses of the neo-patrimonial approach, although never really getting out of its established paradigmatic boundaries, another body of literature has concentrated its efforts on the instrumentation of disorder by African political efforts. The premise of this approach is a straight forward one: Efforts at bringing order and predictability to the African world whether by way of liberal economic and/or political reforms ultimately fail because elites who should be the domestic bearers or enablers of reforms actually do profit from chaos and disorder that is integral to the political culture and economic policy making. This instrumentation of disorder has its own rationality and that rationality underpins how and why Africa actually works (Chabal and Daloz 1999). It is an argument that comes across as, at once radical and cynical. Its offer of a seemingly radical departure from dominant arguments about African political and development failures remains embedded in an approach that treats the continent as a peculiar terrain for which special explanatory variable(s). Its cynicism derives from the assumption that the instrumentation of disorder is a permanent condition from which there is no clear exist. For clearly, although instrumentation of disorder may be boiled down to how Africa allegedly really works, it is also by definition a dead end. Yet, dead ends, by their logic, also invite action for change and this approach offers no possible to grasp the politics of change no matter where it originates from.

Transcending Received Wisdom in African Studies
The principal bane of the mainstream approaches that have dominated the interpretation of contemporary politics and development in Africa is their tendency, directly or indirectly, to seek to understand dynamics on the continent in a flawed comparative framework that measures the continent against stylised narratives about governance and change in other regions of the world, especially the West. Proceeding from a premise that what Africa is experiencing is similar to what societies in the West went through in a distant or not-so-distant past, an idyllic picture of economy, politics and society in the West is then constructed against which African realities are assessed. Yet, that idyllic picture is a far cry from historical experience and/or contemporary reality in the West. Its effect, however, is that perfectly similar processes in Africa and the West, sometimes happening simultaneously, are characterised in radically different ways that generate more questions than they answer for the critical mind with a global comparative lens. At one level, the approach reproduces in the knowledge sector, the lopsided historical relations of power between Africa and the West. At another level, it reduces African dynamics to a collection of pathologies for which experimental remedies are to be imported in the quest for solutions. In the end, the politics of reform in a season of change becomes little more than an exercise in the mimicry of Western ‘models’ and ‘blueprints’. Translated into policy, it has made of Africa, a giant experimental laboratory for a succession of schemes ostensibly aimed at getting governance and development right.

Much of the African Studies literature on contemporary African politics has been centred around competitive naming and labelling for various allegedly African pathologies. Fuelled by an academic rat race and a frenzied competition for policy relevance, the field has been littered with an endless succession of adjectives aiming to offer encapsulate the nature of the African political economy. The resultant tower of babel has generated considerable noise but too little by way of conceptual clarity, originality, and/or innovation that could help enrich our understanding of change in Africa and strengthen the field of African Studies itself (Zeleza 1997). Overcoming this state of affairs has been a long-standing challenge and meeting the challenge will involve, as a starting point, a recognition that although Africa, like other regions of the world, does have its historical and contemporary
specificities, it is also part and parcel of a global mainstream of political, economic, and social change with all the implications for the way in which power is structured, used, abused, and reproduced. Such an approach may show that, comparatively, Africa may have much more by way of commonalities with the rest of the world than the dominant literature concedes. In the end, the big challenge may not necessarily be one of how Africa could be helped to become like the rest of the ‘advanced’ world - a world which, itself, is locked in a struggle between the forces of decomposition and recomposition - but, rather, how all over the world, governance, both locally and globally, may be reinvented to once again place the citizen at the centre of policy and politics.

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Migration governance: Migration within and from Africa

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Abstract
A recent and significant increase of migrants from the Global South to the Global North has caused serious issues such as smuggling and brain drain; additionally, illegal immigrants are included in the movement of people. As the migration problem has become a global issue, multi-layered migration governance is resulting in the rapid emergence of inter-regionalism, regionalism, and bilateralism.

In Africa, regional efforts for facilitating the free movement of persons and improving border control have been progressing gradually in several decades. For instance, the Economic Community on West African States (ECOWAS) agreed on introducing common passports in 2000. These developments are the results of neoliberalism on the one hand and external pressure exerted—especially by Europe—on the other hand. Funds from the EU support technical assistance and capacity building of the ECOWAS Commission. Confronted with illegal migrants from Africa, the EU developed an inter-regional approach to contribute to the externalisation of migrant control beyond its regional framework. The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) since 2005 focuses on continuous dialogue and the conclusion of readmission agreements with non-EU countries.

Apparently, migration governance in Africa is strongly affected by European preferences. However, this essay argues that African countries are no longer merely rule takers and that they attempt to seek leverage from European countries both in inter-regional and bilateral approaches. Furthermore, it raises issues regarding governance of migration within and from Africa.

Key Words
Migration, Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs), inter-regionalism
The number of international migrants reached 244 million in 2015; this figure is 1.6 times compared to that in 1990 (UN 2015). Most of these migrants were born in the Global South. pointed out that in 2015, 90.2 million of the south-south migration represented 37% of the total international migrant stock, whereas 85.3 million of the south-north migration was more than double the 40 million figure in 1990 (IOM 2015). In contrast, migrants born in the North represent 28% of the total migrants. Interestingly, 55.2 million move to the North and only 13.6 million move to the South.

These trends reveal that the increase in the number of migrants has been led mainly by migrants born in the Global South, causing serious global issues such as smuggling and brain drain. Illegal immigration is an additional problem. However, according to the definition of regime as explicit or implicit ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area’ —as Krasner (1983: 1) has mentioned—, Koslowski (2001) insisted that multi-layered migration governance has resulted in the rapid emergence of inter-regionalism, regionalism, and bilateralism instead of the international regime.

This article focuses on migration governance as it relates to the various problems derived from migrants born in Africa. The international flow of African migrants is an important political issue for African countries as well as European countries on the opposite side of the Mediterranean. Thus, migration governance for African migrants has developed within the interactions of Africa and Europe; moreover, their relationship has also changed. This paper is organised into three parts. Section 1 offers an overview of African migrants. Section 2 examines the dynamism of migration governance from European aspects. Section 3 reveals that Africa and Europe has changed from ‘policy makers and takers’ towards ‘partners’. Section 4, in turn, focuses on Africa’s elaboration for establishing migration governance. Finally, the article raises issues regarding governance for migration within and from Africa.

1. Overview of African Migrants
The population of African migrants reached about 30.6 million in 2010, more than double the population in 1980 (Ehrhart et al. 2014: 3). Because of the diversification in migrant destinations, the share of African migrants who stay in Africa has decreased gradually, about half of them still live in Africa in 2010 (Ehrhart et al. 2014: 9). In contrast, in 2015, the number of African migrants staying outside the African continent reached 1.79 million, more than doubling in 15 years (UN 2015).

Europe has been the second most popular destination for African migrants. The emigration of highly skilled labourers from Africa to Europe began in the 1960s. Between 1960 and 1987, Africa lost 30% of its highly skilled labourers (Adepoju 2010: 13). It is considered that until the early 1980s, the emigration of highly skilled labourers was caused by governments of countries of origin, such as Uganda and Somalia, which oppressed the highly educated and intellectuals accused of opposing their governments. In contrast, economic stability in Africa at that time was attractive for highly skilled African labourers, so they tended to remain in their countries of origin. However, since the mid-1980s, the economic restructuring failure pushed such labourers towards international markets and better working conditions with higher salaries. As a result, Africa has suffered from serious brain drain problems. For instance, the doctor brain drain caused Sub-Saharan African countries that invest in training doctors to lose $2 billion in 2010 (Kelland 2011). In Sierra Leone, as the Ebola crisis has revealed, the country had only 136 doctors and 1,017 nurses in 2010. These figures equate to one doctor for approximately every 45,000 people. Surprisingly, 27 doctors and 103 nurses trained in Sierra Leone were employed in the UK at the same time (Borg et al. 2017).
However, brain drain has partly been transformed to brain circulation. Because of economic decline in the Global North, highly skilled labourers have recognised that alternative destinations should be emerging economies in outside Africa, such as China and India, or inside Africa, such as South Africa and Botswana (Adepoju 2010: 16-17). Furthermore, governmental efforts are effective in reducing brain drain. The founding of the University of Djibouti in 2006 resulted in a reduction of students going abroad to study (UNESCO 2015: 519).

In contrast to severe problems triggered by brain drain, migration is an important survival mechanism in terms of remittances (Adepoju 2010: 14). At the community level, without basic welfare services, migrants’ remittances supplement the pressing basic need for a better life with housing, education, and healthcare. At the national level, remittances could be a source of foreign exchange. Formal remittance inflows to the Sub-Saharan Africa region are projected to increase by 10% from about $34 billion in 2016 to $38 billion in 2017, led by Nigeria with its projected remittances of $22 billion. Remittances can also be a source of GDP growth. For instance, remittances are significant in Liberia as a share of the GDP by as much as 26% (World Bank 2017).

According to Adepoju (2010: 15), because the migrant-diaspora-return continuum and its linkages are strong in Africa, many African migrants do not intend to stay elsewhere indefinitely; their plans are to return home. Thus, they keep their families in their countries of origin. Although there remains a dispute about who constitutes the diaspora, the African diaspora has been expected to contribute to the development of countries of origin.

Despite the African experience of rapid economic growth, unemployment rates are currently high, and this situation is serious among youth. Therefore, many African youth have been encouraged to cross the Mediterranean over the past decade, causing tragic deaths and missing persons in huge numbers. Fortunately or unfortunately, Africa—with its continuous demographic boom—is the only continent with a working population that is expected to grow over the next decade (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden/Development and Peace Foundation 2016). Therefore, a solution for unemployment is mandatory.

Without reliable data, trends regarding irregular migration are supposedly significantly underestimated. While irregular immigration from North Africa has persisted since the 1990s, Libya’s foreign policy reforms has contributed to an influx of trans-Saharan migration to Libya and Europe. Libya has been intensifying its relations with Sub-Saharan countries especially since the 1992 - 2000 UN embargo (De Haas 2008: 15). In terms of migration, Libya started to welcome Sub-Saharan Africans to work in Libya under its renewed ‘pan-African’ policies. There are more Sub-Saharan Africans living in the Maghreb than in Europe. Though an estimated 65,000 and 120,000 Sub-Saharan Africans enter the Maghreb annually, only 20 to 38 % of them enter Europe (De Haas 2008: 31). In contrast, most West Africans entering Europe recently do so legally; they represent only a fraction of the total EU immigration of 2.6 million in 2004. The implication is that most migrants enter Europe legally and overstay their visas. It would be prudent for Europe to develop a measure of control over the influx of African migrants.

2. European Aspects: Towards Fortress Europe

European countries have accepted migrant workers from inside and outside of Europe to solve the labour shortage since the end of World War II. Accordingly, bilateralism has been the mainstream of migration governance to normalise the flow of migrants. As Betts (2011) mentioned, the international politics associated with international migration is characterised by a fundamental power asymmetry
between sending states and receiving states. Generally, the former would be rule takers and the latter would be rule makers. Therefore, bilateralism usually reflects the preferences of receiving states. For instance, France concluded a bilateral agreement between Tunisia and Morocco.

However, the economic recession caused by the 1973 oil crisis resulted in the rejection of the new entry of migrant workers. Migrants from Africa flew into Southern Europe, from which migrants were formerly sent. Moreover, the labour demand derived from the accession of Spain to the European Community in 1986 and the recovery of the European economy in the 1990s encouraged an influx of legal and illegal migrants, especially from Sub-Saharan Africa.

As a result, after the 1990s, bilateral agreements between European states and African states shifted from recruiting migrant workers to dealing with illegal migrants. For instance, bilateral agreements between Spain and Morocco in 1992 and France and Senegal in 2005 included readmission and visa facilitation. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) between the EU and non-EU states, including northern African states, started in 1995, placing as one of its main priorities a reduction in migratory pressure on the EU. It required non-EU states to accept readmission of illegal migrants by conducting bilateral agreements individually.

At the regional level, while an intergovernmental agreement of 1985 aimed to establish a free movement of persons within the so-called ‘Schengen area’ (where internal border checks have been abolished), the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 and the Treaty on European Union required cooperation in addressing the migration problem from the fields of justice and home affairs as a so-called third pillar under intergovernmental methods. However, having experienced a large number of migrants and a refugee influx in the 1990s, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 integrated the policies on migration, asylum, and the free movement of persons in the European Community section of the EU Treaty. Additionally, the European Council held in Tampere, which addressed the creation of an area of freedom, security, and justice, was a milestone for a common EU asylum and migration policy that included elements such as constructing a partnership with countries of origin and developing efficient management of migration flow. In the border management field, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) was established in 2004, two years after the ad-hoc centres on border control had been established. Its first major operation at sea was Joint Operation Hera dealing with irregular immigration from West Africa to Spain’s Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean.

3. Relationship between African and Europe: From Policy Takers to Partners
Regarding the EMP, mentioned in section 2, Geddes insisted that whether a country would be able to join the EU or not created different incentive structures among non-EU states. In other words, candidate countries of the EU accession would give the EU more leverage, and countries without the prospect of joining the EU would strive for the opportunity to gain leverage and negotiate with the EU (Geddes 2012: 407).

Deadlock in terms of enforcement of the unilateral EU migration policy led the EU to seek dialogues and negotiations with African countries. Since 2005, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) has been a hybrid framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy characterised by both the bilateral and inter-regional approaches. Bilaterally, GAMM’s aim is to establish mobility partnerships (MPs) or Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMMs). MPs include negotiations involving visa facilitation and readmission agreements, mainly vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. So far, MPs have been signed with Cape Verde in 2008, Morocco in 2013, and
Tunisia in 2014. CAMMs without negotiations involving visa facilitation and readmission agreements have been used for other third-world countries like Nigeria in 2015.

For developing the inter-regional approach, establishing a formal dialogue between Africa and the EU began in 2000. The first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo resulted in an agreement on the support of the EU for African countries in ensuring free intra-African mobility of labour and migration, collaboration in addressing the root causes of migration, and the reciprocal integration of migrants, migrant rights, readmission agreements between European and African countries, and efforts to combat racism and xenophobia. However, it took seven years for the second Africa-EU Summit to take place, in which they adopted the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership based on formal dialogues and the Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME). Although the fourth Africa-EU Summit adopted the EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Mobility, which suggests a high level of interest in inter-continental migration, the MME would be insufficient without concrete outcomes contributing to the progress of migration governance for African migration problems.

Regional consultative processes (RCPs) are inter-regional dialogues with the following features: informal and non-binding, dealing with migration issues only, continuous, and not officially associated with formal regional institutions. RCPs, with their multilateral governmental networks, spread from the ministerial level to lower-levels of national regulators and are supposed to contribute to cooperation among states by encouraging information exchanges (Köhler 2011). Moreover, a ‘projectised’ approach enables RCPs with small secretariats and small budgets to be effective, since RCPs can authorise the hiring of staff for specific projects (Betts 2011: 34). RCPs are facilitated with the support and secretariat functions of international organisations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

The Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) between migration officials in countries of origin, transit, and destination has been encouraging dialogue among Africa, Europe, and the Middle East since 2003. The 5+5 Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean, officially launched in Rome in 1990, provided an informal forum since 2002 to promote information exchanges, joint management of international borders, agreed forms of labour migration, migration for development, and protection of the rights of migrants among member states.

Although the RCP model does not ensure the efficient dialogue among states (Freyburg et al. 2015: 158), the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process) indicates that institutional procedures reflecting preferences of sending states are necessary. Since 2006, the Rabat Process has been bringing together European and African countries from North, West, and Central Africa, as well as the European Commission (EC) and the ECOWAS Commission; this proactive RCP has four pillars of strategic priority: organising mobility and legal migration, improving border management and combating irregular migration, strengthening the synergies between migration and development, and promoting international protection.

The rapid increase in the number of irregular migrants crossing the Straits of Gibraltar or reaching the Canary Islands poses a problem that is not exclusively the responsibility of Morocco and Spain. In this context, France, Morocco, Senegal, and Spain took the initiative to establish the Rabat Process. While Spain and France have viewed the fight against irregular migration as a priority, Morocco and Senegal have considered the development problem a priority to reduce migration flow. Senegal, regarded as a gatekeeper of western Africa, has suspended negotiations with the EU regarding an MP (Meng-Hsuan 2012). At the same time, it is conducting bilateral agreements with France, Spain, and Italy for the deportation of irregular migrants instead simplifying procedures legal migration of experts.
and students from Senegal (Barolomeo 2010). Morocco regarded migration problem as a ‘geographical rent’ (Natter 2014:18), searched approach to negotiate for their preference.

Consequently, the Rabat Process takes a balanced approach towards sending states and receiving states. The steering committee is the strategic governing body; it is composed of five African countries and five European countries: Belgium, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, France, Italy, Mali, Morocco, Portugal, Senegal, and Spain, as well as the European Commission (EC) and ECOWAS. The ministerial conference, the forum for the highest level of dialogue within the Rabat Process, has been taking place in Africa and Europe alternately (i.e. Rabat, Paris, Dakar, and Rome). Thematic meetings dedicated to specific topics of migration have been co-hosted by both African and European states; thus, unilateral discussions led by either Africa or Europe are avoided. An example was the thematic meeting on return, readmission, and reintegration under the co-presidency of Belgium and Côte d’Ivoire in 2016. Nevertheless, return and re-admission are issues in which receiving states prefer to use their power, with meetings allowing African states to claim the developing database for identification; revalidation of penal provisions for irregular migrants and assistance in reuniting migrants were inevitable for an anti-irregular migrant policy (Rabat Process 2016).

Other significant aspects of the Rabat Process are support projects crossing pillars. Such projects support capacity building programmes in terms of the objective for supporting information sharing and improved coordination between partner countries. For instance, support projects develop tools sharing as a good practice (e.g. Guides on the Use of Migration Data in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali). Moreover, the Rabat Process launched a flagship initiative aimed at promoting entrepreneurship in Africa in 2016.

The significance of the Rabat Process to other RCPs is the Rabat Process that facilitates cooperation among sending states and transit states in Africa. As migrants’ routes became more diversified, evolving into a complex phenomenon, transit countries such as Morocco and Senegal spent money for the deportation of migrants from Sub-Saharan African states and strengthened border control, recognising the need to link countries of origin, transit, and destinations affected by the migration routes linking Central, West, and North Africa with Europe.

Thus, the Rabat Process, representing the practical RCP model for countries of origin, transit, and destinations, provided the EU with an alternative approach beyond the dialogue between African countries. The EU-Horn of the Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process) was established in 2014 as a continuous dialogue to address human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants through regional collaboration between countries of origin, transit, and destinations on the route between the Horn of Africa and the EU.

In addition, from the Rabat Process and the Khartoum Process, a formal dialogue between Africa and Europe known as the Valletta Summit on Migration, brought together European and African heads of state and governments in 2015. In response to the summit, the European Commission has launched an ‘Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa’, with €1.8 billion from the EU budget and the European Development Fund.

4. African Approach: Progress and Stagnation

Various approaches for facilitating regional economic integration in Africa have been strongly influenced by Balassa’s theory that regional economic integration develops in five stages: free trade, customs union, common market, economic union, and political union (Balassa 1961). Therefore, African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, the East African Community
(EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) attempt to establish regional free movement of labour between member states.

At the continent level, the Abuja Treaty, which planned to establish the African Economic Community by 2028, requires African Union (AU) member states to adopt necessary measures in order to achieve the free movement of persons and ensure the enjoyment of the right of residence and establishment by their nationals within the Community.

In 2006, the AU provided guidelines for member states and RECs in Africa to formulate national and regional migration policies through the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA), which includes respect and protection for the rights of labour migrants. In the same year, the African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPMD) recommended that migration and development issues should be addressed at national, continental, and international levels. It is emphasised that MPFA and ACPMD are not intended to be legally binding, nor do they impose any obligations on member states.

Though various policy instruments exist that affect and facilitate migration adopted by the AU, the 2004 AU Plan of Action on Employment Promotion and Poverty Alleviation and the Declaration on Migration of 2015 have not attained sufficient results so far.

Under the provision, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the EAC and SADC agreed in 2012 to harmonise their programmes for trading arrangements, the free movement of people, joint implementation of inter-regional infrastructure, and institutional arrangements for cooperation. Therefore, the free trade area was launched in 2015. As a next step, cross-border migration and labour policies should be concluded by 2017; however, the facilitation of frequent labour migration within this area is underdeveloped presently.

In contrast, ECOWAS, with the 1979 Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment as a legislative basis, is a pioneering REC for developing regional free movement. Although the establishment of free movement in the ECOWAS was planned for implementation in three phases within 15 years, progress on the second and third phases was stagnant because of the decline in economic performance in the 1980s and regional instability caused by wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone throughout the 1990s. Since the 2000s, the ECOWAS Travel Certificate, ECOWAS common passport, and various national identity cards have enabled ECOWAS citizens to travel freely within the region. In 2009, the ECOWAS Regional Labour and Employment Policy and Plan of Action was adopted. Since its implementation remains limited, the International Labour Organization has supported the effective implementation through a project funded by the EU under the 10th European Development Fund since 2013.

Namely, the elaboration of RECs in Africa are the results of neoliberalism on the one hand and external pressure—exerted especially by Europe—on the other hand. Activities of the Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA) since 2000, an RCP designed to encourage ECOWAS Member States to discuss common migration issues and concerns in a regional context, have been strongly supported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Thus, support includes technical assistance for the MIDWA Secretariat.

Conclusion
It appears that governance for African migration is undergoing a dynamic transformation and is strongly affected by European preferences, who need a comprehensive migration governance framework to deal with irregular migrants’ problems.
However, the author of this essay argues that within the RCP model, represented by the Rabat Process, African countries are no longer merely rule takers, and they seek leverage from European countries. In addition, efforts to develop African migration governance are remarkable among African RCPs, which require both technical and financial support from outside Africa. The implication is that African ownership faces an enormous dilemma of intervention by European countries.

It is anticipated that more than half of the expected growth in the global population by 2050 will occur in Africa, with transformation of global governance for unemployment and migration in Africa deserving attention.

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Session 2
Economy and Development
Markets, Politics and Land Administrative Reform in Africa: What can African Studies contribute?

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Abstract
Over the last twenty years the land question has received considerable attention in Africa, to the extent that most countries have introduced new land policies or land laws. The major focus has been on introducing institutional reforms of the administration of land rather than redistributive land reform. This has largely been concerned with strengthening customary systems of land management, integrating customary and statutory tenure into a single framework of property rights, and encouraging enhanced community participation in land administration. Land administrative reform has largely been framed through the lens of market liberalism, good governance, and civil society and community participation, rather than through a political economy framework examining processes of accumulation and appropriation of land. This paper addresses this framework of land administrative reform, tracing the logic of its conceptualisation and the extent to which this has distorted our understanding of land relations within Africa. It is argued that a framework of analysis is required that accounts for complex political factors within regional economies and production frontiers and of investment patterns within the global economy.

Land administrative reform in Africa has been characterised by two distinct perspectives. The first sees land reform as part of a process of opening up African economies to foreign and private sector investment and facilitating market expansion. The second is concerned with governance reforms and with introducing more participatory systems of planning and greater involvement of civil society in governance. The paper traces the influences of these two perspectives on land administration. The first part of the paper provides an overview of the reframing of the African land question under neoliberalism, and the logic of this within the context of the process of opening up African markets and introducing institutional governance reforms. The second part critically examines notions of the commodification of land and the nature of property; and the concept of community solidarity that underlies the land administrative reform against the backdrop of social differentiation, political alliances and the integration of communities into wider systems of capital accumulation.

Key Words
land policy in Africa, land administrative reform, commodification of land, land conflicts, communities and regional economies
Reframing the land question
The main framework for land policy in Africa during the last twenty years has been associated with the institutional reforms of land administration as a component of good governance. This has focused on two themes:

1. making land markets more efficient and opening up land to market relations.
2. integrating customary relations into state regulation of land and gaining recognition of customary land rights within statutory land registration.

The process of reform of land administration has been central to market liberalisation in Africa, since the opening up of investment to foreign investors and the private sector requires stable access to land and other resources, and transparent transactions. These objectives require the creation of a regulatory environment in which investors can be confident that there is a legal and regulatory structure to back up and enforce contracts and transactions of property rights and detailed information about present land ownership. Following the introduction of macro-economic reforms to facilitate markets many investors found that the ownership of lands they attempted to acquire were often contested, and that processes of registering land were intractably slow and cumbersome. Thus, they were reluctant to invest without a comprehensive reform of the regulatory environment and institutions of land management.

This new regulatory environment began to emerge in the concept of good governance, a series of institutional reforms to provide transparency, information about markets, and an enabling environment for investment. The roots of this framework of good governance in Africa can be traced back to Bates (1981), the Berg Report of the World Bank (1981) and Landell-Mills (1992). These studies depicted a rapacious state in Africa that sought to maintain political control over resources for its political allies and use this control for political domination. It was argued that this resulted in disastrous consequences: the economy was distorted by political goals and the people were alienated from state policy and frustrated in their attempts to develop economic enterprises. The objectives of reforms were to roll back state control over the economy, make the state responsible for creating an enabling environment for business, and promote decentralised management with greater civil society and community participation. According to Landell-Mills (1992) one of the aims of governance reforms was to make the state more in tune with traditions, beliefs and structures of African people. These traditions were depicted as represented by entrepreneurship, market sensibilities, and aspirations to accumulate capital. While this appeared to give weight to African cultural values, these values were distorted to make them represent aspirations for market liberalism.

This particular framing of liberal reform has had a deep impact on administrative land reform in Africa. The first attempts at reforms of land administration were concerned with regularising land markets to make way for investors and strengthening the process of land registration through land cadastres. However, this proved to be a highly ambitious task, particularly when most land was held under customary land tenure and not formally registered. Existing land cadastres were only based in the largest cities and carried information on only a small proportion of the parcels of land within the country. They could not be used effectively for purposes of gathering comprehensive information and transparency about land in the nation and on the ‘rightful’ owners of the majority of plots. To make any impact on land markets land cadastres had to be more comprehensive and embrace customary land rights, which accounted for the overwhelming majority of land plots.

For instance, in Ghana, one of the earliest countries to adopt a structural adjustment programme,
initial attempts at land administrative reform centred on the creation of a Land Title Registration Act in 1986. Although statutory land titling has existed for a long time in Ghana this has been on a voluntary basis. The 1986 legislation sought to make this compulsory, a condition for the recognition of land transactions. The aim was to make it incumbent on purchasers of land to register their acquisition of land to gain title so that a comprehensive land register could be managed, which would allow greater transparency in land and enable potential investors to ascertain the nature of ownership of the lands they intended to acquire, and who was recognised as the rightful owner. Only three land cadastres existed in the country, in Accra, Tema and Kumasi, and these did not have the capacity to register land in a timely fashion. They were mainly concerned with the registration of urban residential plots.

Registration was complicated and costly. As a consequence most purchasers of urban land did not seek to gain security over their land through registration but to establish claims to the land by completing the building of residential housing. Consequently, 20 years after the enactment of the Land Title Registration Act only 111,786 applications for registration had been received and only 16,829 land title certificates issued (Amanor 2009, Gough and Yankson 2000). Most investors could find very little information on lands they intended to purchase on existing land cadastres, and frequently found their attempts to acquire land thwarted by disputes over ownership among the customary right holders and chiefs.

The framework of approaching property rights through strengthening state cadastres was questioned by a number of analysts working in community participation and agricultural development. Bruce (1993) interrogated the capacity of the state to introduce transparent management of land, given its history of allowing ‘bureaucratic and other elites to grab land’ (Bruce 1993: 50). Bruce (1993) advocated a framework of land management focused on ‘community based’ solutions. Similarly, Migot-Adholla et al. (1991) argued that land titling did not have a significant effect on agricultural investment by smallholders, since other factors such as infrastructure development, market efficiency, information on new technologies, and credit and insurance markets, which would enable land to be converted into collateral, were not sufficiently developed. Without these factors land titling was influenced by negative factors of securing land against the possible claims of others. Given the high transaction costs of land registration this tended to detract from investment in agriculture as farmers expended scarce capital on land claims rather than investment. They concluded that governments would be better off addressing the immediate constraints on production rather than investing in costly land cadastres. They argued that land titling should only be initiated when a demand arose from below and from the development of commercial agriculture.

These positions crystallised at the World Bank into a theory of evolutionary property rights (Deininger 2003). This argues that as land becomes increasingly scarce and subject to competition a demand will arise at the community level for institutions to regulate land, restrict access, and encourage the development of land markets. This would result in a shift from access to land embedded in customary and kinship relations to the evolution of land markets in which households characterised by underproduction would sell land to those households seeking to expand their own production. In this perspective recognition of customary relations in land and the fostering of the dynamic trends within it can result in the rapid evolution of land markets. The evolutionary school of property rights argues that land markets can be encouraged to develop by building upon informal community institutions and harmonising customary land management with statutory tenure. By granting formal recognition of customary institutions, land transactions originating from within the customary sector can be gradually held to account, regulated and shaped. The collection of information on customary
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land would also enable investors to gain more information on land and enable them to identify favourable areas in which land could be acquired and hotspots to be avoided. The overall objective was to transform customary land institutions into well functioning land markets with clearly defined private property rights. Where individual rights were not clearly demarcated these could be registered as group rights in which ‘groups can internally decide on individuals’ resource access’ (Deininger 2003: 76). These rights would be transformed dynamically, as conditions of production changed, eventually resulting in individualised property. The recognition of group rights would in theory enable ‘indigenous groups’ such as herders and marginal agriculturalists to register their land and minimise encroachment by outsiders, while allowing for the internal evolution of property rights within the group.

In integrating customary land rights with statutory tenure the World Bank and other international policy institutions could draw upon the experiences of those working in community-based natural resource management and social forestry. Most notable was the tradition of community forestry that had developed in Sahelian countries in the drought of the 1970s. This was also a period of the weakening of the state in the context of the world economic crisis. There was an increasing conceptualisation within forestry circles that environmental problems resulted from complex interconnections of institutional and economic factors that required multi-sector initiatives and community participation in building institutional frameworks for interventions.

*Gestion de terroir* originated in francophone West Africa in the 1980s to enable communities to initiate technical innovations and management structures to halt environmental degradation and introduce conservation measures. It legally recognised the rights of communities to manage their village resources and promoted community councils that implemented a management contract for its territory (Guèye and Laban 1992, De Haan 1998). Village lands were mapped out and zoned according to their land use. This concept of *gestion de terroir* provided the framework for the subsequent emergence of Rural Land Plans or *le Plan Rural Foncier* (PRF) in Francophone West Africa, in which the emphasis shifted from developing state cadastres to community-based land mapping (Gastaldi 1999).

PRFs were first implemented in Côte d’Ivoire in 1990, and then introduced into Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Madagascar. The PRF approach devised a simple land register in which all existing rights in land were mapped in the territories of rural communities, using aerial photographs, GPS devices, simple mapping techniques, interviews with rights holders, and community group consultations. The objective was to record all the existing rights in specific plots of land of all landowners and land users, and the nature of these rights (such as if the land can be sold or transferred to heirs). Where land was the subject of multiple interlocking user rights, these were recorded. Where land was the subject of disputed ownership, this was also recorded. This provides useful information where investors could identify hotspots with many land disputes and more stable areas in which purchases were safer. In Côte d’Ivoire this was used to create a national land title register, village by village, and to issue land certificates (Gastaldi 1999, Ouédraogo 2005, Lavigne Delville 2004) to individuals whose lands had been mapped without contestation. In Côte d’Ivoire, these land certificates could in theory then be converted into registered private land titles within a three-year period of initial registration. In contrast, in Madagascar the land titling registers were institutionalised within the process of decentralisation, which created community land registers integrated into decentralised councils. Since there has been a long process of issuing informal written documents for land transactions in rural Madagascar land registration also recognised and regularised these
documents and converted them into land certificates (Teyssier et al. 2009, Chauveau et al. 2006).

Similar systems have been introduced in other countries. In Tanzania the New Land Act of 1997 vested the administration of land within elected village councils, which have legislative powers to enact byelaws. The village councils have powers to register land, allocate land certificates, and adjudicate land disputes. All resident members of a village have rights to land. The Land Act recognises customary land tenure and enables these rights to be registered provided the claimant can prove that they have used the land for at least twelve years. Recognition of land also includes rights to sell customary land (Veit et al. 2008, Alden Wiley 2003). The Land Act provides for the transformation of these customary rights into individual property. The Land Act has been shaped by two distinct influences: concerns to create stable transactions in land to encourage foreign investment, and the appeasement of rural disquiet about the growing alienation of customary land to investors (Manji 2006, Tsikata 2003, Shivji 2000), without resolving the contradictions between the two perspectives. It co-opts villagers into the commodification of land by according them rights to claim and sell land, which can end up in the hands of private investors.

Similarly, the 1997 Mozambique Land Law attempts to resolve problems of recognising user rights while promoting new investments in land. The major innovation has been to remove the dualist framework of customary and statutory tenure. The Land Law recognises the prevalence of customary tenure and makes provisions for formal recognition of customary rights and land transactions within the customary sector. Customary and formal land holdings are integrated into one legal framework in which different types of land rights coexist. Customary land rights are given full legal equivalence to state registered land (Tanner 2010). Within the new land reform the local community is recognised as a legal entity with formal rights in land. The rights of the members of the community are recognised on the basis of the norms within the community, but also on the principle that all community members have equal rights to community property, and equal rights to participate in decision-making within the community (Knight 2010, Tanner 2010). Where users choose to register their rights, proof can include community based evidence, community participatory mapping, and evidence based upon the history of land occupation and its productive utilisation (Tanner 2010). Recognition also enables users to sell their land and a process of consultation has been institutionalised through which foreign investors can negotiate with communities for land, streamlining their access.

The Ugandan Land Act of 1998 also recognises customary rights and makes provision for the registration of customary rights, which can be converted into individual property rights and freehold title. Decentralised land boards administer land, record rights to land, verify boundaries, and can allocate unclaimed lands. Lands can be registered as individual or as group lands, such as extended families or clans. Corporate groups can register their land as group land, without defining the rights of individual members within the group or the status of individual members of the group (Mugambwa 2007, Adoko and Levine 2005).

Land Boards also dominate the administration of land in Botswana and Lesotho. Land Boards largely occur where the administration of customary land is delegated to decentralised government institutions that are responsible for interpreting customary law and adjudicating disputes over land. Traditional authorities may be represented on these Boards. In Botswana the Land Boards hold the rights and titles of chiefs in trust for ‘the benefit and advantage of tribesmen of that area and for the purposes of promoting economic and social development of the people of Botswana’ (Botswana Tribal Land Act 1968 quoted in Fitzpatrick 2005: 463). Although allocation of land was originally restricted to local people, this was removed and amended in 1993, as a result of public concern (including from
wealthy citizens interested in investing in cattle ranching) that this contravened the recognition of the equality of all citizens in the constitution of Botswana (Molomo 2008).

In Ghana, reforms have involved the decentralisation of land administration to Customary Land Secretariats (CLS) under traditional authorities. These are responsible for recording ownership rights, issuing land lease documents, collecting land levies, and adjudicating disputes. Ownership of land is not only confined to local community members and the chiefs transact land with both migrants and foreign investors, who are allocated land documents that can be formally registered. Similarly in South Africa communal lands come under the administration of chiefs.

The commodification of land
A distinct pattern of commodification of land underlies all these recent interventions in the administration of land. The formal recognition of customary rights essentially transforms user rights into forms of private property that can be transacted on markets, and provides those who gain customary certificates or titles with the freedom to sell the land. Where the land is subject to multiple claims of rights these can be recorded as such, as clan land, family land, common property, grazing land, etc. This enables the process of commodification to continue without a critical questioning of its precepts, and allows these disputed lands to ‘evolve’ in the future into individual property, or group rights that can be transacted by a corporate structure within the group or subject to a contract. This process of comprehensive registration of customary land also enables areas not subject to claims to be transacted and sold to investors. In Tanzania, areas that are not claimed as village land can be transacted by the government with foreign investors. In Botswana the Land Boards are able to sell land to private investors on which there are no customary claims. The CLS in Ghana register land leases sold by the chiefs to migrants and foreign investors.

While the process of decentralising land administration claims to strengthen customary rights, the forms of recognition accorded to customary land transforms it into individual property rights. It does not establish a sphere in which customary lands remain confined to members of the community, but enables recognised rights to be transacted with buyers beyond the realm of the community. This facilitates the appropriation of community land by the market. It is not a mere coincidence that those areas associated with the most comprehensive customary land titling and most ‘progressive’ land administrative reforms are the very same areas that have been associated with the most extreme forms of land grabbing, such as Tanzania, Mozambique and Madagascar. In Tanzania, for instance, village land can be sold to external investors, provided it passes through a number of laid down procedures, including consultation with ‘the community’ and agreement to ‘compensation’ by the interested parties. Frequently, the clamour for land places great pressure on villagers to sell their lands and village council leaders are frequently bought off by investors to support their desire to purchase land and persuade members of the community to transact land. A Daily News report of 2009 describes how villagers were ‘deceived’ into releasing their land to investors:

[Villagers] claimed to have been short-changed by the investors and given as little as 2,000/- or 5,000/- to accept a useless deal. A list of meeting participants in the villagers was shrewdly used to mean that it was a list of village government council which could authorize the offer of land to an investor. A village government member, Mr Saidi Mata said that an investor has invaded his village and ‘grabbed’ it through a village meeting which was disguised as a village council meeting. We were gathered
here in the village about 40 of us and some of the leaders lured us to sign a deal with an investor. The investor paid 6,000/- to each villager who attended the meeting. We are told that we had approved his application just because we appended our signatures. We are now regretting, he said (Lugungulo 2009).

Tanner (2010) notes a similar process of consultation in Mozambique where villagers are also pressurised to release land to investors. Since land markets are in the process of being established and land increasingly commodified, it becomes difficult for villagers to place a value on the land, which also becomes an object of speculation. Villagers are not fully aware of the value of their land and often release it at low prices, allowing investors to make windfall profits. Tanner (2010) documents cases where community members in Mozambique sold beachfront land to investors for US$ 390 per hectare. Investors subsequently packaged this land for holiday home development selling 10 hectare plots for US $200,000. Although the Mozambique Land Law claims to be socially inclusive and to create a legal framework in which customary rights are given full equivalence to state registered land, Tanner (2010) notes a distinct trend towards concentration in the registration of land, in which large areas are been formally registered by a small number of applicants. For instance in Zambezia Province, 11 percent of the approved applicants registered 74 percent of the registered area of land. Tanner (2010) identifies a trend of the gradual expansion of investors into communal lands and the displacement of rural people through market transactions.

This trend of displacement of rural producers is also associated with accumulation at the national level. In Botswana, a dominantly cattle herding economy, with the removal of the restriction of customary land rights to ‘tribesmen’ the process of administration of land has been accompanied by the privatisation of rangelands which are then converted into cattle ranches. This has worked against the interests of those who lack capital to fence land and establish ranches as individual property (Molomo 2008, Quan 2000, Peters 1994). The expansion of ranches has led to a decline in common grazing lands.

Although customary land administration purports to enable various group rights and multiple rights in land to be recorded, this is difficult to achieve in practice, since customary rights are often fluid - they change over time and occur within changing land boundaries and ecological zones. In the West African Sahel many pastoralists have lost grazing land as farmers have moved into these areas and gained recognition of their ownership of individual plots of land, although the pastoralists may have been the original settlers. In the Ferlo region of Senegal, Juul (1993) notes that two distinct Fulani herding groups have co-existed over a long period of time. The first were semi-sedentary combining agriculture with herding. The second group, the Foutanke, focused solely on herding, had larger herds and used mobile management strategies moving between different grazing grounds. Mourides farmers later moved into the area establishing large groundnut farms. The Mourides were able to make successful claims on the land and were able to register areas with critical grazing resources as their own individual property. As farmers increasingly encroached into the area and established successful claims on land the agropastoralists also resorted to acquiring land titles for their own lands. This created further problems with long-term implications for the Foutanke whose seasonal grazing grounds became subject to ownership claims from the other groups with a more sedentary presence in the area.

Initiatives such as gestion de terroir and village lands in Tanzania have also eroded the grazing grounds of pastoralists, as agriculturalists have claimed and registered these areas as their own village
lands, some of which may be sold to investors at a later date.

Brockington (2002) argues that pastoralists include many groups that are both ethnically and economically differentiated. Some of the wealthier groups have been able to take advantage of customary land administration to gain access to land, which they convert into ranches. While some international NGOs have taken up the cause of the loss of land of particular pastoralist groups, such as the Maasai, this privileging of particular ethnic groups serves to further the marginalisation of poorer pastoralists, who often come to constitute members of multi-ethnic poor communities. This privileging of ‘indigenous’ communities often compounds the poverty of poor pastoralists who lose resources to the wealthier more visible groups. These powerful groups are able to shape group identities in alliance with external interests, furthering the accumulation of rangelands and making the plight of the poor invisible (Hodgson 2011).

Early debates about land administrative reform argued from the perspective of the interests of smallholder farmers. Since then the centrality of smallholders to agricultural development initiatives has been questioned. The World Development Report of 2008 (World Bank 2008) depicts an increasingly socially differentiated (‘heterogeneous’) rural structure in which flagging farmers are expected to make way for more entrepreneurial farmers, by exiting agriculture or transforming themselves into hired labour. This makes way for increasing accumulation of community land by prosperous farmers. The World Bank (2009) report Awakening Africa’s Sleeping Giants also posits two potential roads to agricultural development in Africa, one, characterised as the Thailand road, based on smallholder commercialisation, and the other, the Brazilian Cerrado path, associated with the emergence of large-scale agriculture. Contemporary narratives of agricultural development argue that Africa can only meet its food requirements by modernising agriculture to incorporate new seeds and inputs and this can only be achieved by replacing subsistence farmers with commercial farmers and creating opportunities for aspiring commercial farmers to gain access to land. Recent research points to the emergence of a middle stratum of commercial farmers made of retired civil servants and traders who have accumulated capital and wish to invest it in commercial agriculture (Jayne et al. 2016). The ambitions of this group have been made easier to achieve by the commodification of village lands and emergence of land markets.

Community and hierarchy
The narratives of governance reforms represent the emergence of decentralised community land administration as a strengthening of the rights of the majority of small-scale producers. However, customary relations often embody forms of inequality, patriarchy and coercive political relations (Peters 2004). Strengthening these relations or forms of community management may strengthen rural privilege and the ability of the rural nobility to represent their narrow interests as community interests or customary values and dispossess the rural poor of their resources.

This is most obvious in the context of gender relations in land, where women may not hold rights to land in themselves but acquire these through husbands or male relatives. Since women often have limited public representation within customary forums their ability to represent their own interests are limited (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003, Joireman 2007, Hunt 2004, Manji 2001). The expansion of commercial agriculture and commodification of land often erodes women’s access to land, as men expand the areas under which they cultivate commercial crops, or lease out land to other commercial farmers. Without direct claims on land or an ability to represent their own interests, titling of customary lands can undermine the use of land by women. In Tanzania, Tsikata (2003) argues that in
the context of increasing liberalisation and sale of land to private investors, women organised within the Gender Land Task Force to support the creation of a Lands Bill that would support rural women’s interests. However, this failed to reform customary land in favour of women. As a consequence some women supported the liberalisation of land markets, since this would enable them to purchase land (if they had the means) and register it. In South Africa the Rural Women’s Movement has opposed the strengthening of the rights of traditional rulers to administer land, since this undermines women’s rights in land. It has been involved in a legal challenge on the constitutionality of the Communal Rights Land Bill (Rural Women’s Movement of South Africa 2010). In other instances, such as in Ugandan women have been involved in challenging customs, and in portraying customary codes as a distortion by patriarchal male interests that seek to erode women’s access to land. The Land Equity Movement of Uganda (LEMU) seeks to challenge the erosion of women’s rights within the customary system (LEMU n.d.).

Hierarchical principles within customary land systems do not only affect women. Colonial Rule bolstered a patriarchal order of chiefs, elders to maintain control over the population, coerce farmers into cash crop production, and provide forced labour and taxes. Political coercion was used to establish wage labour, migrant labour and cash cropping. For instance, in the Futa Jallon of Guinea the Jallonke were conquered by Fulani in pre-colonial times and turned into a class of servile farmers providing labour services and surplus crops to the landowners. The colonial authority established a close relationship with the Fulani, and enabled them to maintain the servile subjugation of the Jallonke in return for providing forced labour (Boiro 1996, Diop 2007). The deep sense of injustice felt by the Jallonke resulted in them becoming active in the anti-colonial struggle led by the Parti Democratique de Guinea (PDG) (Schmidt 2005). Following independence redistributive land reform was implemented in the Futa Jallon, which granted land to the cultivators and enabled the Jallonke to possess their own land. With the turn to market liberalism and decentralised communitarianism during the 1990s, a pilot RFP project was introduced in the Futa Jallon concerned with mapping community lands. The Fulani overlords took advantage of this to demand restitution of lands seized by the state in the early independence period and they forcefully ejected Jallonke farmers from the lands they claimed, resulting in violent community conflicts (Boiro 1996, Diop 2007). Thus, far from representing an inclusive land institution, customary land tenure in this instance was structured by hierarchical relations rooted in histories of subjugation and notions of historic privilege.

In Ghana the strengthening of traditional authorities in the 1992 Constitution and their control over pilot CLS has emboldened them to extend their interests in land. Chiefs have become involved in the redefinition of customary rights, which is used to appropriate the land of local and migrant cultivators. Boone and Doku (2012: 10-11) cite the case of the Wassa Amenfi Customary Land Secretariat where the chiefs have used the process of registering land to renegotiate tenancies and re-designate migrant farmers that acquired land through outright purchase as ‘tenants’. Boni (2005) describes similar processes in Sefwi, where chiefs are retrospectively converting land purchases by migrant farmers into tenancy agreements. In peri-urban Kumasi Ubink (2008) also reveals that chiefs are appropriating the lands of small-scale cultivators and reallocating them to real estate developers, who are willing to pay large amounts. This involves re-inventing customary laws to enable the appropriation of farmlands in the vicinity of expanding urban housing. In these instances the chiefs appropriate and commodify land, using custom as a veil for appropriating land from the local economy and relocating it within commercial circuits.
Communities and regional economies
The notion of community embodied in governance reforms is of a group representing the unitary interests of a locality in an inclusive fashion. In contrast with this communities are often integrated into regional economies or ‘vernacular markets’ (Chihowu and Woodhouse 2006). This brings different groups into wider alliances of capital accumulation, and conflicting interests into village sites. Villages are often part and parcel of economic frontier activities that incorporate migrant and autochthonous populations, aspiring capitalist farmers and migrant labourers. The expansion of these systems result in increasing land shortage for poor local farmers and youth, which is often exacerbated by economic downturns. This results in increasing immiseration and a sense of loss and betrayal of a birthright that becomes manifest in ethnic conflicts.

In Cote d’Ivoire the cocoa economy of the 1970s and 1980s was built upon a social contract between the state, migrant farmers with capital, migrant labour from Sahelian countries, and land holding communities in the southwest with surplus land but little capital to invest in the development of land (Chauveau 2006). The state negotiated with councils of elders within these communities to release land to migrants in exchange for development initiatives within the area and support for local communities. The state recognised the rights of cultivators to gain rights in the lands that they cultivated, in a bid to attract investment in cocoa and migrant labour into the cocoa economy. The chiefs and elders released land to migrant farmers through the elaboration of a neo-customary institution, the tutorat. This established a relationship between chiefs, elders and migrants based on notions of patronage and annual prestations of gifts. As demand for land grew these prestations increased in value to reflect the scarcity value of land, and were understood by migrants to constitute a form of land sale. The communities in the southwest where re-compensated for their loss of land by the state through the redistribution of state cocoa revenues in development projects and social welfare provisioning. This continued until the economic crisis of the late 1990s, following the collapse of world cocoa prices in 1989, which resulted in large urban unemployment, declining state social provisioning and welfare, and rapidly declining standards of living. In political circles this crisis was blamed upon the influx of migrants and this was taken up by youth in rural localities, who began to attack migrant farmers and eject them from the land (Chauveau 2006, Babo 2013, Kouamé 2010). Attempts to introduce community land management and a new land act played into this xenophobia, with notions of the pre-eminence of customary land rights, the exclusive rights of Ivoirians and of autochthones. Embracing slogans of ‘Ivoirite’ and ‘land for Ivoirians’ many rural youth in the southwest attacked migrant communities. This interethnic violence eventually escalated into a civil war between the north and south of the country.

Similar ethnic tensions have also existed in Eastern Congo. Land tenure was historically based on a system of clientage in which chiefs gained tribute from their subjects to whom they allocated land (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005). From the sixteenth century small numbers of Banyarwanda herders from Rwanda moved into the Kivu area, some of them becoming tributary clients of Hunde chiefs. During the early colonial period a large influx of Banyarwanda labourers moved into the Kivu area. Wealthier Banyarwanda migrants began to purchase land from the Hunde (Mararo 1997). Population densities were high in the Kivu area and there was limited land that could be given out to migrants. Therefore, chiefs found new ways of expropriating land from indigenous farmers, inventing an array of neo-customary conventions regulating land, which enabled them to invoke a ‘right of return’ of land back to the chiefs (Van Acker 2005). These trends intensified during the 1970s when investments in land became a major source of accumulation for aspiring capitalists (Mararo 1997). During the 1970s
traditional authorities actively colluded with the state in the alienation of land to aspiring capitalist farmers (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005, Van Acker 2005). Prunier (2009) writes that by the 1990s land in the Masisi territoire of Kivu became extremely concentrated with 512 families, of which 503 were Banyarwanda, claiming more than half the land. The largest holding was 230,000 hectares, while the average holdings were of less than one hectare, including most of the land occupied by the majority of Banyarwanda people.

This process of land accumulation led to increasing social differentiation and the emergence of a local labouring class with very limited access to land. By the early 1990s these trends resulted in mounting ethnic tensions. Disaffected local farmers began to organise against their chiefs, refusing to recognise them and pay tribute. They also began to form local militias organised against the Banyarwanda, whose numbers rapidly grew with the arrival of new migrants from Rwanda (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005, Huggins 2010, Autesserre 2010). In the North Kivu area, in which the Banyarwanda were most concentrated, they came to constitute about 40 percent of the population by the 1990s (Prunier 2009: 48). Local chiefs attempted to impose new tributary exactions on Banyarwanda landholders, which the Banyarwanda attempted to resist. Faced with increasing difficulty in controlling migrant Banyarwanda and problems of legitimacy with the farming population for alienating large tracts of land, the chiefs then turned on the Banyarwanda as a convenient scapegoat, mobilising ‘those local youngsters that had shown their preparedness to take up their machetes for the defence of their own community’ (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005: 146). This resulted in widespread ethnic violence, in which it has been estimated that between 6,000 - 10,000 people were killed and 350,000 displaced (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005), before escalating into an extremely violent civil war.

In these examples communities become sites of complex processes of capital accumulation and social differentiation, involving alliances between aspiring capitalists, chiefs and local elites and the state, which get played out as interethnic conflicts between migrants and autochthones.

**Conclusion**

The dominant framework for land administration in Africa is built upon discourses about community, in which customary institutions are seen to provide an inclusive framework in which smallholder farmers can be guaranteed access to land and rights in land. However, the rights that have been allocated through institutional reforms are essentially property rights that convert user rights into market commodities. This creates pressures on rural communities to transact these rights with investors, which facilitates a process of capital accumulation and social differentiation. This in effect transforms the village into a site of accumulation, through which its residents are drawn into market economies as labourers and commercial farmers. The harmonisation of customary and statutory tenure facilitates the commodification of land, and its transfer into the hands of those most able to add value to the land. To understand this process, assumptions about community solidarity and customs need to be critically examined against the backdrop of larger regional economies operating within global markets. The dynamics of adaptation of customary land relations reflect complex political and economic processes that are transforming localities. Thus the analysis of land relations and land markets needs to go beyond a framework of the study of the institutions, and the harmonisation of customary and statutory relations. It is important to understand the processes of the commodification of land, the historic role of customary institutions in this process of commodification, and the political ramifications on social relations of production, values, and social identities. This requires policy,
institutions and notions of community and civil society to be subject to critical investigation. This provides an important area of research for an interdisciplinary African studies approach to critically examining the dominant policy narratives on land.

References


Markets, Politics and Land Administrative Reform in Africa: What can African Studies contribute?


Periphery or Battlefront: Africa in the International Economy

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Abstract
The resource-rich African economies experienced rapid growth in the 2000s, largely due to high international resource prices and foreign direct investment inflows. The boom was mainly natural resource-led and short-lived, similar to the experiences of African countries in the past. Furthermore, for most of the countries, the recent boom did not result in significant industrial growth. However, the high resource prices and discovery of new natural resource reserves during the boom in some of the countries opened a way to the international capital market through the issuance of Eurobonds. The history of sovereign defaults suggests that the debt financing of government expenditures, especially private and foreign-owned debt, requires serious care. It must be asked whether this is a delightful acceptance of Africa into the international financial market, or a premature securitisation of African development.

Key Words: Sovereign debt, resource curse, Africa, Eurobond.
1 Introduction
African economies have often been referred to as having been ‘left behind’ by the rapidly changing global economy and its development. However, since the beginning of the 2000s, the economies have finally begun to grow, after decades of stagnation, largely due to high international resource prices and foreign direct investment inflows, with the exception of a few resource-poor countries. The boom had already reached its peak and lost momentum when the Chinese economy began to slow down in 2013. While a close evaluation of achievements through economic changes during the above-mentioned boom time in Africa is required, the high international resource prices and discovery of new natural resource reserves in some African countries have brought a clear change to the macroeconomic management of those countries. For example, those countries have gained new access to the international capital market through the issuance of Eurobonds. While debt issuance in the foreign capital market is not rare for emerging economies, most of it was by the Latin American and other middle-income countries, but not Sub-Saharan Africa. While the introduction of foreign private money into development and macroeconomic management seems to be largely welcomed by the governments of the respective African countries, several points require close consideration.

This paper first briefly reviews the recent economic situation in the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries and changes in the way they finance their economies. It then discusses problems specific to the resource-dependent economies in terms of foreign borrowing. An example of a resource-dependent Eurobond issuer, Ghana, is also briefly discussed. The last section discusses the risks of sovereign default and its influence on development, based on the past experiences of other emerging economies.

2 African economic growth in the 2000s
African economies have grown at a relatively high rate in the 2000s, though the growth rate has been declining since 2013, as shown in Figure 1. This slowdown is largely due to changes in China’s economy. The other oft-cited reason (though closely related to the former) is the stagnation of international resource prices.

The positive economic growth is indeed remarkable for African countries, even though it is slowing down, given the long period of stagnation since the 1980s. However, we have good reason to be cautious after a boom. The last boom for African economies, in the 1960s and 1970s, was also commodity-led. During this time, the countries accumulated international debts, both bilateral and multilateral, resulting in a debt crisis and the introduction of a special initiative to cancel debt.

As many as 34 countries in Africa were eligible as Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCds) by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The HIPCds framework aims to provide eligible countries with relief from the burden of debt payments in an effort to reduce poverty. Most of the African HIPCds had reached the decision and completion points by the 2000s, and their economies started to pick up again. This can be viewed as the result of the debt reduction/cancellation and the success of the framework. However, a much stronger pull factor exists in changes in the trends of the international economy. While some countries made progress in reforming their macroeconomies during the special scheme for HIPCds, most of the countries had begun to accumulate debt again, though gradually, by the end of the process. This suggests that the countries’ basic macroeconomic structures have not changed significantly.

However, reflecting the growth of African countries, and closely connected to the financial situations in advanced economies, there was a clear shift in the attitude of the market toward the SSA economies.
‘Innovative financing mechanisms’

A publication by the WB, titled Innovative Financing Mechanism for Development, edited by Ketkar and Ratha (2009), is a remarkable example of how the international market and the policies of the international development society have changed in the 2000s. Here, the innovative mechanism refers to the introduction of private money to finance the development of emerging, or developing countries, such as through issuances of Eurobonds. Since the publication, some African countries have begun issuing sovereign bonds in the international capital market.

Brady bond

The issuance of sovereign bonds by emerging economies is not new. A market mechanism was previously introduced into the sovereign problems of development financing, especially in emerging economies.

When the accumulated debt problem of Mexico and other countries started to emerge during the international debt crisis in the 1980s, U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady applied a market mechanism to solve the sovereign debt problem, and the bonds issued at that time, in exchange for the non-performing loans held by private banks, were called ‘Brady bonds’. The scheme was praised as a ‘market-based solution’ to sovereign debt problems. The idea of the Brady bond was welcomed by both sides, the creditors and the debtors, because it increased the recovery rate for non-performing loans held by syndicates of international private banks and decreased the repayment burden of debtor countries.

The experience with Brady bonds in the 1990s paved the way for emerging countries to borrow in the international market. For the government of an emerging economy, access to the international capital market means an opportunity to raise money without depending on official development aid or lending from the IMF, free from conditionalities and other limitations.

In this sense, the issuance of a Eurobond is indeed innovative for governments in need of cash, that had limited access to capital. However, it is clear that the true innovativeness of the market-based solution is not for the debtor governments, but for the others. It is innovative for the development society that must watch over the management process of the lent money and often must bear the cost of default. It is even more innovative for international banks, which had bitter experiences with sovereign loans in the 1980s, because they no longer need to deal with sovereign risk by themselves. Their risk-loving customers are now buying the sovereign bonds of emerging countries. The international financial environment, after a long period of low international interest rates and declining yields, also welcomed the entry of high-risk–high-return sovereign bonds issued in the international market.

A sovereign debt problem is a critical issue for the international society, especially when money is raised in the international market, because in the case of default it may trigger an international financial crisis, as was feared in the 1980s and during the recent Greek bond crisis. However, in the well-extended international market of today, the risk of default by a relatively small developing economy is minor. In the case of SSA countries, the average loan size is even smaller than that of other emerging economies, though the amount itself is large in relation to their economic size.

1 It is noteworthy that while the IMF seems to be relatively cautious in introducing private money into African development, the WB is more positive. The difference in their attitudes is revealed in publications such as Mecaguni et al. (2014) and in their behaviours. For example, the WB partially guarantees the bond issuance of Ghana, while the IMF seems to be more cautious.
3 Africa and Eurobonds

The issuance of Eurobonds by SSA countries started to increase in the 2000s. As reviewed above, most of the African HIPCs completed the scheme for debt cancellation in the middle of the 2000s (IMF 2016). At the same time, some economies started to grow, led by high international resource prices and foreign direct investment, mainly into the extractive sectors. As some of the SSA economies entered the category of middle-income countries, money began to flow into the service sector as well (UNCTAD 2014).

According to information published by the international rating companies, one of the earliest entrants into the international capital market, aside from South Africa, was Botswana. West African countries such as Senegal, Benin, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and Mali also started earlier. However, the rush of African governments for a nomination in the ratings started around 2011 (Standard and Poor’s 2017, Moody’s 2017). While having a rating by these companies does not necessarily result in an issuance of Eurobonds, and vice versa, it suggests that many of the SSA governments started to contemplate access to the international market in the 2000s. According to statistics by the Bank for International Settlements, the issuance of bonds began to increase in 2007. Available data show that Coˆte d’Ivore, Gabon, Namibia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and Nigeria started to increase their bond issuances around that time. Figure 2 confirms that issuance speeded up in 2013. As of the end of June 2017, the country with the largest international private debt outstanding was Ghana, closely followed by Coˆte d’Ivore.

Given the entry of many African countries into the international capital market, and the fact that many of them were HIPCs until the middle of the 2000s, it is no wonder that almost half of the rated sovereign bond issuers today are categorised as ‘speculative grade’, with their bonds referred to as ‘junk’ (Moody’s 2017).

According to an IMF report on Eurobonds issued by SSA countries, the debt maturity (tenor) is, on average, 10 years, and the yield (coupon) is, on average, 8.5% (Mecagni et al. 2014:7). The coupon rate appears to be high compared to concessional loans, but as part of the HIPCs framework, new borrowing from other governments or international institutions should have been restricted. For governments that had to resort to borrowing from the domestic market at a very high interest rate, the coupon rate must be attractively low.

4 Natural resource-dependent economies

Economics textbooks suggest that borrowed money must be invested, not consumed, to make a profit for future repayment. However, in the case of the Eurobonds issued by African countries, the distinction between investment and consumption is already vague from the issuance, because it is widely known, and even publicised, that the proceeds from the Eurobonds are used to restructure the remaining debt in some countries.

Indeed, there are a number of reasons to believe that investing is not straightforward for African countries. Many, though not all, Eurobond-eligible countries in the SSA region are natural resource exporters. While an endowment of natural resources is often regarded as a promising sign of high national revenue and growth, the reality is not that simple.

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2 According to Mecagni et al. (2014), most of the Eurobond issuances by African countries occurred well before the completion of debt cancellation, and some countries used Eurobond proceeds to restructure their debt.

3 The outstanding debt of Nigeria is by far the largest if non-government bond issuance in the international capital market is included.
The economic problems of countries dependent on exhaustible natural resources are often called the resource curse (Auty 1990, Gelb et al. 1988, Sachs and Warner 2001). While a wide range of problems, from the Dutch disease to corruption, violence, and domestic conflict, are included in the resource curse, a feature specific to a resource-dependent economy is declining export-oriented industries other than that of natural resources, whether it be manufacturing or agriculture (Corden and Neary 1982, Corden 1984, Karl 1997, Collier and Hoeffler 2000).

**Weak manufacturing**

Regard industrial structures and their shifts within economies from manufacturing to services, Rodrik (2016) argues that manufacturing industries in the world economy today tend to peak at lower GDP levels than already industrialised economies did. He also argues that most SSA countries, except for Mauritius, will see their manufacturing sectors decline, without achieving industrialisation. While this suggestion is striking by itself, it indicates the problem of the economic structure of most African countries. Preserving the colonial-type trade characteristics of commodity exports, with less value added, Africa has been suffering from a weak manufacturing sector, especially for exports.

While it is not easy to identify whether the decline of manufacturing (and agriculture, in the case of Africa) is the cause or the result of natural resource exports, this decline clearly indicates that the governments of resource-dependent countries do not have many options to invest domestically using the money raised through issuing Eurobonds. While most of the governments are aware of the necessity of fostering the manufacturing sector to diversify the economy, the development of an industry obviously takes too long to reap the investment return for short-term debt repayments.

**The deficits**

Another feature of resource-dependent economies is the boom-and-bust cycle of resource revenue, given the short-term cyclical movement of international prices, which often results in a chronic budget deficit. The mechanism behind this is more likely explained by human psychology than by economic theory. When revenue increases, it is easy to increase expenditures, but it is difficult to reduce spending once revenue decreases. Believing that the downturn will not last long, people tend to increase their borrowing. Aside from this problem, most African countries suffer from a weak tax collection system, which leads to a chronic budget deficit to meet the high demand of spending for development projects.

Another issue associated with rapidly growing economies is that imports tend to grow much faster than exports, resulting in a chronic trade balance deficit. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a few countries, such as Zambia, have recently managed to maintain their trade balance, but most of the countries continuously run a trade deficit. Furthermore, the characteristics of the economies as developing countries drives the demand for imports of capital goods, which results in a current account deficit.

The negative international balance of payments, coupled with the government budget deficit, makes the prospect even more difficult. As a result, in many SSA countries Eurobond issuance is enabled, implicitly or explicitly, using future natural resource revenue as collateral.

**5 The case of Ghana**

Long before the colonisation by the West, the economy of the region now known as Ghana depended on gold exports. The economy started to export cacao in the colonial period, which strengthened the dependence of the economic structure on commodity exports. The expectation of off-shore oil was strong under British rule, but subsequent discoveries were not on a commercial scale. The expectation
of oil in Ghana remained strong even after independence, with exploration continuing both on land and off the Tano basin.

In 2007, Kosmos Oil and Tullow Oil announced the long-awaited discovery of off-shore oil. Commercial production started, and oil revenue began to flow at the end of 2011. On the other hand, in 2007, Ghana gained access to the international capital market, despite its recent history as one of the HIPCs and the completion of the debt cancellation process just one year earlier. Ghana issued its first Eurobonds in 2007, mainly to repay domestic debt with its high interest rate.

With the prospect of future oil revenue, the government started to spend more than planned, partly to meet the expectation of the population and partly owing to the ruling party’s hope of pleasing the constituency. The change started with an increase in the salaries of public servants, which resulted in a larger budget deficit and a further increase in short-term borrowing from the domestic market (WB 2015). The increase in domestic debt, however, also seems to be a consequence of the previous international debt and the HIPC initiative process. Figure 3 shows that Ghanaian borrowing from its domestic market started to increase even before the oil discovery.

After three issuances of Eurobonds and further deterioration in the macroeconomy, largely due to lower oil revenue than expected because of the low international energy price, the government approached the IMF to request a rescue in 2015. Ghana received three-year lending under the Extended Credit Facility of the IMF of SDR 664.20 million, or about USD 900 million as of March 2015 (IMF 2015). While receiving IMF support, Ghana issued a fourth Eurobond in 2015, with a partial guarantee by the WB, and a fifth in 2016. Thus, the debt outstanding at the end of June 2017 amounted to USD 6.5 billion. Because the first Eurobond, issued in 2007, already reached redemption in 2017, the repayment seems to have been accomplished using part of the Eurobond issued in 2016.

Repeated discussion and warnings against the issuance of Eurobonds by the domestic and international media and commentators notwithstanding, government expenditure seems to be increasing further. For example, the free senior high school (SHS) was introduced in September 2017, after the installation of the new regime in 2016. The introduction of the free SHS was part of the manifesto of the presidential election in 2016, but the announcement of its introduction was made on short notice, and there seems to be an ongoing dispute over the budget source and its sustainability.

Despite the dependence on commodities, such as gold, cacao, and now crude oil, the macroeconomy of Ghana has been relatively stable, especially when compared with its resource-rich neighbour, Nigeria. This seems to be why Ghana has been successful in its series of Eurobond issuances. However, the case of Ghana still suggests that with a resource boom, even a relatively sound economy can slip away from prudent macroeconomic management. Recently, the cedi has been depreciating against the US dollar in nominal term, and with two-digit rate inflation the weak currency will place a greater burden on future debt repayments.

6 Discussion

Experiences of history

Table 1 shows a (selected) list of past sovereign bond defaults around the world. The table clearly shows that, until recently, most of the sovereign states that defaulted on foreign borrowing were emerging economies, especially in Latin and Central America. Since the recent international financial crisis, Greece and Cyprus have also appeared on the list. However, the most recent entry to the list is Mozambique, which is the first African country to have defaulted on a Eurobond.⁴

⁴ The Republic of Congo was also reported to have missed a scheduled payment, but it subsequently made a full payment (Wigglesworth, Financial Times, 2016).
What can we learn from the experiences of the defaulting economies? Why are there so many repeated defaults, and what kind of impact does a sovereign default have on an economy’s development?

Referring to the current situation, Haque et al. (2017) state that less financially reliable African countries can no longer depend on ‘market discipline’ in the sense that the market no longer censors debtors whose creditworthiness is in doubt. However, the issuance of Eurobonds also lacks an incentive mechanism, which is usually part of market-based contracts.

Absence of an incentive mechanism
The existence of repeated defaults and the long list of defaulting countries suggest that the mechanism of contract enforcement is malfunctioning in the case of international sovereign debt. Discussions of mechanisms of contract enforcement often employ agency theory to explain the relationship between contractors. For example, in the case of a financial contract, a listed company raises money by issuing shares. Here, the shareholders are the principal and the executives of the company are the agent, and their relationship is embedded in an incentive mechanism. To prevent moral hazard of the agent, shareholders have an incentive and a mechanism to monitor the executives through a managerial board. The executives, in turn, have an incentive to manage the business profitably so that their salaries increase. Here, the possible penalties are a reduction of their payment or dismissal, in a serious case. However, such an incentive mechanism is less clear in contracts between foreign creditors and sovereign debtors.

In the case of the Eurobonds issued by SSA countries, the principal (i.e. the international investors) are basically in favour of risk, in the sense that they are investing in a bond categorised as speculative grade. On the other hand, a debtor government should be responsible for growth, for the sake of the principal, but there is ample room for moral hazard.

Borensztein and Panizza (2008) suggest that there are four types of default costs for a bond-issuing government: reputation, possible sanctions in trade relationships, adverse effects on the domestic financial system, and political costs. These costs should prevent moral hazards and defaults. Borensztein and Panizza conclude that the negative effects of these economic costs do not last long, but that the political cost may be relatively large. However, as is often the case with African countries where political systems are not that stable, the regime that issued the sovereign bond is not likely to be in power at the time of redemption. As a result, there are almost no costs associated with sovereign default that are strong enough to enforce a contract.

The incentive mechanism suggested by Bulow and Rogoff (1989), on which the study by Borensztein and Panizza (2008) is based, seems to be more realistic in the current context. They suggest that a contract of sovereign borrowing cannot be enforced in small countries unless the lender acquires the legal right to seize the borrower’s assets abroad, or to sanction (economically) the defaulting country. This idea is close to what happens in reality when Eurobonds are issued, and is called the ‘innovative financial mechanism’. Ketkar and Ratha (2009) describe the system as ‘securitisation of future-flow receivable’, which means the future resource revenue is kept legally outside the borrower’s country using a special purpose vehicle (SPV). Here, the future revenue serves as collateral, or even as direct payment to the investor. This suggests that for resource-rich countries, Eurobonds are no more than a loan of future resource revenue.
Twisted market discipline and mechanism

While there seems to be neither strong enough market discipline nor a well-functioning incentive mechanism to force a debtor government to maintain sound macroeconomic management, the existence of an official guarantee by the WB makes the situation even more complicated. For example, in the case of Ghana, the existence of IMF support reflects a macroeconomic risk in the country, which should negatively affect the coupon rate of debt (Haque et al. 2017). In contrast, the existence of the WB guarantee on the Ghanaian sovereign bond means a substantial increase in the expected value of the repayment to investors, because even when the possibility of default is high, the value at default is strictly non-zero. If the investors are not interested in the macroeconomic stability and growth of the debtor country (which is likely), but only in the expected return, support by international development institutions may be abused in favour of the ‘market’.

The possible logic here is that whatever the market expectation is, it is worth offering a guarantee if doing so leads to a successful Eurobond issuance. However, with the existence of a guarantee, the already weak incentive mechanism for the contracts collapses, because it simply dilutes the sense of obligation of sound management, and the debtor government becomes even more prone to moral hazard.

Sovereign default impacts on growth

However, the weakness of the incentive mechanism does not mean there is no cost of sovereign default for developing, and especially small, economies. The experiences of the Latin American countries tell us that sovereign defaults are often associated with currency crises and domestic financial crises, including domestic banking crises and high inflation, that result in slower growth (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). However, as Trebesch and Zabel (2016) note in their analysis, the causality is not clear. On the other hand, Trebesch and Zabel (2016) and Asonuma et al. (2016) suggest that the severity of the impact of a sovereign default will depend on how the country deals with the default, but missing a scheduled payment may lead to a protracted decline in trade, investment, and growth.

Because most existing studies are based on the data and experiences of emerging economies (including South Africa) and on countries in the EU, these implications may not necessarily apply to the more fragile economies of African countries. However, the fact that most bond-issuers are past HIPCs means there is little reason to be optimistic about the impact of sovereign default.

Regarding the cost of default, a further concern that may threaten debtor countries in Africa is the existence of hedge funds, sometimes called ‘vulture funds’. The basic strategy of these funds is to purchase the ‘destroyed bond’ in the secondary market, and then ‘hold out’ in the debt restructuring negotiation and file a lawsuit against the debtor sovereign states to collect the original amount of the bond. Such behaviour in the international financial market, though clearly not illegal, has detrimental effects on solving the sovereign debt problems of emerging and developing economies, which deters the effort to stabilise the macro economy. The negative effects on the defaulting economy were well publicised in the case of Argentina, which defaulted (again) in 2001. Even though the problems with vulture funds are now on the agenda of the United Nations and the terms of collective action on debt contracts are widely noted, the risk still exists (UN 2016). Moreover, given the still relatively weak legal systems and very limited resources in African countries, the damage and trouble could be even more serious than in Latin American countries.\(^5\)

\(^5\) In fact, a number of SSA countries have already had trouble with vulture funds. For detailed information, see the article on the homepage of the African Development Bank (https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/african-legal-support-facility/vulture-funds-in-the-sovereign-debt-context/ accessed on 18 October 2017).
7 Concluding remarks
The acceptance of African countries into the international capital market is recent. However, this phenomenon can also be viewed as well-known part of the boom-and-bust cycles of resource-dependent economies, though in a new form. Based on the analyses of problems with resource-dependent economies since the 1980s, we now know that the strong cyclicality of an economy only deteriorates its long-term stability.

We must not forget that the recent acceptance of African countries into the international capital market reflects the situation in advanced economies. Low interest rates and low investment yields have led to increased demand for high-return investment targets. African sovereign bonds must be an extreme 'high-yield investment' for most sound investors in the international financial market, because they seem to be interested in low-risk, investment-grade securities. However, the increase in African sovereign bond issuances should remind us that, historically, unsightly greed in the international economy has often been realised at one end of the global economy, whether relatively poor parts of rich economies or in Africa.

While most of the HIPC countries have passed the completion point, we still need to ask whether the debt problems of African countries are truly over, or whether they are simply changing to another form. Given the introduction of market-based systems into the development of SSA, it is not clear who is responsible for the development of these legally weak and still economically fragile countries.

The struggles to tame the global financial mechanism to serve development and inclusive growth was fought mainly by Latin American countries in the 1990s and 2000s. Now, the battlefront is shifting gradually to Africa, and further research is needed regarding whether it is time for African economies to securitise their development, or whether this is still premature.
Figure 1: SSA countries GDP growth (annual rate, excluding high income)

Figure 2: SSA Gov. international debt outstanding (End of the year, billion USD)
Figure 3: Ghana: Stock of domestic debt (total, billion cedi)
Table 1: Past sovereign bond default

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Defaulted debt (Mil. US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>72,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>6,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>4,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>82,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>5,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Dominican Rep</td>
<td>1,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>242</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>296</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>3,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>7,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>261,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>547</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>42,076</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>9,100</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1,311</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>29,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>13,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data source: Moody’s 2017.
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Wigglesworth, R. 2016. ‘Republic of Congo set to cure bond default’. Financial Times. (https://www.ft.com/content/211b49a3-be5b-3759-ad72-f5098e613a1d/ accessed on dd month, yyyy
Session 3
Environment and Climate Change
**Forest and climate change response in Africa**

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**Abstract**

Africa is facing serious constraints exacerbated by climate change. Several components of its development are now constrained by this global environmental problem. More important is the fact that the poorest who are less contributor of climate change are the most vulnerable. Response to this global threat needs to address both the causes of the problem (i.e. mitigation actions) and the consequences (known as adaptation to climate change). The 21st Paris Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC CoP) was an important milestone that lead to the development of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) with commitments to mitigate climate change, but also to address vulnerability related to this climate alteration. These efforts in responding to climate change, particularly his mitigation component, are to be done in the context where the continent wants to improve its development. Despite its weakness, Africa is expected to contribute to the global climate change mitigation efforts, while enhancing its resilience. Forest as others natural resources management which are contributing to the Development of the continent are also to be at the centre of environment solutions such as climate change mitigation. But, several ecosystems of the continent, including forest ones, are subject to climate modification and thus also need to be taking in consideration in responses related to this global menace. In the current paper we review: 1) The vulnerability of Africa to climate change, 2) The climate change mitigation responses and 3) The place of Forest in responding to climate change (both Mitigation and Adaptation) on the continent.

**Key Worlds**

climate change, vulnerability to climate change, climate change mitigation, INDC/NDC, Africa, development of Africa, forest and climate change.
**Introduction**

Of the 3 conventions related to Rio 1992, the one on climate change have been of great attention in the continent during the last decade. The trajectory of the continent has not been put in parallel with climate dynamics as it has been the case, this last decade. The African Union (AU), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank (WB) developed a climate strategy/agenda for the continent. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) had created an African Climate Policy Center (ACPC) to deal with the issues and response to climate change. All the strategies build generally on the chapter developed by Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) focusing on the continent (Niang et al. 2014). The African Progress Panel chaired by Koffi Annan and which included some respected leaders of the continent are regularly calling for actions on climate change.

The continent is known to be among the worse places in the world in terms of poverty and environmental degradation (Sachs and Warmer 1997, Sudo 2014). It is not surprised to see that countries of the continent fail to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (UNECA et al. 2015). The recent growth of the continent had not been sufficient to give opportunities to reduce the vulnerability of Africans. Though Africa is being gradually perceived as a continent that will be driving the world economy in the nearest future. But this potential need to be turned to realities for the benefit of Africa and the world (Sudo 2014, Rodrick 2016, Bhorat and Tarp 2017). Recent finding from McKinsey Research Institute reveals that, to renew his dynamism, governments of the continent need to focus on six priorities: more mobilisation of domestic resources, aggressive diversification of economies, acceleration of infrastructure development, deepening of regional integration, creation of tomorrow talents, and insurance of healthy urbanisation (Bughin et al. 2016). The transformation of this potential will really depend on the socio-economic and ecological context of the continent (Sudo 2014, Brahmabhätt et al. 2016, Bhorat and Tarps 2017). Climate change is among the factors that are affecting and will continue to affect the trajectories of the continent in the nearest future (Davidson et al. 2003, Niang et al. 2014, Sudo 2014). The continent cannot ignore the will of the global community to move to a green growth economy. The 2015 milestone with the SDGs and the Climate change UNFCCC Cop of Paris are important signs towards a sustainable world.

Among the sectors that affect and are also affected by climate change, forest is one of the important one by its coverage and importance in the continent (Lewis et al. 2009, Leal 2009, Thompson et al. 2009, AMCEN 2011, Ciais et al. 2013, Sengul et al. 2007). On the continent, other sectors (mainly agriculture and energy) are associated to forest to sustain the livelihoods of smallholders in rural and urban areas (AMCEN 2011, CIFOR 2005). Land use management particularly forest landscape management can thus be seen as an opportunity to mitigate climate change (Sengul et al. 2007, Gizachew et al. 2017). On the other hand, such landscapes that support livelihoods are under the influence of changing climate and thus need to be subject to adaptation to climate change (Nabuurs 2007). Mitigate and adapt to climate change can thus be done through the management of land cover/use, including forest landscape management (Bele et al. 2015).

The year 2015, have been an important milestone for the environment and development agenda worldwide including Africa. Beside the SDGs, the Paris Agreement perceives a new direction with climate change response. After the recent discourse of world leaders at the global level, climate change has taken a new landmark on the diplomatic agenda and outputs of the Paris agreement and related elements now need to be translated into concrete actions at the national level. Prior to the Paris agreement, the intended nationally determined contributions (INDC) development was an occasion for African countries to show their commitments (Mbeva et al. 2015, GIZ 2016). International effort was
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also brought in to strengthen the national capacity (see Tiani et al. 2015 for some details/issues on the mastering of climate change responses) of countries in line with this process. The Paris agreement that resulted from these efforts generated a new framework that will structure the way countries respond to climate change. The previous technical dynamics around adaptation and mitigation will remain but will probably need to be more rooted in the commitments of sectorial policies at the national level.

The continent through the African Union, has been trying to speak with one voice (Ramsamy et al. 2014), making appearances with what is known as the African pavilion managed by AfDB, UNECA and AU. Nevertheless, the realities in the continent is diverse. Not all the regions are affected in the same way and responses are also diverse (Davidson et al. 2003, AMCEN 2011). The objective of the current paper is to review the forest and climate responses in Africa in the era of INDC/NDC. This will be done by sharing rapid information on the following: 1) Vulnerability of Africa to climate change, 2) Mitigation responses of the continent, 3) The place of forest in responding to climate change. Information presented here are based on the review of existing literature and expert view of the author base on his experience as a researcher and many years of participation in stakeholder/expert deliberations on climate change in Africa and beyond.

Vulnerability of Africa to climate change

The vulnerability of the Africa is as a result of its exposure and sensitivity to climate change and the nature of the activities taking place in the continent.

The 5th Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report reveals that the continent has shown some increase trends of warming over the last 50 to 100 years (Niang et al. 2014). This tendency will increase by at least 2 degrees by the end of the century. This will be faster than other parts of the world, particularly on the arid lands. The precipitation is reducing and will continue by the end of the 21st century particularly in the Northern and southern parts of South Africa, while rainfall is increasing in some complex topographies, such as the Ethiopian Highlands.

The consequences of temperature and precipitation change is negative on African ecosystems, on water availability leading to the modification of Agriculture, health and other livelihoods sectors (Davidson et al. 2003, Knox et al. 2012, Bele et al. 2013, Ciais 2013, Niang et al. 2014). On the continent, agriculture depends mainly on rainfall, with very limited development of irrigation systems (Davidson et al. 2003, Sonwa et al. 2016b). This dependence on rainfall thus make the agricultural system more sensitive to the climate variability (Muller et al. 2011, Knox et al. 2012). Beside crop production, several agricultural health problems are exacerbated by climate modification (Morton 2007). On the continent, it is common to see health issues associated with seasons. Such seasonality of the health problems is related to the seasonality of parasites and/or vectors. With the high concentration of population in African cities, coupled with poor drainage infrastructure, flooding is so common putting the lives of many citizens to danger (Niang et al. 2014). Several parts of the continent are subjected to floods, with negative impacts on farmer’s livelihoods. Drinkable water is another sector of the continent that is suffering from climate change/variabilities. The limited access to water is exacerbated by the long and intense drying period. Such drought thus leads to the lack of drinking water but also the increase of some illness problem and reduction of crop productivity (Niang et al. 2014). There are thus some linkages between sectors when it comes to climate change vulnerability (Mbeva et al. 2015). The continent is known to be the most affected by climate change because of some previous constrains related to its poverty (Davidson et al. 2003, APP 2014). In brief, the vulnerability of African countries to climate change is partly associated with their poor/insufficient
institutional and technical capacities, poverty and lack of appropriate technologies to face climate change. Among the capacities, one of the main constraints is the lack of climate and hydrological observatory systems.

Several adaptation measures have been put forward on the continent following the UNFCCC initiatives such as the Nairobi Adaptation framework, National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA), National Adaptation Plan (NAP) processes etc. (Sonwa et al. 2009, 2011, 2016b, Mbeva et al. 2015). Adaptation is perceived as a priority for Africa (Davidson et al. 2003, AMCEN 2011, APP 2014). The INDCs of African countries reveals that land use management, agriculture and health are among some of the key importance preoccupations for adaptation. Responding to vulnerability requires a proper examination of climate risks on climate sensitive sectors on the continent. NAPA processes were very good opportunities to address rapid adaptation measures. With this process, many Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa proposed and prioritised adaptation activities that were supported by the NAPA funds (Daze et al. 2016). Several sectors were covered by these set of activities. The NAP process is to identify medium and long-term adaptation needs (Daze et al. 2016). Contrary to the NAPA that were for the short-term response, NAP documents are supposed to be more holistic in responding to climate change for countries. Beside NAPA and NAP processes, other frameworks and mechanisms were put in place to help African countries to adapt to climate change (Sonwa et al. 2016b). The Japanese support through United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) falls within this category, in terms of building an enabling environment towards NAP development. Beside institutions within countries, adaptation investment can thus be summarised to the following: finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building.

Climate change Mitigation response in Africa.
Climate change mitigation response over the continent have gradually been build up around the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries (REDD+) initiatives (Walker et al. 2008, Gizachew et al. 2017, Tsayem et al. 2015). The slowness of the mitigation response of the continent was, partially, due to the insignificant contribution to global emission of Green House Gases (GHG). The developed world with their industrialisation trajectories contributes immensely to GHG emissions. On the continent, few countries are considered among the world top polluters or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies. Some stakeholders think that, since these trajectories taken by the developed countries lead to their development and to the current situation of climate change, the countries of the continent do not need to be prevented to their development by putting response to climate change as priority (Davidson et al. 2003). Based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, the role of Africa is recognised to be very minor. The polluter pays principle is also highlighted within the UNFCCC arena and Africa is supposed to be part of the world receiving support for climate change mitigation (AMCEN 2011, Baimwera et al. 2017). Initiatives falling within this principle of polluter pays were conveyed through CDM and REDD+ processes. Nevertheless, countries still need to have their NAMAs that contain country’s effort to mitigate climate change. Some scholars think that it will be strategic to the continent to link his climate response to development. Davidson et al. (2003) proposed the ‘Development First’ approach.

Previous initiatives (CDM, REDD, NAMA, etc.) were recently repackage in the INDC and NDC
processes. The participation of the continent in the GHG market have been very low: in 2016, only 261 projects representing 3.0% of the 8,814 CDM global projects; 1% of voluntary global market (Brainmwera et al. 2017). The recent years have seen increase in the trends: 54% of the 45.1 Mt CO2 trade by the continent by 2015 were done in the last 3 years (Brainmwera et al. 2017). Since the continent is not among the big greenhouse gas emitters, the main challenge is how to continue with development taking a pathway that have less negative impacts on the environment. This will include technological transfer and paradigm shift to more clean development initiatives. The continent then sees mitigation as an opportunity to green growth (AMCEN 2011, APP 2014). Transition to this green growth beyond ‘Foreign Knowledge’ concerns some environmental policies such as: 1) Broad cross-cutting that strengthens market incentives to preserve natural capital; 2) Expansion of green infrastructure and improvements in infrastructure efficiency; 3) Modernisation of Agriculture, and adoption of climate smart agriculture, and investment in key public goods; 4) and adoption of green urban policies (Brahmbhatt et al. 2017). These issues thus need to be taken into consideration within the thematic pillars of the African Union strategy; a) Improving climate change governance, b) Mainstream and integrate climate change Imperative into national and regional policy, planning and development processes; c) Enhance research, awareness and education on climate change; d) Promote national, regional and international cooperation.

Forest in climate change responses on the continent.
Forest play an important role in the socio-economic and ecological dynamics of the continent (Pesche et al. 2016). Since the colonial time, African forest were subject of exploitation mainly for medicinal plants and later for its timber (Nasi et al. 2006). After independence, African forest was subjected to several interests because of the role of timber in the macro-economy of the countries (APP 2014). With the intensive exploitation of timber and activities that were threatening the forest, conservation issues mainly for biodiversity emerged as one of the key considerations (Norris et al. 2010). During all this period, forest had been contributing to African livelihoods and played a key role in stabilising the climate. This last function has been gradually recognised. Beside this service, Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) were also an important component of the forest that got recognition around three decades ago.

One of the main role of forest in responding to climate change have been underscored in the CDM context. In the forest sector, the CDM was an opportunity to allow developing countries such as the one on the continent to grow forest plantations through afforestation and/or reforestation initiatives and claim for support. Since Bali 2007, REDD+ had been promoted as an effort to avoid deforestation, forest degradation and/or enhance carbon stocks to be part of a compensation process (Sonwa et al. 2011, 2016a). Such dynamic was captured in the NAMA process putting forest close to other processes of climate change mitigation. But as it can be seen during/after the INDC/NDC process, Forest still holds an important role in mitigation response on the continent (Kim et al. 2016). During the period 1990 to 2009, net emission from land use land cover change average 320 ± 50 TgCy-1 in sub-Saharan Africa (Valentini et al. 2014). Certain parts of the continent as the Congo Basin are contributing to carbon sinks (Fisher et al. 2013, Valentini et al. 2014). REDD+ has taken an important development on the continent moving from countries dominated by humid forest to semi-arid ones, or moving from countries with high forest cover to the ones with less forest cover, etc. REDD+ is happening thanks to initiatives/structures such as Global Environment Facility (GEF), Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI), Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (CFPF), etc. including support by institutions such as
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JICA. Initially focusing on forest, support is moving beyond the forest sector since the threat to forest resources are coming outside the forest (Tchatchou et al. 2015, Ordway et al. 2017). Recent studies have highlighted the importance of forest in meeting the target of the Paris (Mile et al. 2015, Federici et al. 2017). At the local level where REDD+ will be implemented some previous efforts such as Biodiversity conservation activities can help to achieve the objective of reducing deforestation. In the Masito Ugalla Ecosystem REDD+ initiative (Tanzania), activities include for example Forest patrols, beekeeping as alternative income sources, and Enhancement of capacity and governance mechanisms for local communities and government institutions to administer and benefit from REDD+ (Kweka, 2014). Some of the constraints encountered by this project included: Lack of sufficient technical skills and financial resources, Difficulty in transferring tenure rights, and Risk of increase conflict over land and resources with unintended consequences (Kweka, 2014).

Forest is threatened not only by logging, agriculture, mining, but also by climate change (AMCEN 2011, Megevang et al. 2012, APP 2014). Forest and his vegetal and animal components are exposed to climate change and variability in the continent (Lewis et al. 2009). Plant and animals of the forest may face some stress related to the modification of their habitat. This will lead to the re-composition of flora and fauna in the continent (Leal 2009). Some threatened species will face more stress related to climate change. Forest management can also play an important role to resist the effects of climate change (Hannah et al. 2008). While mangrove forest is known to be able to protect coastal ecosystems, forest can provide other adaptation measures. Protected areas are known to be good adaptation measures since they can provide space to allow plant and animal migration to a suitable area during climate change (Hannah et al. 2002). Outside protected areas, tree planting have been an opportunity to have more shelter in dry areas, providing food during drought periods where crops are suffering from stress, and have been able to prevent erosion and protect against strong wind, etc. In the Congo Basin for example, participatory assessment of communities reveals vulnerabilities of farming systems (mainly crops and livestock) while forest activities were less sensitive to climate change, suggesting that they may be used for climate change adaptation (Bele et al. 2015). Diversification of activities and strengthening of local institutions also appeared as ways to reduce vulnerabilities of farmers in forest landscapes (Sonwa et al. 2009, 2011, Brown et al. 2010, Brown and Sonwa 2017).

While growing forest for adaptation purposes, plants capture and store carbon and by so doing contribute to both mitigation and adaptation to climate change (Guariguata et al. 2008). Such double functions of forest is now used to put emphasis on the synergy role than can be played by the forest. With such double functions, the planting of trees and/or forest management provide some good opportunities to synergise adaptation and mitigation goals and additionally contribute to biodiversity conservation and livelihood satisfaction (Bele et al. 2015). Forest response to climate change is now implemented in Africa thanks to several organisations (Brown et al. 2010). On agricultural land for example, Agroforestry practices can thus be useful in synergising climate change responses (Adaptation and Mitigation) with other rural development purpose (Gockowski and Sonwa 2011).

Using forest to respond to climate change imply bringing research consideration and climate change research agenda together in the perspectives of responding to population needs in a changing climate. The last IPCC report mentioned some research gaps that are important (Niang et al. 2014). On Adaptation the following can be mentioned: Climate Science (observation, modelling, seasonal to sub-seasonal forecasting; Impact on hydrology, food security, health infrastructure, etc.); Ecosystems (long term monitoring for long term change; modelling); Food Systems (Vulnerabilities, long term suitable map, etc.); Water (observation, linkage between climate and non-climate factors); Adaptation (impact,
mainstreaming to development, coordination); Forest (Vulnerability and mainstreaming in Adaptation responses). On Mitigation the following gaps need proper attention: Understand the barriers of access to climate finance; Map the context that can lead to better internal cooperation between green economy sectors; Mapping the skills needed to mainstream REDD+ at the national level and render it concrete at the jurisdictional level; Modelling different scenarios for green growth; Understand the dynamics around cooperation between the multitudes of stakeholders; Lessons learn on the early CDM, REDD+ and green growth activities. Specifically, for university institutions, the recent advices from University presidents in line with sustainability can be a good way forward. They clearly mention that for the Global Sustainability and the Responsibilities of Universities, research universities have the following urgent and specific responsibilities: 1) transform education (— and not just post-secondary, but the full spectrum of formal and informal education — to educate, engage, empower and energise the next generation of problem-solvers); 2) drive a robust international and collaborative research agenda designed to identify, invent, test and deploy solutions designed to address the formidable challenges of global sustainability; 3) insist on building both disciplinary in depth and trans-disciplinary breadth of research and education, connecting science, engineering, technology, mathematics, social sciences, arts and humanities disciplines in service to society; 4) assess the need for societal action, to transmit authoritative information to stakeholders and then take ownership of the process of transition of knowledge to application, working in new partnerships (Weber and Duderstadt 2012). In the context characterised by the need of research to have more consideration on impact of their work, the theory of change may be an appropriate tool in shaping forest considerations in the climate change response agenda (Thornton et al. 2017). This imply multidisciplinary approach that take into consideration, governance and institutional mapping at different scales (Internationally, nationally and locally), livelihood in forest landscapes and its linkages to climate change impacts and climate change response (both Mitigation and Adaptation), Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV), related to Adaptation (Exposure to climate change, finance and technical responses) and Mitigation (GHG emission and all related activities such as technical and financial transfer, as well as institutional reforms). In searching of appropriate solutions, the synthesis science approach may also be useful in complementing classical research activities (Rodrigo et al. 2013).

**Conclusion**

The African continent is not a big greenhouse gas emitter, but is more vulnerable to climate change. Despite this low responsibility in climate change, the continent is gradually putting in place some responses to mitigate climate change. Being the most vulnerable, least developed countries of the continent have developed short term responses to face climate change. The mid and long-term strategies of adaptation have been developed in the continent and need some support for implementation. Forest play an important role in both adaptation and mitigation. Forest resources and trees have important synergy roles for both mitigation and adaptation. They thus offer a good opportunity to tackle climate change in a sustainable manner. With the role of forest in climate response, the new research frontiers are on multidisciplinary approach that take into consideration the forest (its components and stakeholders) with emphasis on its climate services that are not differentiated from other forest functions.
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Forest and climate change response in Africa
Sustaining forest livelihoods in an era of climate change: 
Dialogue beyond ‘participation’ and ‘community’ arguments

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Abstract
As climate change risks enlarge, the environment is an ever more important framework to consider when discussing global sustainability. In Africa, following the leadership of national and trans-national economic communities, considerable effort is being made to establish regulations and legal frameworks on environmental resource use, based on international conventions and laws. Such initiatives are often undertaken within a top-down initiative of ‘participatory’ and ‘community-based’ approaches, despite these concepts originally suggesting bottom-up tactics. However, such idealistic approaches have been translated and introduced to regional and local contexts without sufficient consideration for the unique local and social conditions. This then tends to be received in the local context as enforcement, or an obligation, which may be cause for local conflicts. It is therefore critical that gaps between global environmental policy initiatives and their actualised efforts on the ground are identified.

Taking examples from the tropical forest zone of southeastern Cameroon, I will report on how environmental and rural development policies are impacting rural livelihoods, the social welfare of the local residents, and the forest landscape. I will then attempt to demonstrate micro-level governance challenges from perspectives identified within the local society. Finally, while acknowledging the limitations as an outsider, I will discuss what kind of research and practice can contribute to the positive co-governance of natural resources between diverse actors, referring to the potential creation of a citizen science platform in Africa.

Key Words: environment policy
1. Introduction

1-1. Climate change risks and livelihood sustainability: Global discourse

The African tropical forest draws worldwide attention because it is believed to contribute to global environment stability by stocking Green House Gases (GHGs) as a huge stock of carbon. From such a viewpoint, conservation of various types of African tropical forests is regarded as an urgent priority, considering that the globe is already exceeding planetary boundaries for sustaining the ecosystem as a whole. The loss of tropical forests challenges the planet’s thresholds, especially seen in the decrease of biodiversity and climate change. Most tropical forests remain in Western and Central Africa. The Congo Basin especially harbours 170 million hectares of tropical forest, which contains the second largest tropical forest in the world after Amazonia. Logging, mining, and biodiversity loss are the core environmental threats against the Congo Basin forest ecosystems.

Global environmental issues have political as well as ecological facets. The aforementioned three threats are all related to each other politically and economically: they are deeply linked to national economic policy and global politics of development (Kitanishi 2010). For example, structural adjustment enforced by the World Bank brought an increase of timber exportation in Cameroon (Burnham 2000). Logging increases wildlife and biodiversity loss by enhancing local demands and by opening access between forest and urban areas (Auzel and Wilkie 2000).

Most of the forested zones in Congo Basin countries are less developed in state services. Logging and mining industries provide employment, essential infrastructures, and access to the global market in rural areas in forested zones (Figure 1). This condition makes the majority of local people accept and even feel favourable towards these operations. The dilemma between conservation and rural development represents a contradiction of the idea of ‘sustainable development’. Thus, what is challenging in Africa is that the demands of both forest conservation and rural development should be satisfied under politically and economically vulnerable conditions.

REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), which emerged as an international formal framework at COP13 in 2008, adds economic incentives for developing countries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The idea of REDD came from the concept of Payment for Environmental Services (PES). In addition to REDD, REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries) also includes the acts of forest conservation, sustainable forest management, and increasing forest carbon biomass. The international conservation discourse moved from project-based conservation approaches in the framework of Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) to REDD and REDD+ (Blom et al., 2010). The global REDD framework will also incorporate tropical forest conservation and management into the next global change agreement (Angelsen 2008). Whereas its political and economic influence in forest sectors is large, the REDD concept is still not familiar to most African citizens. Even among the elites who attend at meetings for REDD+ implementation, the meanings of basic terms are not well understood. Stakeholders including the media, researchers, bureaucrats and administrators, international organisation officers, and civil people did not hold enough basic conceptual understanding related to climate change (Tiani, Bele, and Sonwa 2014).

1-2. Paradox of ‘Participation’ and ‘community’ in environmental policies

Preceding REDD and REDD+, plenty of participatory approach-based projects on local communities have been initiated in African countries under the various synonyms of Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), such as community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and community-based wildlife management (CWM), in the last two decades. Since the late 1980s diverse environmental policies have been introduced and promoted under the initiative of a participatory and community-based approach. This has reflected the turn in development theory from a ‘top-down’ to a ‘bottom-up’ approach. These bottom-up approaches were, however, implemented in a top-down way.

From a policy makers’ perspective, some of these policies succeeded, but many failed in various ways. REDD+ can also fall into the same ‘pitfalls’ of past environmental policy enforcements at local levels, so REDD+ policy makers need to learn from existing experiences (Blom et al. 2010). Community-based participation of local people contains paradoxes. Discussing community participation, Robert Chambers (1983) put importance on ‘participation as end’ rather than ‘participation as means’: the former aims to achieve autonomy and empowerment of the community itself through development, whereas the latter aims to achieve particular developmental goals using community participation. However, the reality falls short of the desire ‘participation as end’. In Tanzania, for example, most participatory wildlife conservation approaches have failed to realise full participation because they had prioritised the latter (Iwai 2016).

Since its beginning, ‘participation’ and ‘community’ have been almost fake in Cameroon, as British anthropologist Barrie Sharpe criticised community forest implementation in southwestern Cameroon during its very early stages. Sharpe showed that the concepts of ‘participation’ of local people are not realised, and their ‘community’ is illusion at a local level (Sharpe 1998). Following Sharpe, more than a few number of authors, including Burnham and Hattori, pointed out problems related to community-based approaches to forest societies.

- Definition of ‘community’ itself has caused the problem. Mobile and dynamic characteristics of African rural societies are not necessarily compatible with the static image of community (Sharpe 1998).
- Inequality in decision-making processes. The culturally and politically heterogenetic composition of the community often results in the exclusion of minorities from decision-making processes.
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Silent stakeholders remain out of discussion and information sharing (Burnham 2000).

- Benefit sharing provokes conflict and discrimination. Benefits from concessions of logging companies, sports hunting agencies, etc. are controlled by local authorities or local dominant people and are unfairly distributed (Hattori 2005, 2014).

1-3. Aim of the presentation
Summarising these reports, the so-called participatory approach barely facilitated dialogue between different actors, both at the ‘community’ and at the sub-national level. Rather, these initiatives brought local conflicts. Thus this paper aims to explore (1) how we can leap beyond these paradoxes between knowledge (concept) production and practice, and (2) how we can contribute to sustaining local livelihoods through what kind of participation we engage in from an African area studies perspective.

2. Research area
2-1. Cultural diversity in Cameroonian forest scape
Cameroon accommodates more than 250 linguistic groups in different ecological landscapes, including the savannah and tropical forests. The southeastern part of the country is covered with dense tropical forest vegetation, which constitutes a part of the northwestern ridge of the Congo Basin. The African tropical forest has been an internal frontier in the continent since the Bantu expansion started some thousands of years ago.

In the Congo Basin forest, there inhabit a dozen groups of hunter-gatherers who are first inhabitants. From the past to present, the tropical forest provides refuge for various peoples in times of warfare and violence. Diverse peoples come into the forest and encounter the others. Anthropologists have demonstrated that it has also been a sociocultural interface that allows different peoples of various origins to coexist for long periods of time. As such an inner frontier (Kopytoff 1989), the tropical forest plays a role as one of the social places that contribute to the coexistence of local people who have different identities and values. Recent studies in historical ecological approaches are revealing such heterogeneity in local societies has also shaped forest landscape for centuries by ecological modification of forest vegetation through slash-and-burning, hunting and gathering, and settlement itself.

2-2. Local settings: Multi-ethnic frontier in Cameroon-Congo border forest
My research site is a typical example of a multi-ethnic community in the Cameroonian lowland rainforest, which is located on the international border between Cameroon and the Republic of the Congo, and 650km away from Yaoundé, the capital of Cameroon. The variety of people can be classified into three categories according to their lifestyle and ethnic identities: the Baka are hunter-gatherers; the Bakwele (who speak a Bantu language) are farmers; and the Hausa, Bamileke, and Bamoun are merchants. Their populations number around 300, 250, and 50, respectively, for a total population of around 600 (Oishi 2012, Figure 2). The migrant merchants came from the northern parts of Cameroon and various West African countries of the Sahel area. In addition to the Hausa, non-Muslim cocoa traders and merchants, including the Bamileke and Bamoun peoples from the western parts of Cameroon, are increasingly common as cocoa cultivation and markets have begun expanding in the region (Oishi 2016).
3. Case Study: Trajectory of Forest Policy, its impacts on local society, and local responses

3-1. Large-scale enclosure of forest world from the upper governance

The forest world and the people there have been confronting new political pressure during the last two decades, which has been brought into local society in a top-down way. These include, for example, forest zoning which is impacting local livelihoods, especially for hunter-gatherers who are more dependent on forest products. The process can be seen as an enclosure of the forest from the government wherein the modern twin of commercial timber exploitation and nature conservation are co-working. Hereafter in the documentation of forest policy consequences, stakeholders include local communities constituted by local Bantu and Pygmies, international conservation NGOs such as World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF: Nature Conservation NGO), NGOs for human rights and indigenous movements, commercial logging companies, and Le Ministère des Forêts et de la Faune (Cameroon government).

3-2. Forest zonation and customary use

Forest zonation was the first official output of forest policy implementation in Cameroon. Forests are divided into permanent commercial logging zones and non-permanent logging zones. Most parts of the forest are reserved for commercial logging. Local people are excluded in the process of forest zonation, which is similar to the concessionary exploitation of resources in the colonial period (Lewis 2005). Following forest zonation, the Cameroonian government and the WWF launched the Jengi project in southeastern Cameroon to achieve their conservation and development goals, and utilised a participatory approach, specifically focusing on the Baka Pygmies as they are the first known inhabitants of the area (Hattori 2014).

Participatory mapping by Cameroonian anthropologist Olivier Njounan Tegomo demonstrates how the Baka hunter-gatherers continue to use the forest, regardless of these boundaries in the forest (Figure 3). Community forest implementation has been attempted in the aftermath of zonation policy with support from the WWF. However, very few villages could succeed in maintaining it. Forest parcels just closed to the ‘community’ had been temporarily registered as community forest, but the government demanded tax payment to fulfil the right to have it maintained. After the Rehman shock,
WWF decreased activities in southeast Cameroon (Sayer et al. 2012), and the project was left in the hands of local people. In the research area, several family members of the village chief stole the benefits from timber sales, and the community forest was closed.

Figure 3: Forest zonation and hunter-gatherer forest use in southeastern Cameroon (Source: Njounan Tegomo et al. 2012).

The Cameroon Forest Law of 1994 also established regulations on local people’s use of the forest, including hunting and fishing activities. Control over game animals is decided according to their placement within grouped categories of endangered species created by the Cameroon Forest Law of 1994: A (integritily protected), B (partially protected), and C (the other species). Implementation of these regulations had been very ‘flexible’ at the ground level. The situation changed, however, in the late 2000s, when the conservation policy shifted from ‘participatory’ oriented to ‘enforcement’ oriented. This change included a militarisation of conservation activities, using army forces such as the Rapid Intervention Battalions to support anti-poaching patrols (Oishi et al., 2015; Kamgaing et al., 2016). According to government officials, this was done to stop illegal activities like ‘poaching’ and the distribution of illegal firearms, such as the AK47. The underlying problem motivating this policy change was the increase of elephant poaching with military arms in national parks. Armed operations have occurred at least three times near our research sites between 2009 and 2012. Starting in 2013 and persisting into the present day, local people continue to protest this policy shift at WWF local headquarters.

3-3. Emerging land issues: small-scale enclosurement of the forest world on the ground
I described how the impact of forest conservation functions from above. Now I want to introduce local responses at the ground level, taking an example from cocoa-based small-scale agriculture, which is the most important source of cash income for local peoples in the research area. Cocoa farms are, as a food producing agroforest with food crops, also used as food production by local residents. The cocoa agroforestry system draws attention not only because it shows significant resilience against both climate instabilities and international market fluctuations but also because of its ability to contribute to the decrease in GHG emissions. The following data show, however, that it can also bring socioeconomic inequity at the ground level.

Figure 4 shows the historical trajectory of cocoa farming. Cocoa farming started in Cameroon during the colonial time, but burst after the penetration of the logging operation in the late 1980s.
Figure 4: Chronology of major socioeconomic events related to cocoa farming.

Figure 5 shows how cocoa cultivation expanded from the 1960s to the 2010s, based on field surveys. We can see how the political and economic events in the larger world, such as liberalisation of national cocoa markets, civil war in the Ivory Coast in the early 2000s, as well as logging operation, relate to and affect cocoa farming in a remote village.

Cocoa farming in the forest is hard work, including the labour in the long-running rainy season (saison in French) for harvest. People expect that their harvest will bring a lot of cash, but in reality it results in an increase in debt among the poor. Commoditisation brought accumulation of cash debts among hunter-gatherer households (Oishi, 2016).

To solve the debt problem, lands became subject to negotiation. Land sales are prohibited in Cameroon; therefore, people practise land rents, and land rents transform into land transfers as they continue for years. Table 1 shows the combination and direction of land rental contracts, which is literally one-way traffic from the Baka to the Bakwele, and from the Bakwele to the Merchants. Although Baka acknowledges borrowers because they can get cash immediately, these contracts are very unequal between the lender and the borrower (Oishi 2016).
As a consequence of land transfer, now land is accumulated by a small number of migrant merchants (Figure 6). This characteristic of land occupation in cocoa farming is now causing small-scale land grabbing by immigrants from local hunter-gatherer and farmers, causing new sorts of conflicts between local peoples.

If perennial tree crop plantations continue, crop fields would not return to forests, unlike the traditionally practised slash-and-burn fields of food crops. The lands no longer rotate from crop fields to forests, and vice versa. This brings fundamental change in the recognition of land use and ‘rights’ to the land.

Differences in the causes and patterns of land disputes demonstrate that hunter-gatherers, farmers, and migrants perceive land resources differently based on their own sociocultural backgrounds. The legitimacy of their informal ‘rights’ to land is often controversial because of the multiple contexts in which rights are claimed. There are the contexts of customary rights to the use of lands, local rules authorised by local authorities, and the state statutory law on the rights to land ownership. Since a cocoa plantation requires semi-permanent occupation of the land, a customary system that defends temporary rights does not catch up to it.

Local agents of the state and village authorities generally accept the rental and sale contracts of land which is prohibited by the state, particularly because they can expect some benefit from
approving the contracts. Under these conditions, migrants gain accumulation of cocoa farms. Whereas these processes can be simply interpreted as a marginalisation of ‘indigenous’ peoples, transmission of cultural traditions were also observed among stakeholders in the process of land negotiation.

3-4. Summary of case study
I summarise my observation: New sorts of land issues emerged in a village between local people of different sociocultural backgrounds. From perspectives of local hunter-gatherers, this is a kind of small-scale enclosurement of the forest space. Together with top-down forest zonation, the rights and livelihoods of local people have been damaged. As room for local people’s forest use is increasingly narrowed by forest zoning policy, in combination with commercial logging and nature conservation, this kind of local land conflict imposes a risk of worsening in the near future.

Ingram, Ros-Tonen, and Dietz demonstrated how Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) producers and traders created a bricolage within different governance arrangements of statutory, marked-based, customary, and project-based mixture of institutions and corruption. This model well explains the realities of wicked situations of forest governance related to cocoa and coffee farm managements, and how local actors try to adapt in responding to it (Ingram et al. 2015).

4. Reflections
Researchers play multiple roles in the past and current construction of global environmental discourse, though there are a variety of positions researchers can occupy in the governance hierarchies. It is noteworthy that James Fairhead and Melissa Leach described a ‘conglomerit’ of researchers, international agencies, and NGOs (for example, the ‘Tropical Forest International’) that interplay to create order in conservation policies, which can bring considerable impact to local people’s livelihoods (Fairhead and Leach 2003).

According to Tetsu Sato, who is a Japanese environmental sociologist as well as an ecologist, there are weakness in, and losses in translation between, different scales of governance: local, national, and global. This prevents equitable participation of stakeholders and tends to sacrifice knowledge users at the bottom (Figure 7). Sato discusses that ‘vertical translators’ are needed to improve the communication gap, which can bridge the fissure between global conceptualisation and regional and local contexts (Sato 2016).

![Hierarchical structure of environmental knowledge circulation](image)

Figure 7: Triangle of environmental knowledge production and circulation (Modified from Sato 2016).
Citizen science can be a breakthrough in mediating different stakeholders to achieve win-win practices of forest use and conservation. Citizen science is ‘a situated, bottom-up practice that takes into account local needs, practices and culture and works with broad networks of people to design and build new devices and knowledge creation processes that can transform the world’ (Extreme Citizen Science of UCL). For example, participatory mapping of the forest with local peoples using GPS units and its application in improving forest management may be a good example of the potential of citizen science (Lewis 2012).

The question of ‘how I can participate’ (Chambers 1997, Iwai 2016) should be addressed by every researcher and scholar who wants to contribute to bringing about more equitable African environment policies and close to gap in ground-level realities.

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